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3. The difference between the two regions is prominent with regard to the level of conflict and armed clashes (see above). In addition, the ECE was developed from the outset as a multilateral framework, while the current Middle Eastern environmental settings are largely characterized as bilateral or trilateral ones. The significance of these differences will be discussed further below.

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7. The ‘satisfactory’ solution is the course of action that meets the decision-maker's minimum standards of acceptability.

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12. For a formalized game theoretical analysis of the Middle Eastern environmental system, see Hirsch, , loc. cit. n. 10, at pp. 94–110.Google Scholar

13. See, e.g., Keohane, R.O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, Princeton University Press 1984) pp. 18, 27;Google ScholarAbbott, K.W., ‘Modem International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers’, 14 Yale JIL (1989) p. 335 at pp. 346–350.Google Scholar

14. Stein, A.A., Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstances and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca, Cornell University Press 1990) p. 10;Google ScholarStein, J. Gross, ‘International Cooperation and Loss Avoidance: Framing the Problem’, in Stein, J. Gross and Pauly, L.W., eds., Choosing to Cooperate (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press 1993) p. 2 at pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

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16. Maximum O₃ values are observed in several world locations 50 to 100 kilometers downwind from the center of emission, usually formed 3 to 5 hours after the emissions of primary pollutants. Peleg, M., et al. , ‘Airborne Measurements of Ozone Levels over Central Israel’, in Antilla, P., Kamari, J. and Tolvanen, M., eds., Proceedings of the 10th World Clean Air Congress, Heldal Espoo, Finland, 06 1995, Vol. 2, p. 292 at p. 294;Google ScholarLuria, M., et al. , ‘The Formation of O₃ over Israel, A Growing Concern and a Potential International Issue’, in Steinberger, Y., ed., Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference of the Israeli Society for Ecology and Environmental Quality Sciences, Vol. VI A (Jerusalem, The Israeli Society for Ecology and Environmental Quality Sciences 1966) pp. 13–16;Google Scholar See also Seinfelf, J.H., ‘Urban Air Pollution: State of the Science’, 243 Science (1989) p. 745.Google Scholar

17. The origin of the prime pollutants triggering the process that generates photochemical smog is intensive industrial activity (including five large power plants) in the Tel-Aviv metropolitan area. Peleg, , et al. op. cit. n. 16, at p. 292.Google Scholar See also Tal, A., ‘Enmity in the Wind: Regulation of Transboundary Air Pollution in an Israeli-Palestinian Environmental Agreement’, in Twite, R. and Isaac, J., eds., Our Common Future (Jerusalem, IPCRI 1994) p. 246.Google Scholar

18. The assumption that the ozone formed in some parts of Jordan is also generated by air pollutants transported from Israel's coastal area has not been scientifically approved yet, and this issue is currently being examined. Luria, M., et al. , Transportation of Air Pollutants to Israel and from Israel to the Jordan Valley (Jerusalem, Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1966) p. 56.Google Scholar

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20. Luria, et al., loc. cit. n. 19; University of Athens, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Middle East Technical University of Ankara, Transport and Transformation of Air Pollutants from Europe to the East Mediterranean Region: Final Report (Brussels, Commission of the European Communities 1996) p. 293.Google Scholar

21. Dayan, U., ‘Climatology of Back Trajectories from Israel Based on Synoptic Analysis’, 25 Journal of Climate and Applied Meteorology (1986) pp. 591–595.Google Scholar

22. Atmospheric sulfur emissions in Israel are mainly emitted from five large power plants and two oil refineries located along the Mediterranean coast. Luria, , et al., op. cit. n. 18, at p. 56.Google Scholar

23. Gvirtzman, H., ‘Groundwater Allocation in Judea and Samaria’, in Isac, J. and H.I., Shuval, eds., Water and Peace in the Middle East (Amsterdam, Elsevier 1994) p. 205 at pp. 208–214;Google ScholarBenvenisti, E. and Gvirtzman, H., ‘Harnessing International Law to Determine Israeli-Palestinian Water Rights: The Mountain Aquifer’, 33 Natural Resources Journal (1993) p. 543 at pp. 550–559.Google Scholar

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25. Lowi, M., Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1993) p. 190.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26. A comparison of the quantities of water used by the parties does not lead to a clear answer because two different factors lead in different directions. On the one hand, the fact that Israeli users’ share in the aquifer's waters is much greater than the Palestinians’ (currently the rate is about 5:1) suggests that significant water pollution in the aquifer will entail greater negative payoffs to Israel than to the Palestinians. On the other hand, the fact that the aquifer supplies 90 percent of the Palestinian annual consumption, and only about one-third of Israel's consumption, indicates that the loss sustained by the Palestinians following a significant contamination will be greater than the loss sustained by Israel.

