The UNESCO Courier of November 1977 carried an article in which Karel Vasak, the Director of the Organization's Division of Human Rights and Peace, called for the recognition of a ‘third generation’ of human rights: solidarity rights. The idea of solidarity rights was not new, but Vasak was the first to attempt to provide these rights with a conceptually valid place in the whole catalogue of human rights. For this purpose, he chose an attractive and, at first sight, an appealing formula. He took as his starting point three basic concepts and three types of revolution. The first revolution was the French Revolution of 1789, with its motto, ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’. In the course of this revolution it was, however, only the so-called freedom rights, the basic civil and political rights, which were actually realised. It was thanks to the Mexican and, in particular, the Russian Revolutions that a second generation of Human Rights gradually achieved universal recognition; these were the so-called equality rights: economic, social and cultural. We are currently experiencing a third revolution: the emancipation of colonized and dominated peoples, linked to total interdependence. One world or no world.

Turkish private international law is regulated by the Statute Regarding International Private Law and Procedure which was enacted on 20 May 1982 and became effective on 22 November 1982. This law repealed the former Temporary Law on Rights and Duties of Foreigners in Ottoman Lands of 23 February 1330 (1915) (hereinafter ‘Temporary Law’), which, although intended as a temporary law when enacted during the Ottoman period, was effective until 1982.

The formation of a parallel government, often in exile to supplant the incumbent government of a State, though this has occurred on many occasions, has been a contentious issue in international law and relations. Such an alternative government exists over a period of time not as a matter of design but as a result of a political or historical accident of the changing requirements of international life. Ever-growing international activities of such bodies have generated a great deal of controversy over their status, personality and competence in international law. The recently constituted Interim Government of Afghan Mujahideens in exile in Pakistan and its appeal for recognition is a contemporary case in point.

On 26 April 1988, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ‘the ICJ’ or ‘the Court’) delivered its Advisory Opinion on the Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947 (hereinafter ‘the PLO Mission case’). Although it might be argued that in this case the Court was not really called upon to deliberate or pronounce upon significantly fundamental issues of international law, the Opinion does raise a number of issues that may in time come to be regarded as landmark planks in the growing body of the Court's jurisprudence. But not all aspects of the Opinion can be cast in a positive light, at least from the point of view of some legal commentators. On the contrary, there are certain aspects of the decision which may arguably be characterized as a blot on the Court's jurisprudence. I propose to address two of these: the ICJ's approach to the interpretation of the provisions of the UN Headquarters Agreement which were at the centre of the dispute between the United Nations and the United States, and the question of prudential discretion as exercised by the Court in this particular case. But first, a discussion of the background facts.

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is founded upon certain values and institutions common to the legal systems of all the Contracting States. In the absence of such common values and institutions the attempt to create generally applicable guidelines for the balancing of the rights of individuals against the general interest will run into difficulties.

The exercise, in the political sphere, of powers traditionally characterized as inherent in his office has become a well-established and particularly important activity of the United Nations Secretary-General.

This article is premised on my belief that the use of force and violence should not be unlimited, even in times of war. Despite countless examples of apparently lawless wartime behavior, the fact that international wars are subject to limits is fairly well-accepted. The Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials evidence the consequences of having exceeded acceptable limits of violence and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 represent an extensive codification of those limits for international war. Most States are parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and many of the provisions of those treaties are recognized as customary international law.

Every legal system has its own forms of legal person. Dutch law knows of four types, and they are stated in Book 2 BW (Civil Code): the association and the foundation, the public and the private company with limited liability. These are legal persons because the law provides that they possess legal personality (Art. 3 Book 2 BW).

You will at once observe that the title of my talk does not ask you to consider whether trial by jury is an ideal mode of trial, nor whether the English law of defamation is ideal or even the best that there is. I rather suspect that Professor Markesinis has already told you that it is not. And certainly it is he and not I who is competent to undertake that wide comparative study. My purpose is simply to take our substantive law as it is and to ask whether, at the end of the 20th century, it is better that civil actions for defamation should be tried by judge and jury or by judge alone.

The constantly increasing pressure on the environment caused by the transboundary effects of human activities has posed the problem of defining the limits beyond which such transboundary deleterious effects become legally relevant under international law, giving rise to interstate claims of a compensatory, preventive or procedural nature. The abstract characterization of a certain intensity of transboundary environmental interference by using such attributes as ‘serious’, ‘appreciable’, ‘significant’, ‘considerable’, etc., has become an important method of describing that threshold. It is used in State practice mostly in rules of a general character – often in the absence of or in addition to specific environmental quality standards, limits or prohibitions. It plays a major role in defining the scope of the emerging rule of general international law prohibiting ‘significant’ transboundary environmental harm.

On 1 January 1958 the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) entered into force. The objectives of this Treaty are: the harmonious development of economic activities throughout the Community, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to the Community. These objectives are to be achieved by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of the Member States. This should ultimately result in the realisation of a common market, characterised by the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. Since the territory of the Contracting States is regarded as forming a single entity, the common market will have the characteristics of a vast domestic market.

The sea level is rising. One of the causes of this phenomenon is the so-called ‘greenhouse effect’. This concept refers to the rising of the temperature of the atmosphere as a result of the increase of the concentration of carbon dioxide and several other gases in the atmosphere. One of the consequences of this rise in temperature is the melting of land ice, in particular glaciers and the ice-caps of Greenland and perhaps Antarctica. This melting water enters the ocean, which results, in combination with the expansion of sea water as a consequence of its higher temperature, in a rising of the sea level.