1. The idea for this article resulted from the contributions of both authors to a discussion on the Nicaragua v US case organized by the Leyden-Amsterdam-Columbia Summer Program in American Law at Leyden University on 21 July 1986. The authors want to thank all the participants to that provocative discussion.

2. Hussain, I., Dissenting and Separate Opinions at the World Court (1984) p. 266Google Scholar.

3. Ibid., p. 62. In the Permanent Court of International Justice, dissenting and separate opinions of Judges covered 910 pages as against 1,390 pages of judgments and opinions of that Court. Roughly speaking, the numbers of pages covering dissenting and separate opinions of Judges, on the one hand, and judgments, orders and opinions of the present Court itself, on the other, are in a proportion of three to one. Judge Schwebel submitted a dissenting opinion of 243 pages, nearly twice the length of the judgment itself, albeit including a lengthy factual appendix. Thus he easily beat Judge ad hoc Van Wyk's record of 150 pages in the 1966 South West Africa case (second phase).

4. Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, Judgment (Merits), ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 14Google Scholar.

5. Akehurst, M., A Modern Introduction to International Law, 6th edn. (1987) pp. 1–12Google Scholar. See also Briggs, H.W., ‘The International Court of Justice Lives Up to its Name’, 81 AJIL (1987) pp. 78–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar. According to Briggs (ibid., p. 86) the Court has upheld the law. The present issue of AJIL contains a special section with 16 appraisals supporting or vehemently rejecting the ICJ's decision on the merits of the dispute between Nicaragua and the US. Together the appraisals reflect, in the words of their editor H.G. Maier (ibid., p. 78) ‘a wide spectrum of legal and political viewpoints’.

6. Schwarzenberger, G., A Manual of International Law, 6th edn. (1976) p. 10Google Scholar; and, by the same author Schwarzenberger, G., International Judicial Law, Vol. IV entitled ‘International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals’ (1986) pp. 727–728Google Scholar.

7. Friedmann, W., ‘The International Court of Justice and the Evolution of International Law’, 14 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1969–1970) p. 320Google Scholar.

8. Schwarzenberger, , International Judicial Law, op.cit. n. 6, pp. 731–733Google Scholar.

9. ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 153.

10. Judge Lachs quoting Justice Frankfurter in his separate opinion, ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 160. See also Farer, T.J., ‘Drawing the Right Line’, 81 AJIL (1987) pp. 112–116CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11. This position was represented by Hans Smit in the course of the discussion referred to in n. 1. His colleagues from Columbia University argued differently. See also Highet, K., ‘Evidence, the Court and the Nicaragua Case’, 81 AJIL (1987) p. 51CrossRefGoogle Scholar: ‘The difficult Judgment just rendered in that case will in every likelihood engender a broad assault from legal circles sympathetic to the position of the United States, to the effect that the Court has seriously injured itself, and that its future caseload and activity - certainly in respect of cases from the developed countries of the West - will suffer as a result’. A glaring example is offered by Anthony d'Amato in the same issue who qualifies the Judgment as ‘a failure of legal scholarship’ (p. 105).

12. P.H. Kooijmans, ‘Who Tolled the Death-Bell for Compulsory Jurisdiction? Some Comments on the Judgment of the ICJ in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application)’, in Bos, A. and Siblesz, H., eds., Realism in Law-Making: Essays on International Law in Honour of Willem Riphagen (1986) pp. 84–85Google Scholar. See also Wengler, W., ‘Gerichtszuständigkeit und Klagezulässigkeit im Verfahren Nicaragua/USA vor dem IGH’, 38 NJW (1985) pp. 1266–1267Google Scholar; Scott, G.L. and Carr, C.L., ‘The ICJ and Compulsory Jurisdiction: The Case for Closing the Clause’, 81 AJIL (1987) pp. 57–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13. Cf., for example, Von Staden, B.. ‘Diplomatie und Volkerrecht’, Europa Archiv (1984) pp. 505 and 508Google Scholar.

14. Rosenne, Shabtai, The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice (1965) p. 94Google Scholar.

15. Schlochauer, H.J., ‘Permanent Court of International Justice’, in Bernhardt, R., ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Instalment 1 (1981) p. 171Google Scholar.

16. de Waart, P.J.I.M., The Element of Negotiation in the Pacific Settlement of Disputes between States: an Analysis of Provisions Made and/or Applied Since 1918 in the Field of the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1973) p. 193Google Scholar.

