1. I will confine myself here to a reference to Margaret Doxey's interesting “cost-benefit” analysis, “International Organisation in Foreign Policy Perspective”, The Yearbook of World Affairs (1975) pp. 173-95Google Scholar, and the literature cited therein. On p. 174 Doxey states, “There has been a tendency to assume that it [international organisation] is good per se and that more is better, and theories of federalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism have all looked for increased security and prosperity as a result of institutionalised integration. Experience dictates reservations in this regard; in particular, expectations of automatic progression towards closer independence can underestimate the extent of control retained within member States.”

2. See the remarks, “wise” indeed, relating to this in the Report on European Institutions of the “Committee of Wise Men” to the European Commission, October 1979 pp. 3–7.

3. Claude, Inis L., “The Growth of International Institutions”, in Brian, Porter, ed., International Politics 1919–1969 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972) pp. 281–300 at pp. 284, 286.Google Scholar

4. Jost, Delbrück, “Die völkerrechtliche Bedeutung der Schlussakte der Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa”, in Bernhardt, Rudolf et al. , eds., Drittes deutschpolnisches Juristen-Kolloquium, Band I: KSZE-Schlussakte (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1977) pp. 31–50 at p. 43.Google Scholar

5. See Wengler, W., Der Begriff des Politischen im internationalen Recht (Tübingen: Verlag J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1956) p. 42Google Scholar: “in der Tat [wird] gerade von Juristen häufig übersehen, dass das Recht nur eines der möglichen Mittel zu Verwirklichung unterschiedlicher Interessen an dem Verhalten andeier ist”.

6. For an example of an effort towards such an analysis, and the arguments for its importance, see Michel, Virally, “La deuxième décenne des Nations Unies pour le développement; Essai d'interprétation para-juridique”, XVI AFDI (1970) pp. 9–33Google Scholar, in particular pp. 9–10, 28.

7. Cf., Otto, Kimminich, “Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa und Menschenrechte”, Archiv des Völkerrechts (1977/1978) pp. 274–94, at p. 275Google Scholar: “Das Odium, weniger aktuell zu sein, muss der Jurist gelassen auf sich nehmen. Sogar Diffamierungen seiner Wissenschaft entheben ihn nicht der Pflicht, die rechtlichen Konsequenzen politischer Fakten mit juristischer Methodik zu untersuchen”.

8. See, by way of example, the study by the political scientist de Vree, J.K., “On the Origins and Growth of Law and Morals”, 23 Philosophica (1979) pp. 129-76.Google Scholar

9. See, for a report on the course of the Conference, the English text and Dutch translation: of the Final Act, and a commentary on the text of the Final Act, Publication No. 115 of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Conferentie over Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa; Helsinki–Genève–Helsinki 1973–1975 (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1976)Google Scholar, hereafter referred to as “BZ No.115”. The most important documents relevant to the Conference can be found in Hans-Adolf, Jacobsen et al. , eds., Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa Analyse und Dokumentation 1973–1978 (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politic, 1978).Google Scholar

10. For example, BZ No. 115 p: 11. See also, Friedrich-Karl, Schramm et al. , eds: Sicherheitskonferenz in Europa; Dokumentation. 1954–1972 (Frankfurt: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1972) pp. IX–XGoogle Scholar, where it is stated that the idea of collective security played a role in Russian foreign policy as early as in the 'twenties and thirties. The text of Molotov's proposal is given in Schramm, ibid. p. 363; see also pp. 364–5. For the main reasons for the rejection of this proposal by the Western countries, in which differences of opinion on the German question were central, see Wolfe, Thomas W., Soviet Power and Europe 1945–1970 (Baltimore & London: The John Hopkins Press, 1970) pp. 75-6.Google Scholar

11. Schramm, ibid. pp. 416–8. This took up an initiative of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rapacki, made in the UN General Assembly on 14 December 1964, ibid. pp. 415–6.

