No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Does domicil bear a single meaning?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 May 2009
Extract
Domicil is an important legal concept in the United States. It plays a particularly significant role in conflict of laws (private international law), where it affects such broad areas as judicial jurisdiction, choice of law and governmental benefits and burdens. As to the first area a state has in personam judicial jurisdiction over its domiciliaries whether or not they are physically within its territory at the time of service of process. And, under prevailing conceptions, only the state where at least one of the spouses is domiciled has jurisdiction to terminate their marriage by divorce. One cannot be a citizen of a state of the United States unless one is domiciled there. This means that the parties must have different domicils for a federal court to have jurisdiction over an action between them on the ground that they are “Citizens of different States” within the meaning of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. In the second area, choice of law, the law of a man's domicil controls such matters relating to his personal status as legitimacy, adoption, emancipation (if minor), and the validity of his marriage. The same law governs the transfer of personal property upon death and therefore determines such questions as the validity of a will dealing with personalty and the division of such property in the event of an intestacy. With respect to the third area, it is the state of domicil which allows a man to vote and to hold public office. Conversely, this state can subject the individual to various types of personal taxation and, perhaps of greatest importance in this connection, can impose an inheritance tax upon all of his intangibles. Whether or not the defendant is domiciled in a particular state is also a material factor to be considered in determining whether he is a nonresident ofthat state within the meaning of a provision tolling the statutory period of limitation.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1955
References
page 15 note 1 By and large, what is said here is equally applicable to the rules of domicil in force in other Anglo-American countries.
page 15 note 2 Milliken v. Meyer, , 311 U.S. 459 (1940).Google Scholar
page 15 note 3 Williams, v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945)Google Scholar: Alton v. Alton, , 207 F. 2d 667 (3rd Gir. 1953).Google Scholar
page 15 note 4 Restatement, Judgments § 17 (1942).
page 15 note 5 Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 31, 131, 132, 137–140, 172 (1934).Google Scholar
page 15 note 6 Id., §§ 303, 306.
page 15 note 7 Reese, and Green, , “That Elusive Word, ‘Residence’,” 6Google Scholar Vand. L. Rev. 561, 571–572 (1953).
page 15 note 8 Id. at 573.
page 16 note 1 Id. at 574.
page 16 note 2 3 American Law Institute, Proceedings 225–231 (1925), quoted in Cheatham, Goodrich, Griswold, and Reese, Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws 42–45 (3rd ed. 1951).
page 16 note 3 Cook, , The Logical and Legal Bases of Conflict of Laws (1942).Google Scholar
page 16 note 4 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws 92–94 (1935).Google Scholar
page 17 note 1 A classic case in point is that of Dr. Dorrance, the former head of the Campbell Soup Company. During his lifetime, Dr. Dorrance divided his time between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and after his death each of these states sought to impose an inheritance tax upon his estate. Both were successful. The Pennsylvania courts found that a tax was due Pennsylvania because Dorrance had died domiciled in that state. In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303 (1932). On the other hand, the New Jersey courts held that a tax was owed New Jersey, since in their opinion Dorrance had died domiciled there and not in Pennsylvania. In re Dorrance's Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 Atl. 601 (1934). As a result, the estate was subjected to double inheritance taxation.
page 17 note 2 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, 1948 Supplement 80 (1949).Google Scholar
page 17 note 3 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws 94 (1935).Google Scholar
page 17 note 4 3 American Law Institute, Proceedings 226–227 (1925).Google Scholar
page 19 note 1 192 N.Y. 238, 84 N.E. 950 (1908).
page 20 note 1 Id. at 252, 84 N.E. at 955.
page 20 note 2 Similar self-serving declarations by Dr. Dorrance that his home was in New Jersey were disregarded by the Pennsylvania courts in finding that he had died domiciled in the latter state. See Note 1, p. 17, supra. In another tax case, however, such declarations were given controlling effect in an intrastate situation. Thayer, v. City of Boston, 124 Mass. 132 (1878).Google Scholar
page 20 note 3 104 Conn. 169, 132 Atl. 902 (1926).
page 22 note 1 104 Conn. 169, 132 Atl. 902 (1926).
page 22 note 2 Comment, 36 Yale L.J. 408 (1927).
page 22 note 3 Coudert, Some Considerations in the Law of Domicil, 36 Yale L. J. 948, 963 (1927).Google Scholar
page 23 note 1 May v. May, 169 Law Times 42 (1943)Google Scholar; see Note, 42 Col. L. Rev. 640 (1942).
page 23 note 2 American Law Institute. Restatement of the Law Continued, Tentative Draft No. 2 53–54 (1954).Google Scholar