3. Report of the Secretary-General, CM/2210 (LXXIV). Council of Ministers, 74th Ordinary Session/9th Ordinary Session of the AEC, 2–7 July 2001.

4. Art. 28 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union provides that ‘[t]his Act shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by two-thirds of the member States of the OAU’. Text available at OAU Website: http://www.oau-oua.org/LOME2000/Africa%20Union%20Con-stitutive%20Act%20 ENG.htm (29 November 2001).

5. J. Muhammad, ‘African Leaders: “Let us Unite” OAU Summit Ends in Agreement to Speed Pace Towards One Africa’, http://www.finalcall.com/international/1999/oau9–21–99.htm (29 November 2001).

6. The 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in Lome, Togo, from 10 to 12 July 2000. It was at this meeting that the Constitutive Act of the African Union was formally adopted. See CM/2210 (LXXIV), supra n. 3.

7. The establishment of the AU owes much to the adoption of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (the Abuja Treaty) in 1991, in Abuja, Nigeria, which came into force in 1994. This treaty has been referred to by African leaders frequently as setting the tone of a wider dimension to regional integration, which the AU Act would seem to have codified. See text at: http://www.oau-oua.org/document/Treaties/Abuja%20Treaty.htm (29 November 2001).

8. The meeting of African leaders at Sitre took place in two phases. The first was between 8–9 September 1999, to discuss ‘the pace at which Africa is moving in the face of such global challenges’. The first meeting resulted in the Sitre Declaration of 9 September 1999. The second phase of the Sitre Meeting took place between 1–2 March 2001, which led to the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. See the Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Sitre Decision on the African Union (EAHG/Dec.l [V]).

9. ‘Long live the African Union’, an Interview with Minister Abdul Muhammed, who represented the Nation of Islam at Sitre Meetings. See Final Call Online Edition, http://finalcall.com/perspectives/ interviews/akbarO3–20–2001.htm (29 November 2001).

10. ‘Gadhafi says African Unity Stronger Than Nuclear Bombs’, See Final Call Online Edition, http://finalcall.com/international/africa%5Funion03%2D27%2D2001b.htm (29 November 2001).

11. Ibid.

12. Supra n. 9.

13. In its 35 years of existence, the OAU adopted 20 treaties. Of these, only 14 are currently in force, including the Constitution of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations of 1974, which is only provisionally in force. See Maluwa, T., ‘International Law-Making in the Organization of African Unity: An Overview’, 12 RADIC (2000) p. 201 at p. 202.Google Scholar

14. Robertson, A.H. and Merrills, J.G., Human Rights in the World (Manchester, Manchester University Press 1996) p. 242.Google Scholar

15. Ibid., at p. 254 (arguing that ‘the Charter is the first international agreement to list collective rights in detail but not the first to mention them’).

16. See ACHPR, Art. 23. (Robertson and Merrills contend that ‘although no other instrument guarantees the right explicitly, the Universal Declaration comes close in its Article 28’, op. cit. n. 14, at p. 255.)

17. ACHPR, Art. 23(2)(b). See Robertson, and Merrills, , op. cit. n. 14, at p. 255.Google Scholar

18. Art. 4(g) Constitutive Act of the AU.

19. Art. 4(h).

20. Ibid.

21. Examples of such conflicts include the Rwanda genocide (1994), Liberia (1989–1997), Sierra Leone (1997-present), Congo (1998-present), and so on.

22. For a comprehensive account on the work of the OAU see Naldi, G.J., The Organization of African Unity: An Analysis of its Role, 2nd edn. (London, Mansell 1999)Google Scholar; Sesay, A., ‘The Limits of Peace-keeping by Regional Organizations: The OAU Peacekeeping Force in Chad’, 11 Conflict Quarterly (1991) p. 7.Google Scholar

23. See Maluwa, loc. cit. n. 13.

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30. Final Communique, Meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff of Contributing States of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, Abuja, 15 April 1999, para. 9(a) on file with the authors.