12. Ibid. pp. 425–35.

13. See the English language quotation in Wolfe, op.cit., in n. 10 p. 309.

14. Schramm, op.cit., in n. 10 p. XVII.

15. See the text of various Soviet proposals in 1954 and 1955, ibid. pp. 363–79 and 382–3, and the Declaration of Bucharest already mentioned, ibid. pp. 425–35. Mention can also be made of the so-called “First Rapacki Plan” from Poland in 1957, ibid. pp. 388–90.

16. See, inter alia, Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Völkerrecht beim Institut für Internationale Beziehungen an der Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft der DDR, Völkerrecht, Part 1 (East-Berlin: Staatsverlag, 1973) p. 194Google Scholar. The preamble to the Warsaw Pact, 219 UNTS 2962, speaks of the desire of the founding states “to create a system of collective security in Europe based on the participation of all European States, irrespective of their social and political structure”, and Art. 9 lays down that other states can accede to the Pact “irrespective of their social and political structure”. Art. 11, para. 2 says: “In the event of the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe and the conclusion for that purpose of a General European Treaty concerning collective security, a goal which the Contracting Parties shall steadfastly strive to achieve, the present Treaty shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the General European Treaty comes into force”.

17. The official commentaries are rather ambiguous in regard of this status quo because the Soviet Union originally adhered to the standpoint of German reunification. See, however, inter alia, Robin Alison, Remington, The Warsaw Pact; Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution (Cambridge, etc.. The MIT Press, 1971) p. 154Google Scholar. See also BZ No. 115 p. 12.

18. Concerning the Declaration of Bucharest, see Schramm, op.cit., in n. 10 pp. 430–1; see further, particularly, the Communique of Budapest of 17 March 1979, ibid. p. 452, and the Declaration of Prague of 31 October 1969, ibid. p. 475.

19. See, in particular, the Declaration of the North Atlantic Council of 24–5 June 1968 (the so-called “Reykjavik Signal”), in which the proposal was made to open discussions on mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR); NATO, Texts of Final Communiques 1949–1974 (NATO Information Service) pp. 206–9. See also, the impetus thereto in the “Harmel keport” of 1967, ibid. pp. 198–202.

20. The Non-Aggression Treaty of 12 August 1970 between the FRG and the Soviet Union, 9 ILM (1970) p. 1026, and the Treaty concerning Basis for Normalizing Relations of 18 November 1970 between the FRG and Poland, 10 ILM (1971) p. 127.

21. The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin of 3 September 1971, 10 ILM (1971) p. 895.

22. For the Communiqué at the end of the visit, see Schramm, op. cit., in n. 10 pp. 638–9. The abbreviation MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction) is still the most common in Western circles, though it has officially been replaced by the term MUR-FAAMCE (Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe); see, North Atlantic Assembly, Military Committee, Report on the Negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe, presented by Alfons Pawelczyk, October 1979, W 137, MC (79) 10 rev. 2.

23. See, the Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council of 30–1 May 1972 at Bonn, , Texts of Final Communiqués pp. 276-9.Google Scholar

24. This point was mentioned as early as the Declaration of the North Atlantic Council of 4–5 December 1969 at Brussels, ibid. pp. 229–32 at p. 231. Since that time it has regularly reappeared in the communiques of the biannual meetings of the Council; see, ibid. pp. 233–97.

25. See, besides the veiled terms in the Communiqué of the meeting of Foreign Ministers of 18–19 February 1971, Schramm, op. cit., in n. 10 pp. 565–7: Sanakoyev, Sh., “Peace in Europe and the Confrontation of the Two Systems”, International Affairs (Moscow), November 1972 pp. 7–15 at pp. 8–9Google Scholar. While traditional cultural relations and the exchanges connected thereto were counted as belonging to the area of interstate relations, this was not the case, for example, for matters such as emigration, immigration and the reunion of families. See, the passage in Mr. Brezhnev's 1972 speech cited in Nalin, Y. & Nicolayev, A., The Soviet Union and European Security (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973) pp. 108–9.Google Scholar

26. Proposals in the field of European security were bundled in the first imaginary Basket; proposals on co-operation in the economic, scientific, technological, and environment field in the second Basket; the third Basket contained proposals on the free flow of persons, ideas and information, and concerning cultural co-operation; the fourth Basket, proposals on the “follow-up”. These “Baskets” are frequently referred to in connection with the structure of the Final Act, a practice which will be followed in this lecture.

