1. Since writing the above paragraph, General de Gaulle has expounded in a Press conference, with his usual detachment and single-mindedness, France's position on President Kennedy's new plan for a consolidation of the Atlantic Alliance, and on Britain's entry into the Common Market. In spite of an apparent clarity in his statements, it would be extremely hazardous to speculate on the extent to which General de Gaulle is prepared to risk France's isolation should her partners in the Common Market refuse to follow his lead, nor whether he would then envisage a reversal of alliances, and risk impairing all that France has so far achieved under his rule.

All that can be suggested is that in any discussion or attempt at an assessment of French foreign policy under General de Gaulle, it might be helpful to bear in mind two fundamental principles which would seem to stand out as signposts in his vision of the world. They seem to occupy the center of his political thinking —in the broader sense of the term. First, his conception of “nation”, in particular as applied to France and epitomized in the words: “Elle ne peut être la France sans grandeur”. (Mémoires de guerre, Tome I.) Secondly, his determination to restore to France her “rang” and make of her the cornerstone of a Europe “appelée à devenir l'une des trois puissances planétaires, et, s'il le faut un jour, l'arbitre entre les deux camps soviétique et anglo-saxon”. (Ibid., Tome III; see a series of articles by Fontaine, André, “Quatre ans de diplomatic Gaulliste', Le Monde, 27–29 11 1962.)Google Scholar However, it must be added, that the existence of this vision does not seem to exclude an empirical approach to the modalities of achieving it.

On the other hand, it seems pretty certain that he is determined to perpetuate and even strengthen the new powers of the Head of State. Whether he intends to stand for another term of office or to secure the election of a successor of his choice is another matter.

2. It is already being argued that unless the 1958 Constitution is revised on certain points, the risk of a relapse, once General de Gaulle retires, is very great. Commenting on grave flaws in the 1958 Constitution, Maurice Duverger predicts a return to the parliamentary system under the 1875 Constitution, in spite of the increased powers of the Executive under the present Constitution. Future Presidents would, in his view, most certainly be refused the “absolute powers” with which General de Gaulle has been in fact invested. See his series of articles on “Le Problème Constitutionnel” in Le Monde, 4, 5–6 and 7 02 1961.Google Scholar For a discussion of alternatives to General de Gaulle, 's regime, below, pp. 177 ff.Google Scholar

3. Some writers go even further. In the opinion of Raymond Aron, “The head of the State will continue to exercise, behind a façade of representative institutions, absolute power”. He defines the present regime in France as a “monocratie”, albeit liberal, or a constitutional monarchy, except that the king or the emperor is now elected by direct popular vote. See his editorial “Sous quel régime vivons-nous?”, in Le Figaro, 18 12 1962.Google Scholar

M. Paul Reynaud, former Prime Minister, who played an important part in the drafting of the 1958 Constitution, accused General de Gaulle of exercising “absolute power without control” in breach of the Constitution, of seeking to combine the role of the Head of State with the functions of the Prime Minister. See compte-rendus of debates in the National Assembly on the censure motion following President de Gaulle's decision to submit to referendum a Bill on the election of future Presidents by direct popular vote. Le Monde, 6 10 1962Google Scholar

4. In every one of his radio-television speeches, General de Gaulle held the traditional political parties responsible for all the evils that had befallen France and openly declared that any weakening of his powers would plunge the country into the familiar chaos. The Government and its supporters used and even abused the same theme.

5. There is a difference of opinion as to what extent the new mode of election of the President of the Republic is likely to accelerate the regrouping of political parties and thereby facilitate the adoption of a presidential regime midway between the present British parliamentary system and the United States model. See below pp. 177–179.

6. Following the recent unsuccessful coup d'Etat, Senegal has now opted for a presidential regime midway, in some respects, between the United States model and the African type. In a recent interview given to a reporter of Radio-Luxembourg, President Senghor reiterated his conviction that the existence of a “bicephalous” Executive had been the primary cause of the constant friction between the head of the Executive and the Head of State. Senegal had inherited from the Third and Fourth French Republics not only the methods of political party rivalry, but also the tensions resulting from pressure groups within the parties, hence the necessity of a reform of the country's institutions. See also his declaration of investiture before the National Assembly on 19 December 1962, in Le Monde, 21 December 1962.

For an analysis of constitutional developments in the newly emancipated African States, see author's forthcoming book, Modern Trends in Treaty Law (Stevens & Sons Limited).

7. M. Gaston Monnerville, President of the Senate, reminded his listeners of the role he had played in the framing of the 1958 Constitution and declared his resolution to uphold the new Constitution, which assigned to the Executive the responsibility of conducting the nation's home and foreign policy and to Parliament the right to exercise control over the Government's action. What he rejected was the President's claim to possess under the Constitution an all embracing competence while remaining irresponsible, that is not accountable for his acts to any State organ. Broadcast on behalf of the Radical Party in the referendum campaign on 23 October 1962. M. Monnerville was refused the right to speak in his capacity as President of the Senate.

8. This ineluctable interdependence of political events has been and is, even more so to-day, a dominant factor in any assessment of the foreign policy of a State. General de Gaulle's France is no exception.

9. Writers on constitutional law go even further and argue that Article 37 in fact consecrates the supremacy of the Executive in the field of legislation. In their opinion the legislative competence of the Executive is the rule—“competence dite de droit commun”—whereas that of Parliament is the exception in that it only exists in so far as it is stipulated for in Article 34.

Article 37 stipulates: “Les matières autres que celles qui sont du domaine de la loi ont un caractère réglementaire.

“Les textes de forme legislative intervenus en ces matières peuvent être modifies par decrets pris après avis du Conseil d'Etat.”

10. For a discussion of the role of the Conseil d'Etat and developments consequent on the above ruling, see below p. 30 + n. 53, 39–43.

10(a). Article 38 provides: “Le Gouvernement peut, pour l'exécution de son programme, demander au Parlement l'autorisation de prendre par ordonnance, pendant un délai limité, des mesures qui sont normalement du domaine de la loi.

”Les ordonnances sont prises en Conseil des Ministres, après avis du Conseil d'Etat.

11. At the request of the Government, the Standing Committee of the Council of State had advised the Government that the ‘ordonnance’ in question was inconsistent with the terms of the referendum law of 13 April 1962 on which it was based. See below p. 172.

11a. Article 49 § 3 provides: “Le premier Ministre peut, après deliberation du Conseil des Ministres, engager la responsabilité du Gouvernement devant l'Assemblée National sur le vote d'un text. Dans ce cas, ce text est considéré comme adopté, sauf si une motion de censure, déposée dans les 24 heures qui suivent, est votée dans les conditions prévues à l'alinea précédent.»

On dissolution, following the vote of a censure motion, see article 12 n. 11b. (11b) Article 12(1) provides: « Le Président peut, après consultation du Premier Ministre et des Président des Assemblées, prononcer la dissolution de l'Assemblée Nationale.” Under § 3 no new dissolution is possible in the year following the general election.

An important point to note here is that under article 19 dissolution is a Presidential act which does not require the signature of the Prime Minister.

12. See his letter of 11 January 1961, in which he recalls how the Government prevented the National Assembly from voting on the text of the nuclear striking force Bill, in violation of Articles 3 and 34 of the Constitution, by engaging its responsibility under Article 49 (3) on all three readings of the Bill, and how in complete disregard of the Senate's two successive negative votes secured its adoption under the threat of dissolution. Le Monde, 21 01 1961.Google Scholar

13. In his reply of 26 January, M. Debré contested M. Reynaud's interpretation of Articles 3 and 34, since nothing prevented the National Assembly from exercising its power to vote on the text of the Bill. While conceding that recourse to Article 49 (3) should be limited to legislation of exceptional importance, he maintained that the right of the Government to ask for a vote of confidence, whenever it deemed it necessary, was of the very essence of a parliamentary system. Once Parliament had approved Government policy, then it must be given the legislative and financial means to carry it out. Le Monde, 3 02 1961.Google Scholar

14. Below p. 177 ff.

In fact the Reynaud-Debré controversy loses much of its relevance and importance when viewed against the background of a Government based on a solid and stable majority. France achieved ministerial stability when the Gaullists were returned to power in the 1962 general election in full force, namely, with a comfortable majority.

