1. Cf., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran: Indication of provisional measures by Order of 15 December 1979, ICJ Rep. (1979) p. 7; Judgment of 24 May 1980, ibid. (1980) p. 3.

2. ICJ Rep. (1979) p. 11; (1980) p. 8.

3. ICJ Rep. (1979) p. 11.

4. ICJ Pleadings, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, p. 184 et seq.

5. ICJ Rep. (1980) p. 38.

6. Ibid. p. 40 (emphasis added).

7. See Articles 1 and 17 of Part 1 of the draft on State responsibility adopted by the ILC on first reading in 1980, ILC Yearbook 1980 vol. 2 part 2, p. 30 et seq.

8. ILC Yearbook 1976 vol. 2 part 2 p. 80.

9. See, in particular, Preliminary Report, ILC Yearbook 1980 vol. 2 part 1, p. 107 at p. 128–9; Third Report, UN Doc. A/CN.4/354 (= Riphagen III)/Add. 1, paras. 40–64, 93.

10. ILC Yearbook 1981 vol. 2 part 1 (= Riphagen II), p. 79 at p. 100.

11. Riphagen III (supra n. 9), Add. 2, para. 138.

12. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-fifth Session, 3 May - 22 July 1983, GAOR 38th session, Suppl. No. 10 (A/38/10), p. 91. The references in the text of the draft article are to a proposal concerning jus cogens not yet decided upon in 1983 and to an article securing the priority of the UN Charter.

13. UN Doc. A/CN.4/380 (= Riphagen V), para. 8 and p. 4.

14. Riphagen III (supra n. 9), para. 16.

15. ILC Yearbook 1982 vol. 1 p. 202, para. 16 (emphasis added). See also Fourth Report, UN Doc. A/CN.4/366 (= Riphagen IV), para. 31.

16. See, e.g. Riphagen IV supra, para. 20.

17. Ibid. Riphagen IV Add. 1, paras. 43 et seq.

18. Ibid. paras. 70 et seq.

19. Riphagen III (supra n. 9), Add. 1, para. 94.

20. Cf., ILC Yearbook 1982 vol. 1 p. 202, para. 16.

21. Comment by P. Reuter, ILC Yearbook 1981 vol. 1 p. 138, para. 22.

22. ILC Yearbook 1982 vol. 1 p. 201, para. 8.

23. Riphagen IV (supra n. 15), Add. 1, para. 50.

24. ILC Yearbook 1981 vol. 1 p. 127, para. 17 and passim.

25. ILC Yearbook 1982 vol. 1 p. 202, para 17.

26. Riphagen II (supra n. 9), Add. 1, para. 38.

27. Ibid. para. 39.

28. Ibid. para. 42.

29. Loc. cit., n. 10, p. 86.

30. In principle, therefore, treaties are not “locked circles from which it is impossible to escape”: Zoller, E., Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures (Dobbs Ferry 1984) p. 89Google Scholar (whose discussion of the issue on p. 84 et seq. appears, however, to misinterpret Special Rapporteur Riphagen's views).

The concept of “self-contained regimes” proposed in the text relates to closed subsystems consisting of rules of international law. Thus, rules for State behaviour which are not intended to create international legal obligations at all and whose breach is not supposed to lead to State responsibility in the international legal sense, fall outside its scope. In its judgment of 31 July 1973, the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) denied the Basic Treaty (Grundvertrag) concluded on 21 December 1972, between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic the character of such an extra-international legal “self-contained” regime: “The special character of the treaty…may also be suggested by the formula that it regulates “inter se relations”. But it does not regulate exclusively such relations and, therefore, does not fall outside the order of general international law, that is to say, it does not belong to a particular legal order of a specific character that would have been created only by the treaty and limited as to subject matter … The treaty thus has a double character; generically, it is a treaty in international law; in its specific content, it is a treaty which regulates primarily inter se relations” (Translation by Wilk, K., “Federal Republic of Germany Case Note”, 70 AJIL (1976) p. 147 at p. 152).Google Scholar

31. Riphagen, , “State Responsibility: New Theories of Obligation in Interstate Relations”, in Macdonald, R.St.J. and Johnston, D.M., eds., The Structure and Process of International Law (The Hague 1983) p. 581 at p. 603 et seq., para. 50.Google Scholar

32. Ibid. at p. 604 et seq. (para. 52).

33. See the example given in Riphagen III (supra n. 9), Add. 1, p. 13 note 27, of Art. 27 of the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and nationals of other States, which bars the exercise of diplomatic protection, but only if and as long as the receiving State complies with the award rendered in its dispute with the foreign investor.

