2. In this respect, Weil stated: ‘La conquête de la délimitation maritime par le droit n’est en fin de compte l’œuvre ni de la convention ni de la coutume, mais celle de la jurisprudence qui, loin d’apparaître comme une source subsidiaire du droit international, remplit ici la mission d’une source primaire et directe de droit, même si elle a choisi modestement d’en porter le crédit au compte du droit coutumier.’ Weil, P., Perspectives du droit de la délimitation maritime (Paris, Pedone 1988) p. 13.Google Scholar See also Cahier, P., ‘Les sources du droit relatif à la delimitation du plateau continental’, in Le droit international au service de la paix, de la justice et du developpement, Mélanges Michel Virally (Paris, Pedone 1991) pp. 175–182.Google Scholar

3. After the Eritrea/Yemen case, on 16 March 2001, the International Court of Justice rendered a judgment regarding the Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits), which was related to both territorial questions and maritime delimitation. In this paper, references to the Eritrea/Yemen case pertain, in principle, to the award given after the second phase.

4. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ER-YEagreeprinc.htm>.

5. The Arbitral Tribunal was composed of: Sir Robert Jennings, President; Stephen Schwebel; A.S. El-Kosheri; Keith Highet; and Rosalyn Higgins. The arbitration took place in London. The Tribunal fixed its Registry at the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Peace Palace, The Hague. Furthermore, all written pleadings, of verbatim transcripts of the oral proceedings and deliberations of the Tribunal, shall be confidential (Art. 9(3) of the Arbitration Agreement). For a summary and comments on this award, see Dobelle, J.-F., ‘Le différend entre l’Erythrée et le Yémen: La sentence arbitrate du 17 décembre 1999 sur la delimitation des frontieres maritimes’, 45 AFDI (1999) pp. 554–563;CrossRefGoogle ScholarLabrouse, AH., ‘La fin du conflit en mer Rouge’, 4 Annwire du droit de la mer (1999) pp. 215–222;Google ScholarHelali, M.S.E., ‘Chronique de jurisprudence Internationale: Sentence du 17 decembre 1999’, 104 RGDIP (2000) pp. 511–514Google Scholar. B. Kwiatkowska, ’The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration: Landmark Progress in the Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty and Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation’, 32 ODIL (2001)pp. 1–25;N.S. Marques Antunes, ‘The 1999 Eritrea-Yemen Maritime Delimitation Award and the Development of International Law’, 50ICLQ (2001) pp. 299–344.

6. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ER-YEarbagree.htm>.

7. Judgment, <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chap5.htm>, para. 116. Curiously, however, Eritrea has never claimed an EEZ. ‘Table of National Claims to Maritime Zones’, United Nations, Law of the Sea Bulletin (1999–39) p. 42. A writer thus argued that the Tribunal delimited a ‘potential maritime boundary’. N. S. Marques Antunes, loc. cit. n. 5, at p. 333. On this point, according to the present award of 1999, Eritrea indicated that the maritime boundary in the northern sector was between respective continental shelves and EEZ. Arbitral Award, <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chapl .htm>, para. 23. Furthermore, in its arguments, Eritrea stressed the importance of fisheries and historic rights regarding fisheries. Accordingly, it would appear that Eritrea might have presupposed its EEZ, although there was no official claim on this matter.

8. Arbitral Award, <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chap5.htm>, para. 132.

9. For the award after the first stage, see G. Distefano, ‘La sentence arbitrate du 9 octobre 1998 dans ’affaire du differend insulaire entre le Yemen et l’Erythree’, 103 RGDIP (1999) pp. 851–890; ‘Chronique des faits internationaux’, 103 RGDIP (1999) pp. 189–192.; W.M. Reisman, ‘Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the Proceedings (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute)’, 93 AJIL (1999) pp. 668–682.

10. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chap5.htm>, para. 130.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., para. 131.

14. Ibid., para. 132

15. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chapl.htm>, paras. 12–21.

16. Ibid., paras. 22–30.

17. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chap2.htm>, para. 48.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., para. 64.