It is a well-established fact that under a two-party system of Parliamentary Government a censure motion is tabled by the opposition as a rule, to mark its disapproval of the Government's action, but not with a view to overthrowing the Government, which it well knows it has no power to achieve, except in times of national crisis when the Government majority breaks up. Thus, in contrast to the procedure adopted on 11 January 1961 in respect to the adoption of the “force de frappe” Bill, the National Assembly approved by a considerable majority the Government's nuclear policy by its vote of the military budget. In the general debate, the opposition, no doubt, was able to ventilate its views and put before the nation the arguments against the maintenance of an independent nuclear deterrent, but there was no question either for the Government to ask for a vote of confidence or for the opposition to table a motion of censure. See, in particular the resolute opposition of the M.R.P. by its President M. Lecanuet in the National Assembly, Le Monde, 23–25 11 1963.Google Scholar Similarly the fact that the Bill was not only severely criticized but rejected by the Senate, only delayed but did not prevent its final adoption by the National Assembly.

15. This, in fact, is the general trend in recent national constitutions. In a forthcoming book, on modern trends in treaty law, the author examines at length developments in the constitutional law and practice of States in respect to treaty-making and treaty implementation, within the context of the Executive's effective powers.

16. Article 52 reads: “Le Président de la République négocie et ratine les traités. II est informé de toute négotiation tendant à la conclusion d'un accord international non soumis à ratification.” For the original and English text of the articles on treaty-making in the 1958 Constitution, see Clunet vol. 86 (1959), pp. 530–532.Google Scholar

16a. For an analysis of trends in favour of a Presidential regime, see Duverger, Maurice's La Vlème République et le régime présidentiel (Paris, 1961).Google Scholar The question continues to be discussed both by the opposition parties, with the exception of the Communist Party, and the majority parties. Significantly, in his radio and television speech on 26 September 1962, when General de Gaulle announced his decision to submit to referendum a Bill proposing the election of future Presidents of the Republic by direct popular vote, he referred to the extensive powers of the President under the 1958 Constitution, and more specifically to his powers to “negotiate and ratify” international treaties and agreements with the Community, as well as to article 5.

17. See Rousseau, who notes that the quasi-totality of treaties concluded under the 1946 Constitution were not “signed” by the President in violation of article 31 (1). “La Constitution de 1958 et les traites internationaux” in Hommage d'une génération de juristes au President Basdevant, (1960) Pédone, Paris, p. 465.Google Scholar

The Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation, which was signed on 22 January 1963 by General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer, constitutes a notable exception motivated, no doubt, by specific and purely prestige considerations of policy.

18. See a series of articles by André Fontaine on “Quatre ans de diplomatic Gaulliste” in Le Monde, 26, 27 and 28–29 10 1962.Google Scholar In M. Fontaine's opinion diplomacy is General de Gaulle's “domaine réservé” it is he who, as “guide de la nation” defines and conducts in person the foreign policy of France. In the field of treaty-making, it may be added, the negotiation and conclusion of the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation provides a concrete application of the provisions of article 52.

19. See debates in the National Assembly, J. off., 14 06 1947, p. 2132.Google Scholar

20. Article 8 provided: “Le Président de la République négocie et ratifie les traités. II en donne connaissance aux Chambres aussitôt que l'intérét et la surêté de l'Etat le permettent…” See Poincaré's inaugural presidential address, “Presidence et politique extérieure” in Le Temps, 27 09 1926.Google Scholar

21. See Professor Rouvier's definition of the presidential powers under the 1958 Constitution, “Regards sur les institutions de la Ve Republique” in Dalloz, , Chronique 1958, p. 259Google Scholar, and below p. 158 ff.

22. The principle has been inscribed into most post World War II national constitutions.

23. Italics added. The French text reads: “Les traités de paix, les traités de commerce, les traités ou accords relatifs à l'organisation internationale, ceux qui engagent les finances de l'Etat, ceux qui modifient des dispositions de nature législative, ceux qui sont relatifs à l'échange ou adjonction de territoire, ne peuvent être ratifiés ou approuvés qu'en vertu d'une loi.

Ils ne prennent effet qu'après avoir été ratifiés ou approuvés.

Nulle cession, nul échange, nulle adjonction de territoire n'est valable sans le consentement des populations intéressées.»

24. See Rousseau, , op. cit., p. 465Google Scholar, who notes: “La nouvelle formule ne laisse pas de surprendre”.

25. For the details of the procedure of transfer, See R.G.D.I.P. (1955) pp. 692–698.Google Scholar The de facto transfer took place on 1 November 1956 and the definitive treaty was signed in New Delhi on 28 May 1956. The text of the decree does not seem to have been either published or submitted to the ratification of the Head of State. Parliament refused to authorize ratification on the ground that the treaty had been viciated by grave constitutional irregularities with respect to the procedure of consultation under article 27/2 of the 1946 Constitution. Nevertheless the Government did not submit the 1958 Constitution to referendum in the territories ceded to India, and thereby confirmed in law as well as in fact that the territories no longer formed part of the French legal system. Nor did the Government use its plenary powers under the 1958 Constitution to authorize the President to ratify the treaty. When seized the Conseil d'Etat declined to rule on the constitutional regularity of the cession. Its Judgment of 27 June 1958 gave rise to conflicting opinions. Those who approved the ruling argued that by pronouncing on the legality of the ordonnance of 11 10 1954Google Scholar, relating to the procedure of transfer, the Conseil d'Etat would have exercised jurisdictional control over the constitutionality of the parliamentary law authorizing ratification. French courts do not possess such power. “It is consequently not necessary to have recourse to the conc pt of an act of Government” to explain the Court's refusal. It was also argued that article 27 of the 1946 Constitution (identical in this respect with article 53 of the 1958 Constitution) does not in fact prescribe any specific conditions or procedure of consultation, and the representative character of the 1946 Constitution under article 3 does not exclude a different procedure. See opinions of Bredin, Jean-Deim, Pinto, Roger and Pouscul, André in RGDIP (1958) p. 429.Google Scholar However it might here be mentioned that there was a clear precedent in the case of the cession of Chandernagar when consultation took place on 19 January 1949

the treaty was signed on 2 February 1951 and authorization of ratification given by virtue of a law on 17 February 1952.

Per contra see Rousseau who notes: “The Constitution of 1958 (art. 53) repeats the provisions of article 27, therefore the solution adopted in the Judgment remains valid. The conformity with the Constitution may nevertheless be considered by the Constitutional Council under Article 61 (2)”, although ratification seems no longer necessary, p. 518. The last part of Professor Rousseau's opinion no doubt refers to ratification effected by conduct, that is, by executing the treaty

For a discussion of the nature of the respective competences of the Conseil d'Etat and the Conseil Constitutionnel, see below p. 162. ff.

Obviously, as it emerges from the declaration of the Foreign Minister in the National Assembly, on the occasion of the subsequent ratification of the Treaty of Cession, political considerations dictated the derogation from an established constitutional practice. Thus, one of the last acts of M. Debré's Government was to persuade the National Assembly to give its blessing to an irreversible situation created by the de facto as well de jure transfer of the French Establishments. The authorization to the President to ratify the Treaty was voted by a show of hands on 13 July 1962, i.e., eight years after its implementation. See declaration of Foreign Minister, M. Couve de Murville, in the National Assembly, Le Monde 14 07 1962.Google Scholar

26. See Rousseau, , “La Constitution de 1958 …” op. cit., pp. 464–465.Google Scholar Commenting on the distinction between legislative authorization and legislative approval, the former applying to formal treaties and the latter to “accords en forme simplifiée”, he notes: “Il resterait toutefois à déterminer si l'absence de cette dernière formule affecterait la validité internationale d'un accord dont le mérite propreest précisément d'être parfait dès la signature. On est en droit d'en douter, car l'approbation, intervenant a posteriori, ne saurait avoir la même portée qu'une autorisation de ratification qui, elle, apparaît comme le préalable nécessaire d'une opération dont elle conditionne la régularité. Mais le défaut d'approbation parlementaire interdirait certainement aux tribunaux, pour reprendre la formule de l'article 53 (2), de ‘donner effet’ à un accord en forme simplifiée conclu dans certaines conditions”, at p. 465.Google Scholar

27. See author's forthcoming book on French constitutional practice and the attitude of national courts.

Briefly stated, under French constitutional practice, i.e., under the effective Constitution as opposed to the written Constitution, the fact that an executive agreement had been definitively concluded and become binding on the international plane was considered sufficient for the agreement to become applicable in national courts. Absence of ratification stricto sensu was, in the opinion of the courts, covered by the intervention of the President in the form of a decree published in the Official Journal, particularly as ratification was in fact only one of the means of expressing, under international law, the State's final consent to the treaty. Thus what the courts sought was approval by the Head of State. Consequently publication was considered as approval a posteriori of the agreement concluded by the Government, and presidential decrees erroneously named “decree of ratification”. See J. Dehaussy, who cites cases before French civil courts and adds: “This case law has henceforth been invariable”. The Conditions of Application of Conventional Norms in the French Forum in 87 Clunet (1960), pp. 719–721 at p. 721.Google Scholar

It is in this sense that in a memorandum of 10 January 1953 to the United Nations, the French Government stated inter alia that in the case of treaties not subject to ratification, signature not subject to subsequent confirmation binds the State definitively. See Laws and Practices concerning the conclusion of treaties. UN Doc. ST/Leg/Ser. B/3, p. 48.