34. The abstract concept of “self-contained regimes” has only recently been given attention in literature. Cf., however, Zoller, op.cit., n. 30; Rauschning, D., “Verantwortlichkeit der Staaten für völkerrechtswidriges Verhalten”, 24 Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht (1984) p. 7 at p. 20 et seq.Google Scholar; Dominicé, Ch., “Représailles et droit diplomatique” in Recht als Prozeβ und Gefüge. Festschrift für Hans Huber zum 80. Geburtstag (Bern 1981) p. 41Google Scholar (limited to a discussion of the ICJ Tehran judgment).

35. Riphagen III (supra n. 9), Add. 1, para. 28; loc. cit., n. 31 p. 606 (para. 55).

36. Riphagen III (supra n. 9), Add. 1, para. 101.

37. Riphagen IV (supra n. 15), para. 50.

38. Riphagen II (supra n. 10), p. 86, para. 59.

39. Riphagen IV (supra n. 15), para. 53.

40. Ibid. para. 50.

41. Ibid. para. 81.

42. UN Doc. A/CN.4/380 (= Riphagen V).

43. Riphagen, loc. cit., n. 31 p. 606 et seq. (paras. 56–57).

44. See also Dominicé, loc. cit., n. 34 and Zoller, op. cit., n. 30.

45. Thus the ILC in its commentary on the draft of the (later) Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, ILC Yearbook 1958 vol. 2 p. 97.

46. ICJ Rep. (1980) p. 40.

47. Cf., for instance the acts of severe violence committed by Libyan diplomatic agents in London on 17 April 1984: 88 RGDIP (1984) p. 945 et seq.

48. For an opposing view see the statement by P. Reuter (loc.cit., n. 21).

49. See Dominicé, loc. cit., n. 34 p. 551: “[P]our affirmer qu'une violation initiale du droit diplomatique ne peut en aucune manière autoriser l'Etat qui en est la victime à le transgresser à son tour, l'argument du régime se suffisant à lui-même n'est pas nécessaire”.

See also the harsher judgment by Zemanek, K. in: Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für VölkerrechtGoogle Scholar, loc. cit., n. 34 p. 104.

50. Cf., Cahier, Ph., Le droit diplomatique contemporain (Geneva 1962) pp. 39, 192Google Scholar; Malintoppi, A., “L'elemento della reciprocità nel trattamento delle missioni diplomatiche”, 39 Rivista di diritto internazionale (1956) p. 534 et seq.Google Scholar

51. UNTS Vol. 500 p. 95 et seq.

52. ILC Yearbook 1958 vol. 2 p. 105. See also Decaux, E., La réciprocité en droit international (Paris 1980) p. 145 et seq.Google Scholar

53. Cf., the statement of Special Rapporteur Riphagen introducing his Fifth Report to the ILC: Provisional Summary Record of the 1858th meeting, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.1858 (24 July 1984) p. 8 et seq.; and the remarks by Sir Ian Sinclair, ibid. p. 14, and in the Provisional Summary Records of the 1865th Meeting, A/CN.4/1865, p. 6.

54. In his Fifth Report (supra n. 42), Riphagen proposes an Article 8, according to which, subject to certain limitations (embodied in Articles 11–13 of the same Report), “the injured State is entitled, by way of reciprocity, to suspend the performance of its obligations towards the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act, if such obligations correspond to, or are directly connected with, the obligation breached”. The proposed article on reprisals (Article 9) accordingly limits such countermeasures to the suspension of the performance of other obligations towards the wrongdoer.

