1. Bergsten, C. Fred et al. , “International economics and international politics: a framework for analysis”, in Bergsten, and Krause, Lawrence B., eds., World Politics and International Economics (Washington D.C. 1975) p. 5.Google Scholar

2. Ibid., p. ix.

3. Spero, J.E., The Politics of International Economic Relations, 2nd edn. (London 1981) pp. 4–5.Google Scholar

4. van Themaat, P. VerLoren, The Changing Structure of International Economic Law (The Hague, 1981) p. 320.Google Scholar

5. Brownlie, I., Principles of International Law, 3rd edn. (Oxford 1979) p. 262.Google Scholar

6. Schwarzenberger, G., Economic World Order? (Manchester 1970) p. 4.Google Scholar

7. See e.g., Metzger, S.D., Law of International Trade (1966 and later edn.)Google Scholar; Lazar, L., Transnational Economic and Monetary Law (New York 1982 continuing)Google Scholar; Carreau, D. et al. , Droit international économique, 2 edn., (Paris 1980)Google Scholar; McGovern, E., International Trade Regulation (Exeter 1982)Google Scholar. A more limited study is Fawcett, J., International Economic Conflicts, Prevention and Resolution (Munich 1977).Google Scholar

8. VerLoren van Themaat, op.cit., n. 4.

9. VerLoren van Themaat, op.cit., n. 4 pp. 240–7.

10. VerLoren van Themaat, op.cit., n.4 pp. 240–7.

11. VerLoren van Themaat, op.cit., n.4 p. 243.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., at p. 247.

14. ibid.

15. See B. Simma, this volume.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. See text at note 58 below.

19. “ ‘At Arm's Length’: The Coming Law of Collective Bargaining in International Relations”, 15 Virg. JIL (1975) p. 579Google Scholar; reproduced in Lillich, R.B., ed., Economic Coercion and the New International Economic Order (Charlottesville VA. 1976).Google Scholar

20. There are over a dozen such requirements in the GATT, and additional requirements have been imposed by decisions of the Contracting Parties and by the Tokyo (MTN) Codes. See GATT: Notification and Surveillance, Proposal by Director-General, C/111, 1980, Annexes.

21. “The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers”, in Krasner, S., ed., International Regimes (London 1983) pp. 299–300.Google Scholar

22. 26 Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (BISD) (1980) p. 210Google Scholar. See McGovern, E., International Trade Regulation (Exeter 1982) ss. 1.16–1.162, 1.165.Google Scholar

23. Text in 17 JWTL (1983) p. 67.

24. Gold, J. “The Stand-by Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund”, published by IMF 1970Google Scholar, and reproduced in Weston, B. et al. , International Law and World Order (St. Paul MN 1980) pp. 793-4.Google Scholar

25. VerLoren van Themaat, op.cit., n.4, p. 166.

26. Cf., the ICJ's formulation in the Nuclear Tests Cases, ICJ Rep. (1973) pp. 253, 457.

27. “Certain Aspects of the Law and Practice of the International Monetary Fund”, in Schwebel, S., ed., The Effectiveness of International Decisions (Alphen a/d Rijn 1971) pp. 82–83Google Scholar. See also Guitian, M., “IMF Conditionally”, Finance and Development (published by the IMF and the IBRD) (1980) vol. 17 no.4 p.23Google Scholar and (1981) vol. 18 no.1 p. 8 and no.2 p. 14. On Jamaica and the IMF, see Kincaid, G.R. in Finance and Development (1981) vol. 18 no.2 p. 18Google Scholar, Alix-Hérard, Paul in Inter-American Economic Affairs (1983) vol. 37 no.2 p. 45Google Scholar and Jennifer, Sharpley in Killick, T., ed., The IMF and Stabilisation: Developing Country Experiences (London 1984) pp. 115–160.Google Scholar

28. Summarized and discussed by Guitian, loc.cit., n.27 (1981) vol. 18 no.1 at p. 11, and by Pirzio-Biroli, , “Making Sense of the IMF Conditionality Debate”, 17 JWTL (1983) p. 115Google Scholar. Text in Williamson, J., ed., IMF Conditionality (Washington D.C. 1983) p. 667 et seq.Google Scholar

