1. A parliamentary enquiry held in the summer of 1984 into the events surrounding the demise of the Rijn-Schelde-Verolme concern proved to be a constant source of sensation. One of the items of information which came to light was that a secret gentlemen's agreement had been concluded between two Dutch firms and the Dutch electricity companies regarding (tendering for) the construction of boilers and turbines for electricity power stations (report in the Volkskrant on 30 March 1984; reports of the enquiry will appear as sequels to Parliamentary document no. 17 817). Cf., Boon, P. J., De parlementaire enquête [Parliamentarir Enquiries] (dissertation) Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 1982Google Scholar, and de Ru, J.J., Parlementair onderzoek bij door Stoat gesteunde ondememingen [Parliamentary enquiries relating to statesupported undertakings], Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB) (1983) pp. 433–437Google Scholar. See for other examples sections 2 and 3.3.

2. The controversial Bill entitled “Further statutory provisions governing benefits and wage-claims for employees during sickness, Tweede Kamer [Lower House] (TK), session 1981–1982. no. 17 348(1–3).

3. The gentlemen's agreement referred to in the text between the State and the joint Dutch banks was established in writing in the form of a “Code of Conduct” early in 1984. See Nederlandse Staatscourant (Stc.) (20 01 1984) No. 15Google Scholar; Weekblad voor Fiscaal Recht (WFR) (1984) p. 154 et seq. In view of the rather narrow national interest involved here, I have not dealt with this case in detail here. It is covered, however, in my book Gentlemen's Agreements (Arnhem, 1984) and of which the present article is an abridged versionGoogle Scholar. I concluded the monograph in question in October 1983. Material published since then has been incorporated in this article wherever possible. For further details, see the gentlemen's agreement between the State of the Netherlands and Shell and Esso, section 9.2. below.

4. See more generally Hondius, E.H., Recodification of the law in the Netherlands. The New Gvil Code experience, 29 NILR 1982) pp. 348–367 (with literature references)Google Scholar. For translation of the provisions of the draft of Book 6 of the New Civil Code (“General part of the law of obligations”), use has been made wherever possible of the unofficial translation edited by the Dutch Ministry of Justice (Leyden, 1977). This translation was supervised by Professor F.H. Lawson. According to the latest information concerning the parliamentary processing of Books 3, 5 and 6 (cf., Hondius, op.cit.) and Book 7, title 1 (purchase), of the new Civil Code, the introduction of these parts cannot be expected until some time towards 1989 (see Stc. (4 July 1984) No. 128).

5. Cf., Mendel, M.M., De jurist in het bedrijfsleven [Lawyers in industry ] (lecture at Leyden, 5 02 1977) NJB (1977) pp. 319–324Google Scholar, who observes on p. 323 that there are legal constructions such as letters of intent which one seldom if ever comes across at university but which are the order of the day in industry. Other examples are “Punktation”, agreements in principle, heads of agreement, etc. See also section 5.

6. This is the definition given in the Grote Winkler Prins Encyclopedia, Vol. 8 (1976) p. 211.

7. Schoordijk, H.C.F., Het algemeen gedeelte van het verbintenissenrecht mar het Nieuw Burgeriijk Wetboek [From the general law of obligations to the New Civil Code] (1979) p. 466Google Scholar. It should be noted that Schoordijk lectures in Anglo-American law at the University of Amsterdam.

8. The book referred to in n. 3 also examines gentlemen's agreements (which are indicated or known as such) in international law, for instance the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, European public law and Dutch tax and administrative law, op.cit., (n.3), p. 19 et seqGoogle Scholar. See section 6.2. for European competition law.

9. Hardenberg, L., “De rechtens vrijblijvende afspraak” [The legally non-binding agreement] Weekblad voor privaatrecht, notariaat en registratie (WPNR) (1976) p. 5359Google Scholar, and Schoordijk, H.C.F., op.cit., (note 7) at p. 61Google Scholar. Examples include agreements between bankers, the Association for the promotion of the interests of the book trade and the State Purchasing Department and those between the Royal Dutch Publishers' Association (KNUB) and the Literary Writers' Association (VvL).

10. As Boney M included three female singers, it would seem that women too can be party to a gentlemen's agreement.

11. Volkskrant, 30 April 1983.

12. See Hemels, J.M.H.J., “Auteursrechtelijke aspecten van de scriptie in relatie tot de wetenschappelijke publikatie”, in:: Universiteit en Hogeschool (U en H), Vol. 28 (1981–1982) No. 2, p. 116 et seq., in part. p. 125Google Scholar.

13. This was entered into ten days before the two teams were due to appear in the playoffs for the national title, according to the Volkskrant, 13 April 1982. Other agreements apply in the world of English football: “Equally revolutionary was the gentlemen's agreement which the chairmen reached regarding the position of club managers. They agreed that during the season they would not take over a manager from another club”. NRC Handelsblad, 10 February 1981. The same paper (21 November 1978) reported the existence of a “gentlemen's agreement” between the BBC and the British Football League regarding the exclusive television rights granted inter alia to the BBC's successful Match of the Day programme. These rights had evidently subsequently been granted to a commercial television company.

14. See also section 6.2 and 9.1.

15. Loc.cit. (n.9).

16. Loc.cit. (n.9), p. 514.

17. Schut, G.H.A., Rechtshandeling, overeenkomst en verbintenis [Juristic acts, agreements and obligations], Studiepockets privaatrecht No. 15 (1980), p. 62Google Scholar, cf., also Fortuyn, E. Drooglever, Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis (RM Themis) (1977) p. 275Google Scholar, who observes that a gentlemen's agreement is “something which is not legally binding but is morally binding”. Asser-Rutten II (1982), p. 11, refers only to three judgments of lower courts from 1949 and 1974 (see further section 3). Hofman-Abas (1977), p. 4, merely states that in his view gentlemen's agreements do not constitute contracts within the meaning of Art. 1349 of the Civil Code: “A contract is an act whereby one or more persons bind themselves towards one or more others”.