17. Schlochauer, , ‘International Court of Justice’, in Bernhardt, , op.cit. n. 15, p. 79Google Scholar.

18. United States diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1980, p. 3Google Scholar.

19. Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, Judgment (Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), ICJ Rep. 1984, p. 392Google Scholar and (Merits), ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 14.

20. ICJ Rep. 1980, pp. 8–9. For the US influence on the Shah's Iran, cf., Hohmann, H., ‘Die Entwicklung im Iran des Schah’, 28 Die Neue Gesellschaft (1981) pp. 1009–1014Google Scholar.

21. Schwarzenberger, , International Judicial Law, op.cit. n. 6, p. 545Google Scholar.

22. ICJ Rep. 1980, p. 19.

23. Ibid., p. 20. In his dissenting opinion Judge Tarazi did not disagree on that point. He only considered it ‘not right to proclaim the responsibility of the Iranian Government unless its examination is first preceded by an appropriate study of the historical facts antedating the seizure by Islamic students of the United States Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979. In that respect, it is a matter for deep regret that the Iranian Government refused to appear before the Court’ (ibid., p. 60).

24. Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, Judgment (Merits), ICJ Rep. 1986, pp. 220 and 240.

25. Kooijmans, , loc.cit. n. 12, pp. 71 and 72Google Scholar.

26. ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 284.

27. Ibid., pp. 284–285.

28. Ibid., p. 289.

29. Ibid., p. 293.

30. Ibid., p. 295. The establishment of facts was quite difficult due to the non-appearance of the US. As it had in the dispute between the US and Iran, the Court dealt at length and cautiously with statements of representatives of the American Government as well as American publications and other documentary material. Judge Schwebel stressed that, unlike the default-procedure against Iran, this time the facts were in fundamental dispute (ibid., pp. 266 and 293). This situation induced him to include a Factual Appendix of 133 pages (ibid., p. 267) ‘in which a detailed exposition and analysis of the facts inadequately stated in the Court's Judgment is placed. The facts are relegated to an appendix not because they are secondary in importance. On the contrary, they are primary’. Probably unintentionally Judge Schwebel thus contributed to bridging the gap caused by the US decision to default in the secondary phase and thenceforth strengthened the moral authority of the judgment vis-à-vis the world community. See also Falk, R., ‘The World Court's Achievement, 81 AJIL (1987) p. 111CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31. Ibid., p. 296. In other words, unlike the Court Judge Schwebel seems to consider ‘ideological intervention’ to be legally permitted.

32. For the separation of legal and political questions by the German Federal Constitutional Court, cf., Heussner, H., ‘Datenverarbeitung und Grundrechtsgeschutz’, in Hohmann, H., ed., Freiheitssicherung durch Datenschutz (1987) pp. 110–126Google Scholar. The German Federal Constitutional Court also has to decide disputes with a highly political and contentious element. For the separation between legal and political disputes in the US Supreme Court cf., Brugger, W., ‘Verfassungsgerichtspolitik à la USA’, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (1987) pp. 52–61Google Scholar. See also Wengler, W., ‘Die Entscheidung des IGH im Nicaragua-Fall, 39 NJW (1986) pp. 2994–2997Google Scholar.

33. ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 168.

34. ICJ Rep. 1984, p. 442.

35. Merrills, J.G., International Dispute Settlement (1984) p. 70Google Scholar. See also De Waart, P.J.I.M., ‘ICSID and Other Forms of Arbitration and Conciliation: Institutionalization of Dispute Settlement in the Context of the Right to Development’, in Dicke, D.C., ed., Foreign Investment in the Present and a New International Economic Order (1987)Google Scholar.

36. These phases cover the consent by the parties concerned to international dispute settlement; the choice of a specific means; the designation of an appointing authority, if any; the composition of the forum for conciliation or arbitration; the determination of the procedure; the choice of the applicable substantive law; the acceptance of the decision; and the enforcement of the decision.

37. Verzijl, J.H.W., Inter-State Disputes and their Settlement (1976) pp. 71–85Google Scholar and 390–402 (International Law in Historical Perspective series, vol. 8).