31. For a review of the joint action by ECOWAS and the UN in Sierra Leone, see Abass, A., ‘The Implementation of ECOWAS New Protocol and Security Council Resolution 1270: New Developments in Regional Intervention’, 10 University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review (2002) (forthcoming).Google Scholar

32. Art. 2(e).

33. ECOWAS is composed of the Republics of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’lvoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, (the Islamic Republic of) Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

34. SADC members are: The Republics of Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa. Zambia, Zimbabwe, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland. Text of the Protocol on file with authors.

35. For the text of and commentary on this treaty, see Abass, A.. ‘The New Collective Security Mechanism of ECOWAS: Innovations and Problems’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2000) p. 211 (treaty annexed).Google Scholar

36. AHG/Decl. 1–6 (XXXVI); AHG/St. 1–3 (XXXVI).

37. AHG/Decl. (XXXVI).

38. AHG/Decl. 4 (XXXVI).

39. Ibid., para. 1.

40. Ibid., para. 4.

41. Ibid.

42. For the place and status of Principles in the law-development of the OAU, see Maluwa, loc. cit. n. 13.

43. Supra n. 38.

44. Ibid.

45. AHG/Decl. 2 (XXXVI).

46. The Lome Declaration on HIV/AIDS in Africa was also adopted, AHG/Decl. 3 (XXXVI).

47. AHG/Decl. 2 (XXXVI), Preambular para. 4.

48. Ibid., para. 5.

49. See Naldi, , op. cit. n. 22Google Scholar; Cot, J.-P., ‘The Role of the Inter-African Peacekeeping Force in Chad, 1981–1982’, in Cassese, A., ed., The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of force (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986) p. 167Google Scholar; Alagappa, M., ‘Regional Arrangements, the UN, and International Security; A Framework for Analysis’, in Weiss, T., ed., Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs (London, Macmillan Press Ltd. 1998) p. 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar; C. Adibe, ‘The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership’, in Weiss, ed., ibid., at p. 67.

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51. Para. F.

52. Para. 1.

53. Para. 2.

54. GA Res. 2131, UN GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, p. 11, UN Doc. A/6014 (1965) (adopted by 109 votes to none, with the United Kingdom abstaining); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Friendly Relations Resolution), GA Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, p. 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970) adopted by consensus); Declaration of Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, GA Res. 36/301, UN GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 31, Art 1., UN Doc. A/36/761 (1982); Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314, UN GAOR 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, p. 142, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974). For an analysis of this principle, see Kritsiotis, D., ‘Reappraising Policy Objections to Humanitarian Intervention’, 19 Michigan JIL (1998) p. 1008.Google Scholar

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57. The conflicts in Congo, Chad, and Liberia were believed to have been covertly or overtly supported by foreign governments. For instance, the United States and France supported the two factions in the Chadian conflict against each other. See Naldi, G.J., ‘Peace-keeping Attempts by the Organisation of African Unity’, 34 ICLQ (1985) p. 593.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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59. For a documentation of the events in Chad, see Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives (1982) pp. 31677–31680.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., p. 29842.

62. For an analysis, see Cot, , op. cit. n. 49, at p. 167.Google Scholar

63. For a good analysis of this, see Naldi, , op. cit. n. 22, at p. 595.Google Scholar

64. Adibe, , op. cit. n. 49, at p. 69.Google Scholar

65. Art. 3 of the Charter of the Organisation of American States, 30 April 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394; 119 UNTS p. 3Google Scholar, reprinted in 33 ILM (1994) p. 981Google Scholar, as amended by the Protocol concluded by the OAS at the Cartegena de Indias, 5 December 1985. General Assembly Document OEA/Ser.P, AG/doc. 16 (XIV-E/85) rev. 2, 26 February 1986.

66. Ibid.

67. Art. 3 OAS Charter.

68. Arts. 27, 28 and 116. See also the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), 1947, OEA/Ser. X/11, Treaty Series No. 61.

69. Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Sitre Declaration on The African Union (EAHG/DEC.1(V)); see also, Council of Ministers, Seventy-fourth Ordinary Session/Ninth Ordinary Session of the AEC 2–7 July 2001, CM/2210 (LXXIV).

70. See Naldi, op. cit. n. 22.

71. The Chadian President, President Goukouni, had invited the OAU in 1981 into Chad. However, when the currents of the civil war began to move against him and the OAU maintained astute impartiality, the president became extremely hostile to the OAU forces, a circumstance, which was rightly perceived by the OAU as a withdrawal of consent by the president. The OAU withdrew from Chad. See Naldi, op. cit. n. 22; see also, Gray, C., International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2000) p. 217.Google Scholar

72. See Durch, W., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Study and Comparative Analysis (New York, Martin’s Press 1993) particularly at p. 124.Google Scholar

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75. The Security Council had adopted Resolution 504, in response to the OAU appeal, and called on the Secretary-General to establish a special fund for the purpose of the OAU mission in Chad. However, by June 1982, two months after the Security Council proposed the fund, the intervention of the OAU in Chad ended.

76. See Alagappa, , op. cit. n. 49, at p. 15Google Scholar (noting that ‘the OAS relaxed the commitment to the principle of non-intervention’).

77. El-Ayoutty, Y., ‘An OAU for the future’, in El-Ayoutty, Y., ed., The Organisation of African Unity Thirty Years On, cited by Alagappa, at p. 17.Google Scholar

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79. See Report of the Secretary-General, CM/2210 (LXXIV), supra n. 3, at p. 10.

80. Art. 3(f).

81. Art. 3(g).

82. Art. 4(d).

83. Art. 4(e).

84. Art. 4(f).

85. Art. 4(g).

86. Art. 4(h).

87. Art. 4(i).

88. Art. 4(j).

89. Art. 4(h).

90. Maluwa, loc. cit. n. 13.

91. GA Res. 2131, UN GAOR,20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, UN Doc. A/6014(1965)adopted by 109 member states with one abstention by the United Kingdom); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625, UNGAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, p. 21, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970) (unanimously adopted); Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314, UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, p. 142, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974); Declaration of the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the internal Affairs of States, GA Res. 36/301, UN GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 31, UN Doc. A/36/761; and finally, Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of refraining from the Threat or Use of Force, GA Res. 42/44, UN GAOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. No. 41, UN Doc. A/42/41 (1987). For a history and principle of the doctrine of ‘non-intervention’ see Kritsiotis, , loc. cit. n. 54, at p. 1008Google Scholar

92. Ibid.

93. Under this article, member states solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. The collective nature of this undertaking is to be distinguished from the individual restrain of Art. 4(g) of the Act.

94. Hohfeld, W.N., Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (Connecticut, Greenwood Press Publishers 1964) p. 5.Google Scholar

95. Schermers, H.G. and Blokker, N.M., International Institutional Law, 3rd edn. (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995) pp. 59–62.Google Scholar Both describe a supranational organization as one which can make binding decisions for its members and which can act independently of the cooperation of its members. It also can bind members against their will. Because of these massive powers of a supranational organisation, Schermers and Blokker observe that ‘no such supranational organization currently exists’ (p. 62). Thus, the present authors adopt the relative sense in which Schermers and Blokker use the term to the extent that ‘all intergovernmental organizations have some supranational aspects’, ibid.

96. The singular objection of the leader of a state in conflict (attending the Assembly) against the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State to intervene will be immaterial because Art. 7(1) of the Act provides that ‘[t]he Assembly shall take its decisions by consensus or failing which, by a two-thirds majority of the Member States of the Union [emphasis added]’.

97. Brownlie, I., International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1963) pp. 267–268CrossRefGoogle Scholar, arguing particularly that ‘[n]or is it possible to argue that the phrase must be given its “plain meaning” which “coincides with the limitations on the obligations of non-intervention which traditional international law recognises” … [I]t is difficult to accept a “plain meaning” which permits evasion of obligations by means of a verbal profession that there is no intention to infringe on territorial integrity’).