Such a direct application of reciprocity to international legal obligations has no basis in the lex lata. Reciprocity as such can only operate in the way envisaged by the Special Rapporteur where it conditions the application of standards of behaviour not prescribed by international law or where the performance of an international obligation has been made dependent upon another party's corresponding performance by way of inserting a reciprocity clause (in the language of the ILC: where the condition of reciprocity is built into the primary rule). On the relationship between reciprocity and countermeasures in international law see Simma, B., “Reflections on Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Its Background in General International Law”, 20 Österreichische Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht (1970) p. 5 et seq.Google Scholar; Verdross, A. and Simma, B., Universelles Völkerrecht. Theorie and Praxis 3rd edn. (Berlin 1984) p. 515 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar (paras. 811 et seq., with further references). See also Zoller, loc. cit., n. 30 p. 27: “[R]eciprocity can be conceivable only if it involves lawful treatment … As such, reciprocity can only be resorted to when it leads to a lawful situation. Otherwise the reciprocity process cannot be implemented. The condition of reciprocity is, as it were, ‘frozen”’ The thus outlined limitations on “naked” reciprocity appear to this author to have been generally accepted in the doctrine of international law. In any case they were quite clear to the ILC when it drafted the provision on non-discrimination in diplomatic law cited in the text as well as the corresponding provision for the consular law convention; cf., the references by Decaux, op. cit., n. 52 p. 146 et seq.

55. UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR 1858 (supra n. 53), p. 15.

56. UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/27. Cf.,Rosenne, S., “Is the Constitution of an International Organization an International Treaty?”, 12 Comunicazioni e studi (1966) p. 21 et seq.Google Scholar

57. Cf., however, Bleckmann, A., “Zwangsmittel im Gemeinsamen Markt?”, 24 Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (1978) p. 91 et seq.Google Scholar; Klein, E., “Zulässigkeit von Wirtschaftssanktionen der EWG gegen ihre Mitgliedstaaten”, 31 Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (1985) p. 291 et seq.Google Scholar; Riphagen III (supra n. 9), Add. 1, paras. 59 et seq.

On the particular aspect taken up in the text see, in addition, Forlati Picchio, L., La sanzione nel diritto internazionale (Padua 1974) pp. 289 et seq.Google Scholar, 424 et seq.; Decaux, op. cit., n. 52 p. 321 et seq.; Weber, A., Schutznormen und Wirtschaftsintegration (Baden-Baden 1982) p. 446 et seq.Google Scholar; Geck, W.K., “Die Ausweitung von Individualrechten durch völkerrechtliche Verträge und der diplomatische Schutz”, in Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit. Festschrift für Karl Carslens (Cologne 1984) p. 339 at p. 346 et seq.Google Scholar; Stein, T., “Die Autorität des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts”, in Die Autorität des Rechts (Heidelberg 1985) p. 53 at p. 63 et seq. and 73 et seq.Google Scholar; G. White, this volume.

58. For a comprehensive and particularly well-documented summing-up of this view see Schwarze, J., “Das allgemeine Völkerrecht in den innergemeinschaftlichen Rechtsbeziehungen”, 18 Europarecht (1983) p. 1 et seqGoogle Scholar. See further Everling, A., “Sind die Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften noch Herren der Verträge?”, in Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung. Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit. Menschenrechte. Festschrift für Hermann Mosler (Berlin 1983) p. 173 at p. 181 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Karpenstein, P., “Commentary to Art. 171”, in Grabitz, E., ed., Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag (looseleaf) (1984) paras. 19 et seq.Google Scholar

59. Article 88 para. 3 of the ECSC treaty is understood by the dominant view in Community law doctrine as a “fall-back” into general international law. See Ipsen, H.P., Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (Tübingen 1972) p. 531 et seq.Google Scholar Interestingly enough, the Court of Justice of the European Communities in its 1975 opinion on the European Union, proposed to insert a clause similar to Article 88 para. 3 ECSC treaty — an idea wholeheartedly supported by the European Parliament in 1983: Stein, loc. cit., n. 57 p. 73 et seq. and note 105. See also Art. 44 of the Draft Convention on the Establishment of an European Union, approved by the European Parliament on 14 February 1984.

