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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 April 2024
In this essay I shall be discussing William Styron’s depiction of a theologically significant incident in his recent novel Sophie's Choice (London: Corgi Books, 1979). Since our discussion will approach this novel from a theological, as opposed to a purely literary, standpoint, it behoves us to begin by specifying the theological context of the argument that we hope to develop in this essay. This essay is concerned with the doctrine of the Atonement. More specifically: we shall argue that Styron’s narration of the episode which gives his book its title provides a basis for a criticism of all purely ‘subjective’ interpretations of the Atonement. The adherent of a purely ‘subjective’ conception of the Atonement emphasizes the manner in which the believer makes the work of Christ his own — the saving significance of Christ’s work is reckoned by the ‘subjectivist’ to lie in the ways in which individuals appropriate that work. That is to say, Christ’s saving work takes the form of a ‘subjective’ process; it is, in the words of Donald Baillie (a notable modem proponent of the ‘subjective’ conception), a “reconciling of us to God through a persuasion in our hearts that is ... a realizing of His eternal love”.
‘Subjective’ understandings of the Atonement have come to prevail in recent years. This is mainly because ‘objective’ conceptions are invariably bound up with incarnational christologies, and incarnational christologies no longer totally dominate the theological consensus. Instead, so-called ‘functional’ christologies tend increasingly to be in vogue, and since a ‘subjective’ understanding of the Atonement accords better with a ‘functional’ christology than it does with a fully incarnational (or ‘ontological’) christology, there has been a recognizable drift away from ‘objective’ conceptions of the Atonement.
1 . God was in Christ: An Essay on Incarnation and Atonement (London: Faber & Faber, 1961), p 198Google Scholar. It should be stressed that we are not seeking to question the intrinsic coherence or plausibility of ‘subjective’ conceptions as such. Rather we shall be attempting to show that ‘subjective’ conceptions cannot stand on their own, that in addition to the “persuasion in our hearts” that Baillie talks about, Christ's saving work must be said to possess a dimension that is independent of the manner in which we appropriate this work. In other words: the saving efficacy of Christ's work can be guaranteed only if the Atonement is conceived ‘objectively’, and not merely ‘subjectively’.
2 The question whether it is possible to justify this shift away from ‘objective’ conceptions of the Atonement is precisely the question that lies at the heart of the well‐known Lampe‐MacKinnon debate on the Resurrection. Cf. Lampe, G.W.H. and MacKinnon, D M, The Resurrection: a Dialogue (London: Mowbray, 1966)Google Scholar For arguments in favour of detaching the doctrine of the Atonement from an incarnational christology, cf. Wiles, Maurice, The Remaking of Christian Doctrine (London: SCM, 1974)Google Scholar, chap 4; and Robinson, John A T, The Human Face of God (London: SCM, 1973), pp 230ffGoogle Scholar.
3 A Theology of Auschwitz (London: SPCK, 1978), p 71Google Scholar
4 Language and Silence: Essays 1958‐66 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969), p 203Google Scholar
5 Schoonenberg, Piet, Man and Sin: A Theological View (London: Sheed & Ward, 1965), p 21Google Scholar. Italics added
6 Christ: The Christian Experience in the Modern World (London: SCM, 1980), p 203Google Scholar
7 Jungel, Eberhard, Death: The Riddle and the Mystery (Edinburgh: The Saint Andrew Press, 1975)Google Scholar, passim
8 Doctor Faustus, in Marlowe, Christopher, Complete Poems and Plays (London: Dent, 1976)Google Scholar, quoted in Phillips, D Z, Through a Darkening Glass: Philosophy, Literature, and Culture Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), p 90Google Scholar. I am deeply indebted to Phillips’ masterly essay, ‘Knowledge, Patience and Faust’, op cit, pp 89–112, for several insights into the nature of the Faustian complex. It was Rowan Williams who drew my attention to the importance of Phillips’ essay.
9 Phillips, op cit, p 90
10 Commentary on Romans (London: SCM, 1980), p 104Google Scholar
11 The Theology of the New Testament (London: SCM, 1974), pp 184–5Google Scholar
12 Theology of the New Testament: Vol I (London: SCM, 1952), p 290Google Scholar. Paul, of course, equates God's deed of salvation with the event of Christ's obedience on the cross. Cf Philippians 2: 8; and Romans 5: 15‐21
13 loc cit.
14 Grace and Personality (Cambridge: University Press, 1919), p 206Google Scholar
15 Von Niemand's realization represents a negation of the Pauline view that the ways of God are beyond all understanding (Philippians 4: 7)
16 Creon and Antigone: Ethical Problems of Nuclear Warfare (London: The Menard Press, 1982), p 26Google Scholar
17 Cf Käsemann, op cit p 139, where Christ is described as being “… in person the irreversible ‘for us’ of God”. My understanding of the God of the future is deeply indebted to the writings of Paul Ricoeur. Cf especially the essays in Parts IV and V of his collection The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974)Google Scholar. Ricoeur has, by the way, acknowledged his indebtedness to Jürgen Moltmann's Theology of Hope. It should be noted that the distinction between the God of the future and the God who is, is not meant to be absolute – we use it simply to draw attention to the moral apocalypticist's rather one‐sided affirmation of the God who is, which results in a failure on his part to recognize the importance of the God who is to come.
18. Goethe, , Faust/Part One, trans. Wayne, P (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976), p 91Google Scholar Quoted in Phillips’op cit. p 111, which contains a splendid interpretation of this passage.
19. Cf the quotation of Käsemann's cited in footnote 17 above.
20. On the fundamental dichotomy between salvation and our capacity to comprehend the true nature of this salvation, cf Lash, Nicholas, Theology on Dover Beach (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1979), p 93Google Scholar. The principal theme in our essay has been the denial that man can be the author of his own salvation, and that our understanding of the Atonement cannot therefore be merely ‘subjective’. Simone Weil has shown exactly why it is that a purely ‘subjective’ interpretation of the Atonement will never be really adequate to the true nature of our salvation:
21. ‘On Free Will’, in Burleigh, J H S (trans), Augustine Earlier Writings (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963), p 169Google Scholar
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