98. Bowett, D.W, Self-Defence in International Law (Manchester, Manchester University Press 1958) pp. 12–13, 152.Google Scholar

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100. Ibid., at p. 292.

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106. 382 UNTS No. 5475

107. 16 ILM (1977) p. 1022.Google Scholar

108. Antonopolous, C., The Unilateral Use of Force by States in International Law (Athens, Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers 1997) p. 514.Google Scholar

109. Ibid., at p. 511.

110. The provision in Art. 4(h) of the AU Act conferring the Union with the right to intervene in a member state constitutes a consent precedent by every member state of the Union to that effect.

111. Curzon, L.B., Dictionary of Law, 4th edn. (London, Pitman Publishing 1994) p. 316.Google Scholar

112. Oppenheim, L., International Law: A Treatise, 7th edn. (London, Longman 1948) p. 447.Google Scholar

113. Ibid.

114. In 1965, the OAU was granted an observer status by the General Assembly. See United-Nations-Organization of African Unity Co-operation Agreement of 15 November 1965, 548 UNTS p. 316.Google Scholar

115. Art. 53(1) second clause.

116. See supra n. 35.

117. Art. 4(h).

118. 37 ILM (1998) pp. 999–1019.Google Scholar Arts. 6, 7 and 8 define ‘genocide’, ‘crime against humanity’ and ‘war crimes’ respectively.

119. Art. 7(1) AU Act.

120. Art. 9 of the AU Act establishes the general functions of the Assembly.

121. ECOWAS argued that it is costly in terms of human and material resources to keep waiting for the UN authorisation before acting. See Abass, loc. cit. n. 31.

122. Ibid.

123. See Elihu Lauterpacht’s foreword to Weller, ed., op. cit. n. 28, at p. ix.

124. But see Murphy, J.F., ‘Force and Arms’, in Joyner, C., ed., United Nations and International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1997) p. 102.Google Scholar

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128. Examples of these are at both regional and international levels. Regarding the former, ECOMOG was ‘accused of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law’ (see, for instance, Zwanenburg, M., ‘Double Standards in Peacekeeping? Subcontracting Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Law’, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law (1999) p. 753 at p. 754).CrossRefGoogle Scholar This author argues that ‘[w]ithin ECOMOG an internal mechanism is set up for the investigation of violations of international humanitarian law. There have been few investigations undertaken with respect to the allegations of summary executions, however’, ibid. At the international level, Canadian contigent members of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), ‘shot an intruder in the back and tortured a teenager. Both Somali were killed in the Canadian compound. Both were unarmed.’ For an account of the attempted cover-up of the incident, see The Economist, April 1996, p. 44. See also Berman, E., ‘The Security Council’s Reliance on Burden-Sharing: Collaboration or Abrogation?’, 4 International Peacekeeping (1998) p. 1 at p. 6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

129. See ‘The EU and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)’, the European Union in the US Website at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/HumanRights.htm (4 February 2002).

130. See 9th Preambular Paragraph and Art. 11(1) (e) of the OAU Charter, 479 UNTS p. 39.Google Scholar

131. Adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, rev.5. See 21 ILM (1982) p. 59.Google Scholar

132. See, e.g., Claude, E. W., ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Five Year Report and Assessment’, 14 Human Rights Quarterly (1992) p. 43Google Scholar, Odinkalu, C.A. and Christensen, C., ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Development of its Non-State Communication Procedures’, 20 Human Rights Quarterly (1998) p. 235.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also the Twelfth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights – 1998–1999, available at University of Minnesota Human Rights Website at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/12thannualrpt.htm (17 October). See also generally Murray, R., The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights and International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2000).Google Scholar

133. This is in comparison to the European and Inter-American human rights regimes. See Steiner, H.J. and Alston, P., International Human Rights in Context, 2nd edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2000) p. 920Google Scholar. See also Mutua, M., ‘The African Human Rights Court: A Two-Legged Stool?’, 21 Human Rights Quarterly (1999) p. 342 at pp. 343–344.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

134. See OAU Sirte Declaration of 9 September 1999, para. 6.

135. The Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action on Human Rights in Africa 1999 CONF/HRA/DECL (I) was issued on 16 April 1999 after the First OAU Ministerial Conference on Human Rights held in Grand Bay, Mauritius from 12 to 16 April 1999. The Cairo Agenda for Action was adopted by the 31 st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity held in Cairo from 26 to 28 June 1995.