27. See, n. 9.

28. Andorra, which is under the joint suzerainty of the French President and the Spanish Bishop of Urgel, maintains no independent foreign relations. On the question of whether Albania could still sign the Final Act and participate in the “follow-up”, there is nothing laid down in the Final Act; this would obviously require the unanimous agreement of the participating states.

29. See, para. 65 of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, BZ No. 115 p. 204: “All States participating in the Conference shall do so as sovereign and independent States and in conditions of full equality. The Conference shall take place outside military alliances”. See also, Suzanne, Bastid, “The Special Significance of the Helsinki Final Act”, in Thomas, Buergenthal, ed., Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord (New York: Universe Books, 1977) pp. 11–9 at p. 12.Google Scholar

30. Para. 54 of the Final Recommendations, BZ No. 115 p. 201.

31. See, for example, Mojmir, Povolny, “The Soviet Union and the European Security Conference”, 18 Orbis (1974) pp. 201-30 at p. 207.Google Scholar

32. Via an announcement.by the Soviet Ambassador in Washington. The participation of Canada and the United States was approved during the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the WP countries on 21 and 22 June 1970 in Budapest; Schramm, op.cit:, in n. 10 p. 521.

33. Para. 57 together with para. 56 of the Final Recommendations, BZ No. 115 p. 201. During the second stage of the Conference, the following Mediterranean countries made use of the possibility offered: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia; see, the third paragraph of the preamble to the Final Act, BZ No. 115 p. 253.

34. See; para. 53 of the Final Recommendations, BZ No. 115 p. 200.

35. In particular in the preamble and Sections 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the second Basket, Section 4 of the third Basket and para. 1 of the fourth Basket.

36. In particular in Section 4 of the second Basket, Sections 3 and 4 of the third Basket and para. 1 of the fourth Basket.

37. See, Evgeny, Chossudovsky, “The Role of International Institutions in All-European ‘Extra-Political’ Cooperation: ECE and CSCE”, 14 Co-Existence No. 1 (1977) pp. 50-9 at p. 57Google Scholar. The International Labour Organisation is mentioned in Section 6 of the second Basket under “Economic and Social Aspects of Migrant Labour”.

38. The Final Act mentions, in Section 6 of the second Basket, under “Development of Transport”, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine and the Danube Commission. In connection with Section 3, “Harmonization of Standards”, one can think of the work of the International Organization for Standardization. Further, it is obvious that organizations such as the OECD, the EEC (including EPC), Comecon, NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Europe are involved with the follow-up in some way or other.

39. It should, of course, be borne in mind that the territory of the Soviet Union and Turkey is, to a large extent, outside the continent of Europe.

40. Paras. 14 and 15 of the Final Recommendations, BZ No. 115 p. 190.

41. See, for example, paras. 17 and 19 of the Final Recommendations, ibid.

42. In particular, in the Declaration of Principles of the first Basket, and under “Matters related to giving effect to the above Principles”.

43. See, the “Matters related …” referred to in the previous note, under (i), last para.

44. See, the Russian draft treaties on collective security in Europe of 1954 and 1955; Schramm, op. cit., in n. 10, pp. 364–5, 377–9, 382–3. For the various declarations in the framework of the Warsaw Pact and from individual WP countries on a future European Treaty, see, ibid., pp. 385, 386–8, 395–400, 402–5, 408, 413, 418, 434, 441.

