1. For Liberia generally, see the following texts: Dunn, E. D. and Holsoe, S. E., Historical Dictionary of Liberia (1985);Google ScholarSchick, T. W., Behold the Promised Land. A History of Afro-American Settler Society in Nineteenth Century Liberia (1977);Google ScholarLiebnow, J. G., Liberia. A Quest for Democracy (1987);Google ScholarJohnson, R. E., Liberia. America's African Friend (1952);Google ScholarBeyan, A. J., The American Colonization Society and the Creation of the Liberian State. A Historical Perspective (1991);Google ScholarGershoni, Y., Black Colonialism. The Americo-Liberian Scramble for the Hinterland (1985).Google Scholar

2. For reports of human rights violations in Liberia during Doe's regime see, for example, 1985 Amnesty International Report (1985) pp. 59–61;Google Scholar1987 Amnesty International Report (1987) pp. 66–68;Google Scholar1989 Amnesty International Report (1989) pp. 62–64.Google Scholar

3. For the nature of the economic problems facing Liberia during Doe's administration see, for example, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Economic Survey of Liberia (1984) pp. 1–4;Google ScholarEconomist Intelligence Unit, Ghana, Sierra Leanoe, Liberia Country Report, No. 1 (1989) pp. 31–37.Google Scholar

4. Ofuatey-Kodjoe also ascribes the outbreak of the conflict to ethnic international and regional factors. See Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W., ‘The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia: Regional Organizations and the Internal Conflicts’, Occasional Paper Series No. XVII, The Ralph Buche Institute of the United Nations (04 1994) pp. 2–13.Google Scholar

5. See West Africa Magazine (8–14 January 1990) pp. 33–34.Google Scholar

6. Established in 1975 for the purpose of closer economic cooperation among its members, the ECOWAS Member States are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. See 14 ILM (1975) p. 1200. For a general introduction to ECOWAS see Asante, S. K. B., Political Economy of Regionalism: A Decade of the Ecomomic Community of West African States (1986);Google ScholarEzenwe, U., ECOWAS and the Economic Integration of West Africa (1983);Google ScholarIrele, M., The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): A Bibliography and Sourcebook (1990);Google ScholarDiejomaoh, V. P. and Iyoha, M. A., eds., Industrialization in the Economic Community of West African States (1980);Google ScholarAkinyemi, A. B., Falegun, S. B. and Aluko, I. A., eds., Readings and Documents in ECOWAS (1984);Google ScholarEdozien, E. C. and Osagie, E., eds., Economic Integration of West Africa (1982).Google Scholar

7. The intervention entailed the following. Firstly a cease-fire monitoring group was to interpose itself between the warring factions and, forcibly if necessary, end the fighting. After this, the next stage was the reconstruction of Liberian civil society by installing an interim administration and organizing presidential elections. See Decision A/DEC. 1 August 1990, 21 Official Journal of the ECOWAS (cited hereafter as ‘Official Journal’) (1992) pp. 6–8;Google Scholar Decision A/DEC. 2 August 1990, ibid., p. 8; West Africa Magazine (16–22 July 1990) p. 2126;Google Scholar 27 Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series (1–31 07 1990) no. 7, p. 9772 col. C.Google Scholar

8. See 27 Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series),Google Scholaribid.., p. 9772 C-9773 B.

9. In actual fact, apart from the Armed Forces of Liberia, there were five rebel groups, namely: the NPFL, the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), the Nimba Redemption Council, the Liberia Peace Council and the Lofa Defence Force. See, for example, The Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, S/1994/168,14 February 1994, paras. 18–19.Google Scholar This Report mentions unverified accounts of another rebel group called the Bong Resistance Movement, para. 19.