29. Pirzio-Biroli, loc.cit., n.28 p. 141.

30. Killick, ed., op.cit., n.27, pp. 203–4.

31. See Nurick, L., “Certain Aspects of the Law and Practice of the IBRD”, in Schwebel, , ed., op.cit., n.27, pp. 114–117.Google Scholar

32. “World Bank Financing of Structural Adjustment”, in Williamson, , ed., op.cit., n.28, p. 104.Google Scholar

33. Ibid., pp. 102–103.

34. Nurick in Schwebel, ed., op.cit., n.31, Record of Discussion at p. 465.

35. See Flory, M., “Commercial and development policy”, in Thirty Years of Community Law (Brussels 1981) p. 379.Google Scholar

36. See chapter by Lipson, C., “The transformation of trade”, in Krasner, , ed., op.cit., n.21 pp. 247, 251.Google Scholar

37. McGovern, op.cit., n.22 s.10.216.

38. Ibid., s.10.212.

39. Re Anti-Subsidy Proceedings concerning Certain Kinds of Women's Shoes Originating in Brazil, 81/901/EEC, [1982] 2 CMLR p. 416.

40. EC Council Regulation 2641/84 of 17 Sept. 1984 [1984], OJ L 252/1, “On the strengthening of the common commercial policy with regard in particular to protection against illicit commercial practices.” Text also in 23 ILM (1984) p. 1419.

41. Petersmann, U., “Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities”, 20 CML Rev. (1983) p. 437Google Scholar. On the significance of possible direct effect for GATT provisions in Community law see infra, text at note 68.

42. For recent disputes between the EEC and the USA concerning anti-dumping and countervailing measures against import of special steels, involving Article XIX of GATT, see issues of the EC Bulletin 7/8–1983, 9–1983, 2–1984, 6–1984, 7/8–1984 and 9–1984. A bilateral arrangement between the parties relating to carbon steel was reached in October 1982, see ibid. 10–1982 and OJ [1982] L 307/1 et seq. Disputes have arisen regarding its application, but have been resolved by negotiation.

43. McGovern, op.cit., n.22 s.10.112.

44. Including the former EFTA Secretary-General, Sir Frank Figgures, in 14 ICLQ (1965) p. 1079 and van der Meersch, W. Ganshof, 1 Organisations Européennes (1966) p. 503Google Scholar. See generally Szokoloczy-Syllaba, A., “EFTA, The Settlement of Disputes”, 20 ICLQ (1971) p. 519CrossRefGoogle Scholar and on the imposition of the import surcharge by the UK in 1964, Lauterpacht, E., ed., British Practice in International Law [1964]-II pp. 247–255.Google Scholar

45. The European Free Trade Association and the Crisis of European Integration (London 1968) p. 246.Google Scholar

46. Text: [1974] OJ L 118. See Sutton, A., “Equality and Discrimination in International Economic Law (VI): Trends in the Regulation of International Trade in Textiles”, 31 YBWA (1977) p. 190.Google Scholar

47. Sutton, loc.cit., n.46 p. 203.

48. Ibid., p. 209.

49. See generally on Art. XXIII, Dam, K.W., The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization (Chicago 1970) p. 357 et seqGoogle Scholar. On the ‘chicken war’ see Walker, J. in 58 AJIL (1964) p. 671CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Lowenfeld, A. in 4 J Maritime L and Comm. (1973) p. 599.Google Scholar

50. See Dam, op.cit., n.49; Jackson, J.H., World Trade and the Law of GATT (Indianapolis 1969) pp. 169–186Google Scholar; McGovern, op.cit., n.22 pp. 25–28. See also Goldsmith, P. and Sonderkotter, F., “Equality and Discrimination in International Economic Law (V): The European Communities and the Wider World”, 29 YBWA (1975) p. 265Google Scholar; Jackson, J.H., “Equality and Discrimination in International Economic Law (XI): The GATT”, 37 YBWA (1983) p. 234.Google Scholar

