1. In the United States, the phrase “international judicial assistance” is frequently used interchangeably with that employed in the text. For American discussions of problems arising in this area, see, e.g., Smit, & Miller, , International Co-Operation in Civil Litigation—A Report on Practices and Procedures Prevailing in the United States (Milan 1961)Google Scholar; Jones, , International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 Yale L.J. 515 (1953)Google Scholar; Smit, , International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1031 (1961)Google Scholar; Symposium: Pre-Trial and Trial Techniques in International Litigation, A.B.A., Sec. Int'l & Comp. L. 34 (1959).Google Scholar

2. Although international co-operation in civil litigation may embrace such varied subjects as the recognition of foreign judgments and gratis legal assistance to foreigners, it is here used only to denote the assistance rendered by one country in connection with civil litigation conducted or to be initiated in another. For a discussion of acts that may have to be performed abroad in connection with American litigation, see Smit, note 1 supra.

3. Many countries specifically regulate the assistance to be rendered. For a discussion of United States practices, see Smit, & Miller, , op. cit. supra note 1, at 8–40Google Scholar; for German provisions, see Bülow-Arnold, Der Internationale Rechtsverkehr in Zivil- und Handelssachen (Munich and Berlin); for Austrian provisions, see Hoyer & Chlanda, Rechtshilfeerlass Für Bürgerliche Rechtssachen (Vienna 1952).

4. Even in such countries as Germany and Austria, which seriously endeavor to provide proper co-operation, assistance that is inspired by local rather than foreign procedure may be of little use. See also text at notes 59–60 infra.

5. For the deficiencies of French, German, and Dutch law in this respect, see Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932)Google Scholar; Jones, , note 1 supra, at 530–31Google Scholar; see also text at note 58 infra.

6. See McCusker, , Some United States Practices in International Judicial Assistance, 37 Dep't of State Bull. 808 (1957)Google Scholar. The Commission and Project described in note 7 infra are presently engaged in drafting the appropriate statute acknowledging that power.

7. By Act of September 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1743, the Congress of the United States created the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedrue. The task of the Commission is to “investigate and study existing practices of judicial assistance and cooperation between the United States and foreign countries with a view to achieving improvements.” Act of September 2, 1958 § 2, 72 Stat. 1743. The Commission is assisted in its work by the Columbia Law School Project on International Procedure which has undertaken the major part of the research.

8. Precise description of the circumstances that determine before what court a controversy must or may be brought is without the ambit of this paper. For more elaborate treatment, see Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System, especially at 727–33, 891–900 (1953).

9. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 4.

10. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 45.

11. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 4.

12. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1952).

13. For a more extensive discussion of foreign service under the Federal Rules and state laws, see Smit, & Miller, , op. cit. supra note 1, at 40–48Google Scholar; Smit, , note 1 supra, at 1032–53.Google Scholar

14. See, e.g., Utah R. Civ. Pr. 4(d)(3); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 262.14 (1959).

15. See, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 7, § 199(1) (1958); Cal. Veh. Code § 17454–55; ILL. Ann. Stat. c. 110, § 16(1959); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.28.110 (1952); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 262.06(1959).

16. See, e.g., Ariz. R. Civ. Pr. 4(e)(3): Hawaii Rev. Laws § 230–33 (1955).

17. The reforms proposed were drafted by Professor Benjamin Kaplan of the Harvard Law School with the assistance of the Commission and Project mentioned in note 7 supra and are contained in a Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments submitted to the American Bench and Bar for consideration and suggestions. Advisory Comm. on Rules for Civil Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts (1961) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments]. Formal promulgation is to follow after the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference of the United States have had an opportunity to consider the comments and suggestions received.

18. However, if the service is made in accordance with foreign law or pursuant to letters rogatory, the foreign law must be followed. Proposed Amendments Rule 4(i) (1).

19. Proposed Amendments Rule 4(i) (1).

20. Proposed Amendments Rule 4(i) (2).

21. For a more extensive description of federal and state practices, see Smit, & Miller, , op. cit. supra note 1, at 48–62.Google Scholar

22. On letters rogatory generally, see Symposium: Letters Rogatory, (Grossman ed. New York 1956).Google Scholar

23. See Smit, , note 1 supra, at 1057–58.Google Scholar

24. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 30(0); Smit, , note 1 supra, at 1058–9.Google Scholar

25. See, e.g., The Mandu, 11 F. Supp. 845 (E.D.N.Y. 1935).

26. See Jones, , note 1 supra, at 523–29.Google Scholar

27. See Smit, , note 1 supra, at 1057Google Scholar. The reform proposed also includes a provision eliminating some of the objections that may be adduced against the admission in evidence of a record of testimonial evidence obtained under letters rogatory addressed to a foreign tribunal. Proposed Amendments Rule 28 (b). However, whatever amendment is ultimately adopted, there is no doubt that American courts and litigants will continue to distrust testimony that is not taken, and records of such testimony that are not prepared, in accordance with American practice.