136. See Art. 3(e) and (h) of the AU Constitutive Act.

137. Art. 4(l).

138. Art. 4(m).

139. Art. 4(o).

140. Art. 3(h).

141. Art. 4(m).

142. The AHSG of the OAU has previously resolved in the Cairo Agenda for Action in 1995 to, inter alia, promote good governance, peace and security based on the principles of respect of human rights and dignity in Africa. See Cairo Agenda for Action in 1995, supra n. 135, para. 10(i). Also in the Grand Bay Declaration and Plan of Action (1999), the OAU Ministerial Conference declared that ‘the promotion and protection of Human Rights is a matter of priority for Africa’.

143. In the 4th Preambular Paragraph of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the OAU member states did recognise this ‘two-fold objective of … the protection and promotion of Human and Peoples’ Rights’, OAU/LEG/AFCHPR/PROT.(III)(1998).

144. See UN Doc. A/54/216, 12 August 1999, para. 4 and UN Doc. SG/SM/99/91, 7 April 1999, para. 3.

145. See, e.g., Council of Europe, Human Rights Every Day, the Impact of the Council of Europe's Work in the Field of Human Rights (Strasbourg, Human Rights Information Centre, Council of Europe 1996).Google Scholar

146. Grand Bay Declaration, para. 22.

147. See Steiner, and Alston, , op. cit. n. 133, at p. 921.Google Scholar

148. Ibid.

149. See Grand Bay Declaration, supra n. 135, 7th Preambular Paragraph.

150. Art. 3(f) of AU Act.

151. The specialized technical committees established under Art. 14 (1) are the Committee on Rural Economy and Agricultural Matters, the Committee on Monetary and Financial Affairs, the Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters, the Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment, the Committee on Transport, Communications and tourism, the Committee on Health, Labour and Social Affairs, and the Committee on Education, Culture and Human Resources.

152. See Art. 5(1).

153. See Art. 5(2) and Art. 9(d).

154. The Act only defines the functions of the Assembly, the Executive Council, the Specialized Committees and the Permanent Representative Committee. The functions of other organs will be defined either in Protocols to the Act or by the General Assembly. See Arts. 17, 18, 19, 20, 22.

155. Established under Art. 30 of the ACHPR, 21 ILM (1982) p. 58.Google Scholar

156. Established under Art. 32 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 29 November 1999.

157. See Art. 30 of the ACHPR and Art. 32 of the ACRWC, ibid.

158. Emphasis added.

159. Supra n. 157.

160. See specifically Art. 33(1) and (3).

161. See supra n. 143.

162. See ibid, 7th Preambular Paragraph.

163. The Protocol will enter into force one month after ratification by 11 member states. See Art. 31(3) ibid.

164. See Decisions on the Implementation of the Sirte Summit Decision on the African Union, OAU Doc. AHG/Decl. 1 (XXXVII), para. 8 (emphasis added).

165. See Decision on the 14th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc. AHG/Decl. 3 (XXXVII).

166. I.e., The ACmHPR, the ACERWC and the prospective ACtHPR.

167. See, e.g., Murray, op. cit. n. 132, Preface.

168. See Art. 3(l)of the Protocol Establishing the ACtHPR, supra n. 143.

169. See Art. 22 of the AU Act.

170. This is one of the functions and powers of the ECOSOC under Art. 62(2) of the UN Charter.

171. See text to n. 129 above.

172. Supra n. 79.