18. van Dunné, J.M., Normatieve uitleg van rechtshandelingen [Normative explanation of juristic acts], dissertation Leyden (1971), p. 289Google Scholar; for criticism, see Dooyeweerd, H., “Het juridisch wilsbegrip en de juridisch-normatieve uitlegging van rechtshandelingen” [The legal concept of intent and the legal/normative explanation of juristic acts], Speculum Langemeijer (1973), p. 29 et seq., see p. 40 et seqGoogle Scholar.

19. van Schendel, W.A.M., “Enkele opmerkingen over “voorovereenkomsten”, in het bijzonder in de bouw” [Some observations on “preliminary contracts”, in particular in the building industry], Bouwrecht (1981)Google Scholar (Special issue on “Praecontractuele verhoudingen in de bouw”), p. 153 et seq., see p. 162.

20. van der Werf, H.G., Overeenkomstenrecht (Inleiding tot het aangaan, vastleggen en uitvoeren van obtigatoire overeenkomsten) [Law of Contracts (Introduction to the conclusion, establishment and execution of obligatory contracts)] (1981) p. 27 et seqGoogle Scholar. See in this sense for letters of intent Mendel, M.M., op.cit., (n. 5), at p. 321Google Scholar.

21. I consider this abstraction of the will of the parties to be too far-reaching. Cf., Oly, Guda, “Dubbele Rechtsorde,” WPNR (1981) 5551, p. 89Google Scholar.

22. Contractenrecht I (Law of Contracts I) (loose-leaf) (Nas-Fermin), No. 22.

23. This leaves intact the direct applicability of Art. 1, para. 1 of the WEM to legally non-binding agreements if they lead to a dominant economic position as defined in this paragraph (i.e., “an actual relationship or legal relationship in business, whereby one or more owners of undertakings exert a dominant influence in a market for goods or services in the Netherlands;”)

24. W.L. Snijders, “Het optreden tegen economische machtsposities op grond van de Wet economische mededinging” [The occurrence of dominant economic positions under the Economic Competition Act] in: In Orde Liber Amicorum van Themaat, P. VerLoren (1982). p. 267 et seqGoogle Scholar.

25. Oppetit refers to an “engagement pris sur liionneur” between two doctors regarding the division of responsibilities between them, to which the Rules of Honour of the French Medical Society were held to be applicable. Oppetit, B., “L'engagement d'honneur”, Recueil Dalloz Chronique (1979), pp. 107–116, see p. 114Google Scholar.

26. Cf., Art. 2: 360 et seq. of the Civil Code (“Annual Accounts and Annual Reports”). See also end of section 5.1.

27. See Court of Justice of the European Communities, decisions of 15 July 1970, cases 41/69, 44/69, Jurisprudentie van het Hof XVI, 6 (1970), p. 661 et seq., pp. 733 et seq. and 769 et seq.; Ars Aequi (AA) XX (1971), p. 510 et seq., nt. H.M.M. (see further with regard to this decision section 6.2.).

28. Cf. W. Vermeend, Cursus Belastiiigrecht (Wet Investeringsrekening) [Tax Law Course (Investment Account Act)], No. 4.0.1.

29. See text at n. 17.

30. The concepts in question are those of “good faith” and “fairness”. See also n. 75.

31. Ainhem Court of Appeal, 4 January 1949, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ) 1949 no. 581. The editorial in the NRC Handehblad of 18 February 1982 regarding the gentlemen's agreement with Shell and Esso took the same line: “Such an agreement imposes on both parties a moral obligation which may not be taken lightly: it is often more binding than a contract.”

32. Rotterdam District Court (Rb), 19 January 1949, NJ 1950 no. 276.

33. Supreme Court (HR), 15 January 1971, NJ 1971 no. 187, n. G.J.S.

34. The implicit reference in the judgment to the gentlemen's agreements in question has not received any attention in the literature. For the pension aspects of the case, see Bod, Th.L.J., Pensioen en privaatrecht [Pensions and private law], dissertation Nijmegen (1979), pp. 60 et seq., 69and 129Google Scholar.

35. Assen District Court, 24 December 1974, NJ 1975 no. 349. Abas's comment on this judgment is brief and to the point: “My comment: real gentlemen who are contracting”. WPNR (1978) 5423, p. 128Google Scholar.

36. Schut, G.H.A., op.cit. (n. 17), p. 62Google Scholar, See also Hardenberg, L., loc.cit., (n. 9), p. 513, n. 38, who considers that the provision quoted in the text is perfectly clearGoogle Scholar.

37. See for the translation of Art. 1349 of the Civil Code, n. 17. Art. 6.5.1.1., para. 1 of the New Civil Code reads as follows: “A contract within the meaning of this chapter is a multilateral juristic act by which one or more parties enter into an obligation with one or more others.” For the sake of clarity, I should point out that the numbering of the articles is provisional in the period preceding the introduction of the New Civil Code. Art. 6.5.1.1. is placed in Book 6 (General Part of the Law of Obligations), Chapter 5 (Contracts generally), Section 1 (General provisions). See n. 55 for definition of juristic act.

