1. In the United Kingdom, the Immigration and Asylum Act was introduced in 1993, after the 1971 Immigration Act was last amended in 1988. Already three years later this was followed by the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996. In Germany, the immigration legislation has been entirely revised in the Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Ausländerrechts of 9 July 1990, after which the asylum procedure was revised in the Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Asylverfahrens of 26 June 1992. Radical changes in asylum law, involving the German Constitution as well, were decided upon on 6 December 1992, in what tends to be referred to as the Asylkompromiss. In France, on 24 August and 30 December 1993 the Loi Pasqua was enacted, after the Loi Joxe in 1989 had amended an earlier Loi Pasqua dating from 1986. Since then new proposals for further restrictions have been introduced. In the Netherlands, the Vreemdelingenwet was radically revised with effect from 1 January 1994. In Belgium, on 6 May 1993, a radical amendment was effected to the Law of 15 December 1980 (concerning admission to the territory, residence, establishment and removal of aliens), and in 1996 yet new changes took place (Wet VandeLanotte). In Italy, since 1990, a new aliens law has been in force. Portugal enacted a new aliens law in 1993 as well as a law on asylum. Spain adopted new asylum legislation in June 1994. In Finland, new legislation on aliens came into force in 1991. The Greek aliens law dates from 1991, the Austrian from 1992, and the Swedish from 1989.

2. See for a global overview of the European aliens legislation: Ausländerinnen und Ausländer in europäischen Staaten (1994)Google Scholar.

3. 30 ILM (1991) p. 84. See amongst others Meijers, H. et al. , Schengen, Internationalization of Central Chapters of the Law on Aliens, Refugees, Security and the Police (1991)Google Scholar; Boeles, P., ‘Vrij verkeer van personen, mensenrechten aan de buitengrenzen’, SEW (1990) p. 709Google Scholar; Donner, J.P.H., De ontwikkelingen van het vrije verkeer van personen binnen de EG en de overeenkomst ter uitvoering van het akkoord van Schengen, SEW (1990) p. 766 et seq.Google Scholar; Schutte, J.J.E., ‘Schengen: Its Meaning for the Free Movement of Persons in Europe’, CML Rev. (1991) p. 549 et seqGoogle Scholar.

4. Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the EC: 30 ILM (1991) p. 425. See for further 1iterature the previous note.

5. See Meijers, H. et al. , A New Migration Law for Europe (1993)Google Scholar.

6. ECHR 30 October 1991, A 215 (Vilvarajah).

7. See, inter alia: Robinson, N., Convention in Relation to the Status of Refugees, its History, Contents and Interpretation (1953)Google Scholar; Takkenberg, A. and Tahbaz, C.C., The Collected Travaux Preparatoiresofthe 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1989)Google Scholar; Kimminich, O., Der international Rechtsstatus des Flüchtlings (1962)Google Scholar; Grahl-Madsen, A., The Status of Refugees in International Law (1966), and, by the same author, Territorial Asylum (1972)Google Scholar; Fernhout, R., Erkenningen toelating als vluchteling in Nederland (1990)Google Scholar; Hoeksma, J.A., Tussen vreesen vervolging, een inleiding in het vluchtelingenrecht (1982)Google Scholar; Kalin, W., Das Prinzip des nonrefoulement (1982)Google Scholar; Goodwin-Gill, G.S., The Refugee in International Law (1983)Google Scholar; Plender, R., Basic Documents on International Migration Law (1988) pp. 393–458Google Scholar; Hathaway, J.C., The Law of Refugee Status (1991)Google Scholar; Spijkerboer, T.P. and Vermeulen, B.P., Vluchtelingenrecht (1995)Google Scholar.

8. 189 UNTS, No. 2545, p. 137. The text of the Treaty was drafted by the ‘United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons’ during a conference from 2 to 25 July 1951. The final act of this conference is dated 28 July 1951. Cf., Robinson, op. cit. n. 7.

9. 606 UNTS, No. 8791, p. 267. The Protocol was signed on 31 January 1967, by the President of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Secretary-General. On 16 December, in a plenary meeting, the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General to present the text of the Protocol to the States for accession.

10. It is true that Art. 38 of the Convention on Refugees offers the possibility of dispute settlement between contracting States on the interpretation or application of the Convention by the International Court of Justice, but no use has been made of this provision as yet.

