Since 1995, Ethiopia has embarked upon a new federal system. Very little has been written about the process in general and about the manner in which the issues concerning the division of powers between the federal government and the states in Ethiopia are adjudicated The federal Constitution has several peculiar features. One of these relates to the institution empowered to interpret and adjudicate constitutional issues. Unless there is a tribunal that enforces the supremacy clause of the Constitution and that demarcates the proper sphere of the powers of the federal and state governments, chaos would result from jurisdictional conflicts. This power, by virtue of the federal Constitution belongs to the second chamber, otherwise known as the House of Federation. This article begins with a brief introduction of the federal system and proceeds to discuss the role, jurisdiction and procedure of the House of Federation (HOF) in the adjudication and interpretation of constitutional issues from a comparative perspective. It explains why vesting this power on the HOF, and not on the judiciary, was a policy choice.

Natural resources trust funds have been employed in the developed world since the 1970s in order to achieve a fair allocation of revenues and promote social growth. This model has been applied recently in developing economies, however lacking transparency and democratic oversight. As a result of increased public spending and depletion of the funds' assets, instead of economic growth, Dutch disease set in when oil prices fell. The World Bank-inspired Chad trust fund is the only of its kind with some external oversight and a contractual obligation by the recipient state to use the fund's earnings for social development. The idea is commendable, but implementation has been slack and if this model is to work in the future the Bank must condition similar loans to full external oversight, otherwise the whole operation will remain a farce.

There have been numerous unsuccessful attempts to define terrorism generically in international treaty law since the 1920s, from early conferences on the unification of criminal law to efforts in the League of Nations, the International Law Commission, and the UN General Assembly. While these sources do not carry great weight as evidence of customary law, they illustrate the recurring normative and political disputes surrounding definition and elucidate the basic features of an international prohibition and/or crime of terrorism, as perceived by different international actors. The recurrent attempts at definition indicate that the international community attaches considerable normative importance to it. Drafting of a UN Comprehensive Terrorism Convention continues in the Sixth Committee, and the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change advocated definition in treaty law in late 2004. Generic definition of terrorism can capture and stigmatize the political motives which distinguish terrorism from ordinary violent crime, or transnational organized crime for financial benefit. Following an historical pattern, agreement on the scope of any exceptions to a definition of terrorism remains the key obstacle, although much of the argument about exceptions is ideological, not substantive.

The Chinese practice with regard to universal jurisdiction should not be ignored when examining its legal status under contemporary international law. Article 9 of the Chinese Criminal Code 1997 (CC 1997) provides the domestic legal basis for the PRC to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those crimes stipulated in those concluded international treaties within the scope of obligations prescribed therein. This article explores the birth of the Chinese universal jurisdiction clause from a historical perspective, and makes a much-detailed interpretation of it in the combination of the jurisprudence and the most recent judicial practices. It is intended to clear up the misunderstanding widespread in the western world that the PRC never recognizes universal jurisdiction, and provides a picture of the Chinese understanding of universal jurisdiction in the CC 1997. However, due to the restrictions of the legal factors, such as the absence of certain international crimes and penalties in the CC 1997, the inability of applying the customary international criminal law in the Chinese courts, the requirement of the presence of the accused within the Chinese territory, as well as the respect of immunity for the persons with high official position, the effect of the Chinese universal jurisdiction clause is so restricted that it is almost impossible to play a role of suppressing international crimes, in particular those core crimes within the Rome Statute, in the international level.

Since 1 March 2002 the EC Regulation No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation) operates in legal practice. On 1 May 2004 the new EU Member States had to accept the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation as acquis communautaire. The Regulation is now in force in all EU Member States, with the exception of Denmark. As mentioned in the previous survey, it is the intention to conclude eventually a convention with Denmark in which the solutions reached under the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation will be laid down. Then the necessary unity in the application of the rules of jurisdiction and of recognition and enforcement will be restored again. According to Article 68 EC the EC Court of Justice can give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation. Although the first questions are put before the ECJ, there is no decision as yet in which the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation has been interpreted. In one decision regarding the interpretation of Article 5(3) Brussels Convention concerning the forum delicti, the ECJ referred to the solutions reached under the same provision in the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation. The Court decided that Article 5(3) Brussels Convention could also be used in case the harmful event might occur.