38. The Supreme Court did not accept this contention. HR 15 April 1977, NJ 1978, no. 163, n. J.M.M.M. The question concerning the gentlemen's agreement was not considered during the appeal in cassation. For a description of multilateral contracts in Belgian and Dutch law, see the articles of Dirix, E. and Hardenberg, L. respectively in Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht (TvP) (1983) pp. 757–839Google Scholar.

39. See in this connection Art. 6.1.1.4. of the New Civil Code: “The statutory provisions regarding obligations apply mutatis mutandis to natural obligations, unless it follows from statute or the necessary intendment thereof that a provision is inapplicable to an unenforceable obligation.” In his conclusion in the judgment referred to in n. 38, the Procurator General, (P.G. van Oosten, rejected the submission that the ordinary rules of the law of obligations could apply, reasoning rather strangely that Staalcom “was at the very most bound in principle by a gentlemen's agreement and that the law does not provide for such an agreement to be binding”. (NJ 1978, p. 583).

40. Williston, S., Williston on Contracts, Vol. 1 (1957)Google Scholar, edited by W. Jaeger, para. 2, see also para. 21, n. 14; Posner, R.A., Gratuitous promises in Economics and Law, 7 Journal of Legal Studies (1977), p. 411, is also opposed to the idea that such agreements are bindingCrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the position in the USA, see also: Cases and Materials on Contracts, 2nd edn. (1972) edited by Farnsworth, E. Allan et al. , p. 60 et seqGoogle Scholar.

41. Cf., Anson, W.R. and Guest, A.G., Principles of the English Law of Contract (1979), p. 66 et seqGoogle Scholar.

42. van Dunné, J.M., op.cit., (n. 18), p. 358Google Scholar.

43. Ford Motor Co. Ltd. v. A.U.E.F.W. (1969) 1 WLR 339, (1969) 2 All ER 481. According to section 18 of the English Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, a collective labour “agreement” is not deemed to be a legally enforceable contract intended by the parties unless the agreement is in writing and contains a provision that the parties intended to conclude a contract enforceable in law. Cf., in this connection Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract, 10th edn. (1981) edited by Furmston, M.P., p. 97 et seq., see p. 105Google Scholar. A current problem in the United States is the legal character of “prehire” agreements, which are agreements entered into before the trade unions have obtained the consent of the majority of their members. If a majority is subsequently obtained, the prehire agreement “matures” into a collective labour agreement. However, the legal character of prehire agreements which are not subsequently ratified by a majority of members is extremely uncertain. Cf., National Labour Relations Board v. Local 103, International Association of Bridge Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 341, 345 (1978). As to this legal character, see Lowe, D.J., “Prehire Agreements in the Construction Industry: Empty promises or Enforceable Rights” 81 Columbia Law Review (1981) pp. 1702–1720CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A similar problem is emerging in the Netherlands with regard to the assessment of the legal significance of so-called job agreements; see for example the framework agreement concluded in the summer of 1982 between the trade union movement and Nederlandse Standaard Electric Maatschappij (NSEM), a subsidiary of ITT. “Job Agreement or Declaration of Intent?” was the headline in the NRCHandelsblad of 10 July 1982.

44. See Williston on Contracts, op.cit., (n. 40), section 21; cf., van Dunné, J.M., op.cit, (n. 18) p. 358Google Scholar and Anson-Guest, , op.cit., (n. 41) p. 68Google Scholar.

45. I am assuming here that the phrase “do not intend to enter into any legal obligation” must be equated in English law with a gentlemen's agreement. Cf., Jones v. Vernon's Pools Ltd. (1939) 2 All ER 626 and Appleson v. Littlewood Ltd. (1939) 1 All ER 464, where the agreement between the parties “was not to be attended by or give rise to any legal relationship whatsoever”. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English defines a gentlemen's agreement as an agreement “binding in honour, but not enforceable at law”. Cf., here also Ball, S.N., Work carried out in pursuance of Letters of Intent -Contract or Restitution? The Law Quarterly Review 1983, pp. 572–590Google Scholar.

46. Weill, A., Droit Civil, Les obligations (1980) no. 31Google Scholar. Cf., B. Oppetit, op.cit. (n. 25).

47. Cf., Mercadel, N.-Janin, P., Les contrats de cooperation interenterprises (Paris, 1974) p. 43Google Scholar.

48. Cf., R. Kruithof, Oveizicht verbintenissearecht [Survey of the law of obligations], TvP (1983) p. 495 et seq., see p. 508, with references to literature and court decisions.

49. Cf., D. Henrich, “Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertiag (Beiträge zum ausländischen une internationalen Privatrecht 32) (1965) p. 107 et seq. See also Flume, W., Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerrechtlichen Rechts, Bd. II, Das Rechtsgeschäft (1979) p. 92 et seqGoogle Scholar.

50. Siebourg, P., Der Letter of Intent (Ein Beitrag zum U.S.-Amerikanischen und Deutschen Rechtmit vergleichenden Anmerkungen), Inaugaural dissertation, Bonn (1979), p. 153 et seqGoogle Scholar. Cf., also K.F. Reuss, Die Intensitätsstufen der Abreden und die Gentlemen-Agreements, 154 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, (1955), pp. 485–526, in particular p. 489.

51. Defended as a dissertation in January 1982 at the Free University of Berlin, and published in Schriften zum Wirtschafts-, Arbeits- und Sozialrecht, Bd. 24, (Königstein, 1982).