60. Cases 90 and 91/63, [1964] ECR p. 1217 at 1232 (emphasis added). See also the judgment in the Mutton and Lamb case (Commission v. French Republic), Case 232/78, [1979] ECR p. 2729 at 2739: “A Member State cannot under any circumstances unilaterally adopt, on its own authority, corrective measures or measures to protect trade designed to prevent any failure on the part of another Member State to comply with the rules laid down by the Treaty”

61. See, among others, Schwarze and Everling, loc. cit., n. 58.

62. See, e.g., Bleckmann, Klein, Weber, loc. cit., n. 57, Karpenstein, loc. cit., n. 58.

63. Cf., Ehlermann, C.D., “Die Verfolgung von Vertragsverletzungen der Mitgliedstaaten durch die Kommission”, in Europäische Gerichtsbarkeit und nationaie Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit. Festschrift für Hans Kutscher (Baden-Baden 1981) p. 135 et seq., and at p. 151 et seq.Google Scholar; Schwarze, loc. cit., n. 58; Karpenstein, loc. cit., n. 58.

64. Riphagen II (supra n. 10), p. 91, note 58; Riphagen III (supra n.9), Add. 1, paras. 59 et seq.; Riphagen IV (supra n. 15), Add. 1, para. 75; Riphagen, loc. cit., n. 31 p. 602 (para. 46).

65. Cf., the various proposals mentioned by Stein, loc. cit., n. 57 p. 73 et seq. and note 105.

66. Article 60 para. 2 lit. c of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

67. Riphagen V (supra n. 42), Article 11 para. 1 lit. a.

68. Ibid., Article 13.

69. Cf., Riphagen III (supra n. 9), paras. 59 et seq.

70. On the following see the literature quoted in Verdross and Simma, op.cit., n. 54 p. 480, note 10, and p. 909, note 12; Geek, loc. cit., n. 57 at pp. 354–360.

71. Resol. 2200 (XXI) Annex, GAOR 21st session, Suppl. No. 16 (A/6316).

72. See also Ermacora, F., “Über die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit für Menschenrechtsverletzungen”, in Ius Humanitatis. Festschrift zum 90. Geburtstag von Alfred Verdross (Berlin 1980) p. 357.Google Scholar

73. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Rep. (1970) p. 3 at p. 32.Google Scholar

74. Article 19 of Part 1 of the draft articles on State responsibility, ILC Yearbook 1976 vol. 2 part 2, p. 95 et seq.

75. Mohr, M., 29 Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig, Gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe (1980) p. 85 et seq.Google Scholar; idem, 29 Staat und Recht (1980) p. 172 et seq. and, in extenso, Fragen der Durchsetzung von Völkerrechtsnormen, dargestellt anhand der Antirassismuskonvention von 1965 und der UN-Menschenrechts-konventionen von 1966 (unpublished dissertation, East Berlin 1981).Google Scholar

76. See, e.g., Frowein, J.A., “Die Verpflichtungen erga omnes ira Völkerrecht und ihre Durchsetzung”, in Festschrift für Hermann Mosler, op.cit., n. 58, p. 242 at p. 255 et seq., p. 258 et seq.Google Scholar, and the literature cited therein; Geck, loc. cit., n. 57 at p. 354–360.

77. European Commission on Human Rights, Austria v. Italy (Pfunders) case, 4 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights (1961) p. 117 at 139Google Scholar. For a critique of this view see Simma, B., Das Reziprozitätselement im Zustandekommen völkerrechtlicher Verträge (Berlin 1972) p. 161 et seq.Google Scholar, particularly p. 188 et seq.

78. Sir G. Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook 1957 vol. 2, p. 54.

79. Cf., the references cited by Simma, loc. cit., n. 77 at p. 176 et seq.

80. Riphagen IV (supra n. 15), Add. 1, p. 15 et seq.; Riphagen, loc. cit., n. 31 p. 602 et seq. (paras. 48–49).

81. See from the comments made on Article 5 of Riphagen V by the delegate of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Sixth Committee on 6 November 1984: “[H]ere the problem arises of specific and hence exclusive subsystems. This applies equally to sub-para, (iv), i.e., human rights treaties. Pursuant to Article 2, the application of these provisions is also subject to the proviso of the non-existence of specific sub-systems. However, the problem is: when does such an exclusive sub-system exist? Does it already exist if, as in the case of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the possibility of certain procedures without a binding result is envisaged? Or if these procedures are actually in effect between the conflicting parties? Or only if there are bilateral mechanisms that are actually in effect and have a legally binding result, as in the case of the European Convention on Human Rights? In our opinion, most reasons appear to bear out the latter” (mimeographed version of the statement made by Mr. J. Oesterhelt, p. 5–6; emphasis added).