Finally, it is interesting to note that in a recent course of lectures Professor Rousseau himself notes: “Depuis l'installation de la Vè République le Gouvernement a déjà ratifié par voie d'ordonnance, un assez grand nombre de traités, une quarantaine entre le ier juin et 31 décembre 1958, et parmi eux il y en avait qui paraissaient bien nécessiter l'autorisation parlementaire”. La Conclusion des Traités Internationaux, Cours de l'lnstitut des Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1 (1961–1962), p. 70. When Professor Rousseau speaks of the Government ratifying the treaty, he is presumably referring to ratification by the President upon recommendation of the Government, since the latter signs but never ratifies treaties, unless he is using ratification not stricto sensu, i.e., implying prior legislative authorization but in its general sense of subsequent confirmation, which need not necessarily emanate from the Head of State.

28. One other remark must be made. The express enumeration ratione materiae of treaties and agreements in article 53 would seem to imply that international agreements which fall outside the pale of that article would continue to be concluded in accordance with the established practice, i.e., either by ratification of the Head of State on his own authority or by signature with immediate effect, hence in both cases without legislative approval.

If that interpretation should prove correct, then the division under domestic law of international agreements into three categories suggests a certain similarity with the division in the United States constitutional practice i.e., Senateconsented treaties, executive agreements concluded pursuant to congressional authorization and those concluded pursuant to the President's authority. Similarly the Netherlands revised 1956 Constitution is interpreted by some to refer, under article 60, to two categories of international agreements; those subject to ratification and those not subject to ratification, but which under paragraph 2 are submitted to the States-General as soon as possible. The distinction here seems to be based on the words “ratified” and “enter into force” respectively “until they have received the approval of the States-General”, hence the conclusion that under article 60 all international agreements require prior legislative approval. The third category is provided by the provisions of article 62 which dispenses with legislative approval, subject to certain conditions and under certain circumstances.

29. One other interpretation of the novel terminology of “ratified and approved by virtue of a law” must here be mentioned. Professor Nguyen Quoc Dinh bases his interpretation on a division of the treaty making power between the two branches of the Executive, i.e., the President and the Government. In that context the expression “ratified or approved” read in conjunction with paragraph 2 of article 52 which stipulates: “He (the President) is informed of negotiations in respect to the conclusion of an international agreement not subject to ratification”, clearly indicates, it is argued, that treaties subject to ratification follow the traditional procedure and those entering into force upon signature may be “approved” by the Government with prior legislative authorization instead of being ratified by the President. Professor Dinh draws attention to the important fact that whilst the President's act requires the countersignature of the Prime Minister, the latter can act on his own authority.

One objection which comes to mind is that considering all the treaty-making provisions in the 1958 Constitution make no distinction ratione materine, with the curious exception of treaties of peace and treaties of commerce in article 53, between treaties and agreements, and considering that an increasing number of international agreements come into force either upon signature or signature subiect to some form of subsequent confirmation other than ratification, the President's powers of intervention in the negotiation and conclusion of treaties under article 52 would be singularly curtailed. Such a conclusion would seem, moreover, to contradict Professor Dinh's extremely lucid developments on the increased powers of the President under the 1958 Constitution, inter alia the statement: “The Head of State retains the complete control of diplomatic action from its initiation to its completion”. (“La Constitution de 1958 et le droit international” in Revue du D.P. (1959) pp. 529 ff. at p. 547.)Google Scholar The question thus arises whether in view of the powers of the Head of State under article 52, the Government is free by virtue of the words “ratified or approved” to conclude international agreements in any form it chooses to, without consulting the Head of State, unless it is assumed that the President may at any time intervene and request the Government to conclude a given international agreement in the form of a formal treaty subject to ratification or sign subject to ratification a treaty which comes into force upon signature.

Per contra in the opinion of Professor Dehaussy, as a result of the prodigious development of executive agreements, not subject to ratification and valid under international law, the requirement appeared in the constitutional practice under the IV Republic that these agreements be “approved” by decree of the President, authorized to do so, if necessary by virtue of a law. “By offering the alternative ratified or approved’ the 1958 constitution is only incorporating into written constitutional law the requirement established by the practice of the courts on the basis of the interpretation of the terms of the previous Constitution”, op. cit. p. 705.Google Scholar

Finally, because of the novelty in legal practice of the expression “approuvé en vertu d'une loi”, discussion is bound to continue in legal doctrine. Thus, if the words refer to entry into force, then the correct expression would seem to be approved “by a law”, in which case, as under the 1946 Constitution, either express legislative approval would have to be obtained, albeit a posteriori, or else tacit approval, which a Presidential decree constitutes, would, continue to be regarded sufficient. See developments by ProfessorLesage, Michelop. cit., 879–880.Google Scholar

30. Rousseau, , “La Constitution de 1958…”, op. cit., pp. 466–67.Google Scholar He points out that the change represents an obvious regression in relation to traditional French law in which “le concept de loi se définit exclusivement par sa forme et non par son objet”, and cites de Malberg, Carré's Théorie général de l'Etat, I (1920), pp. 326, 377.Google Scholar He adds: “Mais comment s'en étonnerait-on dès lors que, suivant les remarques de notre regretté collègue Paul Durand, la Vè République tend à faire du gouvernement le législateur de droit commun?” p. 467. See P. Duran, “La décadence de la loi dans la Constitution de la Vé République”, J.C.P., 1959. 1. 1470.Google Scholar

31. See also Dehaussy, J. (op. cit., p. 723)Google Scholar, who refers to the difficulties which are bound to arise on the question whether under the terms of the Constitution a treaty or an agreement shall be ratified or approved by virtue of a law, particularly in respect to the expression “treaties which modify provisions of a legislative nature”.

The view held by Paul Durand was implicitly confirmed on the occasion of the Government's draft bill authorizing the ratification of the Franco-German Cooperation Treaty. The opposition's proposal to modify the text of the draft bill was rejected by the Government under the terms of article 128 of the Rules of the Assembly, in spite of M. Coste-Floret's able defense. In the Senate President Monnerville rejected M. Lecanuet's—President of the M.R.P.—arguments and ruled in favour of the Government's “l'exception d'irrecevabilité” on the ground that the amendment could not be based either on article 34 or 53. (For an account of the debates, see Chronique constitutionnelle et parlementaire by Léo Hamon & Claude Emeri in Revue du Droit Public (Sept–Oct. 1963), No. 5, pp. 974–978.) This conjunction of articles 34 and 53 would seem to confirm the view that only if the provisions of the treaty “entrent dans le domaine de la loi” under article 34, is legislative authorization to ratify or to approve an international agreement necessary. “L'étendu de la competence parlementaire subit par là une restriction … qui n'est autre que la conséquence générale de la nouvelle conception materielle de la loi”. Michel Lesage, p. 873. See also de Soto, Jean, “La loi et le règlement dans la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958” in Revue du D.P. (1959) p. 240 ff.Google Scholar

32. Commenting on Article 54, Professor Rousseau notes that in its application it is slightly more restricted than in the original draft of the Commission consultative constitutionnel. In his opinion the purpose of the opponents in subordinating the ratification of the C.E.D. Treaty to a revision of the Constitution was to render more difficult or to prevent its entry into force in contrast to the procedure adopted in other countries “où il s'agissait de sanctionner par une procédure plus solennel l'introduction dans le droit interne des diverses obligations assumées par voie conventionnelle”. at p. 468, n. 5. On domestic unconstitutionality, Professor Rousseau is categorical: “un non sens … dans un système juridique fondé sur la primauté du droit international”, the Constitution itself being part of national law is hierarchically inferior. Ibid.

In connection with the debates in the National Assembly, see also Scelle, 's article ‘De la prétendue inconstitutionnalité interne des traités” in Revue du droit pub. et de la science pol. (1952) pp. 1012 ff.Google Scholar Unconstitutionality in domestic law would mean its supremacy over international law since, he argues, violation of domestic law would entail the illegality of a rule of international law.