52. Loc.cit., (n.51), p. 15.

53. Loc.cit., (n. 51), p. 115 and p. 124 respectively.

54. Loc.cit., (n. 51), p. 23. Bahntje justifies his omission of these juristic acts described as gentlemen's agreements by pointing out that history shows in his opinion that gentlemen's agreements have been developed as an alternative to and as distinct from ordinary contracts. He considers that this may be explicable by reference to the background to the German equivalent of the Economic Competition Act, the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankung (GWB) of 1957. Gentlemen's agreements were not treated as prohibited within the meaning of this Act. Only since 1973 have “aufeinander abgestimmten Verhaltensweisen” fallen under the GWB regime. No such historical explanation can be provided in the Netherlands, and Dutch case law teaches otherwise (see section 3.3.).

55. Loc.cit., (n. 51), p. 20. The concept “rechtshandeling” (“juristic act”) is familiar to all Continental lawyers, but requires some explanation for those lawyers trained in the traditions of the Common Law. Lawson (cf., n. 4) defines it as “a manifestation of the human will intended to create, transfer or exinguish a right recognised by law”. It includes the two components of contract (offer and acceptance, see text of section 6.1.), conveyances, wills, etc.

56. Loc.cit., (n. 51), p. 126.

57. Loc.cit., (n. 51), p. 248.

58. Loc.cit., (n. 51), p. 216.

59. Loc.cit., (n. 9), p. 514. See Van Dales Groot Woordenboek, a dictionary of the Dutch language, which defines the English word gentleman as meaning a “heer”, particularly honourable and civilised person, who conducts himself as a real “heer”, as a noble and a man of integrity.

60. Hardenberg, L., loc.cit., (n. 9), p. 514Google Scholar, and Schut, G.H.A., op.cit., (n. 17), p. 62Google Scholar.

61. van der Werf, H.G., op.cit., (n. 20), p. 27Google Scholar.

62. Cf., Mendel, M.M., loc.cit., (N. 5), p. 323Google Scholar, and van der Werf, H. G., op.cit., (n. 20), p. 27Google Scholar. Cf., in this respect also Siebourg, P., op.cit., (n. 50), p. 154 and seq. and p. 179 et seq.Google Scholar, and Luttei, M., Der Letter of Intent (zur rechtlichen Bedeutung von Absichtserklärungen) (1982), and Chitty on Contracts, Vol. I (London, 1983), section 110Google Scholar. U. Bahntje, op.cit., (n. 51) does not consider this type of construction.

63. For the binding legal nature of heads of agreement, see Hemich, D., op.cit., (n. 49), p. 102 et seq.Google Scholar, and Lutter, M., op.cit., (n. 62), p. 13 et seqGoogle Scholar. Another expression sometimes encountered in business dealings and diplomatic correspondence is “aide-memoire” this amounts to a note summarising a few points or questions that have been considered and is more of a non-binding framework for an agreement to be reached later than a binding “rump contract”.

64. J.H. Maschhaupt Sr., “Off balance”, in: Jurist in bedrijf. Opstellen van bedrijfsjuristen bij het 50-jarig bestaan van het Nederlands Genootschap van Eedrijfsjuristen, Ed. B. Baardman et al. (1980), p. 65 et seq., see p. 72. Cf. also Köhler, H., Patronatserkldrung ah Kreditsicherheit: tatsa'chliche Verbreitung — wirtschaftliche Griinde — rechtliche Bedeutung (1978) p. 1338 et seqGoogle Scholar.

65. Cf., in a rather different connection a declaration which is issued by one party to the other after the termination of a transaction: “We, for our part, feel that we are under a moral obligation towards you if we should continue our activities elsewhere in the town!” Amsterdam Court of Appeal, 10 May 1979, NJ 1980 no. 369.

66. Maschhaupt, J.H. Sr, loc.cit., (n. 64), p. 72Google Scholar; he also deals here with so-called “throughput” agreements.

67. Art. 3.2.3. of the New Civil Code reads as follows: “If a person interprets the declaration or act of another in a way which is reasonable under the circumstances and as being a declaration to him of a particular effect, the other party may not claim as against him that there is a lack of an intent corresponding to such declaration.”

68. van der Werf, H.G., op.cit., (n. 20), p. 29Google Scholar.

69. See n. 37.

70. See also Hardenberg, , loc.cit., (n. 9), p. 513Google Scholar. Illustrative of this is the view taken by Lutter who assumes that as a general rule the parties intend to be bound “im Hinblik auf die Wortwahl ‘agreement’”, op.cit., (n. 62), p. 13.

71. BGH, no. 19 zu par. 242 BGB, MDR 64, 570, BB 64, 410. Cf., Siebourg, P., op.cit., (n. 50), p. 154Google Scholar, n. 1 and Bahntje, U., op. cit., (n. 51), p. 93Google Scholar. As regards gentlemen's agreements in this connection, see also Zonderland, P., “Indeling, uitlegging en regeling van overeenkomsten” (Serie Bijzondere Contracten 1) (1976) p. 27Google Scholar; Bloembergen, A.R., “Contracten met de Oveiheid in het bijzonder in de bouw” Geschrift nr. 3 Serie Bouwrechtmonografieën (1976), p. 23Google Scholar and Fortuyn, E. Drooglever, op.cit., (n. 17), p. 275Google Scholar. English law too recognises that “the label which the parties to a contract attach to their relationship cannot alter or decide the true nature of the relationship”, cf., Young & Woods Ltd. v.West (1980), IRL 201. See regarding what he refers to as the TINILEA clause (This Is Not Intended to be a Legally Enforceable Agreement) Kloss, D.M., The Modern Law Review (1983) p. 774 et seqGoogle Scholar. For French law, compare in the same sense Com 10 January 1972, Juris Classeur Pratique (1973) II. 17 134Google Scholar.

