On 7 June 2004 Professor Maarten Bos passed away peacefully at the age of 87. Professor Bos's passing away not only signifies the loss of one of the Review's founding fathers and its Honorary Editor-in-Chief, but first and foremost a friend and an inspiring and eloquent scholar, an international lawyer and professor pur sang.

Courts are frequently confronted with complaints about unequal treatment of various sorts, varying from legislative acts limiting the rights of inheritance of illegitimate children, to unequal taxation criteria for property taxes. The need to assess different cases of unequal treatment against the equality principle places before the courts a difficult task. The equality principle demands that the courts examine the reasonableness and justifiability of each specific case of unequal treatment, however different the subject. In doing so, the courts need to respect both the discretion or freedom of the party that is responsible for the difference in treatment, and the interests of the person or group that is disadvantaged by it. In order to enable the courts to take account of all interests at stake in any relevant equal treatment case, some variation in the intensity of review is indispensable. In some cases, it is appropriate to exercise restraint in assessing the justification for an inequality in treatment, while other cases call for the strictest scrutiny. In this contribution, the various factors that are relevant to the determination of the appropriate level of review are identified on the basis of a comparative study of the case law of the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights and the US Supreme Court. In addition, a standard is offered to balance intensity-determining factors pointing in different directions.

This article prospects some avenues of reflection on the rare, but interesting, case where two or more states are committed to a substantively equal obligation under different treaty instruments. To what extent can it be said, in such a case, that these states are bound by that treaty-rule in their inter se relations? It is clear that if the rule at stake reflects general customary international law, all states are bound by it, and no problem arises. But what if the rule is merely conventional? The article first explores the rather complex concept of ‘equal obligation’. The measure of that equality must be fine-tuned in several ways, since a similar text does not convey necessarily the same substantive obligation. The article proceeds to give some solutions to the problem posed at the inception, exploring the tension between the rule on privity of treaty (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt) and the rule of non-formality in treaty-law, i.e., that an obligation can be assumed in several informal ways, by looking at the substance.

The launching of the African Union on 9 July 2002 marked the turning of a new page in Africa's modern history. This is especially significant in the context of efforts by African nations to achieve deeper political unity and economic integration. The Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted barely nine months after the adoption of the Sirte Declaration on 9 September 1999, by which African leaders decided to reorient the objectives of the Organization of African Unity to accelerate African integration as a pillar of the continent's collective response to the challenge of globalization. This article argues that while the speedy elaboration, adoption and ratification of the Act demonstrated the collective desire of African countries to accelerate the process of integration, this rush inadvertently precluded a serious debate on the nature and scope of integration entailed in the project of the African Union. The result was the adoption of a document regarded by some of its own signatories, for varied reasons, as an instrument lacking in substance and limited in its scope. These perceived inadequacies have necessitated the early amendment of the Act. However, it is argued here that these amendments will do nothing to hasten the pace of African political unity or economic integration, as they are largely symbolic. They do not deal with the substantive lacunae identified in the Act.

The disputes relating to prompt release constitute an important part of the case law of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The frequency of the use of prompt release proceedings may be explained by the fact that illegal fisheries have increased owing to the exhaustion of biological resources. Considering that the exhaustion of renewable resources entails a serious problem, conflicts regarding illegal fisheries and the detention of vessels and crews will increase. This study examines the procedure for prompt release under Article 292 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea by focusing on the case law of the Tribunal. In particular, this study addresses the issues concerning substantive and procedural requirements provided in Article 292, locus standi, the relation between proceedings of the Tribunal and of domestic courts, and criteria for evaluating ‘reasonable’ bond.