1. A majority of three fifths of the votes in both Houses of Parliament is required for the appointment of the Ombudsman in Spain.

2. Finland 1919; Norway (for the military 1952, for the civil administration 1962); Denmark 1955; Federal German Republic (for the military 1957, in Rheinland-Pfaltz 1974); New Zealand 1962; Tanzania 1966; Great Britain 1967; Northern Ireland 1969; for the municipalities of England, Wales and Scotland 1974; Canada (Alberta 1967, New Brunswick 1967, Manitoba 1969, Quebec 1968, Nova Scotia 1969, Saskatchewan 1973, Ontario 1975, New Foundland 1970, Columbia 1977); Guiana 1967; USA (Hawaii 1969, Nebraska 1971, Iowa 1972, Alaska 1975, Puerto Rico 1977, Guam 1979, Detroit 1973, Flint 1974, Atlanta 1974, Berkeley 1975, New York 1977); Mauritius 1970; Hongkong 1970; Australia 1976 (Federal State) (Western Australia 1972, South Australia 1972, Northern Australia 1978, Victoria 1973, Queensland 1974, New South Wales 1975, Tasmania 1978); India (Maharashtra 1971, Bihar 1973, Regarthan 1973); Israel 1971 (Jerusalem 1967, Haifa 1974); Fiji 1972; France 1973; Zambia 1973; Italy (District of Tuscany 1974); Papua New Guinea 1976; Switzerland (City of Zürich 1971, Canton of Zurich 1978); Austria 1977; Jamaica 1978; Portugal 1977; Ghana 1979; Eire 1980; Spain 1982; Japan 1982; Zimbabwe 1982; Pakistan 1983.

3. With no attempt at being comprehensive: Andersen, P., ‘Om en Rigsdagens Ombudsmand’ in Juristen (1952)Google Scholar, Hurwitz, S., ‘Folketingets Ombudsmand og Administrationen’, N.A.T. 1956Google Scholar, Hurwitz, S., ‘Foletingets Ombudsmand of den kommunale forvaltning’, Festskrift til Prof. Dr. Paul Andersen (Kopenhagen 1958)Google Scholar, Hurwitz, S., ‘The Danish Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil and Militair Administration’, Public Law (1958)Google Scholar, Hurwitz, S., ‘Der Skandinavische Parlamentsbevollmächtigte’, Staatsbürger und Staatsgewalt (Karlsruhe 1963)Google Scholar, Pedersen, I., ‘Ombudsmandinstitutionen i Danmark’, N.A.T. 1962Google Scholar, Jensen, S. G., ‘Folketingets Ombudsmand’, Juristen (1963)Google Scholar, Haller, W., Der Schwedische Justitieombudsman (Zürich 1964)Google Scholar, Gellhorn, W., Ombudsman and Others (Massachusetts 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Rowat, D., The Ombudsman, citizens' defender (Toronto 1968)Google Scholar, Legrand, A., L'Ombudsman Scandinave (Paris 1970)Google Scholar, Stacey, F., The British Ombudsman (Oxford 1971)Google Scholar, Frank, B., ‘The Ombudsman and Human Rights’ Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1976)Google Scholar, Schmid, W., Der Ombudsmann in Kanada (Zürich 1976)Google Scholar, Keller, B., Der Ombudsmann der Stadt Zürich (Zürich 1979)Google Scholar, Matthes, H., Der Bürgerbeauftragte (Berlin 1981)Google Scholar, Vontobel, J., Der Ombudsmann der Stadt Zürich (Zürich 1981)Google Scholar.

4. Herlitz, N., Elements of Nordic Public Law (Stockholm 1969) pp. 19, 193Google Scholar.

5. Herlitz, N., Svensk Själfstyrelse (Stockholm 1933) p. 15 et seqGoogle Scholar.

6. Stavenow, L., Frihetstiden, dess epoker och kulturliff (Gothenburg 1898) passimGoogle Scholar.

7. Para. 17 of chapter 25 reads: ‘Visar ämbetsman vårdslöshet, försummelse oförstånd eller oskicklighet i sitt ämbete och är ej särskilt ansvar därå satt, straffes med böter eller mistning av ämbetet på viss tid…’ Translated, this means: ‘If a public official is careless, negligent or thoughtless in his work and reveals a lack of tact, he is punished with a fine or he is suspended unless he is liable to be prosecuted in another way’.