45. Cf., Thomas, Buergenthal, “International Human Rights Law and the Helsinki Final Act: Conclusions”, in Thomas, Buergenthal, ed., Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord (New York: Universe Books, 1977) pp. 3–10, at p. 3Google Scholar: “formulated in treaty language without being a treaty”.

46. See, Theodor, Schweisfurth, “Zur Frage der Rechtsnatur, Verbindlichkeit und Völkerrechtlichen Relevanz der KSZE-Schlussakte”, 36 ZaöRV (1976) pp. 681–726, at p. 693Google Scholar, where he refers to the opinion of the Russian writer, S.A. Malinins, that on the basis of the concurrence of intention between the participating states, an agreement has come about which is comparable to a treaty as regards its legal consequences. This view is apparently taken also by Siegfried, Bock, “Festigung der Sicherheitin Europa; Kernstück der Schlussakte von Helsinki, 20 Deutsche Aussenpolitik” (1915) pp. 1623-39, at pp. 1626, 1630Google Scholar. For the Netherlands, see, Akkerman, R.J., “De Slotakte van Helsinki: recht, moraal of machtspolitiek”, XXXII Internationale Spectator (1978) pp. 29–35Google Scholar. The latter refers, inter alia, to the Russian writer, I.P. Blishchenko, who has said that the Final Act should be respected as a juridical document by the signatories; Akkerman himself even comes to the conclusion, on unclear grounds (p. 34), that the Final Act is “a binding norm of international law”, but a little further on (p. 35) states, somewhat cryptically, that the binding effect is not “immediate” for all provisions.

47. See, the review by Otto Kimminich, loc.cit., in n. 7 p. 276–81, of a number of writers.

48. See, the analysis of these declarations by Alfons, Klafkowski, “CSCE Final Act – the Basis for Legal Interpretation” in Polish Institute of International Affairs, Studies on International Relations, No. 8 (1977) pp. 76–87, at pp. 83-4Google Scholar. For the declarations themselves, see, Jacobsen, et al., op.cit., in n. 9, particularly p. 780 (Secretary-General Waldheim) p. 784 (Prime Minister Wilson) p. 802 (Prime Minister Moro) p. 809 (Chancellor Schmidt) p. 818 (President Giscard d'Estaing) p. 872 (President Ford) and p. 879 (Prime Minister Den Uyl).

49. 8 ILM (1969) p. 679.

50. Art. 2(1) (a) reads, “For the purposes of the present Convention ‘treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”.

51. See, ILC Yearbook 1965-I, particularly pp. 7–8, 15–6; idem 1966-II, particularly pp. 187–9.

52. As a subject of international law, the Holy See, co-signatory of the Final Act, is on the same footing as a state; Hyginus Eugene, Cardinale, The Holy See and the International Order (Gerrards Cross: Colin Smythe, 1976) pp. 115-7Google Scholar. The fact that the Italian Prime Minister, Moro, is also described as acting Chairman of the Council of the European Communities does not mean that the EEC as such is one of the signatories, though this organization is closely involved in the follow-up, on account of its exclusive competence in certain fields covered in the Final Act; see Moro's address at the closing session in Helsinki, BZ No. 115 p. 435.

53. See, in particular, the comprehensive analysis of Manfred Rotter on this point, “Die Abgrenzung zwischen völkerrechtlichem Vertrag und ausserrechtlicher zwischenstaatlicher Abmachung”, in Marcic, Rene et al. , eds., Internationale Festschrift für Alfred Verdross (Munich/Salzburg: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1971) pp. 413-34 at pp. 426-32Google Scholar. See also, Theodor Schweisfurth, loc.cit. in n. 46 pp. 685–8.