20. Ibid., para. 56.

21. Ibid., para. 57.

22. Ibid., para. 65–69.

23. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chap2.htm>, para. 58.

24. Ibid., para. 70–71.

25. Ibid., para. 72. See also para. 73.

26. The Eritrea/Yemen arbitration: First Phase, <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ER-YEchap9.htm>, paras. 437–438. The disputed islands included all the islands and islets disputed between the parties, such as Jabal al-Tayr, the Zubayer group, the Haycocks and the Mohabbakahs. On this point, see the award regarding sovereignty, <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ER-YEchap2.htm>, para. 90. See also para. 527.

27. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYT2chape.htm>, para. 79.

28. Ibid., para. 80.

29. Ibid., para. 82.

30. Ibid., para. 83.

31. The ICJ, in the Tunisia/Libya case, attached great importance to a de facto line drawn from Ras Ajdir at an angle of some 26’ east of north, which resulted from concessions for the offshore exploration and exploitation of oil and gas granted by both parties. ICJReports (1982) p. 71, para. 96.

32. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYT2chape.htm>, para. 86. In the North Sea Continental Shelf casts, the ICJ had already suggested joint exploitation. In particular, Judge Jessup emphasised the importance of joint exploitation. Separate opinion of Judge Jessup, ICJ Reports (1969) p. 82. In the Tunisia/Libya case, Judge Evensen also suggested joint exploitation. Dissenting opinion of Judge Evensen, ICJ Reports (1982) p. 321. Regarding joint development in general, see M. Miyoshi, ‘The Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in Relation to Maritime Boundary Delimitation’, Maritime Briefing, Vol. 2 (International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham 1999) pp. 1–53.

33. The Eritrea/Yemen arbitration: First Phase, <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ER-YEchaplO.htm>, para. 526.

34. The Eritrea/Yemen arbitration: First Phase, <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ER-YEchapl 1 htm>, operative part of the award, (iv).

35. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chap4.htm>, para. 89.

36. For Yemen’s view, ibid., para. 103; para. 107. See also <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2annexes.htm>, Annex II, Yemen’s Answer to Judge Schwebel’s Question Put to Yemen on Tuesday, 13 July 1999; Transcript, Day 6, 13 July 1999, p. 88, quoted ibid.

37. Ibid., para. 110.

38. Ibid., para. 111.

39. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chapl htm>, para. 21.

40. ICJ Reports (1985) p. 42, para. 51.

41. The Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case, Z9 RGDIP (19S5) p. 533, para. 124.

42. The Greenland/Jan Mayen case, ICJ Reports (1993) p. 75, para. 81.

43. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chapl.htm>, para. 26.

44. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chap5.htm>, para. 125.

45. Ibid., para. 128.

46. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chap5.htm>, para. 165.

47. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chap5.htm>, paras. 138–153.

48. Furthermore, the Eritrea’s baseline created another problem. Under Eritrean domestic law, as enacted by Ethiopia in 1953, her territorial sea is defined as extending from the extremity of the seaboard at maximum annual high tide. Yet the Tribunal ruled that the median-line boundary would be measured from the low-water line in accordance with Art. 5 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, since both parties had agreed that the Tribunal was to take into account the provisions of that Convention. Ibid., paras. 134–135.

49. Ibid., para. 143.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., paras. 144–145.

52. Ibid., para. 146.

53. Ibid., para. 136. See also para. 164.

54. Ibid., para. 154–159.

55. Ibid., paras. 160–162.

56. Ibid., para. 163.

57. Ibid., para. 46. See also para. 164.

58. Ibid., para. 168.

59. It should be noted that, on some points, the views of international courts and tribunals vary. Accordingly, regarding several issues, it may be difficult clearly to distinguish between change and continuity aspects in the law of maritime delimitation.