11. The Executive Committee of the UNHCR programme was established in 1958 at the request of the General Assembly, in order to achieve ‘the widest possible geographical involvement and greater responsibility of those States with a demonstrated interest in, and devotion to the solution of the refugee problem’. The Committee meets annually to discuss the financial programme and the legal activities of the UNHCR.

12. Conclusions on the international protection of refugees, adopted by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR programme; Handbook on procedures and criteria for determining refugee status; both published by UNHCR in Geneva.

13. Handbook, 1988, para. 28. Grahl-Madsen (1966), op. cit. n. 7, part I, pp. 157 and 340.

14. Goodwin-Gill, op. cit. n. 7, p. 13.

15. E/AC.32/SR.21, p. 5, para. 16: ‘Sir Leslie Brass (United Kingdom) concluded from the discussion that the notion of “refoulement” could apply to (a) refugees seeking admission, (b) refugees illegally present in a country, and (c) refugees admitted temporarily or conditionally’. See for the previous discussion, in which ‘refoulement’ is translated into English each time as ‘nonadmittance at the frontier’: pp. 4 and 5, paras. 12, 13, 14 and 15. Goodwin-Gill, op. cit. n. 7, p. 69: ‘In the context of immigration control in continental Europe, refoulement is a term of art covering, in particular, summary reconduction to the frontier of those discovered to have entered illegally, and summary refusal of admission of those without valid papers’. See on this issue also Grahl-Madsen (1972), op. cit. n. 7, Vol. II, p. 94Google Scholar; Kälin, op. cit. n. 7, p. 143, Fernhout, op. cit. n. 7, pp. 15, 16; Boeles, loc. cit. n. 3, p. 709.

16. Goodwin-Gill, op. cit. n. 7, p. 74, points out that this interpretation given by the Swiss delegate did not encounter any opposition (A/Conf.2/SR. 16, p. 6) and was later summarized in that sense by the Dutch delegate, without contradiction (A/Conf. 2/SR. p. 21).

17. Goodwin-Gill, op. cit. n. 7, p. 78. Fernhout, op. cit. n. 7, p. 16, is of the opinion that the prohibition on ‘refoulement’ obliges a contracting State to admit an individual for as long as is necessary to abide by that prohibition.

18. Spijkerboer and Vermeulen, op. cit. n. 7, pp. 183‘186.

19. Goodwin-Gill, op. cit. n. 7, p. 147.

20. Ibid. p. 148.

21. ‘Eine effektive Gewärleistung der Beachtung des Refoulement-Verbots setzt insoweit eine irgendwie geartetes wirksames Verfahren zur Identiflzierung von Flüchtlingen und Prüfung ihres Asylbegehrens voraus’; Hailbronner, K., ‘Perspektiven einer europaischen Asylrechtsharmonisierung nach der Maastrichter Gipfelkonferenz’, Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik (1992) no. 2, p. 51 et seqGoogle Scholar.

22. Meijers, H., ‘Vluchtelingen in West-Europa. “Schengen raakthet gehele vluchtelingenrecht’, NJ (1989) p. 1299Google Scholar.

23. Fernhout, op. cit. n.7, p. 255. He refers for support for his argument to UNHCR London, The Safe Third Country Policy in the Light of the International Obligations of Countries vis-à-vis Refugees and Asylum Seekers (06 1993) p. 7Google Scholar.

24. Swart, A.H.J., ‘Mensenrechten en de Nederlandse asielprocedure’, in Asielzoekers en mensemechten (1987) p. 23Google Scholar.

25. This opinion is also held by Spijkerboer and Vermeulen, op. cit. n. 7, pp. 275, 276.

26. On the role which the principle of good faith between States can play in this context, see extensively Spijkerboer and Vermeulen, op. cit. n. 7, pp. 283–300.

27. A/CONF.2/SR. 19 p. 18. See also the remarks of the Belgian delegate, Herment, that this Convention ‘did not obligate States to admit all refugees, and in no way modified the existing principles governing immigration’ (A/CONF.2/SR.20, p. 7).

28. ‘Indeed, the only article which had any bearing on that aspect of the matter was the article [28, later renumbered 33] prohibiting the expulsion of a refugee to a country where his life or freedom would be in danger.’