38. De Waart, , op.cit. n. 16, pp. 190–191Google Scholar. The survey covers 54 cases up to the seventies. Since 1970, 11 cases have been adjudicated by the Court: Fisheries jurisdiction (UK v Iceland 1974); Fisheries jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v Iceland 1974); Nuclear tests (Australia v France 1974); Nuclear tests (New Zealand v France 1974); Aegean Sea continental shelf (Greece v Turkey 1978); United States diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran (US v lran 1980); Continental shelf (Tunisia v Libya 1982); Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine area (Canada v US 1984); Continental shelf (Libya v Malta 1985); Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US 1986); and Frontier dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali 1986).

39. Ibid., p. 201. Apart from four (Tunisia v Libya, Libya v Malta, Canada v US and Burkina Faso v Mali) the 11 cases mentioned in n. 38 were adjudicated in default of one of the parties, i.e., Iceland, France, Turkey, Iran and the US. See Elkind, J.B., Non-Appearance Before the International Court of Justice: Functional and Comparative Analysis (1984)Google Scholar.

40. Case of the right of passage over Indian territory (Preliminary objections), ICJ Rep. 1957, pp. 145–147Google Scholar.

41. Glennon, M.J., ‘Protecting the Court's Institutional Interests: Why Not the Marbury Approach?’ 81 AJIL (1987) pp. 121–129CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Schwarzenberger, , International Judicial Law, op.cit. n. 6, p. 504Google Scholar.

42. Glennon, , loc.cit. n. 41, p. 124Google Scholar. Glennon argues that in 1803 the US Supreme Court abnegated its jurisdiction (Marbury v Madison) and thus established for all time that it has the final say on what the US Constitution means. However, regrettable or not, the UN Charter is not a constitution and the ICJ not a constitutional court. Therefore it is really doubtful whether the Marbury approach could have been successfully copied from its American setting. Moreover, the Court had already rejected Judge Lauterpacht's opinion on the invalidity of ‘self-judging’ reservations to the Optional Clause in the case of certain Norwegian loans.

43. ICJ Rep. 1984, pp. 601–602. See also Robinson, D.R. (legal adviser US Department of State), ‘Observations on the International Court of Justice's November 26, 1984 Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admissibility in the Case of Nicaragua v United States of America’, 79 AJIL (1985) pp. 422–430Google Scholar.

44. See the UN publication, Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 1928–1948 (1949) p. 1156Google Scholar. This survey, which was prepared by the UN secretariat, includes Nicaragua's declaration in the list of ‘Declarations continuing in force under Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice’ (pp. 1150–1159). Art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute of the PCIJ provided that ‘The Members of the League of Nations and the States mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant may, either when signing or ratifying the Protocol to which the present Statute is adjoined, or at a later moment, declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso factoand without special agreement in relation to any other Member or State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court..’

45. ICJ Rep. 1984, p. 408.

46. Ibid., p. 559.

47. All in all the Court was thus enabled to uphold its jurisdiction by 15 votes to 1 (Judge Schwebel dissenting). See ICJ Rep. 1984, pp. 442, 461–465, 473–489, 517–532 and 533–545.

48. Kooijmans, , loc.cit. n. 12, p. 74Google Scholar. The Court took into account a difference between the English text (‘still in force’) and the French text (‘pour une durée qui n'est pas encore expirée”e’) of Art. 36, para. 5, of its Statute. See also ICJ Rep. 1984, p. 406.

49. ICJ Rep. 1984, p. 413. For the meaning of estoppel in German Law cf., Hohmann, H., ‘§242 BGB und unzulässige Rechtsaüsiibung in der Rechtsprechung des BGH’, 14 Juristische Arbeitsblätter (1982) pp. 112–117Google Scholar. For the meaning of that principle in European Community law and public international law cf., Hohmann, H., ‘Warenzeichenrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht’, 17 Juristische Arbeitsblätter (1985) pp. 381–387Google Scholar; Bleckmann, A., ‘Die Aufgabeneiner Methodenlehre des Völkerrechts (1978) pp. 57–65Google Scholar.

50. ICJ Rep. 1984, p. 407.

51. Robinson, , loccit. n. 43, p. 426Google Scholar.

52. ICJ Rep. 1984, p. 398. The case was registered a few days after the US veto against the draft resolution condemning the laying of sea-mines. Cf., 32 Vereinte Nationen (1984) pp. 97 and 111Google Scholar.