54. Nor did the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations pronounce upon the legal character of the future document. Schachter points out that governments generally prefer to leave this point open in the case of a not legally binding agreement, in order to make the authority of agreed matters as great as possible; Oscar, Schachter, “The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements”, 71 AJIL (1977) pp. 296–304, at p. 297Google Scholar. Romania, the Soviet Union and Switzerland in particular resisted the adoption of a provision on the not legally binding character; Russell, Harold S., “The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?”, 70 AJIL (1976) pp. 242-72 at p. 247.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

55. On the use of the term “Final Act”, inter alia: Krzysztof, Skubiszewski, “Der Rechtskarakter der KSZE-Schlussakte”, in Bernhardt, Rudolf et al. , eds., Drittes deutsch-polnisches Juristen-Kolloquium, Band I: KSZE-Schlussakte (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1977) pp. 13–30Google Scholar; Jean-Francois, Prevost, “Observations sur la nature juridique de l'Acte final de la Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe”, XXI AFDI (1975) pp. 129-53 at pp. 130-8.Google Scholar

56. See, Schachter, loc.cit., in n. 54 pp. 298–9; Schweisfurth, loc.cit., in n. 46 pp. 689–90.

57. This has been pointed out by Skubiszewski, loc.cit., in n. 55 pp. 15–6.

58. See, Wengler, W., “Die Abgrenzung zwischen völkerrechtlichen Normen und nichtvölkerrechtlichen Normen im internationalen Verkehr”, in Legal Essays, A Tribute to Frede Cassberg (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1963) pp. 332-52 at p. 333.Google Scholar

59. Such a provision is also to be found in other documents, which formally do not have the character of legally binding agreements. See, for example, the final part of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly in 1970, 9 ILM (1970) p. 1297. For the background to this sixth paragraph, see, BZ No. 115 p. 116.

60. It is remarkable in this context that two states made reservations, a fact which is hardly consistent with a not legally binding document. Cf., however, the practice with regard to UN resolutions, and the recent Dutch reservation concerning placement following the agreement reached within the context of NATO on 12 December 1979 on the modernization of nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

61. See, BZNo. 115 p. 95.

62. See, for the text, 30 Europa-Archiv (1975) p. D. 539. The English text was sent to me by courtesy of the Finnish Embassy in the Netherlands.

63. See, Schweisfurth, loc.cit., in n. 46 pp. 691–2 and the references therein.

64. Schweisfurth, ibid. p. 698: “Es wäre eine völlige Missachtung des Willens der Teilneh-merstaaten, wolle man sich in die Subtilitäten des Textes begeben, um vielleicht doch irgendwo eine rechtliche Verbindlichkeit entdecken zu wollen”.

65. For example, Schachter, loc.cit., in n. 54 passim.

66. Rotter, loc.cit., in n. 53 p. 414.

67. Mentioned by Schweisfurth, loc.cit., in n. 46, at n. 64.

68. See the declarations included in Jacobsen et al., op.cit., in n. 9, in particular p. 784 (Prime Minister Wilson) p. 802 (Prime Minister Moro) p. 815 (First Secretary Gierek) p. 818 (President Giscard d'Estaing) p. 822 (Secretary General Brezhnev) p. 872 (President Ford) p. 880 (Prime Minister Den Uyl) and p. 891 (President Ceausescu).

69. Cf., the observations of Schermers, H.G. on the task of legal science, Integratie van Internationale organisaties (inaugural lecture, Deventer: Kluwer, 1978) p. 3.Google Scholar

70. See, above, text between nn. 58 and 59.

71. These rules are laid down in Arts. 31–3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969; see, n. 49 above. An application by analogy of these rules is also recommended by Schweisfurth, loc.cit., in n. 46 p. 710.

72. Cf., Art. 31(3)(b) of the Convention mentioned in the previous note.

73. In particular in the Declaration of Principles and the “Matters related to giving effect to certain of the above principles”, linked thereto. See also, para. 17 of the Final Recommendations. For a comprehensive examination of the relationship with UN law, see, Victor-Yves, Ghebali, “L'Acte final de la Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe et les Nations Unies”, XXI AFDI (1975) pp. 73–127, especially pp. 80-3.Google Scholar

74. In this connection, see, in particular, Art. 2(6) of the Charter. See, however, the third of the introductory paras. of the Declaration of Principles, which contains the words “in conformity with their membership”.

