At p. 10 supra, it was proposed to limit the use of the term “interpretation” to the written manifestations of law, i.e., to treaty (as defined in Article 2, paragraph 1(a), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), certain decisions of international organizations, and certain judicial decisions. The present study is concerned with the interpretation of treaties only. With regard to unwritten agreements (not coming under the said definition of treaty), it remains to be seen whether the methods and rules of interpretation also apply to them.

The present article deals with the fate of the 1976 Chlorides and Chemical Pollutants Conventions concluded by the riparian states of the Rhine and in the case of the latter Convention also by the EEC. It further analyzes the decision of 8 January 1979 taken by the District Court of Rotterdam in the case of certain Dutch horticulturists and the Dutch Stichting ‘Reinwater’ against the French Mines Domaniales de Potasse d'Alsace.

The author pleads that the Dutch Government institute proceedings against France before the I.C.J. considering the fact that the French Government refused to ratify the 1976 Chlorides Convention and the fact that the proceedings at present taking place before the Dutch Courts will not lead to a diminuition of the salt-load of the Rhine.

On 19 December 1978 the Dutch Government was informally requested by the UN Secretary-General to provide an infantry battalion for the UN peace-keeping force in Lebanon within the shortest possible time. France had decided to remove about half its UNIFIL contingent. On 12 January 1979 the Dutch Cabinet decided to inform the Secretary-General that, should he make an official request, the Government was willing to give a positive response.

It was these events that gave rise to a sequence of not less than five judicial decisions on the question whether conscripts could be posted to the Lebanon without their consent. Answering this question involved aspects of municipal as well as international law.

The survey is accompanied with the author's comments if necessary.

The Civil Code of Quebec was enacted in 1866. It codified the then existing law which was largely of French origin. The Code was modelled on the French Civil Code but to the three books into which that Code was divided was added a fourth book dealing with commercial law. In this respect, therefore, the French tradition of a separate commercial code was not followed. The codification was regarded as an affirmation of French legal culture in the face of the growing threat of a penetration by English law. Nevertheless, both in the codification stage and in the subsequent evolution of the law, concessions were made to the English legal system. For instance, the trust was introduced into the Civil Code. Again, the fact that final appeals from decisions of the Quebec courts could be brought before courts which were dominated by English-trained judges contributed to the penetration of English legal concepts.1 For instance, these courts applied English ways of interpreting statutes to the construction of Code provisions. On the whole, Quebec courts tried to resist these tendencies and to preserve as far as possible the French character of the legal system. They were hampered, however, in these efforts because they were compelled to accept the English view that decisions of the superior courts constituted binding precedents.

Little is known about the law of prize applied in Holland and Zealand before a Court of Admiralty was established in 1488. Even as regards the functioning of this institution, the so-called ‘Admiralty of Vere’, our knowledge is scanty. Yet, the prize law of the Low Countries in the 15th and 16th centuries is not an unimportant subject for research. It is certain that precedents from this period had a considerable influence on Dutch practice after 1572, i.e., during the Republic's war against Spain. Even though the subject of prize law proper has been rather neglected in the otherwise well-studied ‘Golden Age’ of Dutch history, it is evident that the Dutch Republic, a first-rate maritime power, did much to shape important rules of International Law, such as the famous maxims that “blockades must be effective” and that “free ships make free goods”. Obviously, it would be interesting to uncover the historical roots of these much-debated principles of the International Law of maritime warfare. Moreover, an added zest is given to the study of Dutch prize law by its inevitable association with Grotius. His De Jure Praedae, in spite of its promising title, reveals less about Grotius' historical studies than De Jure Belli ac Pads in which a 1438 decision of the Court of Holland concerning the treatment of neutrals is twice quoted.