10. The words ‘blockade’, ‘siege’ and ‘embargo‘ are used interchangeably throughout this article.

11. See West Africa Magazine (20–26 January 1992) p. 102;Google ScholarWest Africa Magazine (2–8 November 1992) pp. 1868–1869.Google Scholar

12. The right to food is contained in two major human rights instruments, namely: Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Annex to General Assembly Resolution 2200 (XXI), and the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition (UDEHM) adopted by the World Food Conference and endorsed by the UNGA in Res. 3348 (XXIX) (December 1974).

Art. 11 of the ICESCR states that:

‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realisation of this right…'

The UDEHM also stresses that:

‘Every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop fully and maintain their physical and mental faculties…’

Furthermore, the Conference declared that:

‘It is a fundamental responsibility of Governments to work together for higher food production and a more equitable and efficient distribution of food between countries and within countries…’

For an analysis of the international legal regime on food see, for example, Alston, P. and Tomasevski, K., eds., The Right to Food (1984);Google ScholarBrownlie, I., The Human Right to Food (1987).Google Scholar

13. The Communiqué is reprinted in the Official Journal, op. cit. n. 7, pp. 43–45.

14. See Standing Mediation Committee Extract from the Final Communiqué of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Abuja, Nigeria, 4–6 July 1991, reprinted in the Official Journal, op. cit. n. 7, p. 48. Nigeria, for example, announced the establishment of a Fund to assist in the post-war reconstruction process in Liberia, see 28 Africa Research Bulletin (1–31 January 1991)p. 9714 C.Google Scholar

15. Res. A/RES. 3 November 1990 Relating to the Intensification of Humanitarian Relief Work Being Done in Liberia by the International Community and its Humanitarian Organisations, Official Journal, op. cit. n. 7, p. 16.

16. Reproduced in the Official Journal, op. cit. n. 7, pp. 45–47

17. For example, see 27 Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series) (1–31 October 1990) no. 10, p. 9873 B-C.Google Scholar

18. Blockades and sieges became more and more important as States came to rely increasingly on their domestic economies to prosecute wars. By the beginning of the 20th century, weapons construction had become an intricate and complex operation. The building of tanks, guns and other instruments of war demanded an input from civilians. Accordingly as the civilian war effort grew in relevance, warring States began to focus part of their attack on economic targets, the idea being to defeat the enemy on the battlefield by destroying its economy. See Fraunces, M. G., ‘The International Law of Blockade: New Guiding Principles in Contemporary Practice’, 10 Yale LJ (1992) pp. 893–918, pp. 901–902.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19. These comments are reported in 30 Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series) (1–31 05 1993) no. 5, p. 11015 A.Google Scholar

20. See Save the Children Fund, press release, 5 August 1993: Aid to Liberia Cut Off by Border Closure: Save the Children calls for Action.

21. See Medecins Sans Frontieres, Brussels, press release, 4 August 1993: Relief Embargo on Regions Controlled by the NPFL Claims Increasing Number of Lives.

22. International Committee of the Red Cross, communication to the press No. 93/22, Geneva, 22 July 1993: Liberia: ICRC Concerned about 110,000 People Facing Starvation.

23. See Kufuor, K. Oteng, ‘The Legality of the Intervention in the Liberian Civil War by the Economic Community of West African States’, 5 African JI & Comp. L (1993) pp. 525–560, at p. 552.Google Scholar

24. Schachter, O., ‘The United Nations and Internal Conflict’, in Raman, K. Venkata, ed., Dispute Settlement Through the United Nations (1977) pp. 301–364 at pp. 310–316.Google Scholar For Schachter, whether or not the UN will take action, as well as the nature and scope of such action, will be determined by the behaviour of the individual Member States and the collective body. These include the interest and position of the great powers; nationalism of the new States and ‘developing countries’; the place of the regional organisations; the constitutional and financial requirements of the UN; legal considerations; and attitudes with respect to revolutionary movements and human rights, see pp. 316–317.