75. This last definition is derived from Kapteyn, P.J.G., “De verwerking van nieuwe rechtsverschijnselen in de volkenrechtswetenschap”, RM Themis (1978) pp. 612-28, at p. 627.Google Scholar

76. Bos, M., “The Recognized Manifestations of International Law; A New Theory of ‘Sources’”, 20 German Yearbook of International Law (1977) pp. 9–76, at p. 14.Google Scholar

77. A doctoral thesis is currently being prepared, under the present author's supervision, by G.J.H. van Hoof, on the legal aspects of the Final Act of Helsinki. This study will contain an analysis of this type.

78. On this last point, see, Sohn, Louis B., “The Shaping of International Law”, 8 Georgia Journal of International Law (1978) pp. 1–25 at pp. 18–22Google Scholar. That a declaratory repetition of a principle in a not legally binding document leads, on the contrary, to a weakening of that principle, as argued by Wengler, W., “Rechtsvertrag, Konsensus und Absichtserklärung im Völkerrecht”, JZ (1976) pp. 193-7, at p. 194Google Scholar, does not seem to me to be acceptable, in any case when one is dealing with as important a document as the Final Act – the more so, since there is nothing to suggest that the participating states wished to “de-juridicize” these principles. See also, Skubiszewski, loc.cit., in n. 55 p. 25, and Dura, Ninčić, “The Nature and Significance of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe”, Revue Yougoslave de Droit International (1977) pp. 5–19, at p. 17.Google Scholar

79. Russell, a member of the American delegation, says on this point: “many observers think it may become in fact one of the most widely quoted sources of customary international law”, loc.cit., in n. 54 p. 248.

80. For the background history of this, see, Ghebali, loc.cit., in n. 73 p. 83 n. 71. See also, Thomas, Buergenthal, “International Human Rights Law and the Helsinki Final Act: Conclusions”, in: Thomas, Buergenthal, ed., Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord (New York: Universe Books, 1977) pp. 3–10 at p. 8.Google Scholar

81. For declarations of the various government representatives on this matter in the Sixth Committee, see, Doc. A/C.6/S.R. 1178–84; and in the General Assembly, GA/OR/, Plenary Meetings, 25 th Session 1860, Item 85. See also, the analysis of the 25th Session in 12 Harvard International Law Journal (1971) pp. 436–536, at pp. 509-19Google Scholar. The Declaration was adopted as an annex to Res. 2625(XXV) of 24 October 1970; 9 ILM (1970) p. 1292.

82. For the relevant travaux préparatoires, see, Ghebali, loc.cit., in n. 73 p. 83 and the reference in n. 67. For the reason why this Declaration was not expressly mentioned in the Decalogue, see, BZ No. 115 pp. 101–2.

83. In addition, the Final Act also contains references to, for example, UN declarations and resolutions concerning development and the environment; Ghebali, loc.cit., in n. 73 p. 84. However, each of the participating states wished to maintain its stand taken at the UN with respect to the UN documents on development; see, the sixth para, of the preamble to the second Basket.

84. See, Skubiszewski, loc.cit., in n. 55 pp. 22–4.

85. In my view Alting von Geusau overlooks this aspect when he states that these principles “are a re-affirmation at best of the, often violated, principles contained in the Charter”; Alting von Geusau, F.A.M., “Conflict Structure and Modes of Conflict Resolution; a Post CSCE Perspective”, Co-Existence No. 14 (1977) pp. 60-2 at p. 60.Google Scholar

86. See, Antonio, Cassese, “The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination”, in Thomas, Buergenthal, ed., op.cit., in n. 80 pp. 83–110, at pp. 93–105Google Scholar. For the Dutch proposal which was the basis of this, see BZ No. 115 p. 244.

