^{page 365 note 1} 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.B. 2d 502 (1942).

^{page 365 note 2} Ned. Staatscourant A, May 30, 1940, No. 151, as amended by art. 2 of the Decree of May 7, 1942, Staatsblad No. C 34. For further references see Administration of National Assets Abroad by Governments-in-exile, Ch. 21 of Domke, Trading with the Enemy in World War II (1943), p. 345 and of its Supplement, The Control of Alien Property (1947), p. 216.

^{page 365 note 3} 79 F. Supp. 966 (1948); 99 F. Supp. 655 (1951), note by Stein, 1 Am. J. Comp. L. (1952) 261, reversed (as to the application of Decree A 1) 201 F. 2d 455 (1953), notes in 53 Columbia L. Rev. (1953) 561 and 52 Michigan L. Rev. (1954) 753.

^{page 365 note 4} Said Professor M. H. Bregstein in an address, “Measures taken in the Netherlands with regard to the Settlement of Rights Lost by Action of German Occupation Authorities”, at the Second International Conference of the Legal Profession, International Bar Association, The Hague, 1948, on Decree A 1: “The Government's intention is clear: She wanted to prevent her subjects from being robbed of their foreign assets by the occupation authorities, who might take possession of it without compensation.”

^{page 366 note 1} In re van Dam's Estate, 43 N.Y.S. 2d 184 (1943); In re Blak's Estate, 65 Cal. App. 2d 232, 150 Pac. 2d 567 (1944); Gruenebaum v. Lissauer, 57 N.Y.S. 2d 137 (1945), affirmed 61 N.Y.S. 2d 372 (1946).

^{page 366 note 2} Another instance of recognition of a Dutch decree, in the law of economic warfare, is Rothschild v. N.V. Gebroeders Pappenheim's Tabakshandel, 194 Misc. 889, 88 N.Y.S. 2d 157 (1949). There the Dutch defendant corporation was affected by Decree E100, as amended by F 272 and E 133, whereby the military governor, pursuant to art. 162 of the Decree, exercised the function of the Council for the Restoration of Legal Rights, and appointed a Dutch national as Bestuurder of the corporation, with the power of a Beheerder, because of ownership of stock of the corporation by enemy (German) nationals. The New York court denied a stockholder's application for a receivership under sec. 977b of the N.Y. Civil Practice Act, since the defendant corporation had not been nationalized or liquidated or its charter suspended or revoked by the foreign government. Said the court, at p. 892, resp. 160: “The process through which the corporation is now passing is protective rather than destructive of its entity and of the rights of its creditors and stockholders.”

^{page 366 note 3} Cp. the “Suggestion of the Interest of the United States”, inserted verbatim in the opinion of the court, 289 N.Y. 9, at p. 15, whereby application of the Decree was suggested only with regard to persons who are not “at the time of their assertion citizens or residents of the United States”.

^{page 366 note 4} 289 N.Y. 9, at p. 19.

^{page 366 note 5} In re Kahn's Estate, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 839 (1942), the court was disposed to deny enforcement of Decree A 1 against the claims of domestic creditors, next of kin and legatees of estates. See also Petschek v. American Enka Corp., 182 Misc. 503, 49 N.Y.S. 2d 49 (1944), where the Netherlands Government Decree A 1 was not controlling.

^{page 366 note 6} This writer in his 1943 book, supra n. 2, at p. 367.

^{page 367 note 1} 28 N.Y.S. 2d 547 (1941), note in 19 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. (1941) 71, aff'd (without opinion) 263 App. Div. 705, 31 N.Y.S. 2d 194 (1941), comment in 41 Michigan L. Rev. (1943) 706.

^{page 367 note 2} (1942) 2 K. B. 202, note in 24 J. Comp. Leg. & Int. L. (1942) 131. Cp. also Grangemouth and Forth Towing Company, Ltd. v. The Netherlands East Indies Government, 1942 Scots Law Times 228, with respect to the foreign sovereign temporarily not exercising its authority over the then Japanese occupied territory, and with regard to Netherlands Decree A 1, O/Y Wasa Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Newspaper Pulp & Wood Export, Ltd. (1949) 82 Lloyd L. R. 936.

^{page 367 note 3} Wolff, Martin, Private International Law, 2d ed. 1950, p. 528Google Scholar; Dicey, Conflict of Laws, 6th ed. 1949, p. 19, n. 43.

^{page 367 note 4} Cheshire, , Private International Law, 4th ed. 1952, p. 184Google Scholar; he characterized in the third edition, 1947, p. 184, the Lorentzen decision as based on “the abnormal circumstances and the unprecedented exigencies of the period”. Cp. also Mann, Extraterritorial Effect of Confiscatory Legislation, 5 Modern L. Rev. (1942) 262, and McNair, Legal Effects of War, 3rd ed. 1948, p. 375.