8. See Kägi, W. in ‘Studien im Prozess der Demokratie’ in 2 Schweizer Monatshefte (1957) p. 99 et seqGoogle Scholar.

9. Section 96 of the Regeringsform of 1809 reads (in translation): ‘The Ständer of the State shall at every Riksdag appoint a man known for his legal ability and outstanding integrity so that this person, authorized by them, can supervise the way in which courts and officials carry out the laws and, in accordance with the instruction given him by them, before the competent courts institute proceedings against anyone who does not carry out his task impartially, or acts illegally in any other way, or fails to fulfil his obligations as he should, in accordance with the legal order’.

10. Section 99 of the Regeringsform of 1809 reads (in translation): ‘All the minutes and records held by the courts and authorities should be accessible to the J.O…’

11. The first annual report of the first J.O., ‘Friherre”, L.A. Mannerheim, dates from 2 January 1811.

12. Cf., Kirchheiner, H.H., ‘The Ideological Foundation of the Ombudsman Institution’ in International Handbook of the Ombudsman, Caiden, G. E. ed. (Westport, Connecticut 1983) pp. 23–25Google Scholar.

13. Wennergren, B., ‘Ansvar för funktionärer i offentlig verksamhet’, 1 Nordisk administrativt Tidskrift (1976) pp. 25–28Google Scholar.

14. Also see Kirchheiner, H. H., Ombudsman en Demokratie (Alphen a.d. Rijn 1971) pp. 87–92Google Scholar.

15. However, Sweden believed and still believes in the legality principle for the public prosecutor, but not for the J.O., although where ‘a breach of duty’ by an official (judge) was considered to be a punishable offence up until 1 January 1976, the J.O. was up to that date often obliged to prosecute an official (judge) who had failed in his duty. In practice this often led to a restriction on the J.O.'s freedom of discretion. When a general move towards decriminalisation came to the surface in January 1976, this changed, and in practice the J.O. gained a greater freedom of discretion similar to the freedom of the F.O. in Denmark from 1954 (discretionary principle — also for the public prosecutor).

16. Section 9, subsection 2 of the Danish Act on the Parliamentary Commissioner reads: ‘The Parliamentary Commissioner may order the central government administrative authority concerned to institute disciplinary proceedings…’

17. Section 24 of the Danish Act of 11 July 1969 on civil servants reads (in translation): ‘'The disciplinary punishment which can be imposed for transgressions of service, is a warning or reprimand, a fine which may not exceed half a month's salary, a transfer to another function or place, demotion or dismissal’.

18. Section 8, subsection 3 of the Danish Act on the Parliamentary Commissioner reads: ‘In any case, the Parliamentary Commissioner may always state his views on the matter to the person concerned’.

19. See Stevers, Th. A., De Rekenkamer (Leiden 1979) pp. 91Google Scholar, 132, 166 and Parliamentary Reports II, 1984–1985, 17817, Verslag Enquete Commissie Rijn-Schelde-Verolme, no. 16, Tome I and II, pp. 195, 229, 233, 406, 413, 454, 456 and 467.

20. See VAR Geschrift LII, p. 26, and my criticisms of this in VAR Geschrift LIII, p. 37.

21. See the last report of the Evaluation Commission W.O.B., ‘Tussen gunst en recht’, p. 31.

22. By one of Sweden's Constitutional laws, the Act of Press Freedom (‘Tryckfrihetsförordningen’ 2 December 1766) the principle of public access to official documents was introduced and enacted. This was a unique basis for the independently thinking and autonomous responsible citizen.

23. Cf., Timmermans, A., ‘Ontwerp van wet Commissaris van Onderzoek’, 2 Bestuurswetenschappen (1977) p. 108Google Scholar.

24. See Ballin, E.M.H. Hirsch, ‘Beginselen van klachtprocesrecht en de wet N.O’. 2 Ombudsman (1984) pp. 54–61Google Scholar.