27. The biggest investment needed to avoid water contamination involves preventing the infiltration of domestic wastewater into the underground reservoir. This requires the establishment of an adequate infrastructure for collecting and treating sewage. The financial resources needed to establish this system correspond to the number of people residing in this area. Almost 90 percent of the population in this area is Palestinian. Consequently, most of the investment required to develop an adequate sewage system in the West Bank is o t be borne by the Palestinians.

28. Personal interviews with Dr Stuart Wollman, Department of Environmental Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (4 Jury 1997); Dr Yehuda Bachmat, Israel Hydrological Service (25 September 1996); Dr Dror Gilad, Israel Hydrological Service (3 July 1997). See also Assaf, K., ‘Palestinian Water Resources – Water Quality’, in Twite, R. and Isaac, J., eds., Our Common Environment (Jerusalem, Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information 1994) p. 279 at p. 291.Google Scholar

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30. See section 9.

31. Mancy, K.H., ‘Gulf of Aqaba Ecological Overview and Call to Action’, in Sandier, D. et al. , eds., Protecting the Gulf of Aqaba (Washington DC, Environmental Law Institute 1993) (hereinafter: Protecting the Gulf of Aqaba) p. 19;Google ScholarUpper Gulf of Aqaba Oil Spill Contingency Project (Brussels, European Commission 1995) (hereinafter: Upper Gulf of Aqaba) p. 4.

32. Mann, R.B., ‘Tourism and Related Development Compatible with Aesthetic Resource Protection in the Gulf of Aqaba’, in Protecting the Gulf of Aqaba, op. cit. n. 31, at p. 143Google Scholar; Upper Gulf of Aqaba, supra n. 31, at pp. 8–9.

33. For a detailed analysis of the sources of pollution in the Gulf of Aqaba, see Sandier, D., ‘Environmental Law and Policy for the Gulf of Aqaba: An Israeli Perspective’, in Protecting the Gulf of Aqaba, op. cit. n. 31, at pp. 69, 85–89;Google ScholarEnvironmental Quality in Israel, Report Nos. 19–20; 1993–1994 (Jerusalem, The Ministry of the Environment 1995) pp. 183–186.Google Scholar

34. Actions taken by Egypt and Saudi Arabia are not likely to affect the positions of Jordan and Israel since the former are the upstream parties in the Gulf. The prevailing winds in the Gulf are from the north to the south, and the currents run from Jordan and Israel southward to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Thus, pollutants from Egypt and Saudi Arabia are not expected to reach either Jordan or Israel. For a formalized game theoretic analysis of the multilateral setting in the Gulf of Aqaba, see Hirsch, , loc. cit. n. 10, at pp. 96–100.Google Scholar

35. Thus, for instance, an oil spill may drift from Jordan to Israel within six hours and vice versa, Upper Gulf of Aqaba, supra n. 31, at p. 21.

36. On the functional theory in international relations, see Pentland, C. ‘Functionalism and Theories of International Political Integration’, in Groom, A.J.R. and Taylor, P., eds., Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations (New York, Crane, Russak and Company 1975) p. 9;Google Scholar A.J.R. Groom, ‘Functionalism and World Society’, ibid., at p. 93; Dougherty and Pfeltzgraff, op. cit. n. 8, at pp. 420–425; Navari, C., ‘Functionalism Versus Federalism: Alternative Visions of European Unity’, in Murray, P. and Rich, P., eds., Vision of European Unity (Boulder, Westview Press 1996) p. 63.Google Scholar

37. This is particularly true with regard to the USSR and East European states; see, e.g., Chossudovsky, E., East-West Diplomacy for Environment in the United Nations: The High-Level Meeting within the Framework of the ECE on the Protection of the Environment (New York, United Nations Institute for Training and Research) pp. 23–27;Google ScholarLevy, M.A., ‘European Acid Rain: The Power of Tote-Board Diplomacy’, in Haas, P.M., Keohane, R.O. and Levy, M.A., eds., Institutions for the Earth (Cambridge, MIT Press 1993) pp. 75, 81, 113, 123.Google Scholar

38. See, e.g., 18 Special Peace Issue: Israel Environment Bulletin (1995–2001) pp. 5, 9.Google Scholar

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40. See on this trend in the Jordan River basin, Lowi, op. cit. n. 25, at pp. 192–197.