72. See the writers referred to by Schut, G.H.A., op.cit., (n. 17), p. 127 et seqGoogle Scholar. See also Gras, F.A.J., “Het standaardcontract en de verhouding techt/maatschappij”, RM Themis (1983) p. 6 et seqGoogle Scholar.

73. HR 17 December 1976, NJ 1977 no. 241, n. G.J.S.; AA XXVI (1977), p. 654, n. P. van Schilfgaarde. Cf., P. Abas, WPNR (1978) 5423, p. 126 et seq. The Supreme Court considered that in order to determine (in a case where it is established that a legally binding contract has been concluded) how the relationship of the parties is regulated in a written contract, it is necessary to refer to “the sense which each of the parties could reasonably attribute to these provisions and to what they could reasonably expect of one another. A factor which may be of importance in this connection is the particular social strata to which the parties belong and the extent of the legal knowledge which they can be expected to possess.” Supreme Court 13 March 1981, NJ 1981 no. 635, n. C.J.H.B.; AA 30 (1981) 7, p. 355, n. P. van Schilfgaarde. Cf., Art. 3.2.3. of the New Civil Code as cited above (n. 67).

74. HR 14 June 1968, NJ 1968, 331. As regards the pre-contractual relationship, see also in this connection the important judgment HR 18 June 1982, NJ 1983 no. 723, n. C.J.H.B.

75. The reference to Art. 1374 of the Civil Code amounts to a reference to the execution of a contract. This should be “in good faith”. Art. 1375 of the Civil Code reads as follows: “Contracts bind the parties to do not only that which is expressly provided therein but also everything which, in view of the nature of such contracts, is required by fairness, usage or statute.”

76. Schoordijk, H.C.F., op.cit., (n. 7), p. 464Google Scholar.

77. Schoordijk, H.C.F., op.cit., (n. 7), p. 465Google Scholar.

78. Schoordijk, H.C.F., “De verbintenis uit de wet” [Obligations arising from the Law], Guest lecture at Suriname School of Law (1968), p. 31 and the book quoted at n. 7, pp. 412 and 424 et seqGoogle Scholar.

79. (1938) 2 All E.R. 626. See in this connection n. 45.

80. Schoordijk, H.C.F., op.cit., (n. 7), p. 62Google Scholar.

81. Schoordijk, H.C.F., op.cit., (n. 7), p. 59Google Scholar.

82. Cf., in this connection van Rijn, T.P.J.N., Art. 85, para. 1, of the EEC Treaty, Analyse van de toepassingsvoorwaarden, Europees kartelrecht anno 1980 [Analysis of the conditions of applicability, European cartel law in 1980] (Europese Monografieen No. 28) (1981) pp. 19–42, see p. 22 et seqGoogle Scholar. Van Rijn regards gentlemen's agreements as agreements “which are binding not legally but morally”, loc.cit., p. 21.

83. Order of 16 July 1969, Pb. 1969, L. 192/5.

84. For the references see n. 27.

85. See in this sense also A.G. Gand in his conclusion, Jur. XVI, p. 707 et seq., in particular p. 718 et seq. and Maas in his note in AA XX (1971), p. 513.

86. Court of Justice of the European Communities, decision of 16 December 1975, joined cases 4048, 50, 54–56, 111, 113 and 114/73, Jur. 1975, p. 1663 et seq.; AA XXVI (1976), 3, p. 206 et seq., n. D.J. Gijlstra.

87. Court of Justice of the European Communities, decisions of 15 June 1976, cases 51/75, 86/75, Jur. 1976, p. 811 et seq 871 et seq. and 913 et seq. The distinction between such agreements and concerted practices as referred to in the Treaty is wafer thin or, to put it another way, the contracts referred to here have a low legal threshold.

88. Bahntje, U., op.cit., (n. 51), p. 91 and pp. 247/248Google Scholar.

89. Schoordijk, H.C.F., op.cit.,(n. 7), p. 61Google Scholar.

90. The term subjective right is used to denote what in English would be called simply a “right”. Lawson explains its use in combination with the word “vermogens-” (i.e., subjectief vermogensrecht) in the following way (see n. 4, p. 15): “The former (i.e., vermogensrechten, B.W.) are in a sense part of his property, if it is taken to include not only real rights but personal rights of the kind that a Common lawyer would call “choses in actions”. Dutch lawyers apply to them the term “vermogensrecht”, which means literally “right appertaining to a person's estate”, but since the word estate is ambiguous and, in any case, the noun has no corresponding adjective, it seems best to adopt a term used by Scots lawers, namely, “patrimonial”.

91. Schoordijk, H.C.F., op. cit., (n. 7), p. 63Google Scholar.

92. Art. 6.1.1.3. of the New Civil Code reads as follows: para. 1: “A natural obligation is an obligation which is not legally enforceable.” para. 2: “A natural obligation exists: (a) “if statute or a juristic act witholds enforceability from an obligation; (b) if one person is under such a compelling moral obligation towards another that performance of the same may be considered, in accordance with social standards, as the fulfilment of a performance due to him, although it is not legally enforceable.” Meijers'original draft of Art. 6.1.1.3. para. 2(b) originally used the term “een verplichting van zedelijk-maatschappelijke aard”, albeit in a rather different context. Lawson explained this (see n. 4, p. 18 and also p. 79) as meaning literally “a duty of a moral-social kind” and denoting “something that is required not simply by morality or simply by the demands of society, but something the breach of which at the same time would be immoral and would inspire social disapproval. It seems that John Austin's term “positive morality” comes nearest to a manageable equivalent”.