87. See, inter alia, Walter, Rudolf, “Zusammenarbeit in humanitären und anderen Bereichen gemäss der KSZE-Schlussakte”, in Bernhardt, Rudolf et al. , eds., op.cit., in n. 55 pp. 97–135 at pp. 101-2Google Scholar. See also, BZ No. 115 pp. 102–3. For reactions from President Brezhnev himself to this, see, Kimminich, loc.cit., in n. 7 pp. 290–1. For “socialist internationalism” see, inter alia, Nalin and Nicolayev, op.cit., in n. 25 pp. 38–46.

88. For an extensive treatment, see, Louis, Henkin, “Human Rights and ‘Domestic Jurisdiction’”, in Thomas, Bueigenthal, ed., op.cit., in n. 80 pp. 21–40Google Scholar. Schachter, loc.cit., in n. 54 p. 301 refers to the estoppel effect of such an equation.

89. Skubiszewski, loc.cit., in n. 55 p. 25.

90. Russell, loc.cit., in n. 54 p. 259: “it was the intention of participants to apply treaties, agreements, and arrangements and rights and obligations in a manner consistent with the Declaration”. On the question of the extent to which a not legally binding document can resolve uncertainties: Schweisfurth, loc.cit., in n. 46 p. 716–7.

91. On systematic interpretation, see: Jost, Delbrück, “Die völkerrechtliche Bedeutung der Schlussakte der Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa”, in Bernhardt, Rudolf et al. , eds., op.cit., in n. 55 pp. 31–50 at p. 48Google Scholar; on interpretation according to the general rules of international law: Schachter, loc.cit., in n. 54 p. 302, and Buergenthal, loc.cit., in n. 80 p. 6; on good faith as a point of departure for interpretation: Manfred, Lachs: “Some Thoughts on the Role of Good Faith in International Law”, in Akkerman, R.J. et al. , eds., Declarations on Principles (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1977) pp. 47–55.Google Scholar

92. On the first signals of a dynamic interpretation: Skubiszewski, loc.cit., in n. 55 p. 24.

93. Schweisfurth, loc.cit., in n. 46 p. 717, “so dass die Schlussakte mittelbar zu einer rechtsverbindlichen Präzisierung der betreffenden Grundsätze führen kann”, see also, Buergenthal, loc.cit., in n. 80 pp. 6–7.

94. This is pointed at by, inter alia, Adam Daniel, Rotfeld, “Die Schlussakte der KSZE: Verbindlichkeitsgrundlagen und Verwirklichung”, in Bernhardt, Rudolf et al. , eds., op.cit., in n. 55 pp. 51–70 at p. 52.Google Scholar

95. Henkin, loc.cit., in n. 88 pp. 34–7.

96. See, Suzanne Bastid, loc.cit., in n. 29 p. 18.

97. See, North Atlantic Assembly, Final Report of the Sub-Committee on Détente, October 1979, W 146.PC/D (79)6.

98. See, Rotter, loc.cit., in n. 53 p. 420: “Staaten werden nur dann eine Materie in Form ernes völkerrechtlichen Vertrages mit anderen Staaten regeln, wenn die einer solchen Entscheidung zu Grande liegende Motive die Wahrscheinlichkeit für sich haben, während der zu erwartenden Geltungsdauer des Vertrages ihre subjective Gültigkeit zu behalten”.

99. Koers, A.W., Het internationale recht van de zee (public lecture, Deventer: Kluwer, 1979) pp. 6–10.Google Scholar

100. van Themaat, P. VerLoren, The Changing Structure of International Economic Law (Alphen a/d Rijn: A.W. Sijthoff, 1981).Google Scholar

101. Schermers, op.cit., in n. 69 pp. 7–8.

102. Timmermans, C.W.A., Het recht als multiplier in het Europese integratieproces (inaugural lecture, Deventer: Kluwer, 1978).Google Scholar

103. Skubiszewski, loc.cit., in n. 55 pp. 28–9. See also, Schweisfurth, loc.cit., in n. 46 p. 714.

104. E.g., SALT I, the Quadripartite Agreement, the Ost- Verträge and a number of agreements on arms control and disarmament. For the last of these, see, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1977).Google Scholar

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106. See, BZ No. 115 p. 100, and Russell, loc.cit., in n. 54 pp. 249–53.