25. Reisman, W. M. and Silk, J., ‘Which Law Applies to the Afghan Conflict’, 82 AJIL (1988) pp. 459–486,CrossRefGoogle Scholar see pp. 481–486. See also McDougal, M. S. and Reisman, W. M., ‘Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern’, 62 AJIL (1968) pp. 1–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Here the authors criticise the absolute construction by some scholars of the exclusiveness of the domestic jurisdiction clause of the UN Charter. McDougal and Reisman are of the view that once certain activities constitute a threat to international peace and security, they cease to be ‘matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction’ of a State. This is because Art. 2(7) of the UN Charter, which has created the vague and elusive limitation upon the organization's competence, explicitly provides that the principle of domestic jurisdiction shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures provided for under Chapter VII. This proviso is seen as an important example of how, over time, and based upon the changes in the perception by peoples of the world of their interdependence with respect to human rights, the principle of domestic jurisdiction is gradually becoming a permeable; see pp. 14–15.

26. SeeDe Lupis, I. Detter, The Law of War (1987) p. 41.Google Scholar

27. SC Res. 688, 5 April 1991.

28. ibid.

29. UN Doc. S/PV.2982 1991 at p. 36.

30. SC Res. 814, 26 March 1992.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. SC Res. 929, 22 June 1994.

36. For the measures to establish an Interim Government as part of an overall ECOWAS peace plan for Liberia see Decision A/DEC. 2 August 1990 on the Constitution of an Interim Government in the Republic of Liberia, Official Journal, op. cit. n. 7, p. 8; also ‘Interim Leaders Emerge’, West Africa Magazine (10–16 September 1990) p. 2438.

37. See 27 Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series), supra n. 17, p. 9872 B.

38. SC Res. 788, 19 November 1992.

39. This was in pursuance of the provisions of Res. 788. The findings of the Special Representative are embodied in The Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Liberia, UN Doc. S/25402, 12 March 1993.

40. Liberia acceded to the Protocol in 1988, see 289 International Committee of the RedCross Review (1992) p. 107. Protocol I is reproduced in 1125 UNTS (1979) pp. 3–608 (in English, Arabic, Russian, French and Spanish); 16 ILM (1977) pp. 1391–1441.

41. For a critique highlighting the weaknesses of Protocol II and Common Article 3, see D.P. Forsythe, ‘Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflict’, 72 AJIL (1978) pp. 272–295; Cassese, A., ‘A Tentative Appraisal of the Old and New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict’, inCassese, A., ed., The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (1979) pp. 461–501.Google Scholar

42. Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field, 24 April 1863, reprinted in Schindler, D. and Toman, J., eds., The Laws of Armed Conflicts, 3rd rev. edn. (1988) pp. 3–23.Google Scholar Drafted during the American Civil War (1861–65) and only binding on the forces of the United States, the Lieber Code did correspond to a considerable extent to the laws and customs of war which existed at the time. Notwithstanding the provisions of Art. 15, the Code did, however, provide for the protection of non-combatants in armed conflicts and is seen as being the first codified attempt to do so. For example, Art. 22 stated that ‘as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property and honour as much as the exigencies of war will admit’; also Art. 23 enjoins soldiers to respect the life of non-combatants by stating that private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts, and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can afford to grant in the overruling demands of a vigorous war.

43. Hyde, C. C., International Law as Chiefly Interpreted and Applied by the United States, Vol. 3, 2nd rev. edn. (1945) pp. 1802–1803.Google Scholar

44. See Nurick, L., ‘The Distinction Between Combatants and Non-Combatants in the Law of War’, 39 AJIL (1945) pp. 680–697 at p. 689.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Nurick is citing a British Diplomatic Note of 10 February 1915 to the United States concerning the blockade of Germany by Britain during the First World War, in US Foreign Relations, 1915 Supplement, p. 332

45. Wilson, G., ‘Food Supplies and Belligerents’, 24 AJIL (1930) pp. 365–366.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

46. Best, G., Humanity in Warfare (1980) p. 256.Google Scholar

47. Art. 54 states that:

‘(1) Starvation as a method of warfare is prohibited.

(2)It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove, or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away or for any other motive.