93. This question is of some antiquity. Cf., Diephuis, G., Het Nederlandsch Burgerlijk Recht, deel X (1886), p. 23 et seq.Google Scholar, and for French law, Gorovtseff, A., “Etudes de Principiologie du droit: la lutte autour de la notion de sujet de droit”, Revue trimestrielle de droit civil (1929) p. 949 et seqGoogle Scholar.

94. For a further negative reply to this general question, see Asser-Rutten I (1981), p. 8. Cf., also Hoerster, Norbert, “Zum begrifflichen Verhältnis von Recht und Moral, 17 Neue Hefte für Philosophie, (1979), pp. 77–88, see p. 85 et seqGoogle Scholar.

95. Cf., Solus, H. and Perrot, R., Droit judiciare prive, Tome I, (Paris, 1961) p. 94 et seq., in particular p. 105Google Scholar; “on est conduit à poser en règie général que l'action en justice a pour fondement la sauvegarde des droit subjectivs dont une personne se prétend titulaire”. For detailed exposition, see also Ionescu, O., La notion de droit subjectif dans le droit prive, 2nd edn., (Brussels, 1978), p. 79 et seqGoogle Scholar. But also more recently Hage-Chahine, F., “Essai d'unenouvelle classification des droits privés”, Revue trimestrielle de droit civil (1982), p. 705 et seq.Google Scholar, see p. 725: “Pas de contrainte, pas de droit subjectif”.

96. See here, inter alia, Meijers, E.M., De Algemene Begrippen van het Burgerlijk Recht [The General Concepts of Civil Law] (1948) pp. 8 and 51 et seq.Google Scholar; Schut, G.H.A., op.cit.,(n. 17), p. 76Google Scholar and Asser-Rutten I (1981), p. 7; the view expressed in the text can also be found in the New Civil Code.

97. See Asser-Rutten I (1981), p. 4 et seq. See also a recently published study by Scholten, G.J., Grondslag en bronnen van verbintenissen, [Basis and sources of obligations], Monographs on the New Civil Code (A-serie, No. 2) (1983), and the Asser-Rutten-Hartkamp, Verbintenisseniecht I (Obligations in general under the new Civil Code) published in mid-1984Google Scholar.

98. The terms “aanspmak” and “subjectief vermogensrecht” [literally “claim” and “subjective patromonial right” respectively] are synonymous in this context. For the distinction between obligations and other legal duties, see Scholten, G.J., op.cit., (n. 97), p. 7. et seqGoogle Scholar.

99. It is would be going beyond the scope of this article to maintain that the mainstay of the concept of obligation in the field of patrimonial law has certain definite weaknesses; see the book referred to in n. 3, p. 59 et seq.

100. Cf., in this connection n. 91.

101. This is the broad definition of the term “sanction” given by Duk, W., “Tanden van hetrecht” [The law's teeth] (Orienterende beschouwingen over sancties), Address at the University of Amsterdam (1973) p. 11Google Scholar.

102. The (natural) plaintiff will be deprived of his claim or the claim will be stated to be inadmissible, cf., Heemskerk, W.H., “Vorderingsiecht en rechtsvordering”, Address at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (1974), p. 9, e.g., in games and betsGoogle Scholar.

103. By statute: e.g., Art. 8, para. 2 of the Pawnshops Act [PandhuiswetJ(Act of 8 November 1910) (Stb. 321). Cf., Also Meijers, E.M., op.cit., (n. 96), p. 59Google Scholar.

104. Commentary, Book 6 of the Civil Code, p. 466.

105. See for example The Hague District Court, 28 June 1934, NJ 1935 no. 20, and The Hague Court of Appeal, 4 March 1947, NJ 1948 no. 637.

106. Cf., Commentary, Book 6 of the New Civil Code, p. 466.

107. Schut, G.H.A., “Inleiding in het faillissementsrecht”, Syllabus Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (1980), p. 2Google Scholar. Such agreements, known as “non-recoupable advances on royalties”, are also often made by record companies with their recording artists.

108. Pitlo-Bolweg, , Verbintenissenrecht [Law of obligations] (1979)Google Scholar, seems somewhat more cautious. If the parties exclude all possibility of recovery, “the obligation closely resembles a natural obligation in terms of its practical consequences”; loc.cit., p. 11.

109. Van Oven regards gentlemen's agreements as being “at least very close” to a natural obligation. See his discussion of Kuijk's Advisory Report for the Fraternity of Notaries in 1947 in WPNR (1947) 3998, p. 294. Kuijk's answer is that in his view “a gentlemen's agreement is an agreement between a bunch of blackguards”, Stenografisch Verslag, Correspondentieblad December 1947, p. 398. NJ. Polak, WPNR (1961) 4681, p. 267 also describes an obligation under a gentlemen's agreement as (to use my terminology, derivative) natural obligation. Polak too treats gentlemen's agreements very dismissively, stating that they are agreements “concluded by gentlemen who do not wish to remain gentlemen”.

110. Brahn, O.K., Zwaartepunten van het nieuwe vermogensrecht (Een introductie) (1983) p. 332Google Scholar.

111. Hardenberg, L., loc.cit., (n. 9), p. 516Google Scholar, cites Ripert, G., La Règie morale dans les obligations civiles (1949), no. 168 et seqGoogle Scholar. (read no. 186 et seq.). Scholtens, J. E., ‘De geschiedenis der natuurlijke verbintenis sinds het Romeinse Recht’ [The history of natural obligations since Roman law], dissertation University of Amsterdam (1931), p. 259Google Scholar, also considers that a natural obligations results from such “engagements dTtonneur”.