In connection with the debates on Euratom and Common Market Treaties, see Capitant, René, “La constitutionnalité des traités européens”, L'année pol, et écon. (1957) pp. 274–279.Google Scholar

On the consequences of the refusal to ratify a treaty regularly concluded, see author's forthcoming book.

33. Article 54 reads: “Si le Conseil Constitutionnel, saisi par le Président de la République, par le Premier Ministre ou par le Président de l'une ou l'autre Assemblée, a déclaré, qu'un engagement international comporte une clause contraire à la Constitution, l'autorisation de le ratifier ou de l'approuver ne peut intervenir qu'après la révision de la Constitution. » Italics added. On opposition to C.E.D. in the Senate, see J.O., 27 & 29 October 1953, p. 1640.

34. It has been suggested that article 54 further reduces or restricts the powers of Parliament on the ground that if the procedure of revision fails then Parliament is barred from authorizing ratification. And if it succeeds then parliamentary authorization to ratify becomes a pure formality. Incidentally it may here be noted that once the representative assemblies have been associated with the conclusion of important political treaties, refusal of ratification becomes virtually impossible in that it would mean a reversal of a fundamental State policy.

In the case of article 54, it is generally agreed that the underlying motif is the will to resist federalist trends—“le federalisme institutionnel”. See Professor Dinh's developments on General de Gaulle's conception of world organization and national independence in his speeches in Strasbourg on 7 April 1946 and in Rennes, on 27 07 1947.Google Scholar (op. cit., pp. 543–544)Google Scholar His reasoning is here again based on his interpretation of the words “ratify or approve”. He maintains that article 54 further reinforces the division of competence between the two branches of the Executive—the Head of State and the Government. Thus, should the Government, he argues, conclude a treaty of the “integrationist” type, against the wishes of the President, in the form of an agreement subject to “approval”, hence with prior authorization of Parliament, die President can retard such approval by setting in motion the procedure set out in article 54, and vice versa.

Professor Dinh's reasoning, in this respect, is not convincing. For, although within the context of the Gaulliste régime the situation is not likely to arise in view of the well-known opinion of General de Gaulle on national sovereignty versus integration. Should it do so and should the Government be opposed, the President can exercise his wide powers under article 11, which will be discussed further on, to obtain either the rejection of the treaty or its approval by effecting the revision of the Constitution through direct popular vote, the precedent having been established. His acts under article 11 and article 54 do not precisely require to be countersigned by the Prime Minister (see art. 19). The vague and obscure wording of article 11 lends to extensive interpretation of the category of treaties covered by that provision. And this faculty may be exercised by future Presidents as well. However the most important objection to Professor Dinh's analysis is that it is not at all likely that the partners of France would accept to conclude an “integrationist” type of treaty in the form of an agreement not subject to ratification by the Head of State, the internationally competent treaty-making organ, whose treaty-making powers under the 1958 Constitution are both “manifest” and “notorious” in the sense of the rule on the relevance of constitutional limitations adopted by the Commission at its fifteenth session, (See article 31 in UN. Doc.A/CN/4/163) 6 May—12 July 1963.

35. On French constitutional practice, Professor Rousseau notes: “Celle-ci offredes exemples variés de traites internationaux dont certaines dispositions paraissent peu compatibles avec tel ou tel article de la Constitution de 1875 et de celle de 1946 et dont néanmoins la ratification a été autorisée par une loi ordinaire”, p. 469. For concrete examples, see author's forthcoming book.

Besides, the procedure under article 54, no doubt more elaborate and laborious, does not bar the conclusion of treaties contrary to the Constitution any more than it did under the 1946 Constitution. Ultimately it is a case of obtaining the revision of the Constitution and both the President and the Government possess sufficient powers to obtain such a revision, particularly if the trend towards stable majorities continues.

36. Article 55 reads: “Les traités ou accords régulièrement ratifiés ou approuves ont, des leur publication, une autorité supérieure à celle des lois, sous réserve, pour chaque accord ou traite, de son application par l'autre partie.” Italics added.

Article 26 in the 1946 Constitution reads: “Diplomatic treaties duly (régulièrement) ratified and published shall have the force of law even when they are contrary to internal French legislation; they shall require for their application no legislative acts other than those necessary to ensure their ratification”. (Translated in Peaslee, , Constitutions of Nations, (1953) Vol. II, p. 12.)Google Scholar

The reason why the term “diplomatic treaties” has been left out from the 1958 Constitution is explained by its lack of precision and its ambiguity, for it can apply equally to a very restricted number of instruments or to all international agreements.

37. It is not possible, within the context of this article to study the extremely interesting discussions on the nature and scope of articles 26 and 28, although this is essential to a valid appreciation of article 55. See for details author's forthcoming book.

38. Commenting the reservation clause in article 55, Professor Rousseau writes: “Qu'elle procède d'une soumission abusive au préjugé de souveraineté ou d'une adhesion délibérée à une conception exagérément contractuelle du traité international, cette formule n'en est pas moins regrettable”. (“La conclusion des traites …” p. 470).Google Scholar

Per contra, Professor Dinh seems to find comfort in the thought that in view of the established principles in legal doctrine that the inexecution of the treaty is not ground for caducity, the reservation clause would apply, unless the treaty were denounced, to validity in domestic law, although he admits that the Constitution is silent and the intention of the framers is not known. In his view, in the case of inexecution by the other party the dualist principle would prevail, i.e., equality between the treaty and domestic legislation. Thus, article 55 may be said to set up a system, novel in character, by the following two propositions: “confirmation of the principle of monism and a conditional return to dualism”. Consequently, he argues, article 55 may yet prove beneficial in acting as a sanction and incentive to other countries to adopt the monist solution. For, if in the absence of reciprocity the judge will now be able to apply a conflicting law, he will equally be obliged to apply the treaty if the conditions of reciprocity have been fulfiled. op. cit., pp. 560–564, at p. 563.Google Scholar

On the question of the superior authority of international agreements over the Constitution, in spiet of the terms of article 54, Professor Dinh replies in the affirmative. He argues that since it is on the one hand a question of authorizing the approval of the draft texts and not the conventions themselves and, on the other, article 54 implies the authority to proceed with the negotiation of such treaties, the situation might be said not to have altered. Besides, he pursues, the problem of a conflict between international agreements and the Constitution presents no practical interest, since article 54 eliminates such a possibility—a conclusion which in its simplification contradicts his earlier developments. For not only article 54 does not eliminate the conclusion of an unconstitutional international agreement should the Executive choose to do so without resorting to revision but it raises fresh difficulties of interpretation. Finally, Professor Dinh holds that conventions containing clauses contrary to the Constitution, concluded prior to 1958, will continue to be binding because even if the principle of the superior authority of the Constitution were admitted it could have no retroactive effect. Ibid., pp. 551–554.

In the opinion of Kaufmann, article 55 “souligne simplement le caractère bilatéral des traités internationaux …, mais ne porte pas atteinte aux principes …” The author refers only in passing to article 55. His discussion centers on the unity of domestic law and international law, in spite of apparent cleavage and the various theories of transformation, at least as far as conventional law is concerned. “Traité international et droit interne” in Mélanges Gidel (Paris 1961) p. 391.Google Scholar

40. See article 12 § 2 of Sweden's Constitution, under which the Government must expressly reserve legislative approval if the treaty falls within the category of international agreements which require such approval.

41. It is, no doubt, possible that France might be able to count on the party, which has not applied the treaty, not to raise the question before the national courts. Thus by a tacit accord or meeting of wills, the treaty would be suspended until such time as the question is brought before an international tribunal.

42. In the light of discussions in the Comité consultatif constitutionnel, it would seem that the intention was to limit the condition of reciprocity to the application of the treaty—a question of legislative reciprocity. In other words, the signatory State would have to recognize in its legislation the principles laid down in article 55 in respect of the performance of the treaty or agreement, otherwise those principles would cease to be binding on France. Thus the draft text proposed by the Committee read: “la disposition qui précède ne peut fitre opposée par les Etats étrangers qui ne respectent pas ce principe”.

Similarly the original texte (article 50) reads: “Les traités ou accords régulièrement ratifiés ou approuvés ont, dès lors leur publication une autorité supérieure à celle des lois sous réserve, dans chaque cas, de réciprocité”. (Rousseau, , op. cit., p. 470).Google Scholar

43. Those who have so far attempted to analyse the treaty-making power in the 1958 Constitution (and they are very few), and in particular article 55, seem to agree on the gravity of the situation that might arise should an international agreement concluded by France lose, as a consequence of absence or lack of reciprocity, its binding effect.