53. ICJ Rep. 1984, p. 420.

54. Schwarzenberger, , International Judicial Law, op.cit. n. 6, p. 465Google Scholar. See also Kooijmans, , loc.cit. n. 12, p. 74Google Scholar.

55. Wengler, loccit. n. 12.

56. Nicaragua did not invoke the 1956 bilateral treaty in its Application. However, the Court allowed it to do so in its Memorial, ICJ Rep. 1984, pp. 426 and 427. See also Kooijmans, , loc.cit. n. 12, pp. 80–81Google Scholar.

57. ICJ Rep. 1984, pp. 426–427. The European Court of Justice also treats these requirements in a non-formalistic way. Cf., Hohmann, H., ‘Das Reinheitsgebot Urteil und der Europäischen Binnenmarkt’, Juristenzeitung (1987)Google Scholar.

58. ICJ Rep. 1984, pp. 628–629.

59. Case of certain Norwegian loan, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1957, pp. 24–25.

60. See the UN publication mentioned in n. 44 supra, p. 1144Google Scholar. In the Nuclear tests case France refused to accept the jurisdiction of the Court under the 1928 General Act, Nuclear Tests (Australia v France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, ICJ Rep. 1973, p. 100. Judge De Castro, who upheld the Court's jurisdiction under the General Act, dealt with this issue at great length in his dissenting opinion to the judgment on the merits (ICJ Rep. 1974, pp. 377–384). See also De Waart, , op.cit. n. 16, pp. 82–91Google Scholar.

61. See the UN publication, A Survey of Treaty Provisions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 1949–1962 (1966) p. 621Google Scholar.

62. ICJ Rep. 1984, p. 427.

63. ICJ Rep. 1980, p. 26.

64. ICJ Rep. 1984, p. 429. See also p. 442.

65. Ibid., pp. 452–453.

66. ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 137. See also ICJ Rep. 1984, pp. 427–428.

67. Kooijmans, , loc.cit. n. 12, p. 84Google Scholar.

68. Op.cit. n. 61, p. 620.

69. On 1 May 1985 the US gave written notice to the Government of Nicaragua to terminate the 1956 treaty in accordance with Art. XXV, para. 3, thereof. The treaty-relationship was thus terminated on 1 May 1986. Of course, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court under Art. XXIV, para. 2, in the present case.

70. Oppenheim, L., Disputes, War and Neutrality, 7th edn., Lauterpacht, H., ed., (1952) p. 63Google Scholar.

71. ICJ Rep. 1984, p. 610.

72. Ibid., p. 422.

73. ICJ Rep. 1984 and 1986, pp. 424 and 29–38 respectively. In this connection it should be mentioned that on 15 August 1984, prior to the closure of the written proceedings on the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility, El Salvador had filed a Declaration of Intervention under Art. 63 of the Statute. On 4 October 1984 the Court decided by nine votes to six not to hold a hearing on the Declaration of Intervention. Judge Lachs, who belonged to the majority, apparently regretted his vote in favour and afterwards regarded it as an ‘error’ (ICJ Rep. 1986, pp. 170–171). With near unanimity – 14 votes to 1 (Judge Schwebel dissenting) – the Court also decided that the Declaration was inadmissible inasmuch as it related to the phase of jurisdiction of the Court and admissibility of Nicaragua's Application. Judge Lachs upheld his vote on this point. See also Sztucki, J., ‘Intervention under Article 63 of the ICJ Statute in the Phase of Preliminary Proceedings: the “Salvadoran Incident” ’, 79 AJIL (1985) pp. 1005–1036Google Scholar; Schwarzenberger, , International Judicial Law, op.cit. n. 6, pp. 399–411Google Scholar.

74. ICJ Rep. 1984, p. 425. On 28 July 1986 Nicaragua instituted proceedings before the Court against Costa Rica and Honduras concerning border and transborder armed actions organised by contrasin the territories of Costa Rica (since 1982) and Honduras (since 1980). On 12 August 1987, however, the Agent of Nicaragua gave notice of the discontinuance of the proceedings instituted in the Court against Costa Rica (Press Communique No. 87/19). By an order of the President of the Court of 19 August 1987 the case was removed from the list (Press Communiqué No.87/21). As for the proceedings against Honduras, the Agents of both parties have requested the postponement of the opening of oral proceedings by a joint letter dated 13 August 1987 (Press Communiqué No. 87/20). Nicaragua and Honduras are of the opinion that the ‘…judicial situation is to be reviewed by them on the occasion of the Meeting of Central-American Presidents to be held in one hundred and fifty days' time, according to the undertaking laid down in that plan, with a view to reaching agreement on a discontinuance of international judicial proceedings on the situation in Central America’ The current regional peace efforts explain the above development.

