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The International Firm and International Aspects of Policies on Mergers*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 May 2009
Extract
Since literature is not capable of providing a generally accepted answer to the question “What in fact is an international firm?” it is submitted that in this paper a definition should be given being operational in the context of this study.
Thus an international firm is defined as:
—a group of business bases subject to some degree of central managerial control;
—operating within geographically diversified markets subject to different political, legal and cultural spheres; and
—usually interdependent through some form of capital sharing.
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References
1. The term “merger” denotes in this paper either the pooling of control over business activities of the enterprises involved, or the acquisition of control by one enterprise over the business activities of an other, in both cases irrespective of the legal processes by which such results were achieved.
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74. This law, dated 26 December 1957, was published as a chapter of the “Ley General de Presupuestos del Estado” under the name of “Modifications en el sistema fiscal”. This law was thereafter always referred to as the “Ley de Reforma Tributaria”.
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99. Economic Competition Act of 1958, Section 39.
100. As in the United Kingdom, which enacted the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act in 1964 (Section 2).
101. As in France which issued the Law No. 68–678 of 26 July 1968 on “La commu nication de documents et renseignements à des autorités étrangères dans le domaine du commerce maritime” (Official Gazette of 27 07 1968, pp. 7, 267).Google Scholar
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