It may here be mentioned that the question of reciprocity was raised in the past in connection with the clause in the preambule of the 1946 Constitution relating to “limitations of sovereignty”. That clause has been interpreted as being of a general character. Scelle maintains that once an international agreement has been concluded no condition of reciprocity can become a ground of revocation or inapplicability. (See “De la prétemdie inconstitutionnalité …” op. cit., p. 1019).Google Scholar

In his conclusions, Professor Dinh admits that the 1958 Constitution marks a clear regression on the progressive ideas of the 1946 Constitution, and while he believes that the change reflects the deceptions of the epoc, finds it nonetheless regrettable.

All three writers, cited here, seem to agree that while the provisions on the treaty-making power in the 1958 Constitution reinforce the powers of the Executive, they are not likely to affect those of the national courts, which will continue to depend on the Executive's interpretation relating to the international aspects of an agreement or a treaty.

In fact, substantially the situation is much the same in the United States constitutional law and practice. On the dependence of the courts on the State Department in respect to matters touching foreign policy, see Jessup, , “Has the Supreme Court abdicated one of its functions?” in A.J.J.L., (1946), p. 168.Google Scholar

44. Incidentally, under the 1958 Constitution there is no provision relating to the denunciation of international agreements. Under article 28 of the 1946 Constitution denunciation followed the same procedure as the conclusion of the treaty, i.e., with or without prior parliamentary consent, depending on the category of international agreement. It is interesting to note that the absence of a similar provision in article 26 of the Norwegian Constitution has been interpreted as implying that no consent of the Storting (Parliament) is necessary.

The absence of a provision in the 1958 Constitution relating to denunciation will, no doubt, be interpreted as confirming the diminished role of Parliament, although under international law it merely confirms the discretionary powers of the Executive in matters relating to treaty relations in general, and to treatymaking in particular.

45. For instance, treaties of commerce were often executed before ratification in violation of Art. 8 of the 1875 Constitution. Similarly the Briand-Kellogg Pact was approved, in violation of Art. 9, by a simple majority. More recently the United Nations Charter entered into force without legislative authorization and its ratification by the President was not published in the Journal Officiel, in spite of the revolutionary character of Art. 43. Again the ILO Convention was ratified by the Head of State alone in violation of Art. 27 of the 1946 Constitution. As to agreements in simplified form, they were concluded up to 1958 “dans une forme insolute” (Rousseau, op. cit. p. 469), but whose binding character has not been contested by French courts. The quasi-totality of treaties concluded under the 1946 Constitution were not signed by the President, in spite of such requirement under Art. 31 (1). Government practice in France abounds in treaties or agreements concluded in violation of constitutional requirements. Writing on the control by Parliament of conformity of treaties to article 53, ProfessorLesage, writes: “alors que les tribunaux n'exercent dans ce domaine qu'un contrôle timide” op. cit. p. 880.Google Scholar

The only instance of a reference to article 55 by an administrative court not only throws no light on the implications of article 55, but shows a certain confusion in the attitude of the courts on the exact nature of the various modes of conclusion of international agreements. In its Judgment of 6 February 1963, in Maire d'Anboue, concerning the passage of foreign troops, the Administrative Court of Nancy, while declining to pronounce on international agreements bearing on the international relations of France, did refer to article 55 and the rule of superiority, but only in respect to the necessity of ratification and publication.

However, as Professor Rousseau points out, the Court seems to have confused the Treaty of London of 19 June 1951, which stipulated the passage of foreign troops, duly ratified on 16 June 195a, with Germany's accession to NATO of 23 October 1954. Revue gén. de droit pub., 07–09 1963, No. 3.Google Scholar

46. Under article 20 “le gouvernement détermine et conduit la politique de la Nation et est responsable devant le Parlement”; and under article 21 “Le Premier Ministre dirige l'action du gouvernement”. According to official commentators the 1958 Constitution has maintained the classical form of parliamentary government. Cf. Commentaires sur la Constitution du 4 octobre 1948. Documentation française, N.E.D. No. 2530, 11 avril 1959, p. 7.

47. Maurice Duverger speaks of “the Presidential structure of the 1958 Constitution”. See his lucid analysis of the various aspects of the Constitution, op. cit.

48. Per contra, see Raymond Aron's comments on the abusive exercise of power by the Head of State. Thus, he not only appoints the Prime Minister, but also removes him although under § 2 of article 8 he has no such right of revocation. op. cit. The reference here is to the removal of M. Michel Debré after the referendum on Algeria.

See also Lesage, Michel, “Les procédures de conclusion des accords internationaux de la France sous la Ve République” in Annuaire Français de Droit Int., 1962, p. 873 ff.Google Scholar Referring to the official interpretation, the author adds: “très vite le Général de Gaulle apparut le chef réel de gouvernement, le premier ministre n'étant que son premier et principal adjoint, chargé de diriger “l'action du gouvernement”, mais non de fixer son orientation”.

And again: “Dans la conception gaulliste de l'organisation du pouvoir, le gouvernement et le Parlement n'ont en effet qu'un rôle secondaire, le rôle essentiel est celui du chef de l'Etat”, at p. 874.

49. See broadcasts of 18 and 26 October 1962. The following passage from his Memoires gives a clear picture of his concept of the role of the Head of State:

“Suivant moi, il est nécessaire que l'Etat ait une tête, c'est à dire un chef en qui la nation puisse voir, au-dessus des fluctuations, l'homme en charge de l'essentiel et le garant de ses destinées … En dehors des circonstances où il appartiendrait au Président d'intervenir publiquement, gouvernement et parlement auraient à collaborer, celui-ci contrôlant celui-là et pouvant le renverser, mais le magistrat national exercant son arbitrage et ayant la faculté de recourir à celui du peuple”. Tome III, p. 280.

It is the present writer's opinion that the 1958 Constitution translates all the essential elements of the above passage. General de Gaulle has done no more than exercise fully the powers vested in him. Thus, as far back as 25 March 1959, he indicated in his Press conference “qu'il donnerait un sens tres concret au pouvoir de négocier que lui attribuait la Constitution”. Cf. Lesage, Michel, op. cit. p. 876Google Scholar; also Baillou, J. et Pelletier, P., Les affaires etrangères, Paris 1962.Google Scholar

In a speech on 20 September 1961 General de Gaulle again referred to the role of the Head of State in these terms:

“Dans le domain essentiel de la politique extérieure et de la sécurité nationale, il est tenu à une action directe, puisqu'en vertu de la Constitution, il négocie et conclut les traités …” La Documentation française, No. 0.1295.

50. The French text reads: “Le Président de la République veille au respect de la Constitution. Il assure, par son arbitrage, le fonctionnement régulier des pouvours publics ainsi que la continuité de l'Etat. Il est le garant de l'indépendence nationale, de l'intégrité du territoire, du respect des accords de Coramunauté et des traités”.

51. The French text reads: “Le Président de la République, sur proposition du Gouvernement pendant la duree des sessions ou sur proposition conjointe des deux assemblées, publiée au Journal Officiel, peut soumettre au référendum tout projet de loi portant sur l'organisation des pouvoirs publics, comportant approbation d'un accord de Communauté ou tendant à autoriser la ratification d'un traité qui, sans être contraire à la Constitution, aurait des incidences sur le fonctionnement des institutions.”

52. Article 89 stipulates: “(1) L'initiative de la revision revient concurrement au Président de la République et au Parlement.

”(2) Le projet ou la proposition de revision doit être voté par les deux Assemblées en termes identiques. La revision est définitive après avoir eacute;tée par reéférendum.

“(3) Toutefois, le projet de revision n'est pas présenté au référendum lorsque le Président décide de le soumettre au Parlement convoqué en Congrès; dans ce cas le projet de revision n'est approuvé que s'il réunit la majorité de 3/5 des suffrages exprimés.”

52a. Former President Auriol said the referendum was an act of absolute power contrary to the Constitution. Those who supported the Head of State misled public opinion by citing the United States President as an example in favour of the election of the President of the Republic by direct popular vote. They forget, he pursued, that in the United States the two presidential candidates represent two major parties and are pledged to defend and even implement the policy of their respective parties. Le Monde, 26/10/1962.Google Scholar For an analysis of the problem of a “Government majority” in French politics, see below, pp. 175 ff.

53. Compte-rendus of the debates in the National Assembly on the censure motion. M. Pompidou offered his own analysis of the relevant articles, in particular of Article 11 in relation to Art. 89 with respect to the various modes of constitutional revision, which the framers of the 1958 Constitution had in mind.