75. ICJ Rep. 1984, p. 424.

76. See Wengler, , loc.cit. n. 32, p. 2995Google Scholar. According to Judge Padilla Nervo in his separate opinion to the judgment of the Court in the North Sea continental shelf cases ‘Customary rules belonging to the category of jus cogens cannot be subjected to unilateral reservations’ (ICJ Rep. 1969, pp. 98–99). Be this as it may, this does not hold true for conditional Optional Clauses, despite their negotiating element. There is no legal obligation for States to settle their international disputes by judicial settlement, even if rules of jus cogens are at stake. From that point of view the mere fact that States exempt disputes on rules of jus cogens from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court does not make the pertinent reservation invalid. Of course, the Court may understand a multilateral treaty reservation as not exempting from its jurisdiction rules of customary international law in general and rules of jus cogens in particular.

77. The Court noted that the US did not deny the jus cogenscharacter of the prohibition of the use of force (ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 101).

78. ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 153.

79. Ibid., p. 98.

80. Ibid., p. 98.

81. Ibid., pp. 98–99.

82. Wolfrum, R., ‘Gewohnheitsrecht und Stimverhalten’ and ‘IGH: Urteil im Fall Nicaragua-USA’, 34 Vereinte Nationen (1986) pp. 93Google Scholar and 143. For the meaning of soft law cf., among others, Schachter, O., ‘The Nature and Process of Legal Development in International Society’, in Macdonald, R.J. and Johnston, D.M., eds., The Structure and Process of International Law (1983) pp. 745–809Google Scholar and Verdross, A. and Simma, B., Universelles Völkerrecht, 4th edn. (1984) pp. 405–412Google Scholar.

83. ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 100.

84. GA Res. 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, Art. 3(g).

85. ICJ Rep. 1986, pp. 103–104. Akehurst, , op.cit. n. 5, pp. 282–285Google Scholar.

86. ICJ Rep. 1986, pp. 103, 119 and 120.

87. Ibid., p. 347. See also ILC Yearbook 1980 vol. I p. 192Google Scholar.

88. Akehurst, , op.cit. n. 5, pp. 261–265 and 285Google Scholar; A. Cassese, ‘Article 51’, in Cot, J.-P. and Pellet, A., eds., La charte des Nations Unies: commentaire article par article (1985) pp. 769–794Google Scholar.

89. ILC Draft on State Responsibility, Arts. 33 (state of necessity) and 34 (self-defence).

90. Cf., for example, the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, Arts. 5 and 6; Charter of the Organization of American States of 30 April 1948, Art. 27.

91. ICJ Rep. 1986, pp. 104 and 105.

92. Ibid., p. 110.

93. Ibid., p. 151.

94. Malanczuk, P., ‘Countermeasures and Self-Defence as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in the ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility’, 43 ZaöRV (1983) pp. 705–802Google Scholar; Frowein, J.A., ‘Die Verpflichtungen erga omnes im Völkerrecht und ihre Durchsetzung’;, in Bernhardt, R. et al. , eds., Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, Internationale Gerechtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte: Festschrift für Hermann Mosler (1983) pp. 241–263Google Scholar. Frowein asserts the right of third States to resort to reprisals against a State violating erga omnes obligations (ibid., pp. 258–259). It leaves no argument, in our opinion, that arbitrary ‘humanitarian intervention’ is fundamentally wrong. See also Hohmann, H., ‘Südafrikas Menschenrechtsverletzungen, Ursachen und Reaktionen. Menschenrechtpolitik durch Handel oder Sanktionen?’, 23 Internationales Afrikaforum (1987)Google Scholar.

95. ILC Draft on State Responsibility, Art. 19. Cf., Dominicé, Ch., ‘Die internationalen Verbrechen und deren rechtliches Regime’, in Festschrift für S. Verosta (1980) p. 227Google Scholar; Dupuy, P.M., ‘Observations sur le “crime international de l'Etat”’, 84 RGDIP (1980) p. 449Google Scholar.