29. See, however, for the region of Europe of the twelve Member States, the ‘Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the member States of the European Communities’, signed on 15 06 1990 in Dublin (30 ILM (1991) p. 429Google Scholar; which imposes on the contracting States the obligation to examine a request for asylum (Art. 3). According to the definition in Art. 1 under (d), ‘examination’ is understood to mean: ‘all the measures for examination, decisions or rulings given by the competent authorities on an application for asylum, except for procedures to determine the State responsible for examining the application for asylum pursuant to this Convention’. The Convention had not yet entered into force on 1 January 1995. Cf., further the Convention applying the Schengen Agreement, signed on 19 June 1990 (30 ILM (1991) p. 84), which contains a similar obligation (Art. 29).

30. Fernhout, op. cit. n. 7, pp. 234–240, considers the significance of Art. 16 for asylum proceedings self-evident - following in the footsteps of the Netherlands Raad van State [Council of State]. Spijkerboer and Vermeulen, op. cit. n. 7, pp. 379–384, are of the opinion that the notion ‘access to the courts’ in Art. 16 must be interpreted without any restrictions, and apply this provision to asylum proceedings. However, Goodwin-Gill, op. cit. n. 7, pp. 159, 160 does not link Art. 16 with ‘due process’. Hailbronner, loc. cit. n. 21, p. 41, does believe that the prohibition of ‘refoulement’ requires some form of efficacious proceedings for applications, but then does no more than say that no consequences can be drawn from that in relation to the availability of administrative or judicial review of decisions refusing asylum or ordering expulsion, without involving Art. 16 in his discussion. Kimminich, op. cit. n.7, p. 316, does not connect Art. 16 with legal remedies against ‘refoulement’ either. Kalin, op. cit. n. 7, pp. 137 and 139, believes that an answer to the question whether a proceeding should be available in which the threatened violation of Art. 33 can be challenged, depends exclusively on national law. Grahl-Madsen op. cit. n. 7, and Hathaway, op. cit. n. 7, have not dealt explicitly with Art. 16.

31. The discussions nearly touched on this question when the Belgian delegate Herment introduced ‘a new problem’ in the discussion of the third paragraph of the present Art. 16, ‘namely the manner in which a decision as to whether an individual did or did not possess the status of a refugee was to be reached in the various countries’. The problem raised by him amounted to the following: that a refugee recognized in a contracting State A who travels to contracting State B, is not necessarily recognized immediately as a refugee there, and therefore would not automatically need to be given access to the courts on the basis of the Convention. ‘It should be clearly indicated whether the State making the second decision would be bound by the first one’, was Herment's opinion. The Israeli delegate, Robinson, found this to be an ‘artificial difficulty’ and thought that the assessment of the authorities of contracting State A on the refugee's status should be decisive for access to the court in contracting State B (A/CONF.2/SR.8, pp. 11, 12).

32. See for discussions on draft versions of this article: E/AC. 32/SR11, pp. 6–8; A/CONF. 2/SR. 8, pp. 11–14.

33. See also point 5 of Recommendation 16 (1981) of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, dated 5 November 1981, 339th session, published in Plender, R., Basic Documents on International Migration Law (1988) p. 147Google Scholar.

34. Excom no. 8 (XXVIII) - Determination of refugee status, sub. e-vi.

35. Excom Conclusion 30 (XXXIV). The problem of manifestly unfounded or abusive applications for refugee status or asylum, sub. e-iii.

36. Excom Conclusion 44 (XXXVII) — Detention of refugees and asylum-seekers, sub. e.

37. Raad van State 10 April 1979, Rechtspraak Vreemdelingenrecht 1979, No. 3. In 1993, however, the Netherlands Government defended the point of view that law suits concerning aliens law fall outside the scope of application of Art. 16 para. 2 because a Dutch national, other than an alien, cannot be expelled but has the right of entry by law. Bijl. Hand. II, 1992–1993, 22735, no. 9, p. 3.

38. Expeditious treatment merely means that the time period for the handling of an appeal is shortened. That is different from prescribing interim measures pending the final decision on the appeal.

39. ‘De vluchteling een bepaling op zijn weg vond die hem net recht van beroep onthield wegens de duur van zijn verblijfin Nederland’ — Raad van State 6 March 1986, Rechtspraak Vreemdelingenrecht 1986, No. 6. See for a critical view the annotation by Swart published with the decision, in Fernhout, op. cit. n. 7, pp. 239–340.

40. Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak Raad van State, 15 January 1996, No. HOI.94.0067.

41. ‘Que I'appelant, en tant qu'il est privé de recours devant lejuge des référés, est victime d ‘un traitement discriminatoire que la Conventionprohibe’ [that the applicant, insofar as he is denied access to an appeal court is victim of discriminatory treatment prohibited by the Convention]; Cour d'AppelBruxelles, 29 06 1989Google Scholar, Revue du droit des étrangers (1989) No. 54, p. 153 et seq.Google Scholar, with annotation by Rigaux, F. and Carlier, J. Y.. See also the decision by the Belgian Arbitragehof of 14 07 1994Google Scholar, with annotation by van de Putte, M., Tijdschrift voor Vreemdelingenrecht (1994) pp. 179–193Google Scholar.

42. Tribunal Civil (Réf.) Bruxelles, 4 06 1991Google Scholar, Revue du droit des étrangers (1991) No. 64, pp. 237–239Google Scholar: ‘Attendu qu'aucune disposition de droit interne … nepeutpriver I'intéressé de ce droit fondamental, compte tenu de I'article 16 de la Convention de Geneve du 28 juillet 1951, approuvée par la loi beige du 26 juin 1953, norme qui a des effets directs dans I'ordre judiciaire interne et qui prevaut’ [given that no provision of domestic law … may deprive the party in question of this fundamental right, taking into account Art. 16 of the Convention on Refugees of 28 July 1951, approved by the Belgian Law of 26 June 1953, a norm which has direct effects in the domestic judicial order and which has precedence].

43. Grahl-Madsen, op. cit. n. 7, p. 372: ‘Fora number of reasons it is important to determine whether the presence of refugees in such territories is “lawful” or “unlawful”, but it is not always possible to place a refugee in either of those categories’. See for an extensive treatment, Ibid. pp. 344–389.

44. E/AC.32/SR.42, pp. 11–36.

45. The discussion was dominated by Juvigny, a Frenchman, and Henkin, an American, both of whom emphasized that temporary residence should also come within the formulation chosen. Juvigny: '… and temporary residence would be covered by the present wording, at least as far as France was concerned’ (p. 15). Henkin: ‘The intention of the Committee, he had thought, had been to include all refugees lawfully in a territory, even if they were not “resident” in the English sense or “résident” in the French sense’ (p. 16). They did not encounter any opposition to that point of view. The only question was how that view could best be expressed in the two languages. As an example, the then Art. 10 (freedom of association) was taken, where finally the same formulation was chosen as for the protection against expulsion of the present Art. 32. ‘Mr Henkin (United States of America) thought that the first question, which was whether or not the Committee in general wished to accord the rights conferred under Article 10 to refugees merely passing through a country, had been settled in the affirmative’ (p. 20). The proposal by the Israeli delegate, Robinson, to drop the words ‘résidant régulièrement entirely (p. 21) was partly adopted by Juvigny, but he insisted that ‘the word “régulièrement” should be kept in the articles from which the Committee might decide to omit the word “residant“’ (p. 22). The reason for omitting the word “résidant” was thus to exclude any misunderstanding as to whether the provision in question also applied to temporary residence. This happened with a number of articles, including the present Art. 32. In the light of State practice, Goodwin-Gill, op. cit. n. 7, pp. 160, 161, sees objections against ‘the extension of Article 32 benefits to refugees who are merely lawfully present in contracting states’, and would like to limit the scope of Art. 32 to ‘lawfully resident refugees, i.e., those in the State on a more or less indefinite basis’. His objections are hard to understand, given that from the travaux preparatoires it appears incontestable that in relation to this point, it was precisely the intention to include temporary residence in the field of application of the article. The mere fact that some States have not adapted their practice to the intentions of the Convention can not detract from that. After all: ‘the general duty of a party to a treaty to ensure that its domestic law is in conformity with international obligations is beyond contradiction’ (Goodwin-Gill, op. cit. n. 7, p. 141). See also Swart, A.H.J., De toelating en uitzetting van vreemdelingen (1978) pp. 485–486Google Scholar.