“Il s'agit de conformer la Constitution plutôt que de la modifier”. Le Monde, 6 10 1962, pp. 2–6.Google Scholar

54. The Council of State, initially Conseil du Roi, was abolished by the French Revolution in 1791 and reconstituted by Bonaparte in 1799. It was originally intended to be a docile instrument in the hands of the Government to secure decisions favourable to the authorities. However it gradually acquired independence and authority. Article 32 of an Ordonnance issued on 31 July 1945 fixes its Statute and defines its various roles.

55. It was by virtue of its powers when sitting as a court of appeal in administrative matters that the Council of State rescinded the Ordonnance of 1 June 1962 setting up the Military Court of Justice to replace the former Military Tribunal which spared General Salan's life. For an analysis of the above Judgment of the Conseil d'Etat and consequent developments see below p. 171 ff.

56. Article 61 provides: “(1) Les lois organiques, avant leur promulgation, et les règlements des assemblées parlementaires, avant leur mise en application, doivent être soumis au Conseil Constitutionnel qui se prononce sur leur conformity a la Constitution.

“(2) Aux mêmes fins, les lois peuvent être déférées au Conseil Constitutionnel, avant leur promulgation, par le Président de la République, le Premier Ministre ou le Président de l'une ou l'autre assemblée.”

And article 60 merely provides: “Le Conseil Constitutionnel veille à la régularité des opérations de référendum et en proclame les résultats.” Articles 54 & 56 define its composition and the mode of appointments. Italics added.

57. M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen, former President of the M.R.P. (Christian Democrats) and former vice-President of the Council of Ministers, argued that Article 11 authorizes resort to referendum only in matters not dealt with by the Constitution. Le Parisien, 22 10 1962.Google Scholar See also analysis of Art. 11 by M. Coste-Floret, the M.R.P. spokesman in the National Assembly debates, in particular his interpretation of the words “l'organisation des pouvoirs publics.” Op. cit.

58. Although Professor Duverger held that constitutional revision by referendum, without prior submission to Parliament, constituted a violation of Article 89 § 2, he argued that it was a violation of a procedural limitation and, although serious in the case of a constitutional provision, could not be compared to the more serious violations of substantive limitations under the Fourth Republic, such as acts of torture and arbitrary arrest in violation of the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution, and the military action in the Suez conflict in violation of Article 6 of that same Constitution. See his article “La validité du scrutin du 28 Octobre” in Le Monde, 17 10 1962.Google Scholar

59. The original text of the ruling reads:

“Considérant que la compétence du Conseil constitutionnel est strictement délimitée par la Constitution ainsi que par les dispositions de la loi organique du 7 novembre 1958 …

“Considérant que, si Particle 61 de la Constitution donne au Conseil constiutionnel mission d'apprécier la conformité des lois organiques et des bis ordinaires qui, respectivement, doivent ou peuvent être soumis à son examen, sans préciser si cette compétence s'étend à l'ensemble des textes de caractère législatif, qu'ils aient été adoptés par le peuple à la suite d'un référendum ou qu'ils aient été votés par le Parlement ou si, au contraire, il résulte de l'esprit de la Constitution qui a fait du Conseil constitutionnel un organe régulateur de l'activité des pouvoirs publics que les lois que la Constitution a entendu viser dans son article 61 sont uniquement les lois votées par le Parlement et non point celles qui, adoptées par le peuple à la suite d'un référendum, constituent l'expression directe de la souveraineté nationale.

“Considérant que cette interprétation résulte également des dispositions expresses de la Constitution et notamment de son article 60, qui détermine le rôle du Conseil constitutionnel en matière de référendum et de l'article 11 qui ne prévoit aucune formality entre l'adoption d'un projet de loi par le peuple et sa promulgation par le Préident de la République (art. 11 (2) provides: “Lorsque le référendum a conclu à l'adoption du projet” the President promulgates it within 15 days.)

“Considérant qu'il réquite de ce qui précède qu'aucune des dispositions de la Constitution ni de la loi organique précitée prise en vue de leur application ne donne compétence au Conseil constitutionnel pour se prononcer sur la demande …” Italics added. See below n. 75.

For the text of the ruling and the text of the referendum Bill, which was approved by 62.25% of the votes cast (44.66% of the registered electorate) against 37.75% with 23.03% abstentions, published by the President the same day, see Journ. Off., 7 11 1962.Google Scholar Articles 1 and 2 of the Bill replace Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution, and Article 3, which lays down the new procedure, replaces the organic law in the ordonnance of 7 November 1958 relative to the election of the President, and in turn becomes a “loi organique”.

60. Commenting on the Constitutional Council's ruling, Professor Duverger argues that since under Article 60 the Council is responsible for the control of the regularity of the ballot, including the abusive use by the Government of the means of mass communication, and for the proclamation of the referendum results, it is clear that its competence extends to the procedural aspects of a referendum. It is therefore obvious that having controlled the regularity of the ballot and proclaimed the results under Article 60, the Council could not turn round and oppose the promulgation of the Bill adopted by that same referendum. No doubt Professor Duverger does admit that the absence of any mechanism sanctioning resort to referendum by the President under Article 11 is a very serious shortcoming of the 1958 Constitution. Moreover, the fact that the “sovereign people alone have the absolute right to pronounce on the question of constitutionality and that their decision is irrevocable is juridically equally faulty. But, adds Prof. Duverger, under the III, IV and V Republics parliamentary acts, contrary to the Constitution, also escape the control of the sovereign people.” op. cit. This may be so, but under the 1958 Constitution they may be subjected to the control of the Constitutional Council.

61. In his defence of Article 11 Prime Minister Pompidou argued that if constitutional reform could only be obtained through Parliament, then the Senate, which is immune from the threat of dissolution or other Government pressure, would be able to block a reform desired by the country. Radio-television interview. For the text see Le Monde, 26 10 1962.Google Scholar For developments consequent on the hostile attitude of the Senate to the referendum, below p. 173, n. 76.

62. In his nation-wide broadcast, during the general election campaign, General de Gaulle interpreted the results of the referendum approving his Bill to mean “a solemn confirmation of the power inherent, under the Constitution, in the Head of State to submit to the Nation, by means of a referendum, bills on the reorganization of public powers. The Sovereign people, he said, thus decided, once for all, that future Presidents shall in their turn have the faculty to ask the people as I have myself done five times, to pronounce directly on any essential problem”. Translated by the author; (7 November 1962). Commenting on the above speech, M. Beuve-Mery, Director of Le Monde, criticizes the arbitrary nature of General de Gaulle's conception of an all-powerful Head of State. Editorial signed “Sirius”, 9 11 1962.Google Scholar

62a. In an earlier article entitled “En toute conscience”, on the implications of revising the Constitution under Article 11, M. Beuve-Mery expressed his fears on the dangers for the future of an extensive interpretation of Article 11. “If Article 11, he writes, means that nothing, whether political parties, Parliament, ministers, magistrates, the Conseil d'Etat, the Constitutional Council can come between “le guide” and his people, then the referendum, the most democratic procedure, would become the most favourable to absolute power”. Ibid. 26 October 1962. Translated by the author.

63. Conceivably nothing would have prevented General de Gaulle from submitting the recent Franco-German Cooperation Treaty to a referendum, had he wished to, so as to associate the people with this ‘historic and epoch-making event’. It may here be noted that unlike other political treaties of importance, the Franco-German Agreement was signed without Parliament having had a chance to debate it. One of the objections to the ratification of the European Defence Community Treaty was that Parliament had not been sufficiently consulted. (See Holloway, Kaye, “Les Reserves dans les Traités Internationaux, (Paris 1958), p. 78.)Google Scholar

64. Commenting article 11, Professor Rousseau notes: “la formule manque de précision, le recours au terme d'“incidences”, qui en dehors de la législation fiscale n'éveille d'habitude aucun écho dans la langue juridique”, may prove either excessive or inadequate, for “elle ne vise qu'une catégorie de traités arbitrairement choisis et improprement définis; … ne s'appliquera pas à des traités plus importants et où l'initiative du référendum, d'ordre exclusivement gouvernementale ou parlementaire, est refusée aux gouvernés en tant que tels” as in Switzerland. “La constitution de 1958 …” p. 467.Google Scholar

Professor Dinh analyses article 11 within the context of the confederal versus federal concept of international cooperation which, in his opinion, underlies the 1958 Constitution, and on the basis of a division of the treaty-making power between the Head of State and the Government notes: “dans la conclusion des traités internationaux, ce pouvoir propre du Président est le courronement de l'édifice de la Constitution … le chef de l'Etat conserve la maîtrise totale de l'acte diplomatique …” p. 547.Google Scholar Moreover article 11, which relates to treaties of a confederal type setting up “des institutions confédérales et non fédérales, compatibles avec l'independance nationale …” is designed, he argues, to safeguared the authority of the President in the event of a deadlock in Parliament over the approval of a treaty subject to ratification, hence the exclusion of agreements from article 11, which affect alone the authority of the Government, p. 548.