51. Financial recovery was again urged by Fishlow, A. in 1978: “A New International Economic Order: What kind?”, in Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy (New York 1978) p. 57.Google Scholar

52. See Jackson, , World Trade and the Law of GATT op.cit., n.50, pp. 169–171.Google Scholar

53. Text in 18 ILM (1979) p. 579 and [1980] OJ L 71/72 and (UK) Cmnd. 7658. The Code's formal title is “The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the GATT”. For a discussion of some of the problems raised by the arrangement and language of the provisions of this Code, see Benyon, F. and Bourgeois, J., “The European Community — United States Steel Arrangement”, 21 CML Rev. (1984) pp. 321–2.Google Scholar

54. Text in 18 ILM (1979) p. 1079 and [1980] OJ L 71/29. See Middleton, R., “The GATT Standards Code”, 14 JWTL (1980) p. 201.Google Scholar

55. See Articles 13 and 14.

56. VerLoren van Themaat, op.cit., n.11 p. 217.

57. Petersmann, loc.cit., n.42 p. 432.

58. Bowett, D.W., “Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States”, 16 Virg. JIL (1976) pp. 258-9Google Scholar (reproduced in Lillich, ed., loc.cit., n.19 p. 17); Audretsch, H.A.H., Supervision in European Community Law (1978) pp. 81-2Google Scholar; White, G., “The Impact of European Community Law on International Law” in Cheng, B., ed., International Law: Teaching and Practice (London 1982) pp. 78-9.Google Scholar

59. Petersmann, loc.cit., n.41 p. 433 referring to Art. XXIII and to the Tokyo Decision (or Understanding). To the same effect McGovern, op.cit., n.22 pp. 25–8. For an example of the EEC withdrawing compensatory taxes on imports from third States in excess of ‘bound’ duties, after the USA had complained to GATT Council under Art. XXIII, see Case 9/73 Schlüter v. Hauptzollamt Lorrach [1973] ECR p. 1135.

60. Dominick, Mary F., “Countervailing State Aids to Steel: A Case for International Consensus” 21 CML Rev (1981) p. 363.Google Scholar

61. On the Australian and Brazilian complaints see Panel Report (Australian case) in 20 ILM (1981) p. 862; McGovern, op.cit., n.22 p. 356; Smith, I. in 15 JWTL (1981) pp. 95 and 534Google Scholar; Phegan, C. in 16 JWTL (1982) p. 261.Google Scholar

On the US ‘DISC’ tax laws, and similar laws of the Netherlands, see Panel Reports in 20 ILM (1981) pp. 848, 856; Jackson, J.H. in 72 AJIL (1978) p. 747CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McGovern, op.cit., n.22 pp. 254–256.

62. Everling, U., ‘The Member States of the European Community before their Court of Justice’, 9 EL Rev. (1984) p. 228Google Scholar, citing also critical views of G. Bebr, G. Vandersanden and A. Barav. For more recent developments which may lead to the Commission seeking an order from the Court that the defendant State should recover sums paid to firms by way of illegal State aids, see Flynn, J., note in 9 EL Rev. (1984) p. 365.Google Scholar

63. See Schermers, H.G., Judicial Protection in the European Communities (Antwerp 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar ss. 674–676 and Everling, loc.cit., supra pp. 228–9. The cases include 31/77R and 53/77R, Commission v. UK (aids for pigmeat) [1977] ECR p. 921, and 61/77R Commission v. Ireland (protective measures for fishing industry) [1977] ECR pp. 937, 1411.

64. Case 40/82 Commission v. UK [1982] ECR p. 2793.

65. See Everling, loc.cit., n.62 p. 229 and Audretsch, op.cit., n.58 pp. 74–78.

66. Paragraph 13 of the judgment. The Court held that the Commission had not made out its case, so that no order for repayment was made.

67. See also Schermers, op.cit., n.63 s.429 and Audretsch, op.cit., n.58 pp. 74–78.

68. On the British Government's contemplated claim for damages in the ‘sheepmeat’ case, 232/78 Commission v France [1979] ECR p. 2729, see Hartley, T.C., The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford 1981) p. 315Google Scholar. See generally Schermers, op.cit., n.63 s.443.