112. See for example HR 22 April 1937, NJ 1937, 1108, n. P.S., and HR 27 June 1947, NJ 1948, 97, n. Ph. A.N.H.

113. In the judgment on appeal, (1925) A.C. 445, in the case of Rose and Frank Co. v. J.R. Crompton & Bros. Ltd. (1923) 2 KB 161. In Edwards v. Skyways Ltd. (1964) 1 WLR 349, 355, the court held that in the case of agreements in the commercial sphere, the onus of proving that there is no intention to create legal relations “is on the party who asserts that no legal effect is intended and the onus is a heavy one”.

114. I deal in more detail with agreements of a social nature, for instance between relatives and friends, and voluntary work etc. in the book referred to in n. 3, p. 71 et seq. My conclusion is that it is possible, in assessing not only the legal significance of gentlemen's agreements but also that of these social agreements, to accept an intermediate form of agreement, namely contracts which exist and are adjudged at law but which entail no enforceable obligations. If these obligations involve a performance which consists of giving, there can be said to be an agreement with (derivative) natural obligations, op.cit., (n. 3), p. 81. In my view, agreements which do not fall within the sphere of a profession or business but which are performed in daily life only in consideration of a counter-performance generally constitute enforceable agreements, as for instance an agreement for car pooling. Under English law, however, such agreements are not enforceable. Coward v. M.I.B. (1963), 1 Q.B. 259, cf., Chitty on Contracts, Vol. I (1983), section 120.

115. A gentlemen's agreement may possibly be chosen in order to avoid the provisions of peremptory law, as for instance in the Quinine case, (see section 6.2.). As regards the use of gentlemen's agreements (or occasionally side agreements) between local undertakings in countries such as Brazil and Mexico and foreign companies providing technology in order to circumvent national regulations on technology, see Kokkini-Iatridou, D. and de Waart, P.J.I.M., Overdracht van technologie aan ontwikkelingslanden (een juridische benadering) [Transfer of technology to developing countries (a legal approach)], (T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague — Kluwer, Deventer, 1984), p. 134 et seqGoogle Scholar.

116. Cf. Carbonnier, J., Flexible droit, 4th edn. (1979), p. 31 et seqGoogle Scholar.

117. Bahntje, U., op.cit., (n. 51), p. 156Google Scholar.

118. Bahntje, U., op.cit., (n. 51), p. 166Google Scholar.

119. Perhaps comparable to Baron Von Miinchhausen's attempts to free himself from the quagmire by pulling at his own hair.

120. Asser-Rutten II (1982), p. 30. Bahntje's arguments are not strengthened by the fact that he first dismisses a legal explanation of the binding nature of gentlemen's agreements and then uses a “rear door” to base an explanation of their binding nature on a “soziologischen Geltungstatbestand”, which he characterises as a “subjective affectuellen und (oder) wertrationalen Glauben an bestimmte Wert- oder Legalitatsvorstellungen”, Bahntje, U., op.cit., (n. 51), p. 172Google Scholar. This “unlegal” approach is partly attributable to Bahntje's rather narrow view of a gentlemen's agreement as a “persohnlichkeitsbezogener Vertrauensakt” (!, B.W.), Bahntje, U., op.cit., (n. 51), p. 223Google Scholar.

121. Blankenburg, E., “Het idee van een maatschappij zonder recht” [The idea of a society without law], Address at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (1982), p. 4Google Scholar.

122. Cf., Macauly, S., “Non-contractual relations in business, a preliminary study”, 28 American Sociological Review (1963) p. 55 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, in particular p. 59, also included in Schwartz, R./Skolnick, J. (Eds.), Society and the Legal Order (1970)Google Scholar. For a general study of this subject from the legal and sociological point of view, see Felstiner, W.L.F., Abel, R.L. and Sarat, A., “The emergence and transformation of disputes”, included in Felstiner, W.L.F. et al. , Rechtssociologische studien No. 1 (1981)Google Scholar.

123. Cf., the “National Permanent Contact Committee in the Framework of the Gentlemen-Agreement” referred to above in section 2.

124. See Carbonnier, J., “L'hypothèse du non-droit”, in Flexible droit (1979), p. 32Google Scholar: “L'autonomié de la volonte n'est pas seulement la liberté de créer du droit: elle est aussi la liberté, largement ouverte aux hommes, de demeurer dans la absence qu'est le non-droit”.

125. For foreign law, see Zweigert, K., “Du sérieux de la promesse (Remarques de droit comparé sur la distinction des actes qui obligent de ceux qui n'obligent pas)”, Rev. int. dr. comp. (1964), pp. 3344Google Scholar.

126. A similar theory can be developed for the assessment of agreements in the social sphere; see the book referred to in n. 3, p. 89 et seq. Agreements to cohabit and agreements regarding the division and remuneration of household work are also examined in the light of the theory expounded in the text.

127. Bahntje contends that every gentlemen's agreement lacks a legal “WillenserkWrung”, cf., Bahntje, U., loc.cit., (n. 71), p. 124Google Scholar. Nonetheless, he regards it as “nicht absurd” that a gentlemen's agreement should sometimes be recorded in writing to jog the parties' memories and as possible proof(!). An agreement that is recorded in a notarial instrument is in his view either an absurdity or evidence of an intent by the parties to bind themselves legally; loc. cit., (n.66), p. 143.

128. As the Local Court judge in The Hague evidently considered, terming it a “gentlemen's agreement”; 9 August 1967, NJ 1968 no. 68.