(3) The prohibition in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such of the objects covered by it as are used by an adverse Party:

(a) as sustenance for the members of its armed forces; or

(b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, provided, however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be taken which may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement.’

48. The Diplomatic Conference declared that the term ‘starvation’ implies provoking it deliberately, causing the population to suffer hunger, particularly by depriving it of its sources of food or of supplies. See Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C. and Zimmerman, B., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1987) p. 653, para. 2089.Google Scholar. During wars the starvation of the adverse party can be effected in three main ways. The first entails the destruction of objects essential to the survival of the civilian population of the adverse party, e.g., foodstuffs and food-producing areas, livestock, drinking water plants and supplies, irrigation works and other food or water resources within an area, e.g., by means of wreckage or destruction of food supplies. The second method aims to cut off the adversary from supplies of food or water from outside, e.g., by means of a siege, contraband measures or a blockade. The third way envisages scorched-earth tactics; this method may be resorted to by any party to the conflict whether in defence of its national territory against invasion or in retreat from the territory of the adverse party, see Rosenblad, E., International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (1979) p. 103.Google Scholar

49. Sandoz et al., eds., op. cit. n. 48, para. 2087.

50. ibid. p. 656, para. 2105.

51. Ibid., p. 656, para. 2105. The exception here was when military necessity required that they be destroyed, removed or rendered useless. So, for example, the Rapporteur stated that bombarding an area so as to prevent the enemy from advancing through it is permissible, whether or not the area is a food-producing one, but the deliberate destruction of food-producing areas in order to prevent the enemy from growing food on them is forbidden. Similarly, destroying a field of crops in order to clear a field for fire or to prevent the enemy from using it for cover is permissible, but destroying it to prevent the enemy from consuming the crops is forbidden, see fn. 13, p. 655.

52. Ibid., p. 657, para. 2112.

53. See Blix, H., Means and Methods of Combat. International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law (1988)pp. 135,143Google Scholar referred to in Dinstein, Y., ‘Siege Warfare and the Starvation of Civilians’, in Delisson, J. M. and Tanja, G. J., eds., Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (1991) pp. 145–152, at p. 150.Google Scholar

54. Art. 70 states:

‘(1) If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a party to the conflict, other than the occupied territory, is not adequately provided with the supplies mentioned in Article 69, relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions. Offers of such relief shall not be regarded as interference in the armed conflict or as unfriendly acts. In the distribution of relief consignments, priority shall be given to those persons, such as children, expectant mothers, maternity cases, and nursing mothers, who under the Fourth Convention or under this Protocol are to be accorded privileged treatment or special protection.

(2) The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party shall allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel provided in accordance with this Section, even if such assistance is destined for the civilian population of the adverse Party.

(3) The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party which allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel in accordance with paragraph 2:

(a) shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under which such passage is permitted;

(b) may make such permission conditional on the distribution of this assistance being made under the local supervision of a Protecting Power;

(c) shall, in no way whatsoever, divert relief consignments from the purpose for which they are intended nor delay their forwarding, except in cases of urgent necessity in the interest of the civilian population concerned.

(4) The Parties to the conflict shall protect relief consignments and facilitate their rapid distribution.

(5) The parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party concerned shall encourage and facilitate effective international co-ordination of the relief actions referred to in paragraph 1.‘

55. Sandoz et al., eds., op. cit. n. 48, p. 821, paras. 2813–2815. Moreover, under Art. 23(2) the Power which permits the delivery of relief could refuse to do so if it felt that:

(a) the consignments may be diverted from their destination;

(b) that the control may not be effective;

(c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts, or economy of the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned consignments for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy or through the release of such material, services or facilities as would otherwise be required for the production of such goods. This vague wording leaves a very wide margin for an arbitrary interpretation. Since its application is dependent on the blockading power's discretion it could hardly be argued that Art. 23 is a legally binding obligation.

See Rosenblad, op. cit. n. 48, p. 114.