69. See Petersmann, loc.cit., n.42 passim and at pp. 432–437.

70. Schermers, H.G., vol. 2 International Institutional Law (1972) pp. 588–589.Google Scholar

71. See Schermers, op.cit., n.63 s.412 and cases 2–3/62 Commission v. Belgium and Luxembourg [1962] ECR p. 429.

72. Case 7/61 [1961] ECR 326.

73. Under 4.2.1 supra. IMF Articles, Article V, Section 5 provides for a formal decision by the Fund's Executive Directors that a member is ineligible to have access to Fund resources. This power has been used on very rare occasions. See J. Gold in Weston et.al., op.cit., n.24 pp. 799–801.

74. For a useful bibliography on commodity arrangements in general, and on particular agreements see McGovern, op.cit., n.22 pp. 437–40.

75. Op.cit. n. 70.

76. Note that under the ECSC Treaty the Member States do not have the right to bring each other before the Court. Article 88 is limited to obliging the Commission to ‘record’ a State's failure to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty in a reasoned decision, which may be appealed by the State to the ECJ. The sanctions provision of Article 88, in case of failure of the Member to fulfil its obligation within the time-limit specified by the Commission, or of the dismissal of the Member's appeal to the ECJ, has not been used.

77. See text and notes to 5.1.2 supra.

78. E.g., International Wheat Trade Convention, 1971; International Sugar Agreement, 1977; International Coffee Agreement, 1976.

79. See 5.2.1 supra for a discussion of the nature of ECJ judgments.

80. Art. 219 (EEC); Art. 193 (Euratom); Art. 87 (ECSC).

81. See text and notes at 5.1.7 supra.

82. See M.C.W. Pinto's article, this volume.

83. General course, “Principles de droit international public”, 101 Hague Recueil (1960-III) p. 195.Google Scholar

84. Preliminary report, A/CN.4/334, ILC Yearbook 1980 vol. 2 at p. 265 and note 127.

85. In discussion of Quentin-Baxter's Second Report, ILC Yearbook 1981 vol. 1 p. 221, 1686th meeting, paragraph 1.

86. See supra 5.1.5, 5.1.6.

87. System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility, Part I (Oxford 1983) p. 50.Google Scholar

88. Res. 3201 (S-VI). No vote was taken, but the Declaration does not represent a consensus as several States expressed reservations. See Johnson, D.H.N., “The New International Economic Order”, 37 YBWA (1983) pp. 217–220.Google Scholar

89. Paragraph 1.

90. See VerLoren van Themaat, op.cit., n.4 p. 292.

91. Johnston, D.M., “The Foundations of Justice in International Law” in Macdonald, St. John et al. , eds., The International Law and Policy of Human Welfare (1978) p. 131.Google Scholar

92. See text at notes 9–12 supra.

93. The recent arbitrations concerning termination of oil concessions by the host States offer a rich harvest of the current arguments on the basis for reparation, compensation or restitution, and the factors which should affect the nature and amount of reparation. See BP v. Libya (1974), 53 ILR p. 297; Texaco v. Libya (1977), 53 ILR p. 389, 17 ILM (1978) p. 1; Liamco v. Libya (1977), 62 ILR p. 140, 20 ILM (1978) p. 1; Arbitration between Kuwait and the American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil) (1982), 21 ILM (1982) p. 976.

Among numerous comments on one or more of these cases see Bowett, D.W. in 37 CLJ (1978) p. 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kahn, P. in 109 Clunet (1977) p. 319Google Scholar; von Mehren, R.B. and Kourides, P.N. in 75 AJIL (1981) p.1CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Higgins, R., ‘The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law’, 176 Hague Recueil (1982), p. 261 at pp. 301–305, 314–321, 340Google Scholar, and Garcia-Amador, F.V., The Changing Law of International Claims, Vol. I (New York 1984) pp. 398–401.Google Scholar