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‘What is the use of being a good man—I do not mean what is the use to others, but to oneself? Would not the ideal state, from one’s own point of view, be to have the power to injure others for one’s own benefit to any extent at all, without being injured in turn oneself? Suppose, like the man in the fairy story, I were able to make myself invisible at will. If I had this power, and abstained, out of conscientious scruples, from all the indulgence in robbery and seduction for which my talent gave me the opportunity, would I not be mad? All our moral education seems to be based on the principle that the consequences to an agent of his being morally bad are unfortunate to himself; but few seem to assure us that to be bad is in itself to be unfortunate—and when they do so, their assurances carry little conviction. And if it is only a matter of consequences, the ideal aim in life, for a man of enlightened self-interest, would seem to be to find some means of enjoying the immediate fruits of being wicked while avoiding the unfortunate consequences. It may be objected that this would be difficult; but then most worthwhile achievements are difficult. Is there any indication that the good man is somehow, just by virtue of being good, more fortunate than the bad? We would dearly like to believe this, but cannot find any adequate reason for doing so. It is no use saying that men and gods will ensure that the good man is rewarded and the bad man punished; since men can always be put off by flattery and bribery, if not by deception; and the gods by sacrifices. Let us take a stark and extreme case: the contrast between a bad man, with all possible worldly goods, honoured among men as though he were good; and a good man, regarded as bad and, in consequence, poor and persecuted, hated, mocked, and finally enduring an agonizing death by being impaled. Who is going to say that the good man in this case is more fortunate than the bad?’
page 73 note 1 Op. cit., pp. 72‐3, 128. Professor Wilson's understanding of the relation between religion and society is so perceptive that her view that Nuer monotheism ‘is only intelligible in terms of Nuer history’ (op. cit., p. 6) by positing an influence from Nubian Christianity seems surprising. Even if we accept this (and there is no evidence for it), it would still have to be explained how it fitted Nuer society and culture.
page 74 note 1 David Sachs, A Fallacy in Plato's Republic (Plato's Republic. Interpretation and Criticism, ed. A. Sesonke).
page 74 note 2 Cf. Gorgias, 522‐7
page 75 note 1 Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, XI.
page 75 note 2 Cinderella, as re‐told by Beni Montresor.
page 75 note 3 Nicomachean Ethics, I, 8.Google Scholar
page 75 note 4 VIII, II.
page 76 note 1 Joseph Butler, Sermons, passim.
page 76 note 2 Utilitarianism, ch. 3 (Everyman Edition, p. 31).
page 77 note 1 It is fair to say that Kant's attitude has a certain ambiguity; sometimes he seems to be saying that we ought to believe these things, sometimes rather that we ought to conduct our lives as though they were so.
page 78 note 1 Cf. the discussion of the proverb, ‘The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth have been set on edge’, in Ch. 18 of the Book of Ezekiel.
page 79 note 1 This article has been deliberately written from premisses which are not theological; but a theological footnote is certainly in place, as was kindly pointed out to me by the Editor. It is, of course, of the very greatest importance that the point of the doctrine of the Risen Life is not primarily the adjustment of the balance in this one. Nor is it the case that the redeemed deserve the incomparable happiness of heaven; any virtue they may have, as well as their joy, is from God. To quote the Editor, ‘Christianity doesn't provide more sophisticated reasons for not being a sinner, it forgives the sinner‐thereby liberating him to act otherwise’. But only on a superficial analysis would these facts seem actually inconsistent with the main point of the article; that short of christian eschatology, or something similar to it in the relevant respects, the oppressors and the deceivers are often greatly the better off for their practice of oppression and deception.
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