82. As developed in more detail in the following articles: “Zur bilateralen Durchsetzung vertraglich verankerter Menschenrechte: Aktivlegitimation und zulässige Mittel nach allgemeinem Völkerrecht”, in Schreuer, Ch., ed., Autorität und Internationale Ordnung (Berlin 1979) p. 129 et seq.Google Scholar; “Völkerrechtliche Möglichkeiten der Durchsetzung vertraglich garantierter Menschenrechte für Deutsche gegenüber den Staaten Osteuropas”, in Menschenrechte für Deutsche in Osteuropa (Bonn 1980) p. 33 et seq.Google Scholar; “Fragen der zwischenstaatlichen Durchsetzung von Menschenrechten”, in Staatsrecht — Völkerrecht — Europarecht. Festschrift für Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer (Berlin, New York 1981) p. 635 et seq.Google Scholar

83. The author certainly agrees on this point with Geek, loc. cit., n. 57 at p. 354 et seq., whose critical comments on the view expounded here could, however, lead to the (wrong) impresson that it is also intended to apply to the subsystem of the European Convention.

84. In the same sense Tomuschat, Ch., “Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Menschenrechtspakte der Vereinten Nationen”, 26 Vereinte Nationen (1978) p. 1 at p. 8Google Scholar: ‘Als völkerrechtliche Abkommen besitzen die beiden Pakte selbstverständlich auch eine Aktivseite. Wenn die Mitgliedstaaten ein multilaterales Vertragsregime geschaffen haben, so haben sie damit gegenseitige Verpflichtungen übernommen, deren Erfüllung jeder von jedem anderen einfordern kann. Insbesondere die Vorschrift des Art. 41 des politischen Paktes über die Staatenbeschwerde wäre kaum verständlich, würden nicht auch die Menschenrechtskonventionen im üblichen Sinne ein Netz von Rechtsbeziehungen zwischen den einzelnen Vertragsteilen konstituieren. Nachdrücklich zu widersprechen wäre andererseits der These, daβ Art. 41 eine ausschlieβliche Regelung darstelle und daβ demzufolge jedes andere Verfahren zur Geitendmachung der Vertragsrechte ausscheide, mit der Folge, daβ sämtliche dem freiwilligen Staatenbeschwerdever fahren nicht unterworfenen Staaten auβer im Rahmen des Berichtsprüfungsverfahrens durch den Ausschuβ für Menschenrechte von niemandem zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden könnten. Wereine sotche Abweichung von den allgemeinen völkerrechtlichen Regeln behauptet, ist beweispflichtig. Es müβte dargetan werden, daβ die Vertragspartner die Absicht gehabt haben sollten, die Pakte einer ihrer wichtigsten Antriebskräfte zu berauben. Dieser Beweis kann nicht geführt werden.’ For a recent and very exhaustive confirmation of this view see Lattanzi, F., Garanzie dei diritti dell'uomo nel diritto internazionale generale (Milan 1983).Google Scholar

85. Stenographisches Protokoll, 8. Wahlperiode, 39. Sitzung, p. 3033.Google Scholar

86. Bundestags-Drucksache 9/1981, p. 2. See further the suspension by the Netherlands on 16 December 1982 of an agreement on development co-operation concluded with Surinam in 1975 as a consequence of the massive human rights violations following a coup d'état in this former Dutch colony: 15 NYIL (1984) p. 321, and Lindemann, H.-H., “Die Auswirkungen der Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Surinam auf die Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen den Niederlanden und Surinam”, 44 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1984) p. 64 et seqGoogle Scholar. Examples from US practice are cited by Lattanzi, op. cit., n. 84 at p. 322 et seq.

87. See Riphagen III (supra n. 9), Add. 1 para. 42.

88. Weil, P., “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?” 77 AJIL (1983) p. 413 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

89. See further Simma, op. cit., n. 77, p. 252 et seq.