41. ECE: 1947–1987, op. cit. n. 2, at p. 2. See about a similar process in the contemporary Baltic Region (in which border disputes inhibit environmental cooperation), VanDeveer, S.D., Environmental Cooperation and Regional Peace: Baltic Politics, Programs and Prospects, Paper submitted to the International Studies Association Annual Convention (Chicago, February 2001) p. 6. See also on this subject inGoogle ScholarVanDeveer, S.D., ‘Redefining Security Around the Baltic: Environmental Issues in Regional Context’, 5 Global Governance (1999) p. 221.Google Scholar

42. ECE: 1947–1987, op. cit. n. 2, at pp. 8–10; Chossudovsky, op. cit. n. 37, at pp. 8–10.

43. See on the ECE regime to reduce air pollution in Europe: Fraenkel, A.A., ‘The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution: Meeting the Challenge of Intemational Cooperation’, 30 Harv. ILJ (1989) p. 447;Google ScholarRosencraz, A., ‘The ECE Convention of 1979 on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution’, 75 AJIL (1981) p. 975;CrossRefGoogle ScholarBrunnee, J., Acid Rain and Ozone Layer Depletion: International Law and Regulation (Dobbs Ferry, New York, Transnational Publishers 1988) pp. 175–186.Google Scholar

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46. See, e.g., Sarid, Y., ‘Pollution and Peace’, 5 Palestine-hrael Journal (1988–1991) p. 39 at pp. 40–41.Google Scholar

47. This is the case, for instance, with regard to joint activities undertaken by the parties to combat the spread of the foot-and-mouth disease in the region; Haaretz (English Edition) 18 March 2001, p. 1. See also about plans to build a joint desalination plant for Israel and the Palestinian Authority; Haaretz 4 April 2001, p. 7 (Hebrew).

48. Snidal, D., ‘Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation’, 85 American Political Science Review (1991)pp. 703, 722.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

49. The ECE allowed from its inception the participation of external parties who have a special interest in the area. The first and foremost example is the US. Over the years other states acquired the status of full membership (e.g., Canada); Wolfram, R., ed., United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice, Vol. 1 (Dordrecht, Nijhoff Publishers 1996) pp. 436, 442.Google Scholar

50. This alternative is preferable wherever the agreement's provisions are likely to improve (even slightly) environmental protection, compared to the status quo ante.

51. Theoretically, the process does not inevitably develop in only one direction; a reverse trend is also possible. Legally, states can withdraw from most international treaties. In practice, however, withdrawals from environmental agreements are very rare. Rational Choice analysis explains this (desirable) phenomenon with reference to ‘disassociation costs’ that accompany withdrawal from international treaties. Accession to an international treaty regularly requires states to incur some costs (involved in the ratification and implementation of the treaty) and they are usually not inclined to forfeit these ‘sunken costs’.

52. The incremental approach (or ‘the framework-protocol mode’) is also desirable for other reasons, such as enhancement of the legitimatization of the decision-making process that is established through this approach. See on this approach, and particularly in the context of international freshwater regimes, Brunnee, J. and Toope, S.J., ‘Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building’, 91 AJIL (1997) p. 26 at pp. 56–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

53. Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 14 ILM (1975) p. 1292 at pp. 1307–1308.Google Scholar

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55. The long and complex negotiations that took place within the ECE towards the adoption of the 1979 Convention are documented in detail in Chossudovsky, op. cit. n. 37, at pp. 23–107. See also on this subject in Fraenkel, loc. cit. n. 43, at pp. 452–455; and Brunnee, op. cit. n. 43, at pp. 175–176.

56. Thus, for instance, the contracting parties undertook to ‘endeavor to limit, and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution’ (Art. 2 of the LRTAP Conventio, supra); to develop policies and strategies to serve as a means of combating the discharge of air pollutants (Arts. 3 and 6), and to hold consultations with the other members (Art. 5).

57. See Levy, op. cit. n. 37, at p. 76.

58. Note to Art. 8(f) of the LRTAP Agreement, supra.

59. Art. 12(3), ibid.

60. Arts. 10–11, ibid.

61. Article 2 of the Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulfur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 Percent, 27 ILM (1988) p. 707.Google Scholar

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64. The parties’ obligations in this Protocol were set out in accordance with each party’ s economic capacity (see in detail section 9); Art. 2(2) of the Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Further Reduction of Sulfur Emissions (1994), 33 ILM (1994) p. 1540.Google Scholar

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66. Art. 3 of the Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Heavy Metals, <http://www.unece.org/env/env_eb.htm>.