56. See Levie, H. S., Protection of War Victims, Vol. IV (1981) p. 14, para. 26.Google Scholar

57. Ibid., p. 15, para. 27.

58. Ibid., para. 30.

59. Protocol I supra.

60. The Cotonou Peace Accord is reproduced in Weller, M., ed., Regional Peace-keeping and International Enforcement: Liberian Crisis (forthcoming).Google Scholar

61. Ibid.

62. Quoted in Dowden, R., ‘Liberian Lives at Risk as UN Blocks Food Aid’, The Independent (2 September 1993) p. 5.Google Scholar The Aid Agencies criticised this decision claiming that delivery of relief by road and rail from the coast meant supplies had to pass through areas of potential conflict, such as that under the control of the Liberia Peace Council, another armed faction which had not signed the Cotonou Accord and was fighting the NPFL in the south-eastern part of the country and thus placed the convoys at risk. Secondly, the relief organizations also claimed that the war had rendered the interior virtually inaccessible because a major bridge had been destroyed and this meant the diversion of supplies to a town called Kakata which had been occupied and blocked by ULIMO on the grounds that the relief convoys were destined exclusively for the NPFL militia and not for civilians. See 30 Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series) (1–30 September 1993) no. 9, p. 11157 B.Google Scholar

63. See the Cotonou Accord, supra Art. 18(1).

64. United Nations Secretary-General, Further Report on Liberia, S/26200, 2 August 1993, reprinted in Weller, op. cit. n. 60.

65. Ibid., para 19.

66. The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edn., Vol. IV (1989) p. 702.Google Scholar This insistence on the use of the most direct routes was first emphasized in the Secretary-General's Report, S/25402, 12 March 1993, which stated that ‘Responding to concerns of sanctions violations expressed by the Interim Government, my Special Representative reviewed various options for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Of the possibilites via Cote d'lvoire, Guinea, through apeace corridor from Monrovia to Kakata or, from Monrovia to the port of Buchanan, the most direct and convenient route continues to be via Cote d'lvoire’: para. 12.

67. This ECOWAS precondition can also not be supported by a proper reading of Protocol I. If the delivery of relief from the ECOMOG-controlled ports could be done rapidly and without any impediments then Art. 70(3)(a) would aply so as to permit ECOMOG's supervision of the distribution of humanitarian assistance. However, as noted above, fighting on the ground indicated the uncertainty of the situation and thus the Community could not rely on this provision of Protocol I as justification for the supervision and delivery of relief supplies from the area it controlled.

68. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, S/26868, 13 December 1993, para. 11.

69. Although the establishment of the Transitional Government was not a precondition for the commencement of the delivery of food and other relief supplies, the Report noted that the unification of Liberia under a single national authority would greatly enhance the delivery of humanitarian assistance, p. 9. Presumably the installation of this government would render unnecessary the need to deliver relief across the Cote d'Ivoire border as it was to have NPFL representatives on it. See Art. 14(7) of the Cotonou Accord. The Transitional Government was sworn in March 1994, eight months after the Accord was drawn up, see West Africa Magazine (14–20 March 1994) p. 463.Google Scholar

70. See 31 Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series) (1–31 03 1994) no. 3, pp. 11351 A–11352 C.Google Scholar

71. Res. 788 and 813 supra.

72. See UN Charter, Art. 25.

73. For example, Res. 788 and 813 had both stated clearly that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord was to be implemented peacefully, yet in October 1992 ECOWAS launched a military offensive to defeat the NPFL, claiming that they were no longer going to negotiate a peaceful end to the war. Secondly, Art. 53 of the UN Charter states that regional organizations, before they commence any enforcement action, should seek the necessary authorization from the Security Council. However, the Chairman of ECOWAS at the time stated, in an interview, that the Community's interpretation of peace-keeping did not merit the authority of the UN. See West Africa Magazine (13–19 August 1990) p. 2280.Google Scholar