1. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Thirty-Fifth Session-ECOSOC Official Records. New York: United Nations, 1979, para. 133.Google Scholar (UN Document E/1979/36 – E/CN. 4/1347).

2. Ibid. para. 134.

3. Goodin, p. 31Google Scholar; Ullman, p. 6Google Scholar; Williams, ODI Review, generally.

4. Alston, , Working Paper No. 2 p. 72.Google Scholar

5. Alston, , Working Paper No. 2 p. 9.Google Scholar

6. Adelman, and Morris, (1973) p. 189Google Scholar, quoted in Alston, , Working Paper No. 2 p. 9.Google Scholar

7. Adelman, and Morris, (1973) p. 189.Google Scholar

8. Carter, and Marenin, pp. 44–45.Google Scholar

9. Williams, , ODI Review (unpublished summary) p. 2.Google ScholarInternational Dimensions of the Right to Development… E/CN.4/1334 pp. 9–10.Google Scholar

10. Carter, and Marenin, p. 45.Google Scholar

11. Hannum, p. 71Google Scholar; Kapp, p. 1.Google ScholarSocial Development and a New International Development Strategy: Common Elements of Decisions of World Conferences held in the 1970's E/E/6056/Add.1.

12. Linton, p. 21.Google Scholar

13. Ullman, p. 6.Google Scholar

14. Williams, , ODI Review p. 26.Google Scholar

15. Trubek, p. 203.Google Scholar

16. Rawls asserts that given a free choice unencumbered by political and economic realities, people would choose to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. In general, no increase in efficiency in the form of greater advantages for the many justifies the loss of liberty of a few. So long as the system works out to the relative benefit of the worst off social and economic inequalities are permissible. Rawls softens his resolve, however, (notably at Section 82 pp. 62–63 of A Theory of Justice) and allows that it is possible that at low levels of national economic achievement, significant economic gains might be fairly traded for some loss of fundamental liberties. Robert E. Goodin (see article cited in Sources) says (at p. 31) that this theoretical exception “presupposes that a nation can purchase one at the price of the other” (emphasis added).

A leading critic of Rawls's work, Brian Barry (see work cited in Sources) agrees (at Ch. 7) that if it would be possible to obtain a great increase in production by making a small sacrifice of equal liberty it would not be irrational to accept such a trade. He suggests, however, that the only way for a society to gain more at a given stage of development is to make people work much harder than they want to. One probably cannot get more wealth by giving up liberty, Barry intimates, and to be coerced into working harder than one thinks worthwhile would not be rational.

17. Avineri, particularly Ch. 3.

18. Falk, p. 15.Google Scholar

19. Carter, and Marenin, p. 56.Google Scholar “The premise of Marxist or would-be Marxist societies is that society comes first; it is only through the processes of society that the person acquires individuality; and thus only the welfare of society can ensure the welfare of the individual.”: Rodley, p. 117.Google Scholar It may be more precise to say that for Marx, the individual is inseparable from society, and not defineable outside its context: Avineri pp. 86–95.

20. Carter, and Marenin, p. 56Google Scholar; see also Linton, p. 20Google Scholar and Hannum, p. 69Google Scholar; and Reyntjens, and Gorus, pp. 163–166.Google Scholar

21. Linton, p. 20Google Scholar, who continues at p. 21: “I know of no state which has developed, in the sense of achieving a satisfactory standard of living for the majority of its citizens, without extreme exploitation either at home, abroad or both … without a surplus which has been squeezed out at the expense of some group. The United States developed at the expense of the displaced and annihilated red Indians, the black slaves and the working classes; the European giants at the cost of their miserable colonial peoples and their working classes; the USSR at the cost of the benighted peasants and the lost souls of the labour camps”.

22. McChesney, (1978) p. 40.Google Scholar

23. Carter, and Marenin, p. 59Google Scholar referring to the Butare colloquium (analyzed in the same part volume of Universal Human Rights at p. 63Google Scholar et seq. by Hannum). See also West Africa magazine of 14 08 1978 (pp. 1588–89)Google Scholar and 21 August 1978 (pp. 1628, 1668) in which an August 1978 meeting of the African Bar Association is reported. Delegates from 11 “anglophone” countries of Africa affirmed belief in the rights to: freedoms of speech, association, assembly and movement; freedom from arbitrary arrest, inhuman treatment and discrimination on grounds of religion, sex or ethnic origin, and freedom of the individual to hold property (emphasis added).

