The United Nations and African Union agreed, late 2006, on conducting a hybrid operation in Darfur, in a remarkable turnaround from the UN's quest to deploy an autonomous force, which, it was anticipated, would take over the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). This agreement was formalised by Resolution 1769 adopted on 31 July 2007, establishing the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In addition to discussing the various implications of the proposed hybrid operation on the law of peacekeeping and collective security law, this article examines the individual response of the AU and UN to the crisis. It investigates the factors that dictated the AMIS's tepid mandate, and argues that the UN's quest for the Sudan's consent, as a precondition for deploying UNAMID was unnecessary, and that the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)'s original mandate provides a solid legal basis for enforcing the will of the international community in Darfur.