67. Art. 3 of the 1999 Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-Level Ozone, <http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap>.

68. On the technique of linkage as an answer to asymmetric preferences, see L. Martin, ‘Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems’, Keohane, R.O. and Ostrom, E., eds., Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains (London, Sage Publications 1995) p. 71.Google Scholar

69. In accordance with this suggestion, it is desirable that the future environmental agreement in the Middle East will include legal rules to prevent contamination of the joint water resources as well as adequate rules to significantly decrease transfrontier air pollution in the region.

70. That may be the case, in the Middle Eastern context, for Syria and Lebanon, countries that are not expected to be significantly affected by transboundary air pollution from Israel, are the upstream parties in the Jordan River basin and the Mediterranean Sea, and have no significant interest in the Gulf of Aqaba.

71. The legal linkage between environmental and trade issues has already been established in some environmental treaties. See, e.g., Art. 4 of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 ILM (1987) p. 1550.Google Scholar

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73. See Status of Ratification of the 1994 Sulfur Protocol, <http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap>.

74. See particularly Council Directive 88/609 on the Limitation of Emissions of Certain Pollutants into the Air from Large Combustion Plants, OJ(1988) L 336, p. 1, amended by Council Directive 94/66, OJ(1994) L 337, p. 83. See on this Directive and the EC air pollution legislation, Kiss, A. and Shelton, D., Manual of European Environmental Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1997) pp. 407 et seq.;Google ScholarLomas, O., ‘Environmental Protection, Economic Conflict and the European Community’, 33 McGill Law Journal (1998) p. 506Google Scholar; and Bennet, G., ed., Air Pollution Control in the European Community (London, Graham and Trotman 1991) p. 1.Google Scholar

75. I am grateful to Prof. Philippe Sands (University of London) who kindly assisted me with regard to the EC air pollution legislation and the UK’s new position.

76. On the linkage between trade and environment within the EC law, see Esty and Geradin, loc. cit. n. 72, at pp. 294–311; Coleman, M., ‘Environmental Barriers to Trade and the European Community Law’, in Boyle, A.E., ed., Environmental Regulation and Economic Growth (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1994) p. 131;Google ScholarRunge, C.F., Freer Trade, Protected Environment (New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press 1996) p. 34.Google Scholar

77. See section 3(2).

78. For instance, if the issues of trade and environment are combined into the Middle Eastern regime, the Palestinians might not meet their obligations to prevent pollution of the Aquifer because of alleged violations of the commercial provisions by Israel.

79. Under contemporary international law, various counter-measures are admissible to protect human rights (e.g., trade sanctions), but any reprisals involving human rights violations are strictly forbidden. See Art. 60(5) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra; ILC Yearbook (1979–11, Part 2) p. 116Google Scholar; ILC Yearbook (1992–II, Part 2) pp. 32–33; Elagab, O.Y., The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1988) pp. 99–104.Google Scholar

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82. Putnam, R.D., ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, 42 International Organization (1988) p. 427 at p. 434.CrossRefGoogle ScholarAn expanded collaborative project followed Putnam’s two-level game analysis; Evans, P.B., Jacobson, H.K. and Putnam, R.D., eds., Doubled-EdgedDiplomacy (Berkeley, University of California Press 1993) p. 1.Google Scholar For some refinement and criticism of the two-level game approach, see Knopf, J.W., ‘Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations’, 47 International Organization (1993) p. 599.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

83. Putnam, loc. cit. n. 82, at pp. 436–437.

84. Ibid., at pp. 436–443.

85. Putnam labeled the process of endorsement by domestic constituents as ‘ratification’ and it applies also to non-democratic regimes; ibid., at pp. 438–439.

86. Ibid., at pp. 439–440.

87. On the impact of economic disparity on international environmental cooperation, see in section 9.

88. Naturally, treaty provisions may affect the prospect of concluding additional agreements, but they cannot affect the likelihood of concluding the first agreement between the involved parties.

89. For instance, it is desirable for local NGOs to have locus standing apply for administrative remedies or to sue polluters in courts.