129. Cf., Hartkamp, A.S., “Het begrip leveringstitel”, WPNR (1974), 5267–5268, p. 380Google Scholar.

130. The notion that it would be possible to obtain a declaratory confirmation of a natural obligation is based upon a judgment of the Supreme Court, HR 30 March 1951, NJ 1952 no. 29. The Petitions Committee of the Lower House also considered that a declaratory judgment could be obtained with regard to a natural obligation;(14 June 1979), Administratiefrechtelijke Beslissingen (AB) (1979) 436.

131. Cf. Meijknecht, P.A.M., “Planverbintenissen”, (dissertation) Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam (1979), p. 168 et seq. and p. 186Google Scholar. See also Ru, Hj. de, Staatsbedrijven en staatsdeelnemingen [State-owned companies and state holdings], (dissertation) Utrecht (1981), p. 183Google Scholar and Lubach, D.A., Beleidsovereenkomsten [Policy agreements], (dissertation) Groningen (1982), p. 15., who appears to place gentlemen's agreements entirely outside the legal sphereGoogle Scholar.

132. In addition to concessions and support agreements. Geelhoed, L.A., “Economische steunmaatregelen, enkele juridische aspecten” [Economic support measures, some legal aspects] TVVS (1983) pp. 81–86 and pp. 111–119Google Scholar, indicates that in such cases they are not contracts but merely “declarations of intent which can at the most have indirect legal consequences”. I have dealt with the question whether the government (in the private law sense) can be bound by agreements in fiscal matters with private individuals in my book Fiscale overeenkomst (Beschouwingen over de gebondenheid van de fiscus aan inlichtingen en toezeggingen en die van de fiscus en burger aan tussen hen gesloten overeenkomsten) (Arnhem, 1982)Google Scholar.

133. E.g., the gentlemen's agreement between the Nederlandse Bank N.V. [the Central Bank] and the commercial banks concerning monetary policy, loc.cit., p. 180; on this, see also Slot, P.J., “Regelen en ontregelen” (over deregulering en economisch recht), Address at Leyden (1982), p. 22Google Scholar.

134. Minister for Economic Affairs both at the time the agreement was concluded (summer of 1980) and now (March 1984): letter of 12 June 1980, Lower House, 1979–1980 session, 15 800, chapter XIII, No. 93.

135. As regards the NAM, see de Ru, H. J., op.cit., (n. 131), p. 89 et seqGoogle Scholar. For a detailed explanation of the problems, see Bakker, V. and Salverda, F., “De jacht op ons aardgas” [The chase for our natural gas] (Supplement to Vrij Nederland, 15 01 1983, pp. 2–36)Google Scholar and “De prijs van ons aardgas” [The price of our natural gas] (Supplement to Vrij Nederland, 12 February 1983, pp. 2–52). As regards secret agreements etc. in the international oil world over the years, see Sampson, Anthony, The Seven Sisters (The Great Oil Companies and the World They Made) (1975)Google Scholar.

136. I shall not give any references here. See op.cit., (n. 3), pp. 156/157.

137. Shortly before this, in a period when there was no government (i.e., after elections and before the formation of a government), the two mediators appointed to reconnoitre the possibilities of a coalition made the followihg note in a report: “The profits of Shell and Esso from the Slochteren gas field are covered by a gentlemen's agreement concerning the investments of Shell and Esso in the Netherlands. It would, in our view, be justifiable to break this agreement only if Shell and Esso did not appear to be performing it; we have found nothing to indicate that this is the case, in any event at present.”

138. Entitled: Naar zeventien zetels en terug (Politiek dagboek, 9 maart 1981 - 5 november 1982),(Utrecht/Antwerp, 1983), see p. 175. “Dries” was A.A.M. van Agt, then Prime Minister, and “Joop” was J.M. den Uyl, then Minister for Employment and Social Security.

139. Editorial in the Volkskrantof 25 February 1982: “The agreement is not enforceable at law.”

140. The request by F. Salverda, the journalist referred to in n. 135 above, for the contents of the certified accountants' reports concerning Shell's share in 1981 and 1982 was refused by the Ministry of Economic Affairs on the ground of Art. 4(c) of the Freedom of Information Act (Wet openbaarheid van bestuur), which provides that business and manufacturing data will not be disclosed as information pursuant to the Act if it the data in question was supplied to the government in confidence by natural or legal persons. An appeal against this decision was dismissed: Acting President of the Judicial Section of the Council of State, 12 January 1983, KG 1983, 32; AB 1983, 251.

141. News-Night, the current affairs programme on BBC 2, reported on 7 April 1982 that a gentlemen's agreement existed between Datsun, the Japanese car manufacturing company, and the British Government not to import more than 200,000 cars of this make (now Nissan) into the United Kingdom in any yeax. Cf., also Bahntje, U., op.cit., (n. 51), p. 18Google Scholar.

142. Macneil, I., Contracts, Exchange Transactions and Relations (1978), p. XXGoogle Scholar. Cf., also Ball, S.N., loc. cit., (n. 45), p. 581, in connection with letters of intentGoogle Scholar.

143. An example for the purposes of comparison. According to W.H. Heemskerk: “An agreement between a journalist and his source that the latter's identity will not be revealed is in the nature either of a gentlemen's agreement or of an obligatory agreement…”. Annotation to Supreme Court judgment, HR 11 November 1977, NJ 1978 no. 399. It is this “either/or” reasoning which I find hard to accept. Ball refers to it as the “black or white phenomenon” (p. 578) and later that the “control is an all-or-nothing system” (p. 587), but this is even more the case in English law. S.N. Ball, loc.cit., (n. 45).