107. See, Russell, loc.cit., in n. 54 p. 246.

108. Cited by Skubiszewski, loc.cit., in n. 55 p. 54. See also, ibid. p. 28: “Vorläufig sucht Europa Lösungen. Wenn sie gefunden werden, kommt dei Augenblick, sie in einem Vertrag zusammenzufassen”.

109. Schachter, loc.cit., in n. 54 p. 304.

110. See, the declaration of the American Minister, Vance, before the CSCE Committee: “The CSCE Final Act was approved by 35 heads of state and government after three years of intense negotiations. Undertakings of such gravity cannot subsequently be relaxed or overlooked”, Department of State, Third semi-annual Report to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (December 1977) p. 2Google Scholar. For an extensive survey of the capacity of the signatories, see, Prevost, loc.cit., in n. 55 pp. 143–5.

111. On the publicity, see, Rotfeld, loc.cit., in n. 94 p. 56.

112. For the characterization of the Final Act as a “Programme”, see, in particular, Skubiszewski, loc.cit., in n. 55 pp. 27–30. On this concept in a general international law context, see, Michel, Virally, “La notion de Programme – un instrument de la coopération technique multilatérale”, XIV AFDI (1968) pp. 530-3.Google Scholar

113. Cited in Skubiszewski, loc.cit, in n. 55 p. 55.

114. See, especially, the declaration of the Italian Prime Minister, Moro, on this matter, cited in Prevost, loc.cit., in n. 55 p. 142.

115. Michel, Virally, “La deuxième décenne des Nations Unies pour le développement; Essai d'interprétation para-juridique”, XVI AFDI (1970) pp. 9–33 at p. 29Google Scholar: “l'obligation morale est essentiellement une obligation de bonne foi”.

116. See, supra, text between nn. 108 and 111.

117. In this connection, see, the third para, of Section 1 of the third Basket, “Human Contacts”, where it was agreed “to develop, with the continuance of détente, further efforts to achieve continuing progress in this field”. See also, the third para, of Sections 2 and 3.

118. Cf., the reflections of Schachter on the creation of legally binding norms as a process: Oscar, Schachter, “Towards a Theory of International Obligation”, 7 Virginia Journal of International Law (1967) pp. 300-22, especially pp. 307-8Google Scholar. On p. 322 Schachter states that “we should recognize that legal obligations – whether national or international – also may involve ‘degrees’ and that it will depend on attitudes, expectations and compliance”.

119. See, for example, the definition in Brinkhorst, L.J., Grondlijnen van Europees Recht, 2nd ed. (Groningen: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1976) p. 1Google Scholar. See also, Schermers, Henry G., International Institutional Law, Vol. 1 (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1972) p. 6.Google Scholar

120. For an extensive treatment, see, Tomislav, Mitrović, “La continuité et l'institutionalisation de la Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe”, Revue Yougoslave de Droit International (1977) pp. 160-77.Google Scholar

121. See, Russell, loc.cit., in n. 54 pp. 245–6.

122. See, the proposals made during the Bucharest meeting on 21 and 22 June 1970, Schramm et al., op.cit., in n. 10 pp. 520–3, at p. 521.

123. See the description by Skubiszewski, loc.cit., in n. 55 p. 27.

124. See, supra, text between nn. 33 and 38.

125. See, Mitrović, loc.cit., in n. 120 p. 174.

126. See, the review of subjects for unilateral, bilateral and multilateral execution in BZ No. 115 pp. 92–4.

127. Cf., the report of the Working Group on European Co-operation and Security, “Some Institutional Suggestions for a System of Security and Co-operation in Europe”, Bulletin of Peace Proposals (1972) pp. 73–88, especially pp. 81-3Google Scholar: “Interim Stage: an alternative image”.