In a speech before the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly a few years ago, the representative of Israel, Dr. Jacob Robinson, pointed out that the area to which international law was applicable had expanded enormously in recent years owing to the emergence of many independent States. “Although these States had only recently gained their independence, they were the heirs to ancient civilizations and some way had to be found to combine their ancient traditions with the body of international law as developed in modern times”, he said. In drawing attention in this way to the problem of fusing ancient legal traditions to the main stream pf modern public international law, Dr. Robinson was giving expression to what has been a feature of the philosophical development of international law ever since it emerged during the seventeenth century. Without questioning the postulate of the universality of international law (although the term itself is subject to many, and at times irreconcilable, or at least conflicting, interpretations), it is generally recognized that international law, both in its substantive rules and in its procedures, is on the one hand influenced by, and on the other may, indeed must, draw upon, the general legal experience of mankind. Positive acknowledgment of these tendencies is found in Article 9 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which enjoins that the body of judges as a whole shall assure the representation of the ‘main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world’, a formula which, whatever other purposes it was designed to serve, also draws attention to certain features of what might be termed the intellectual elements of public international law, and as such, as is being increasingly recognized, it has wider implications.