1. Thus, Oppenheim, L., International Law, Lauterpacht, H., ed., vol. 1, 8th edn. (1955) p. 460Google Scholar, asserts that: ‘National waters are, in fact, legally though not physically equivalent to national land’. Similarly, the collective Soviet treatise edited by Chikvadze, V.M., Kurs mezhdunarodnogo prava [A Course on International Law] part 3 (1967) pp. 131–133Google Scholar, included internal or national waters as one of the parts of State territory.

2. The only exception was the unsuccessful Hague Codification Conference of 1930. It was originally intended to prescribe some rules concerning the legal situation of foreign merchant ships in national ports within the draft Convention on the Territorial Sea, but that idea was later abandoned.

3. F. Castberg in his 1953 report on the distinction between territorial and internal waters, to the Institute of International Law, strongly supported the view that the external limits of internal waters should not, in all circumstances, be identical with the baselines for measuring the breadth of territorial sea. Cf., 45(1) Annuaire (1954) pp. 115, 123–130 and 172. His attitude was criticized and rejected by most of the other members of his Commission, especially by J.P.A. François (ibid. pp. 188–189 and 207–208); E. Castrén (ibid. pp. 211–218); Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (ibid. p. 204); and G. Gidel (ibid. pp. 211–218). The final text of the Resolution, adopted by the Amsterdam Session of the Institute in 1957, was silent on this topic. This issue was finally settled by Art. 5(1) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which reads: ‘Waters on the landward side of the baselines of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the States’ Identical to it is Art. 8(2) of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention.

4. Bays which form parts of internal waters are regulated by Art. 7 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, which is identical to Art. 10 of the 1982 Convention. Except for so-called ‘historic’ bays, the main conditions are that all their coasts belong to a single State and that their natural entrance cannot exceed 24 nautical miles.

5. An important innovation is paragraph (2) of Art. 7 concerning straight baselines which reads:

‘Where because of the presence of a delta and other natural conditions the coastline is highly unstable, the appropriate points may be selected along the further seaward extent of the low-water line and, notwithstanding subsequent regression of the low-water line, the straight baselines shall remain effective until changed by the coastal State in accordance with this Convention’

And Art. 14 of the 1982 Convention expressly provides that the coastal State may in turn determine baselines by any of the methods provided for in its Articles to suit different conditions. This possibility was implicit in the text of the 1958 Convention.

6. There are, however, a few coastal States which are not parties to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, nor are they signatories of the new Convention. Among them are Albania and Turkey. It seems highly unlikely that they could prove that some of these general customary rules do not bind them too.

7. These are: Règles sur la définition et le régime de la mer territoriale of 1894; La navigation en haute mer of 1927; and Projet de règlement relatif à la mer territorial en temps de paix of 1928.

8. For the texts of these two resolutions, cf., Tableau général des résolutions (1873–1956) (1957) pp. 89–113.Google Scholar

9. Cf., 47(2) Annuaire (1957) pp. 473–476.

10. Cf., Rousseau, Ch., Droit international public, vol. 4 (1980) pp. 287–288.Google Scholar

11. Ibid. p. 341.

12. For cases in support of this condition, cf., Colombos, C.J., International Law of the Sea, 6th edn. (1967) pp. 329–330.Google Scholar

13. On this issue, cf., Jakasa, , Medjunarodni rezim morskih luka [International Regime of Maritime Ports] (1965) p. 75.Google Scholar

14. Art. 5(k) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 provides among the consular functions for extending assistance to vessels and to their crews, and, without prejudice to the power of the receiving State: ‘conducting investigation into any incidents which occurred during the voyage’.

15. Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op.cit. n.1, p. 504.

16. Cf., Schwarzenberger, G., International Law, vol. 1, 3rd edn. (1957) pp. 197–198.Google Scholar

17. Cf., Jessup, P., The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction (1927) p. 194Google Scholar, cited by Colombos, op.cit. n. 12 p. 330.

18. Cf., ‘Uredba o dolasku stranih jahti i stranih camaca namijenjenih razonodi i sportu u obalno more, rijeke i jezera Jugoslavije i o boravku tih jahti i camaca u tim vodama’ [Regulations on Arrival and Stay of Foreign Yachts and Pleasure Boats in the Coastal Sea, Rivers and Lakes of Yugoslavia], Sluzbeni list SFRJ 1975, No. 25, 23 May 1975, pp. 813–815.Google Scholar

19. Cf., Colombos, op.cit. n.12, p. 175.

20. Cf., Laun, R., ‘Le régime international des ports’, 15 Hague Recueil (1926) pp. 5–7Google Scholar; Gidel, G., Le droit international public de la mer, vol. 2 (1932) pp. 20–22Google Scholar; Ibler, V., ‘Opce obicajno medjunarodno pravo morskih luka u doba mira’ [The General Customary International Law on Maritime Ports in Time of Peace], Jugoslovenska revija za medjunarodno pravo (1962) No. 1 p. 26Google Scholar; Jakasa, op.cit. n. 13, pp. 33–38.