64a. Professor Lesage goes even further when he observes: “Les modifications apportées par le texte de la Constitution de 1958 à la procédure de conclusion des traités avec les Etats étrangers doivent d'abord être complétés par l'interprétation donneée par le General de Gaulle à certaines dispositions de la Constitution”, op. cit., p. 875.Google Scholar

65. In the Ivory Coast Constitution the relevant provision, similar to the terms of Art. 11, stipulates that with the consent of the “bureau” of the Assembly—a merely formal requirement—the President may submit bills to referendum. See also the Constitutions of Madagascar and Togo. In the recent Constitutions of Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey and Gabon, the use of the referendum is unlimited. Under the Constitution of Congo-Brazzaville of March 1961, the President may at his own discretion submit to referendum any bill “which in his opinion requires the direct consultation of the people” and promulgate it upon adoption, op. cit. The wording here is almost identical with General de Gaulle, 's definition in his broadcast of 7 11 1962.Google Scholar

66. After declaring that one of the essential features of the 1958 Constitution was that it made the President the real Head of the State, he went on to say that to carry out such a mission the President needs the confidence of the nation, not implicitely as in his case, but expressly as evidenced by his election directly by the people.

In a round-table discussion on Radio-Luxembourg, Mr. René Capitant of the Paris Faculty of Law countered the accusation that the General de Gaulle transformed the referendum into a plebiscite by: “The President asked for a vote of confidence and had his policies approved by the people”. 19/10/1962.

67. General de Gaulle has made masterly use of these and other arms from his exceptionally rich arsenal to mobilize public opinion in a final showdown with the political parties.

67a. Above pp. 140 ff.

68. Cf. Villat, A., who notes: “… dissolution is no longer a normal mechanism of parliamentary Government. It becomes here the means of ensuring the superior authority of the Head of State”. Manuel de Droit Public et Administratif, (1961), p. 85.Google Scholar

68a. In the great majority of African Constitutions of Gaullist inspiration the power of dissolution is vested in the Head of State, who is also the head of the Executive. It provides the key to a stable and strong Executive. The defeat of the Government entails the dissolution of the Assembly. Senegal alone seems to be opposed to the principle of automatic dissolution. Although it has now adopted a “monocephalous” Executive, it proposes to maintain the principle of the separation of powers, by instituting a system in which the Assembly cannot be dissolved by the Head of State nor the Government overthrown. In the event of conflict between the Executive and the Legislature the dispute will go to arbitration before the Supreme Court. Declaration of M. Lamine-Guey, President of Senegal's Assembly, in Le Monde, , 22 12 1962.Google Scholar

69. Art. 16 reads: “(1) When the institutions of the Republic, its national independence and territorial integrity or the execution of its international commitments are gravely and immediately threatened and the regular functioning of its constitutionally established public powers interrupted …” the President, after consulting with the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the two Chambers and the Constitutional Council, exercises emergency powers. “(2) The measures taken shall be inspired by the will to invest the public authorities with the necessary powers to carry out their mission”. Translated by the author.

The French text reads: “Lorsque les institutions de la République, l'independance de la Nation, Pintegrite' de son territoire ou I'execution de ses engagements internationaux sont menaces d'une maniere grave et immediate et que le fonctionnement regulier des pouvoirs publics constitutionnels est interrompu, le President de la République prend les mesures exigées par ces circonstances, apres consultation officielle du Premier Ministre, des Presidents des assemblies ainsique du Conseil Constitutionnel.

“II en informe la Nation par un message.

“Ces mesures doivent être inspires par la volonté d'assurer aux pouvoirs publics constitutionnels, dans les moindres delais, les moyens d'accomplir leur mission …”

70. The state of emergency was proclaimed by decree on 22 April 1961. It was then extended, under article 16, to 15 July 1962. Finally an ordonnance of General de Gaulle of 13 July 1962 extended the application of the state of emergency “jusqu'à une date qui sera fixé par décret en conseil des ministres, et au plus tard jusqu'au 31 mai 1963, pour assurer, directement ou indirectement, l'application des declarations gouvernementales du 19 mars 1962”, namely the Evian Agreements. See “Deux ans sous l'etat d'urgence”, in Le Monde, 6–7 01 1963.Google Scholar

71. It is interesting to note that practically all the African constitutions of Gaullist inspiration contain an article on emergency powers on the model of article 16, in addition to express delegation of legislative powers to the Executive in specific fields and for a limited period of time. See article 19 of the Constitution of the Ivory Coast of 3 November 1960, which has served as a model for the majority of the constitutions adopted by French speaking African States. Similarly all the articles on the treaty-making power are identical with those in the 1958 French Constitution.

72. Le “Haut Tribunal Militaire” was dissolved by a brief “ordonnance” of 26 05 1962.Google Scholar See Journ. off., 27 05 1962.Google Scholar

73. On “les juridictions d'exception” (specially constituted courts), as a direct consequence of the failure of ordinary military courts, see two very interesting articles by Fauvet, Jacques and Theolleyre, Jean-Marc in Le Monde, 28 02 1963.Google Scholar

74. The Judgment of the Conseil d'Etat reads:

“Considérant que l'article 2 de la loi du 13 avril 1962, adoptée par le peuple français par la voie du référendum autorise le President de la Republique “a arrêter par voie d'ordonnance ou, selon le cas, de décret en conseil des ministres, toute mesure législative ou réglementaire relative à l'application des déclarations gouvernementales du 19 mars 1962”;

“Qu'il résulte de ces termes mêmes que ce texte a eu pour objet non d'habiliter le président de la République à exercer le pouvoir législatif lui-même mais seulement de l'autoriser à user exceptionnellement, dans le cadre et dans les limites qui sont précisées, de son pouvoir réglementaire, pour prendre par ordonnance des mesures qui normalement relevent du domaine de la loi;

“Qu'il s'ensuit de là que l'ordonnance attaquée du 1er juin 1962 … conserve le caractère d'un acte administratif et est susceptible, comme tel, d'être déféré au Conseil d'Etat par la voie du recours pour excès de pouvoir;…

“Considérant que … si de telles mesures pouvaient comporter notamment l'institution d'une juridiction spéciale chargée de juger les auteurs de délits et des infractions connexes commis en relation avec les événements d'Algerie … l'organisation et le fonctionnement d'une telle juridiction ne pouvaient legalement porter atteinte aux droits et garanties essentiels de la defense que dans la mesure ou compte tenu des circonstances …

“Considérant qu'il ne résulte pas de l'instruction que, eu égard à l'importance et a la gravité des atteintes que l'ordonnance attaquée apporte aux principes géveraux du droit penal, en ce qui concerne notamment la procedure qui est prevue, et l'exclusion de toute voie de recours … ladite ordonnance, qui excede les limites de la delegation consentie par l'article 2 de la loi du 13 avril 1962, est entachée d'illégalité, qu'il y a lieu par suite d'en prononcer l'annulation.” 19 October 1962, Journ. off. 14 04 1962.Google Scholar

75. It is interesting to note that the reason why the Conseil d'Etat is barred from judicial review of laws stricto sensu is, it is argued, to safeguard Parliament's legislative supremacy. Thus when in 1946 a constitutional committee was set up its powers were confined to the initiation of constitutional revision in the event a law enacted by Parliament was considered contrary to the Constitution so as to conform the latter to the former. Legal opinion saw in the provision a clear indication of the supremacy of the National Assembly. Consequently, it is now argued, the creation, under the 1958 Constitution, of the Conseil Constitutionnel, which is an independent political organ with powers apparently extending to all unconstitutional legislation by Parliament under articles 34 and 46 and its rulings binding on all “pouvoirs publics”, became possible only because Parliament lost its supremacy. Incidentally, articles 54 and 56, relating to the nomination and composition of the Conseil Constitutionnel, which are Presidential acts, do not require under article 19 to be countersigned by the Prime Minister.