60. ICJ Reports (1969) p. 53, para. 101. See also p. 49, para. 90.

61. Ibid., p. 50, para. 92.

62. ICJ Reports (1982) p. 59, para. 70.

63. Ibid., p. 79, para. 110.

64. ICJ Reports (1984) pp. 312–313, paras. 157–158. See also p. 315, paras. 162–163.

65. ICJ Reports (1985) pp. 38–39, paras. 44–45.

66. The Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case, supra n. 41, at p. 521, para. 89; p. 525, para. 102.

67. The St. Pierre and Miquelon case, 31 ILM (1992) p. 1163, para. 38.Google Scholar

68. Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. 18 (New York, United Nations) p. 45, para. 70. This view was also expressed in the Dubai/Sharjah Border arbitral award rendered on 19 October 1981. In applying equitable principles of customary law, the Court of Arbitration considered the island of Abu Musa as a ‘special circumstance’. At the same time, it held that the equidistance method is generally appropriate to the delimitation of the maritime boundary where that boundary is unaffected by the presence of Abu Musa. 91 ILR (1993) pp. 672–673, para. 256.

69. The Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, supra n. 68, at pp. 114–116, paras. 245–249.

70. ICJ Reports (1993) pp. 61–62, paras. 53–56. Regarding the analysis on this point, see Y. Tanaka, ’Review of the Case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen in 1993’, 24 Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Sciences (1999) pp. 5–9.

71. Legault and Hankey confirm this view. Legault, L. and Hankey, B., ‘Method, Oppositeness and Adjacency, and Proportionality in Maritime Boundary Delimitation’, in Charney, J. I. and Alexander, L. M., eds., International Maritime Boundary, Vol. I (Dordrecht, Nijhoff 1993) p. 203.Google Scholar

72. In the present author’s view, thus, the quest for a legal framework which would reconcile the predictability and flexibility is at the heart of the law of maritime delimitation. This question has been considered in the author’s doctoral dissertation.

73. Kwiatkowska, loc. cit. n. 5, at p. 14.

74. The Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits), <http://wwwici-cij .org/icjwww/idocket/iqb/iqbframe.htm>, ‘Judgment of 16 March 2001’, para. 230.

75. Indeed, the equidistance method is the only one which is predicable in its true sense. Thirlway, H. W. A., ’The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice Part Five’, 64 BYIL (1994) p. 41.Google Scholar

76. Regarding effect given to islands in general, see in particular, Bowett, D. W., The Regime of Island in International Law (New York, Oceana 1979);Google ScholarSymmons, C. R., The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law (The Hague, Nijhoff 1979);Google ScholarDipla, H., Le regime juridique des ties dans le droit international de la mer (Geneva, PUF 1984);Google ScholarJayewardene, H. W., The Regime of Islands in International Law (Dordrecht, Nijhoff 1990).Google Scholar

77. The Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, supra n. 68, at p. 110, para. 235.

78. Ibid., p. 117, para. 251.

79. ICJ Reports (1982) pp. 88–89, paras. 128–129.

80. Ibid., p. 85, para. 120.

81. ICJ Reports (1984) pp. 336–337, para. 222.

82. For instance, see dissenting opinion of Judge Evensen in the Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ Reports (1982) p. 300, para. 17 and p. 304, para. 19; dissenting opinion of Judge Gros, ibid., p. ISO, para. 14.

83. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chap5.htm>, para. 139.

84. Yet, the external fringe of the islands lie at a distance of about 40 miles from the mainland coast. One may wonder whether state practice has treated islands so located as integral parts of the general coastal configuration.

85. See <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chap5.htm>, para. 150.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid., para. 151.

88. Ibid., para. 163. On this point, Yemen also assumed that the controlling base points would be on the low-water line of the outer coastal islands. Ibid., para. 127.

89. In addition, the Arbitral Tribunal also took account of the ‘barren and inhospitable nature’ of these islands in determining effects given to them. Ibid., paras. 147–148. It may be suggested that those islands could not have any maritime space because of the lack of sustainability of human habitation, as provided in Art. 121(3) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Nevertheless, as the Tribunal called al-Tayr and al-Zubayr ‘island’ during the second phase of the arbitration, they must have been entitled to claim maritime spaces. Hence, it might be doubtful whether the barren and inhospitable nature of islands could be a reason for giving them no effect.