28. See text at notes 29–41 infra.

29. See, e.g., Riezler, , Internationales Zivilprozessrecht 674 (Berlin 1949)Google Scholar: “Ihre Gewährung ist, soweit nicht Staatsverträge bestehen, ein auf der comitas gentium beruhender Gefälligkeitsakt, keine völkerrechtliche Verpflichtung.”

30. See, e.g., 1 Berber, , Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts 183–84 (Munich (1960)Google Scholar; 1 François, , Handboek van het Volkenrecht 150–59 (2d ed.Zwolle 1949)Google Scholar; 1 Guggenheim, , Traité de Droit International Public, 180–83 (Geneva 1953)Google Scholar; 1 Hyde, , International Law § 54 (Boston 1945)Google Scholar; Verdross, , Völkerrecht 202–03 (4th ed. Vienna 1959).Google Scholar

31. See, e.g., 1 Hyde, , op. cit. supra note 30, § 11Google Scholar; 1 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, , International Law § 125 (8th ed. 1955)Google Scholar; 1 Schwarzenberger, , International Law 185–86 (3d ed. London 1957)Google Scholar; Verdross, , op. cit. supra note 30, at 175.Google Scholar

32. But see Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). In that case, a citizen of the United States upon whom a United States consul had served a subpoena in France contended that the service violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In rejecting this argument, the Court, per Chief Justice Hughes, stated (at 430):

“The mere giving of such a noiice to the citizen in the foreign country of the requirement of his government that he shall return is in no sense an invasion of any right of the foreign government… While consular privileges in foreign countries are the appropriate subjects of treaties, it does not follow that every act of a consul, as e.g., in communication with citizens of his own country, must be predicated upon a specific provision of a treaty. The intercourse of friendly nations, permitting travel and residence of the citizens of each in the territory of the other, presupposes and facilitates such communications.”

33. See, e.g., Berber, , op. cit. supra note 30, at 171–77Google Scholar; 1 François, , op. cit. supra note 30, at 442–54Google Scholar; 1 Guggenheim, , op. cit. supra note 30, at 214, 283–84Google Scholar; 1 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, , op. cit. supra note 31, §§ 133, 288–92Google Scholar; 1 Schwarzen-Berger, , op. cit. supra note 31, at 354–57Google Scholar; Verdross, , op. cit. supra note 30, at 155–61.Google Scholar

34. See, e.g., 1 François, , op. cit. supra note 30, at 452–54Google Scholar; 1 Hyde, , op. cit. supra note 30, § 11AGoogle Scholar; Verdross, , op. cit. supra note 30, at 155–61.Google Scholar

36. 1 Verdross, , op. cit. supra note 30, at 255–57.Google Scholar

37. See, e.g., 1 Verdross, l.c., But see Schwarzenberger, , op. cit. supra note 31, at 153–55.Google Scholar

38. There is a similar dearth of authority supporting a possible claim that the foreign state is obliged under international law to prevent its nationals from engaging in, or to punish them for, such conduct. Cf. 1 Guggenheim, , op. cit. supra note 30, at 214Google Scholar; 1 Hyde, , op. cit. supra note 30, § 11A.Google Scholar

39. It might be argued that, since a rule of international law is involved, the question of whether service by private persons under American rules is an official or a private act must be resolved under international law. While this may be true, the fact remains that the nature of the activity of the person making the service must be evaluated within the setting provided by American practice.

40. Section 271 of the Swiss Penal Code, forbidding, in the absence of appropriate authorization, the performance within Swiss territory of acts within the province of officials, may perhaps be interpreted to contain such prohibition. This section has been construed to outlaw private acts that, in Switzerland, would ordinarily be performed by Swiss officials. See Kämpfer v. Zürich, Staatsanwaltschaft, Bundesgericht, 03 6, 1939Google Scholar, 65 (I.) S.B.G. 39, 44–45 (Swit.) See also 2 Thormann & Von Overbeck, Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch 374–77 (Zurich 1941); Jones, note 1 supra, at 520–21.

41. Even though Section 271 of the Swiss Penal Code appears in Title 13, entitled “Crimes ou délits contre l'Etat et la défense nationale,” and the heading of Section 271 speaks of “actes exécutés sans droit pour un Etat étranger,” the Swiss Bundesgericht has given Section 271 a broad interpretation. See note 40 supra.

42. In the case of Switzerland, desirable reform could be attained by the issuance of an appropriate general authorization under Section 271 of the Penal Code.