^{page 367 note 5} (1951) 2 All E. R. 779; Notes in 65 Harvard L. Rev. (1952) 1463, and 100 Univ. Pennsylvania L Rev. (1952) 764.

^{page 367 note 6} At p. 792.

^{page 367 note 7} 201 F. 2d 455, at 460.

^{page 368 note 1} Verorderung van den Rijkscommissaris voor het bezette Nederlandsche gebied betreffende de behandeling van het joodsche geldelijke vermogen. Verordeningenblad Stuk 32, 9 Augustus 1941, No. 148, Blz. 624.

^{page 368 note 2} See infra note 4, p. 368.

^{page 368 note 3} One of the more recent publications, Mattern, Die Exilregierung (Tuebingen 1953), a thesis of 1949 “brought up to date” (preface p. 2), hardly deals with any court decisions of World War II and does not mention the Anderson case at all. Nor is Flory, Le Statut International des Gouvernements Réfugiés et le Cas de la France Libre 1939–1945 (Paris 1952), relevant in this respect, though mentioning the Anderson case at p. 37.

^{page 368 note 4} The further issues involved in the Archimedes case, where the United States appeared amicus curiae, namely, the application of the United States foreign funds control, under Executive Order No. 8389, 5 Fed. Reg. 1400 (1940), as amended, and General Rulings No. 5, as amended, and No. 12, 5 F.R. 2159 (1940) and 7 F.R. 2291 (1942), and the conflict of laws rules as to the alleged title of Archimedes to the bonds, are not being dealt with in this article, which is concerned alone with the Dutch wartime legislation. See infra n. 4. p. 369.

^{page 369 note 1} E.g. Occupation of Cavalla Case, Greece, Court of Thrace (1930), Themis 41, p. 417 and Ann. Dig. Publ. Int. Law Cases 1929–1930, p. 496, No. 292; De Nimal v. De Nimal, Belgium, Court of Appeal, Brussels (1919), Pasicrisie Belge 1919.II.83, Ann. Dig. 1919–1922, p. 447, No. 311.

^{page 369 note 2} Feilchenfeld, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (1942), p. 136; Van Nispen tot Sevenaer, L'Occupation Allemande pendant la Dernière Guerre Mondiale (1946), p. 235; Stein, Application of the Law of the Absent Sovereign in Territory under Belligerent Occupation: The Schio Massacre, 46 Michigan L. Rev. (1948) 341, and Note, 1 Am. J. Comp. L. (1952) 261.

^{page 369 note 3} In considering the Anderson decision, the court said, 99 F. Supp. 655, at p. 659: “Changed circumstances, and different facts, require that the application of the Anderson case to the present situation be closely scrutinized”, and at p. 661: “It [the decree] was not effective to transfer tide to assets in territory under enemy military occupation at the time the decree purported to do so.”

^{page 369 note 4} At p. 663. The District Court concluded at p. 670, that “neither plaintiff nor interpleader defendant has established a valid claim to the bonds whose possession they seek. Accordingly, the securities remain in the custody of defendant stakeholder to await the appearance of proper claimants, or other appropriate disposition.”

^{page 369 note 5} Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2275 (U.S. Department of State Publication 4324, 1952), pointing to the policy of frustrating attempts of the enemy to profit from wartime loot, as expressed in the Inter-Allied Declaration Regarding Forced Transfers of Property in Enemy-Controlled Territory, of January 5, 1943 (8 Dept. State Bull. No. 185, p. 21), and in Resolution No. VI of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944 (11 Dept. State Bull. No. 276, p. 384).

^{page 369 note 6} As to the purchase in good faith of looted securities under Dutch law, the District Court, 99 F. Supp. 655, at 669, pointed to sec. 20–35 and 37–38 of Decree E-100 and sec. 36 of Decree F-272, and to the practice of Dutch courts that parting with securities through delivering them to LIRO (Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co., Sarphatistraat) was parting with them within the meaning of Decree E-100, that is, under duress, threat or undue influence, stating, at p. 669, that “of approximately one hundred published cases, in only two or three have the Dutch courts found the required good faith”.

^{page 369 note 7} 201 F. 2d 455, at 461. No petition for writ of certiorari was considered by the Supreme Court of the United States; the decision is therefore final.

^{page 370 note 1} Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2295. Cp. Briggs, The Law of Nations, 2d ed. 1952, p. 1024.