90. That criterion may be justifiable on the basis of state practice as well. In fact, after having examined state practice on this matter, Bowett points to the fact that full effect may be given to an island where it can be treated as an integral part of the mainland as a whole. D. Bowett, ‘Islands Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary Delimitations’, in Charney and Alexander, op. cit. n. 71, at p. 151.

91. The ICJ gave full effect to the Bahrain’s Hawar Islands and to the Qatar’s Janan Island including Hadd Janan. Yet, no effect was given to Qit’at Jaradah and Fasht al Jarim. The Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits), supra n. 74, at paras. 218, 222, 248.

92. Regarding economic factors in general, see for instance D.W. Bowett, ‘The Economic Factor in Maritime Delimitation Cases’, in International Law at the Time of Its Codification, Essays in Honour ofR. Ago, Vol. II (Milan, Giuffre 1987) pp. 45–63; B. Kwiatkowska, ‘Economic and Environmental Considerations in Maritime Boundary Delimitations’, in Charney and Alexander, op. cit. n. 71, at pp. 75–113.

93. The North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports (1969) p. 54, para. 101(D)-(3); The Libya/Malta case, ICJ Reports (1985) p. 41, para. 50.

94. ICJ Reports (1984) p. 340, para. 232.

95. Ibid., pp. 343–344, paras. 238–241.

96. The St. Pierre and Miquelon case, supra n. 67, at pp. 1173–1174, paras. 84–87.

97. ICJ Reports (1993) p. 72, para. 76.

98. Ibid., pp. 79–81, para. 92.

99. Cf., Kwiatkowska, loc. cit. n. 5, at p. 15.

100. ICJ Reports (1993) p. 72, para. 76.; Memorial submitted by Denmark, Pleadings, Vol. I, p. 50, para. 183; Counter-Memorial submitted by Norway, Pleadings, Vol. I, ‘Pattern of Location of Norwegian Capelin Catches in the Jan Mayen Area’, pp. 45–46.

101. Judgment, ICJ Reports (1982) p. 72, para. 98. For the Tunisian claims regarding historic rights, see also Memorial of Tunisia, Pleadings, Vol. I, pp. 73111;Google ScholarReply of Tunisia, Pleadings, Vol. IV, pp. 1220;Google ScholarOral statement by Dupuy, R-J., Pleadings, Vol. IV, pp. 457485.Google Scholar

102. Judge Oda criticised the concept from the angle of legislative history. In his view, the Court had failed to recognize the fact that at the 1958 Conference the question of historic title had been taken up in connection with the delimitation of the territorial sea, not of the continental shelf. Dissenting opinion of Judge Oda, ICJ Reports (1982) p. 210, para. 87. By contrast, Judge Jimenez de Arechaga thought that historic rights may berelevant for the delimitation of continental shelf. Separate opinion of Judge Jimenez de Arechaga, ibid., pp. 123–124, para. 82.

103. Judgment, ibid., p. 73, para. 100.

104. Ibid., p. 75, para. 102.

105. Ibid., p. 86, para. 121.

106. In fact, in its award relating to territorial sovereignty, the Tribunal stated that the traditional openness of southern Red Sea marine resources for fishing, unrestricted traffic and the common use of the islands were important elements capable of creating certain historic rights, http:www.pca-cpa.orgER-YEchap4.htm, para. 126.

107. Regarding the concept of Islamic international law, see Khadduri, M., International Law, Islamic, in Bernhardt, R., ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 6 (Amsterdam, North-Holland 1983) pp. 227233;Google ScholarEl-Kosheri, A. S., History of the Law of Nations, Regional DevelopmentsGoogle Scholar: Islam, ibid., Vol. 7, pp. 222–230.

108. See http:www.pca-cpa.orgERYE2chap4.htm, para. 92.

109. Ibid.

110. The extraction of guano or of minerals do not form part of the traditional fishing regime. Ibid., para. In addition, that regime does not extend to large-scale commercial or industrial fishing, nor to fishing by nationals of third states in the Red Sea, whether small-scale or industrial. Ibid., para. 106.