21. Cf., Gidel, op.cit. n. 20, pp. 36–37.

22. Ibid. p. 41.

23. Ibid. p. 45.

24. Art. 3: ‘En règle générale, l'accès des ports et des autres portions de la mer spécifiés dans l'article ler, est présumé ouvert aux navires étrangers. — Exceptionnellement, pour des raisons dont il est seul juge, un Etat peut déclarer ses ports ou quelques-uns d'entre eux fermés, — alors même que des traités en garantiraient d'une manière générale le libre accès, — lorsque la sûreté de l'Etat ou un intérêt public sanitaire justifié le commande. — L'entrée des ports peut encore être refusée à une nation en particulier, par mesure de justes représailles’.

25. Cited by Colombos, op.cit. n. 12, p. 176.

26. Laun, loc.cit. n. 20, p. 30.

27. Colombos, op.cit. n.12, p. 176.

28. Rousseau op.cit. n.10, p. 342. Guggenheim, P., Traité de droit international public, vol. 1 (1953) p. 419Google Scholar, was originally of the same opinion. But later on, he changed his view; cf., 45(1) Annuaire (1954) p. 190.

29. Cf., Bartoš, M., Medjunarodno javno pravo [Public International Law], vol. 2 (1956) p. 163.Google Scholar

30. Ibler, op.cit. n.20, pp. 31–32.

31. Jakasa, op.cit. n.13, pp. 74, 76–77.

32. Gidel, op.cit. n.20, p. 49.

33. Ibid. p. 46.

34. Cf., Greig, D.W., International Law, 2nd edn. (1976) p. 286.Google Scholar

35. Schwarzenberger, op.cit. n. 16, pp. 199–200.

36. Cf., Reuter, P., Droit international public (1958) p. 229.Google Scholar

37. 45 (1) Annuaire (1954) p. 133. Colombos, however, dissociated himself from this conclusion; ibid., pp. 199–200.

38. 47 (2) Annuaire (1957) pp. 473–474.

39. See also in this regard Art. 211(3) of the 1982 Convention.

40. Translation into English was done by Colombos, op.cit. n.12, p. 262 note 3.

41. For the French legislation, see Rousseau, op.cit. n. 10, p. 349.

42. Cf., Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 1st edn. (1966) p. 270Google Scholar; Greig, op.cit. n. 34, p. 287.

43. Gidel, op.cit. n. 20, pp. 79–80.

44. Cf., Rousseau, op.cit. n. 10, p. 347.

45. Cited by Brownlie, op.cit. n. 42, pp. 270–271.

46. Cf., Colombos, op.cit. n. 12, pp. 321–324. Briggs, H.W., The Law of Nations, 2nd edn. (1952) pp. 329–346.Google Scholar

47. Gidel, op.cit. n. 20, pp. 86–87.

48. Cited by Colombos, op.cit. n. 12, p. 320.

49. Of the same opinion is Greig, op.cit. n. 34, p. 290.

50. See, in this regard, Art. 32 of the 1898 Hague Resolution of the Institute of International Law and Art. 38 of the Institute's Stockholm Resolution of 1928.

51. Cf., Art. 39 of the Stockholm Resolution.

52. In Radovcic v. The Prince Pavle case (1942) a District Court in the United States dismissed a claim by a Yugoslav citizen against a Yugoslav vessel to recover damages for personal injuries due to the unseaworthiness of the ship. The Court established the evidence, but nevertheless it stated: ‘There can be no doubt that the law which governs the liability of the defendant is the law of Yugoslavia, the accident happening under its flag, upon a vessel and to a citizen of that country. A merchant ship on the high seas is of the country whose flag she flies, and the law of the flag applies to the right of action which arose on the seas. Jurisdiction and the laws of the nation accompany the ship not only on the high seas but everywhere else she may be waterborne …’. Cf., Briggs, op.cit. n. 46, p. 341.