25. The principle of subsidiary jurisdiction in regard to the N.O. Act means that if, at the time the complainant lodges his complaint concerning the alleged misconduct of the administrative body, there are other legal courses of action open via a non-administrative court or by a legal procedure under administrative law, these should first be exhausted (including appeal) before the complainant can have recourse to the N.O.

26. According to Stoffelen, a Member of Parliament of the PvdA (Labour Party) during the debate on the draft of the N.O. Act.

27. Gellhorn, W.: ‘Annotated model Ombudsman Statute’ in International Handbook of the Ombudsman, Caiden, G.E. ed. (London 1983) p. 164Google Scholar.

28. See Appendix Hand. II, 1982–1983, 17875, no. 2, passim. (Hand. = Parliamentary Record).

29. Of the 92 reports published by the N.O. in 1983, there were 79 cases in which the N.O. was obliged to carry out an investigation on the basis of Article 12, paragraph 3. The length of the investigation of these ‘obligatory’ cases was, on average, between one year and eighteen months. (See Appendix Hand. II, 1983–1984, no. 18358, no. 2, pp. 7 and 8, as well as NJB, 9 June 1984, no. 23, pp. 702–703.). In 1984 the investigation period was reduced: See Appendix Hand. II, 1984–1985, no. 18965, p. 12.

30. See Jensen, S.G., ‘Folketingets Ombudsmand’, 18 Juristen (1963) p. 417Google Scholar.

31. Section 18, first sentence, of the instruction to the J.O. of 27 November 1975 in force 1 January 1976 reads (in translation): ‘If the question raised by the complaint is of such a nature that it can appropriately be investigated and considered by an authority other than the Ombudsman, and if such authority has not previously examined the case, the Ombudsman may forward the complaint to this authority for action’.

32. ‘The Second International Ombudsman Conference’, International Ombudsman Institute, 27–30 October 1980.

33. Article 17 of the Act reads (here abbreviated): An Ombudsman may refuse to investigate a complaint… or to investigate further: ‘(1) if it appears to him that under the law of existing practice there is an adequate remedy…; (2) if in the course of the investigation of the case it appears to him that… any further investigation is unnecessary; (3) if the complaint relates to any decision, recommendation, act or omission of which the complainant has had knowledge for more than twelve months before the complaint is received by the Ombudsman; (4) if, in the opinion of the Ombudsman, the subject matter of the complaint is trivial; (5) if the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or is not made in good faith; (6) if the complainant has not a sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the complaint…’.

34. Section 6 of the 1976 Ombudsman Act for the Federal State of Australia (as later amended) entails more or less the same freedom of discretion for the Parliamentary Commissioner as is given in Article 17 of New Zealands' Ombudsman Act.

35. Friedmann, K.A., in ‘Report of the Ombudsman Committee’, International Bar Association, 17th Conference, 10–17 09 1978Google Scholar, Part II, International Ombudsman Institute, pp. 1–22. See also Kirchheiner, , op. cit., n. 14, pp. 213–214Google Scholar.

36. Since the Act of 17 May 1961, which entered into force in Denmark on 1 April 1962, the F.O.'s jurisdiction includes control over local government authorities. The princple of subsidiary jurisdiction is here in force to the extent that complaints against decisions by local government authorities, which may still be amended by a higher administrative authority, cannot be submitted to the F.O. until after the higher authority has taken a decision on the matter, provided that the case involves a violation of material legal interests. (This is with the exception of decisions of the municipal council as a body, for which the F.O. does not have the competence to decide, provided the case involves a violation of material legal interests). If material legal interests have been violated, the F.O. is immediatelly competent. The above entails that with regard to the dealings, the conduct and acts or omissions of municipal officials the F.O. has complete competence. In my opinion, with this provison the Danish legislator has respected the autonomy of the local government authorities.

37. Appendix Hand. II, 1979–1980, 14178, no. 5, pp. 23 and 29.

38. This is in accordance with the traditional Swedish view of the function. However, after 1968 Sweden had three J.O.'s and since 1975 there have been four, in order to deal with the large increase in cases. The four J.O.'s rank equally and each has his preset area of work, but the J.O., Mr. P.E. Nilsson, is in charge from an administrative point of view.

39. For example, the work of the J.O., A. Bexilius, was characterized by strict feelings of responsibility and integrity. He held the post of J.O. until 1968. The work of the late Prof. Hurwitz, F.O. in Denmark until 1971, was characterized by humanity and intelligence.