76. On two other points the Bilb roused severe opposition: the composition of the Court, appointed by the Government, and the fact that the Garde des sceaux would alone be able to seize the Court. See a strong attack by M. Mitterand, former Garde des sceaux, “le pouvoir veut institutionnaliser la raison d'Etat”. However the Government argued that the common law courts had proved inadequate to deal with offenses against the external and internal security of the State; the creation of a permanent court would do away with “les tribunaux d'exception”, set up on the spur of the moment; the new Court would provide for the respect of the rights of the defence. For the text of the debates in the National Assembly and the Senate, see Le Monde, 5, 6–7 and 11 01 1963Google Scholar, in particular 5 January.

Another interesting aspect of the stormy debates in the National Assembly is the Prime Minister's decision to invoke paragraph 3 of article 44 which authorizes him to ask for a “vote bloqué”. Fearing a split in his majority on the question of the denial of the right of appeal to the accused appearing before the Military Court of Justice, following the validation and prolongation of that court under article 50 of the Bill setting up the Cour de surety de I'Etat, M. Pompidou declared: “en vertu de Particle 44 (3) le Gouvernement demande a l'Assemble'e de se prononcer par un seul vote sur le projet modifié par l'amendement du Gouvernement”. He justified his decision by “ce qui est en cause c'est la légitimité de la résistance a la subversion”. This challenge placed a considerable portion of the majority before the dilemma of a choice between casting doubts on “la legitimite du regime” and thereby of the Head of State, which the leaders of the subversive movement—O.A.S.—contested, and thus “faire le jeu des assassins” and the denial of “les droits imprescriptibles de l'homme”. See Le Monde, 15 01 1963.Google Scholar

For the text of the two Bills: “Loi n. 63–22 modifiant complètement le code de procedure penal en vue de la repression des crimes et delits contre la surety de l'Etat”; and “Loi n. 63–23 fixant la composition, les règles de fonctionnement de la Cour …” J.O., 15 01 1963, pp. 508–509.Google Scholar

The Senate's unrelenting opposition to the Bills, following its equally determined

opposition to constitutional revision by referendum, may, it is feared prove fatal to its existence. The Prime Minister and ministers have, on various occasion, hinted at the desirability of replacing the Senate by a “more constructive” body, such as a social and economic council representing the local governments. The question was again raised, albeit indirectly, at the last U.N.R. Congress (22–25 November 1963). However the Senate, which has now become the stronghold of the opposition leaders, has not been deterred by counsels of moderation in the interest of its own survival. Thus it marked its resolute opposition to the “force de frappe”—France's independent nuclear deterrent—by rejecting the military budget voted by a large majority in the National Assembly.

77. Article 50 stipulates: “Les ordonnances prises en vertu de l'article 2 de la loi no. 62–421 du 13 avril 1962 ont et conservent force de loi à compter de lew publication”. J.O., 16 01 1963, p. 512.Google Scholar

78. See article 51 which inter alia reads: “a l'expiration du délai prévu à l'article 49, la Cour de sûreté de l'Etat sera de plein droit competent pour connaître de toute procédure deieree au Tribunal militaire et la Cour militaire de justice …” Ibid.

(79) See Loi no. 63–138 du 20 février 1963 complétant article 51 de la loi 62–23 du 15 Janvier 1963, which reads:

“Toutefois le tribunal militaire et la cour militaire de justice seront provisoirement maintenus en fonction pour le jugement de toute affaire faisant l'objet de debats ou de delibere en cours a l'expiration du delai prevu a l'article 49; dans ce cas, le jugement ultéieur des accusés ainsi condamnés par défaut et qui auront formé opposition relèvera également de la compétence de ces mêmes juridictions”. J.O., 21 02 1963, p. 1723.Google Scholar

80. Of the three death sentences pronounced by the Court two were commuted to life imprisonment. In spite of the clemency exercised by the Head of State, in the superior interests of the nation, for the various military putches and the subsequent crimes of the O.A.S. cost its authors two executions—more symbolical than retributive—these raised strong protest on the ground that nothing justified the singling out of the two who were executed.

81. Following a series of broadcasts on the origins and evolution of the main political parties in France, Professor Maurice Duverger studied in a second series on “Le Gouvernement et le problème des majorités”, the dominant characteristics and the mechanism of the various majorities. In his opinion, the present Government is Centre-Right rather than Right-wing in the sense of the traditional French conservative parties. Jan.–Feb. 1963.

82. Commenting General de Gaulle's triumph in the 196a General Election, M. Beuve-Mery writes: “Les plus optimistes imagineront sans doute que, non content de refondre et completer ainsi les dispositions constitutionnelles, le chef de l'Etat s'efforcerait de donner une structure et une vie propres au parti dont il est devenu le chef, tout en admettant que l'opposition puisse avoir elle aussi, si la nécessité l'en rendait capable, sa doctrine, son organisation et, le cas échéant, son pouvoir. On imaginerait ainsi, pour ne parler ni de droite ni de gauche, un parti conservateur et un parti travailliste, … Et dans ce cas pourquoi tant d'électeurs et d'électrices qui donnent leur voix au parti communiste, mais seraient bien marris de le porter au pouvoir … qui fausse depuis si longtemps notre politique intérieure. Ainsi … se rétablirait le jeu des forces démocratiques. Sur d'autres bases, il est vrai, que celles proposées par M. Mendès-France …” (“La victoire du Général-Président” in Le Monde, 27 11 1962).Google Scholar For the reference to Mendès-France, , see below p. 178Google Scholar and n. 86. The situation as analysed by M. Beuve-Méry has not changed.

83. 11 December 1962. For the text, see Le Monde, 12 12 1962.Google Scholar

84. Press Conference of 14 01 1962.Google Scholar

85. See Raymond Aron in whose opinion General de Gaulle has not only made ample use of his powers under the Constitution, but has arrogated to himself those which were not there and reduced the role of the Prime Minister to “ledirecteur du cabinet du President de la Republique”. Editorial in Le Figaro, , 4 01 1963. Above n. 48 at p. 158.Google Scholar

To stabilize the regime on a democratic basis M. Beuve-Méry would like to see General de Gaulle restore the necessary balance of power by taking the following measures: “préciser les conditions de recours au référendum pour lui ôter à l'avenir tout caractère plébiscitaire, supprimer ou limiter très strictement le droit de dissolution, reconnaître à l'Assemblé0e nationale un droit réel de contrôle, de remontrance et, le cas échéant, de veto, instituer une Cour suprême habilitée à jugerde la conformité des ordonnances et des lois à la Constitution…” op. cit., Le Monde, 27 11 1962.Google Scholar

In the opinion of M. Mendès-France, the Fourth Republic was “moving towards anarchy” and the Fifth “is heading for despotism”. La République Moderne (Paris 1962)Google Scholar—English edition (London 1963).

86. Op. cit. His further suggestion of an indirectly elected upper Chamber representing social and economic groups is being discussed, with slight variations, by the Gaullists and associates. See also above n. 76 at p. 173.

87. Op. cit, above p. 133.Google Scholar

In a public opinion poll in 1956, 61% were in favour of the election of the Prime Minister by direct popular vote. See La Revue “Sondage” 1956, No. 3.Google Scholar

88. Above pp. 141 and 142 and notes 12 & 13.

88a. The question of a presidential system was raised again, but only briefly; following the sudden and brutal death of President Kennedy. The rapidity with which the vacancy was filled and continuity assured impressed French opinion. However, a proposition by the “Independents” (the Party of the present Finance Minister Giscard d'Estaing) to revise the Constitution so as to provide for the election of a vice-president did not meet with General de Gaulle's approval and has been quietly dropped.

89. In a statement on France's nuclear deterrent M. Mesmer, Minister of Defence, writes: “our military policy explains, in part, the evolution of the political institutions of the nation. The Head of State alone detains the use of the nuclear force. The consequences in a democratic regime is that the Head of State cannot be elected by a restricted electoral college, but by the whole nation.” Thus “our military policy reinforces the other arguments in favour of the election of the President of the Republic by direct popular vote”. Revue de difense nationaltGoogle Scholar, reproduced in Le Monde, 30 04 1963.Google Scholar

90. Commenting on the differences between the 1946 and 1958 Constitutions, Professor Lesage writes: “Mais la pratique de la Ve République, notamment en ce qui concerne le rôle du Président de la République, a étendu largement les differences entre les modes de conclusion des accords internationaux sous la IVe et sous la Ve République.” op. cit., p. 873.Google Scholar

91. The Convention of 18 February 1923 with France on the Free Zones. The Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty has just been ratified without being submitted to referendum, although under article 4 the Treaty is of unlimited duration.