^{page 370 note 2} Cp. Schwenk, Legislative Power of the Military Occupant under Article 43, Hague Regulations, 54 Yale L.J. (1945) 393, and Aboititz & Co. v. Price, 99 F. Supp. 602 (D. C. Utah, 1951), recognizing the extra-territorial effect of currency regulations of Japanese authorities in the Philippines, notes in 65 Harvard L. Rev. (1952) 527, 1 Am. J. Comp. L. (1952) 119, 15 Michigan L. Rev. (1952) 1066.

^{page 370 note 3} Belgium: Re Hoogeveen, Court of Cassation (1944), Pasicrisie Belge 1945. 1.33, Ann. Dig. Pub. Int. L. Cases 1943–1945, p. 432, No. 148;Google Scholar

Holland: Agrocide v. Arsocid, Court of Appeal, Hague (1946), Ned. Jur. 1948, No. 98;Google Scholar

Norway: Public Prosecutor v. Raider Haaland, Supreme Court, Appellate Division (1945), Norsk Retstidende 1945, p. 13, Ann. Dig. 1943–1945, p. 445, No. 154.Google Scholar

Poland: Stasiuk and Jagnycz v. Klewec, Supreme Court, Third Division (1927), Ann. Dig. 1927–1928, p. 560, No. 380.Google Scholar

^{page 370 note 4} This conclusion received further support from the fact that “the claim of the Netherlands does not compete with any valid rights of United States residents”, as the court said at p. 463. For this restrictive concept, which was also applied in the Anderson case, see supra n. 3, p. 367.

^{page 371 note 1} Ned. Jur. 1948, No. 116. See note in Ann. Dig. 1947, p. 239, aff'd Ned. Jur. 1950, No. 493.

^{page 371 note 2} Ned. Jur. 1950, No. 494.

^{page 371 note 3} 111 F. Supp. 833 (1953).

^{page 371 note 4} Staatsblad No. 200, as amended March 4, 1942, Staatsblad No. C 16.

^{page 371 note 5} Cp. also Hausmann v. N.V. Koninklijke Rotterdamse Lloyd, Ned. Jur. 1953, No. 427, digested this Review 1953, p. 87. Cp. In re Ameyund, 201 Misc. 547, 108 N.Y.S. 2d 326 (1951), where the Surrogate's Court held that a power of attorney-in-fact executed on December 22, 1947 at Batavia, Java by a resident of the Netherlands East Indies and a citizen of the Netherlands was not revoked when Indonesia became a sovereign Republic.

^{page 372 note 1} For further references see Transfer of Business Places of Corporations, Ch. 13 of Domke, Trading with the Enemy in World War II (1943), p. 172 and of its Supplement, The Control of Alien Property (1947), p. 123; Bloch in 48 Schweiz. Jur. Ztg. (1952) 245 and Salomon in 83 Weekblad voor Privaatrecht (1953), No. 4253, p. 341, commented upon by Drobnig in 18 Rabels Zeitschrift (1953) 764.

^{page 372 note 2} Referring to Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U.S. 302, 310 (1910), and to Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 279 App. Div. 417, 421, 110 N.Y.S. 2d 383, 387 (1952), meanwhile affirmed 304 N.Y. 942, 110 N.E. 2d 884 (1953), where the court observed that foreign governments cannot, in the foreseeable future, in many cases remove currency restrictions “except at the expense of national survival”.

^{page 372 note 3} Plaintiff's act of transfer in favor of Escomptobank, N.V., by divesting himself of his right of possession and control of the securities, in compliance with Netherlands Indies law, is somewhat related to situations in the British cases to which the court referred: Zivnostenska Bank National Corporation v. Frankman, (1950) A.C. 57, and Kahler v. Midland Bank, Ltd., (1950) A.C. 24.

^{page 373 note 1} The account was transferred in 1942 to the Netherlands Purchasing Commission, an agency of the Netherlands government-in-exile, to be administered by the Commission as “trustee”. The securities were re-transferred to the account of the impleaded defendant Escomptobank, N.V. Said the court: “The purpose of this [1942] transfer was to prevent these assets from falling into the hands of the Japanese, whose invasion of the Netherlands Indies was correctly deemed imminent.”

^{page 373 note 2} An additional viewpoint has not been considered by the court, in support of the application of foreign exchange control: the United States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands are both members of the International Monetary Fund established by the Bretton Woods Agreement Act. This viewpoint of membership in the Fund plays the decisive role in Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank, 304 N.Y. 533, 537 (1953), where the Czechoslovakian foreign exchange law was applied to a pension claim of a former employee of the defendant bank. For a discussion of the issues involved, see Meyer, Recognition of Exchange Controls after the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 62 Yale Law Journal (1953) 867, and for further references of recent date, Domke, Zur Auslandsanwendung deutschen Devisenrechts, 9 Juristen Zeitung (1954) 484.