43. See, generally, Ernst, Gegenseitigkeit und Vergeltung im Internationalen Privatrecht § 7 (Zurich 1950); Riezler, , op. cit. supra note 29, § 56Google Scholar; Lenhoff, , Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U. L. Rev. 619, 752 (1954–1955).Google Scholar

44. On the relationship between reciprocity and retaliation, see, e.g. Ernst, , op. cit. supra note 43, § 11.Google Scholar

45. See e.g., Ernst, , op. cit. supra note 43, at 207–08, 212–13Google Scholar; see also note 47 infra.

46. As Niboyet has stated, “Les Etats vont … à la recherche de l'égalité et généralement ne la trouvent pas.” Niboyet, , 52 Receuil des Cours Cours II, 259, 283 (1935).Google Scholar

47. See, in this connection, Nadelmann, , Reprisals Against American Judgments, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1184 (1952).Google Scholar

48. This is especially true if the reciprocity requirement interposed is a requirement of so-called material reciprocity. See text at notes 54–55 infra; see also Ernst, , op. cit. supra note 43, at 215Google Scholar; Niboyet, , note 46 supra, at 283.Google Scholar

49. Executive determination of satisfaction of reciprocity requirements may spare the court from having to resolve these problems. See, e.g., Ernst, , op. cit. supra note 43, at 164.Google Scholar

50. Especially when the requirement interposed is one of general material reciprocity. See text at note 54 infra; see also Ernst, , op. cit. supra note 48, at 152.Google Scholar

51. For example, if foreign judgments are recognized only on a basis of specific material reciprocity, one of the questions that arises is whether the reciprocity requirement is satisfied as soon as it is established that the foreign country recognizes a domestic judgment rendered in the exact converse situation or only after it has been established that domestic judgments generally are recognized by the foreign country. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895)Google Scholar; C. u. Gen. v. Rh. & M. Feuerversicherungsgesellschaft, 70 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts 434 (1909) (VII. Zivilsenat).Google Scholar

52. See, e.g., Zivilprozessordnung, § 328 (Ger. 25th ed. Baumbach & Lauterbach 1958).Google Scholar

53. See, e.g., Ernst, , op. cit. supra note 43, at 143–63Google Scholar. For a different rubrication, see Niboyet, , supra note 46, at 285.Google Scholar

54. For examples, see Ernst, , op. cit. supra note 43, at 152Google Scholar; Code Civil art. 11 (Fr. 61st ed. Dalloz 1962).

55. For examples, see Zivilprozessordnung § 328 (Ger. 25th ed. Baumbach & Lauterbach 1958)Google Scholar; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).Google Scholar

56. See, e.g., Ernst, , op. cit. supra note 43 at 218–19Google Scholar; 3 Frankenstein, Internationales Privatrecht 550–51 (Berlin 1934)Google Scholar; 1 Von Bar, , Theorie und Praxis des Internationalen Privatrechts § 97 (2d ed.Hannover 1889)Google Scholar; Niboyet, , supra note 46, at 281Google Scholar; Süss, , Die Anerkennung Ausländischer UrteileGoogle Scholar, in Rosenberg, Festgabe229, 231–42 (Munich 1949).Google Scholar

57. Elaboration would unduly expand this paper. For a general discussion, see Smit, & Miller, , op. cit. supra note 1.Google Scholar

58. In the area of international judicial assistance, requirements of material reciprocity occur probably most frequently, but other forms may also be encountered. See, e.g., Rechtshilfeordnung für Zivilsachen § 3(2) (Ger. 1956); Hoyer, & Chlanda, , op. cit. supra note 3, at 25–26Google Scholar; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 326.24 (1958). Letters rogatory requesting the taking of testimony ordinarily contain a promise of material reciprocity. However, if strict compliance with such promises were required, requests contained in letters rogatory exchanged between the United States and foreign countries would rarely be honored for most foreign countries do not take testimony in the manner prescribed in the United States, while the exact manner of taking testimony usual in civil law countries can frequently not be followed in the United States. Although United States procedures for complying with foreign letters rogatory are quite liberal and ordinarily even permit compulsory attendance of witnesses and production of documents, exact duplication of foreign practice is ordinarily not possible. The main difference is probably that an American judge is reluctant personally to examine the witness and summarize the testimony. However, American procedures are flexible enough to permit a sufficiently close approximation of foreign practices fully to satisfy foreign requests for assistance. See Smit & Miller, , op. cit. supra note 1, at 9–22.Google Scholar

59. Seen in that light, Chief Justice Hughes' observations in the Blackmer case would certainly seem apposite. See note 32 supra.

60. See text at notes 23–25 supra.