40. Appendix Hand. II, 1982–1983, 17875, no. 2, p. 5.

41. Berge, J.B.J.M. ten, ‘Ombudsman, raadsman of rechter’, 4 Ombudsman (1983) pp. 257–259Google Scholar.

42. Franken, H., ‘Een personalistisch ambt’, 93 Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis (1984) pp. 225–227Google Scholar.

43. Cf., Duk, W., ‘Wetgeving en rechtsvergelijking’, p. 116Google Scholar of his preliminary report for the Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking, no. 34 (1984).

44. Appendix Hand. II, 1979–1980, 14178, no. 4, p. 13.

45. van Hoik, L.J., Elites, wat is er tegen? — an essay (Kampen 1982) p. 52Google Scholar.

46. See Polak, J.M., ‘De Ombudsman als gangmaker voor wet en regelgeving’, 2 Ombudsman (09 1984) pp. 133–136Google Scholar.

47. Similarly, H. Mulderije, ‘Een Ombudsman voor Nederland’, 2 NJB (1970) p. 17Google Scholar. Cf., my opinion in Kirchheiner, , op. cit., n. 14, p. 30Google Scholar, though in a negative sense: W. Konijnenbelt, VAR, LXXXII, p. 17.

48. Article 1 of the Act on ‘Publicity in Administration’ reads: ‘1. Anyone has the right to inspect documents in cases which are or have been dealt with by the public administration. 2. The petitioner must specify the case for which he wishes to see the documents.’ Articles 2 and 5 of this Act contain the exceptions to the main provision of Section 1.

49. See de Mey, J.M., ‘Openbaarheidswetgeving in Nederland, analyse van de totstandkomingsgeschiedenis en de inhoud van de wet Openbaarheid van Bestuur en de daarbij behorende uitvoeringsregelingen’, Report 10 Evaluatiecommissie WOB, pp. 41, 42 and 70Google Scholar. The author recommended that after the N.O. Act was amended, the N.O. would have a similar function in the Netherlands. This recommendation was adopted by the Evaluation Committee on Publicity (Final Report E.O., p. 48), but was rejected by the present Cabinet on 30 April 1983. (See NRC Handelsblad 30 April 1983).

50. Appendix Hand. II, 1982, 17875, no. 2, p. 39.

51. Cf., A. Timmermans, p. 117, see n. 23.

52. Cf. Gadourek, I., Social change as redefinition of roles (Assen 1982) pp. 410–413Google Scholar.

53. See, e.g., Het Nieuwsblad van net Noorden (3 August 1984) in which the Burgomaster of Groningen, as chief of police, openly criticised the description of the term ‘improper’, used by the N.O. to describe the conduct of the Groningen police force.

54. Meyerink, W., ‘Gevoeligheden’, 2 Ombudsman (09 1984) pp. 137–139Google Scholar.

55. Appendix Hand. II, 1983–1984, 18358, p. 7.

56. Appendix Hand. II, 1980–1981, 16812, no. 2, p. 10 and no. 3., pp. 27–30 and 16812 B, p. 5. Off. Gaz. 1982, no. 16 (art. 35–42), Appendix Hand. II, 1981–1982, 17363, nos. 2 and 3.

57. See the letter from Dr. Rang to the Minister for Internal Affairs, dated 14 February 1983.

58. Cf., Kirchheiner, H.H., De Nationale Ombudsman in democratisch perspectief (Ijmuiden 1984) p. 80 and p. 81Google Scholar.

59. This is a possible task for the Deputy Ombudsman, H.A. van Ee, appointed by the Second Chamber on 22 May 1984.

60. Section 7, subsection 3 of the Danish Act on the Parliamentary Commissioner reads: ‘…If he is a civil servant, the person concerned may always demand that the matter shall be referred to treatment under the provisions of the Civil Servants Act, section 17, cf., section 18. If he is a local government officer he may demand that the matter be treated under the rules governing disciplinary prosecution if the bye-laws of the local government involved contain provision for such prosecution…’

61. See the Report of the Permanent Commission of the Second Chamber for the N.O., dated 12 September 1984, 123rd extended committee meeting.