53. Cf., Art. 8 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas; Arts. 32, 95 and 236 of the 1982 Convention.

54. Cf., Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op.cit. n.1, p. 853.

55. Ibid. p. 855.

56. Cf., Bartos, op.cit. n. 29, p. 179.

57. Colombos, op.cit. n. 12, pp. 273–274.

58. Of the same opinion is Rudolf, D., Medjunarodno pravo mora [International Law of the Sea] (1985) p. 48Google Scholar. See Art. 3 of the Definition of Aggression, adopted by the Resolution of the UN General Assembly 3314 (XXIX) on 14 December 1974.

59. The last point (j) of Art. 19(2), which refers to ‘any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage’, does not relate to activities of ships in foreign ports.

60. Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op.cit. n.1, pp. 853–854.

61. Cf., Hudson, M.O. ed., International Legislation, vol. 3 (1931) p. 1840.Google Scholar

62. Cf., Rousseau, op.cit. n. 10, p. 351.

63. Cf., Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op.cit. n.1., p. 855; Colombos, op.cit. n. 12, p. 275.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Cf., Art. 23 of the Institute of International Law's Hague Resolution of 1898, and Art. 25 of its 1928 Stockholm Resolution; Cavaré, L., Le droit international public positif (1962) p. 719Google Scholar; Rousseau, op.cit. n.10, p. 352.

67. See Art. 22 of The Hague Resolution and Art. 24 of the Stockholm Resolution. However, Colombos, op.cit. n. 12, p. 276, is of the view that in the absence of a bilateral agreement it is not the duty of the territorial authorities to intervene.

68. Cf., ICJ Rep. 1950, p. 284.

69. Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op.cit. n.1, p. 853.

70. This is the view of O'Connell, D.P., International Law, vol.2 (1965) p. 940.Google Scholar

71. Cf., Gidel, op.cit. n.20, p. 216.

72. Cf., Art. 8(3) of the Hague Resolution of 1898, and Art. 11 of the Stockholm Resolution of 1928; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op.cit. n.1, p. 857; Rudolf, op.cit. n. 58, p. 49.

73. For the British and the US practice, see Colombos, op.cit. n.12, p. 267–271.

74. Gidel, op.cit. n.20, p. 316. See also, Cavaré, op.cit. n. 66, pp. 724–725.

75. Cf., Jakasa, op.cit. n. 13, pp. 216–218;.

76. It was Denmark which first used these straight baselines in its 1912 Decree on Neutrality. This example was followed by Sweden in 1927, Cuba in 1934, Norway in 1935, Yugoslavia in 1948, Saudi Arabia in 1949, Egypt in 1951, etc.

77. Cf., ICJ Rep. 1951, pp. 116–206.

78. Cf., 46 (1) Annuaire (1956) pp. 69–71; see also 45 (1) Annuaire (1954) pp. 205–206.

79. O'Connell, op.cit. n.70, p. 551.

80. Cf., Katicic, N., ‘Vlast obalne drzave na pojedinim dijelovima mora prema Zenevskim konvencijama od 1958’ [The Powers of Coastal States on Various Parts of the Sea According to the Geneva Conventions of 1958], Zbornik za pomorsko pravo (1961) pp. 47–48.Google Scholar

81. Art. 4 provides for general rules in drawing straight baselines. Art. 5(1) is of basic importance, establishing the principle that ‘waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State’.

82. Rudolf, op.cit. n. 58, p. 35, who shares the view of Katicic, is of the opinion that even Art. 8(2) of the 1982 Convention remains a treaty provision which will bind parties to the 1982 Convention after its entry into force, as Art. 4(2) of the 1958 Convention, in his view, only binds the parties to it since it entered into force.

83. Unlike Art. 22(3b), according to Arts. 41(4) and 53(9) of the 1982 Convention, coastal States conclude a genuine agreement with the competent international organization on the sea lanes in straits under the regime of transit passage and on archipelagic sea lanes.

84. Cf., the Judgment of 24 February 1982, ICJ Rep. 1982, p. 91, para. 131. The Chamber of the Court in its Judgment of 12 October 1984, delimiting the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine, also took into account both opposite coasts of the Bay of Fundy belonging to Canada, as allegedly being ‘part of the Gulf of Maine’: cf., ICJ Rep. 1984, p. 336, para. 221. Judge Schwebel in his separate opinion reproached the majority that Canada itself considers that Bay as its internal waters, and he commented: ‘It is difficult to understand why the Chamber feels justified in basing its Judgment on this matter, to the benefit of Canada, on a criterion which Canadian law itself appears to obviate’, ibid. p. 354.

85. We have already dealt with these provisions when discussing the jurisdiction of a coastal State over foreign merchant ships in its ports.