46. Grahl-Madsen, op. cit. n. 7, p. 373.

47. Cf., the remark by the Israeli delegate Robinson: ‘The second factor was the expulsion of refugees to territories where neither their life nor their freedom would be threatened. Paragraph 2 of the same article provided a pure formal guarantee in favour of the refugee in such cases: the measure of expulsion should be decreed only after regular procedure’, E/AC.32/SR.20,p. 10, para. 50.

48. Goodwin-Gill, op. cit. n. 7, pp. 159, 160.

49. He refers to Goodwin-Gill, , International Law and the Movement of Persons between States (1978) pp. 227–228, 238–240 and 308–309.Google Scholar

50. Hoare, from Great Britain, was the most explicit during the discussions (A/CONF.2/SR. 14, pp. 24, 25) explaining that in his country there was no possibility of appeal to an ‘appeal tribunal’ against expulsion decisions by the Home Office, and that the UK did not wish to be obliged to make such an appeal possible. See also the remarks by Canada, Turkey, France and Belgium. E/AC.32/SR.20, pp. 6, 7.

51. Robinson, E/AC.32/SR.20, p. 10, para. 50: ‘the measure of expulsion should be decreed only after regular procedure’.

52. See section 2.4 of my forthcoming book Fair Immigration Proceedings in Europe (1997).Google Scholar

53. Amador, F.V. Garcia, ‘Report on International Responsibility’, 1956 ILC Yearbook Vol. II, p. 220.Google Scholar

54. Cf., E/AC.32/SR.20, p. 11, para. 52: ‘The Chairman noted that in the case of paragraph 1 as well as of paragraph 2, the Committee was confronted with a dilemma. If it wished to grant the greatest possible number of guarantees to refugees, it met with resistance from the delegations which had the greater good of their Governments at heart. If, on the other hand, it tried to safeguard the sovereign rights of States to the greatest possible extent, it was liable to draw up a convention which would be unfavourable to refugees. The solution obviously lay in finding the lowest common denominator in these opposing interests’.

55. If in interpreting the term ‘refoulement’ one assumes a meaning which includes refusal of admission at the frontier (travaux préparatoires, E/AC.32/SR.21, pp. 4 and 5). See above.

56. ‘If the applicant is not recognized, he should be given a reasonable time for a formal reconsideration of the decision, either to the same or to a different authority, whether administrative or judicial, according to the prevailing system’.

57. In this context, some significance may also be attached to conclusion 8 of the Executive Committee (sub. iv), in which it is stated that ‘The applicant should be given the necessary facilities (…) for submitting the case to the authorities concerned’. The right to help from — or at least contact with — a representative of the UNHCR is also mentioned in this conclusion.

58. See for the meaning of ‘refoulement’ E/AC.32/SR.21, pp. 4 and 5.

59. Cour d 'Appel Bruxelles, 29 June 1989, Revuedu droitdes étrangers (1989) No. 54, p. 153Google Scholar et seq.

60. Tribunal Civil (Réf.) Bruxelles, 24 December 1990Google Scholar, Revue du droit des étrangers (1991) No. 64, pp. 237–239.Google Scholar

61. See Rigaux, F. and Carlier, J.-Y. in their annotation in Revue du droit des étrangers (1989) No. 54, p. 164.Google Scholar

62. Arbitragehof, 14 July 1994, with annotation by Putte, M. van de, Tijdschrift voor Vreemdelingenrecht (1994) pp. 179–193.Google Scholar

63. ‘Ernstige en onomkeerbare maatregelen, aangezien zij ertoekunnen leiden dat de betrokkene onmiddellijk wordt teruggestuurd naar het land waar, volgens hem, zijn leven of vrijheid warden bedreigd’. Para. B.5.9.4. Unofficial translation.

64. ‘Om dilatoire beroepen te voorkomen en het verloop van de procedure te versnellen, door de klaarblijkelijk niet-ontvankelijke of klaarblijkelijk ongegronde aanvragen van meet af aan te weren’. Para. B.5.9.5. Unofficial translation.