90. See Arts. 3–5, 8 of the LRTAP Convention, supra.

91. See on these programs Levy, op. cit. n. 37, at pp. 87–90.

92. See Levy, op. cit. n. 37, at pp. 131–132, also pp. 92–93, 95, 125, 127.

93. In game theoretical terms, we may say that the structure of the game was altered from a setting characterized by strong features of the Prisoners Dilemma to a setting with prominent features of the Assurances Game. Generally, the prospects for cooperation in the Assurances Game are greater than in the Prisoners Dilemma. On cooperation in the Assurance Game see, Runge, C.F., ‘Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action’, 46 Journal of Politics (1984) p. 154;CrossRefGoogle ScholarHardin, R., Collective Action (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press 1982) p. 167;Google ScholarWard, H., ‘Testing the Waters: Taking Risks to Gain Reassurance in Public Goods Games’, 33 Journal of Conflict Resolution (1988) p. 274.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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95. On the importance of the discount factor for eliciting and maintaining cooperation, see section 3(2).

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98. Art. 2 of the 1985 Protocol to LRTAP Convention, supra.

99. Art. 2(1) of the 1988 Protocol to the LRTAP Convention, supra.

100. Art. 2(2)(a) of the 1991 Protocol to the LRTAP Convention, supra.

101. Under Art. 2(c) of the Protocol, where the annual emissions of a state were in 1988 lower than 500,000 tons, and 20 kg per inhabitant and 5 tons per square km (mainly the states of Central and Eastern Europe whose economies are in transition), it is bound to ensure that its national emissions of VOCs, at the latest by 1999, do not exceed the 1988 levels.

102. Art. 2(2) of the 1994 Protocol to the LRTAP Convention, supra.

103. Art. 3 of the 1999 Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone, supra; see also the explanation in <http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap>.

104. See, e.g., Art. 5 of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 ILM (1987) p. 1550.Google Scholar

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110. See, generally, on these two approaches, Keohane, loc. cit. n. 109, at pp. 386–393; Mearsheimer, loc. cit. n. 109, at pp. 14–47.

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112. See Keohane and Martin, loc. cit. n. 111, at p. 43.

113. Keohane and Martin, loc. cit. n. 111, at p. 49; Axelrod, R. and Keohane, R.O., ‘Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions’, 38 World Politics (1985) p. 226 at p. 234;CrossRefGoogle ScholarGarrett, G. and Weingast, B.R., ‘Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market’, in Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R.O., eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Ithaca, Cornell University Press 1993) p. 173 at p. 176.Google Scholar

114. See, e.g., Patchen, M., ‘Strategies for Eliciting Cooperation from an Adversary’, 31 Journal of Conflict Resolution (1987) p. 164.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

115. It should be noted that in some spheres (such as tariffs and international use offeree), noncooperative moves are visible and need not be detected by institutional monitoring mechanisms.

116. See section 6.

117. See Keohane and Martin, loc. cit. n. 111, at p. 49.

118. Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Long-Term Financing of the Cooperative Program for Monitoring and Evaluation of Air Pollutants in Europe (1982), 24 ILM (1982) p. 484.Google Scholar On the EMEP, see Rausching, D., ‘Interim Report of the Committee on Legal Aspects of Continuous Long-Distance Air Pollution’, in International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Second Conference (London, International Law Association 1987) pp. 198–199; Brunnee, op. cit. n. 43, at pp. 181–182;Google ScholarTollan, A., ‘The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution’, 19 Journal of World Trade (1985) p. 615 at pp. 619–620; Kiss and Shelton, op. cit. n. 4, at p. 235.Google Scholar

119. The bud of a retaliatory mechanism has been formed in Decision 1997/2 of the Executive Body, which established the ‘Implementation Committee’ to review compliance of some provisions of the LRTAP Protocol. The Implementation Committee reports to the Executive Body and the latter may decide upon measures to bring about full compliance with the relevant protocol. See Decision 1997/2 Concerning The Implementation Committee, its Structure and Functions and Procedures for Review of Compliance, <http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap>. Concerning the operation of a similar implementation committee under the auspices of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, see Handl, G., ‘Compliance Control Mechanisms and International Environmental Obligations’, 5 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law (1997) p. 29.Google Scholar

120. Deviations from the Rational Choice model have been found with regard to linkage between several issue-areas (section 6), lack of retaliatory mechanisms (section 10), and the absence of provisions regarding the provision of financial assistance to the developing parties in the LRTAP regimes (section 9).

121. See section 4(2).

122. See section 7.