96. ILC Yearbook 1979 vol. II Part 1, p. 119Google Scholar. Cf., also Malanczuk, loc.cit. n. 94.

97. ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 108.

98. Ibid., p. 133.

99. Ibid., p. 134.

100. Kokkini-Iatridou, D. and de Waart, P.J.I.M., ‘Economic Disputes between States and Private Parties: some Legal Thoughts on the Institutionalization of their Settlement’, 33 NILR (1986) pp. 291CrossRefGoogle Scholar and 295, and Declaration on the Progressive Development of Principles of Public International Law relating to a New International Economic Order, adopted on 30 August 1986 by the 62nd Conference of the International Law Association at Seoul: the principles of equity and solidarity, ibid., pp. 328–329.

101. ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 134.

102. Ibid., p. 156. See also n. 94 supra1.

103. Türk, D. and de Waart, P.J.I.M., ‘The Right to Development’, in Bulajić, M., Pindić, D. and Marinković, M., eds., The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: Ten Years of Implementation (1986) pp. 175–188Google Scholar; Hohmann, H., ‘Justice social et développement par le NOEI?’, Revue de droit international et de science diplomatique etjuridique (1980) pp. 217–231 and (1981) pp. 82–88Google Scholar; Hohmann, H., ‘Recht auf Entwicklung in der internationalen Diskussion’, 30 Vereinte Nationen (1982) pp. 59–64Google Scholar.

104. 33 NILR (1986) pp. 326–333Google Scholar.

105. Ibid., pp. 329–330.

106. GA Res. 41/128 of 4 December 1986, adopted by 146 to 1 (the USA dissenting) with 8 abstentions (Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Sweden and the UK).

107. ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 138.

108. Doc. A/39/504/Add. of 23 October 1984, p. 91. See also Bulajić, M., Principles of International Development Law: Progressive Development of International Law Relating to a New International Economic Order (1986) pp. 240–245Google Scholar.

109. Absolute poverty is defined as a condition of life so characterized by malnutrition, illiteracy and disease as to be beneath any reasonable definition of human decency. See World Development Report 1980, The World Bank (08 1980) p. 32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

110. Fopma, J., ‘Minimum International Labour Standards: The Right to Work and the Prohibition of Forced Labour’, a paper submitted to the seminar ‘International Law and Development’ at the Free University of Amsterdam, 9–1004 1987Google Scholar (to be published in de Waart, P.J.I.M., Peters, P. and Denters, H.M.G., eds., International Law and Development (1988))Google Scholar.

111. P.J.I.M. de Waart, ‘State Rights and Human Rights as Two Sides of One Principle of International Law: The Right to Development’, a paper submitted to the seminar referred to in n. 110 supra.

112. Christenson, G.A., ‘The World Court and Jus Cogens’, 81 AJIL (1987) pp. 93–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The impact of a time of emergency is explicitly recognized in international human rights instruments. Cf., the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 4. This has already urged lawyers to draft minimum standards which authorities should take into account in exercising their powers, i.e., the Minimum standards of human rights in a state of exception, adopted by the 61st Conference of the International Law Association (Report of the sixty-first Conference (1984) pp. 56–95) and the Siracusa Principles on the limitation and derogation provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1984 ( 7 Human Rights Quarterly (1985) pp. 3–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar). See also the Limburg Principles on the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1986, 37 The Review of the International Commission of Jurists (12 1986) pp. 43–53Google Scholar. These principles concern, amongst others, the invoking of national security to justify measures limiting certain rights (ibid., p. 49).

113. Schwarzenberger, , International Judicial Law, op.cit. n. 6, p. 436Google Scholar.

114. See paragraph 3.1 supra.

115. The then President of the Court, Judge Elias, in his Speech of Welcome to the Pope, 13 May 1985, International Court of Justice, Annex 1 to Press Communique No. 98/9. As State practice shows, States abide by the judgment of the Court sooner or later. There is no reason to expect that the US will become an exception to this.

116. ICJ Rep. 1962, p. 163.

117. The American appraisals, referred to in n. 5, of course strike a different note. See Hargrove, J.L., ‘The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defense’, 81 AJIL (1987) pp. 135–143CrossRefGoogle Scholar. According to him, 'it is not the business of courts to send messages or stand up to litigants (and to imply that the Court acted or would be justified in acting with any such intention would impute to it a judicially unworthy act)’.