65. ‘Die laatste doelstelling moet evenwel worden verzoend met de zorg geen zinvol beroep te ontzeggen aan diegene die zou staande houden dat zijn terugzending naar het land waaruit hij is gevlucht, hem aan onmenselijke ofvernederende behandeling blootstelt. lngeval een dergelijk gevaar ernstig zou worden aangevoerd, blijkt de mogelijkheid om voor de Raad van State een beroep tot vernietiging in te stellen, niet de uitoefening te zijn van een daadwerkelijke rechtshulp, aangezien de procedure termijnen het in de meeste gevallen onmogelijk maken ten gepasten tijde een arrest te verkrijgen’. Para. B.5.9.6. Unofficial translation.

66. ‘Door tezelfdertijd te bepalen dat de Commissaris-generaal zijn beslissing uitvoerbaar kan verklaren en dat in dat geval tegen die beslissing geen vordering tot schorsing kan worden ingesteld, heeft de wetgever een maatregel genomen die voonover de Minister over de mogelijkheid beschikt het risico te voorkomen dat de betrokkene in de clandestiniteit verdwijnt (…) niet evenredig is, te meer daar die maatregel de administratieve overheid ertoe in staat stelt zelfaan te geven tegen welke beslissingen het verboden is voor de Raad van State een vordering tot schorsing in te stellen’. Para. B.5.9.8. Unofficial translation.

67. As does Recommendation 16 (1981) of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 5 November 1981 (339th session), point 5. Published in Plender, op. cit. n. 33, p. 147.

68. Excom Conclusion 30 (XXXIV) — The problem of manifestly unfounded or abusive applications for refugee status or asylum, sub. e-iii.

69. Conclusion 8 sub. iii.

70. ‘While it is correct that no direct conflict or incompatibility exists between the provisions of the Convention and the Protocol and provisions of United Kingdom law, closer examination reveals that the law, like that of many countries, is of general application, making no special provision for refugees. It must therefore be supplemented by a judicious use of administrative discretion, both to avoid the application of the general law and to secure appropriate benefit’. Goodwin-Gill, op. cit. n. 7, p. 147.

71. Raad van State 6 March 1986, Rechtspraak Vreemdelingenrecht (1986) No. 6.

72. Raad van State 10 04 1979Google Scholar, Rechtspraak Vreemdelingenrecht (1979) No. 3.Google Scholar

73. Bijl. Hand. II, 1992–1993, 22735, No. 9, p. 3. See also Spijkerboer and Vermeulen, op. cit. n. 7, pp. 382–384.

74. Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak Raad van State, 15 01 1996Google Scholar, No. H01.94.0067.

75. ‘Geen bepaling van de Grondwet of van een Internationale overeenkomst verplicht de wetgever om een algemeen administratief kort geding in te stellen. Wanneer evenwel de wetgever oordeelt dat het wenselijk is te voorzien in de mogelijkheid van een vordering tot schorsing van de bestuurshandelingen, kan hij die vordering niet ontzeggen aan bepaatde categorieën van rechtssubjecten ten deze bepaalde categorieën van vreemdelingen die zich vluchteling verklaren, indien daarvoor geen redelijke verantwoording bestaat’. Unofficial translation, Arbitragehof, 14 July 1994, Tijdschrift voor Vreemdelingenrecht (1994) p. 184Google Scholar, para. B.5.7.

76. Tijdschrift voor Vreemdelingenrecht (1993) No. 1, p. 14.Google Scholar

77. Art. 26 ICCPR, Art. 3 Convention on Refugees, Art. 14 ECHR.

78. Para. B.2.6. The Netherlands Raad van State also applies this criterion. See Bijl. Hand. II, 1993–1994, 23 558, A, p. 1.

79. Namely Art. 52(l)(2nd) of the Belgian act which allows refusal of residence and return for an alien who claims to be a refugee and whose application ‘is manifestly based on motives which are entirely unconnected with asylum, in particular because they are fraudulent, or because they are not connected with the criteria defined in Art. 1 A (2) International Convention relating to the status of refugees, signed at Geneva on 28 July 1951, or with other criteria which justify granting asylum’ (‘klaarblijkelijk steunt op motieven die totaal vreemd zijn aan hetasiel, inzonderheid omdat ze bedriegelijk is, of omdat ze geen verband houdt met de citeria bepaalde bij art. 1 A (2) van net Internationaal Verdrag betreffende de status van vluchtelingen, ondertekend te Genève op 28 juli 1951, noch met andere criteria die de toekenning van asiel wettigen’. Unofficial translation).