111. Ibid., para. 110.

112. The Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, supra n. 68, at p. 26, para. 26.Google Scholar

113. Ibid., p. 27, para. 28.

114. Weil, op. cit. n. 2, at p. A Chamber of the ICJ came to a similar conclusion in the Frontier Dispute case between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1986, which related to a land boundary. In that case, the Chamber faced the question of the rights of Niger vis-a-vis either party. The problem was whether the Chamber had the power of fixing the tri-point NigerMaliBurkina Faso without the agreement of Niger. Mali answered the question in the negative, whilst Burkina Faso did the opposite. The Chamber considered that its jurisdiction was not restricted simply because the end-point of the frontier was located on the frontier of a third state not a party to the proceedings, since the rights of Niger were safeguard by Art. 59 of the Statute. Thus the Chamber concluded that it had a duty to indicate the line of the frontier between the parties over the entire length of the disputed area. ICJReports (1986) pp. 576580, paras.

115. ICJ Reports (1982) p. 42, para. 33.

116. ICJ Reports (1985) p. 26, paras.

117. See http:www.pca-cpa.orgERYE2chapl.htm, para. 44.

118. Ibid, para. 46.

119. See http:www.pca-cpa.orgERYE#5.htm, para. 136.

120. Ibid., para. 164.

121. Ibid., para 164.

122. See http:www.pca-cpa.orgERYE2chapl.htm, para 46.

123. As with the EritreaYemen award, recently, the QatarBahrain judgment also took the same approach by stopping the delimitation line well short of areas where the title of third states, Iran and Saudi Arabia, might be involved. The QatarBahrain case (Merits), supra n. 74, at paras. 221 and 249.

124. Regarding the concept of proportionality in the context of maritime delimitation, seeJaenicke, G., The Role of Proportionality in the Delimitation of Maritime Zones, in Bos, A. and Siblesz, H., eds, Realism in law-Making, Essays on International Law in Honour of Willem Riphagen, (Dordrecht, Nijhoff 1986) pp. 5169;Google ScholarIda, R., ‘La notion de la proportionnalit dans les conflits recnts sur la delimitation maritimeLe principe de la proportionnalit en droit international’ (in Japanese), 124 Kyoto Law Review (1989) pp. 81–110Google Scholar

125. ICJ Reports (1969) p. 52, para 98.

126. ICJ Reports (1982) p. 91, para 131. But the recourse to proportionality in such geographical situations was put in doubt by Judges Gros and Evensen. Dissenting opinion of Judge Gros, ibid., p. 152; dissenting opinion of Judge Evensen, ibid., p. 314, para 23.

127. 127.Voelckel, M., Apercu de quelques problemes techniques concernant la delimitation des frontieres maritimes, 25 AFDI (1979) p 706.Google Scholar

128. ICJ Reports (1984) p. 336, para The Chamber included the Bay of Fundy in its calculation, although it was not an area of overlap. As Judge Schwebel indicated, this distorted the calculation of proportionality. Separate opinion of Judge Schwebel, ibid., p 706.

129. While Canada contended that the ratio of coastal lengths was 21.4 (Canada): 1 (France), France arrived at a ratio of 6.5:The st. Pierre and Miquelon case, supra n. 67, at p. 1164, para 33. Dissenting opinion of Mr. Weil, ibid., p. 1207, para. 24, rh 19. It will be noted that the Court of Arbitrations application of the proportionality test was sharply criticised by national arbitrators Gotlieb and Weil. Dissenting opinion of Mr. Gotlieb, ibid., pp. 1181–1188, paras. 537; dissenting opinion of Mr. Weil, ibid., pp. 12041207, para.2023

130. Ida, , loc. cit. n. 124, at p 101.Google Scholar

131. Higgins states: The concept of proportionality in maritime delimitation remains, for me, full of uncertainties and problems. Higgins, R., Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1994) p 230.Google Scholar

132. See http:www.pca-cpa.orgERYE2chapl.htm, para 39.

133. Ibid., para 42.

134. Ibid., para 43.

135. See http:www.pca, para 166.

136. Ibid., para 167.

137. Ibid., para 168.

138. In the QatarBahrain case (Merits), proportionality was not taken into account. But, this was because there was no disparity of coastal lengths between the parties. Supra n. 74, at paras.