24. Hannum, p. 63.Google Scholar

25. Hannum, p. 65.Google Scholar

26. Cranston, pp. 65 and 66–68.Google Scholar An indication that this view is not unique to Cranston is given by the way in which the Council of Europe treats publications pertaining to the European Convention on Human Rights as opposed to the European Social Charter. The former is characterized as “human rights” whereas the latter are considered as pertinent to economic and social affairs: Harris, p. 274.Google Scholar This apparent attitude contrasts with the norm for average Europeans, who although supporting both clusters of human rights, seem to place more emphasis on economic and social claims as perceived rights: See the analysis of surveys in the UK, FRG, Italy and France, at p. 61 of Szabo.

27. Plenary Session, Seminar on Human Rights and their promotion in the Caribbean, reported in Human Rights and Development p. 61Google Scholar; Carter, and Marenin, p. 46.Google Scholar

28. Carter, and Marenin, p. 59Google Scholar: Williams, , “Human Rights and Economic Development” p. 28.Google Scholar

29. Williams, , “Human Rights and Economic Development” p. 28.Google Scholar Among examples he gives of economic damage done by governments which committed serious breaches of civil and political rights is that of Equitorial Guinea: “Thus the drop in Equitorial Guinea's cocoa exports from 40,000 tons in 1968 to 2340 tons in 1975 was not due to economic factors but to the producers' suffering the loss of most of … civil and political rights…”.

30. Linton, , 21.Google Scholar

31. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A.Res. 3291 (S.VI); The Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A.Res. 3292 (S.VI); the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A.Res. 3281 (XXIX); and the resolution on Development and International Economic Co-operation, G.A.Res. 3362 (S.VII). Among the tenets of the NIEO are respect for principles of self-determination of peoples, permanent sovereignty over natural resources, freedom from domination and occupation by colonial powers, and full compensation for damage to the natural resources of the state by exploitation; improving competitiveness of raw material over synthetic substitutes, favourable conditions for transfer of resources to less developed countries and access to modern technology: Bruce, Cathy, “The New International Economic Order: Myth or Reality?” (unpublished) 1978.Google Scholar

32. “The concept of a human right to development is that each individual, community and nation is entitled within the limits of what is possible to the resources and conditions necessary for the realization of their basic economic, social and cultural rights. The concept implies an obligation on the developed nations to transfer a share of their resources and technology to the nations of the Third World for their development; but it in no way alters the existing obligation of the Third World nation to employ the resources available to them to the greatest extent possible to foster the development of their own people.” See Kapp, pp. 12–13Google Scholar, and E/CN.4/1334 pp. 20–62. There is some documentary basis for positing a right to development: (a) The Proclamation of Teheran states that “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights … constitutes an obligation for the members of the international community” and that “the International Covenant on Economic, Special and Cultural Rights [has] created new standards and obligations to which States should conform”; (b) The ICESCR binds States Parties “to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, … to achieving the full realization of the rights recognized …” (Art. 2(1)) and in Art. 11 recognizes “the essential importance of International co-operation” in the struggle for the “continuous improvement of living conditions”; (c) Through Arts. 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations member states pledge action to promote “conditions of economic and social progress and development”.

33. Para. 125, Commission on Human Rights, cited at n. 1 supra.

34. Rodley, p. 117.Google Scholar This may be an appropriate juncture at which to thank Nigel Rodley of Amnesty International for providing source materials and counsel in the initial stages of writing this paper. Gratitude is expressed also to Peter Duffy, Lecturer in Law at Queen Mary College, and Reg. Austin, Senior Lecturer in Law at University College London for their encouragement and assistance.

35. Hannum, p. 75.Google Scholar

36. Williams, , “Human Rights and Economic Development” pp. 37–38.Google Scholar

37. Plenary Session, Seminar on Human Rights and their Promotion in the Caribbean, reported in Human Rights and Development p. 61.Google Scholar

38. See especially Section 4.2.

39. Alston, , Working Paper No. 2 p. 70.Google Scholar

40. Hannum, p. 70Google Scholar; Carter, and Marenin, p. 43Google Scholar; Linton, p. 20.Google Scholar See also Trubek, p. 203Google Scholar: “Thus, the argument runs, it was always clear that the liberal and welfare states, and the full protection of human rights, were impossible in Latin America without rapid economic growth. Further … we … believe that rapid growth cannot occur unless political activity is suppressed and pressures for rapid redistribution of income are resisted. If ultimately we want to see human rights fully protected in the long run, we must tolerate shortrun sacrifice of political liberty and tolerate regressive income policies.” See also Reyntjens, and Gorus, p. 77.Google Scholar

41. Linton, p. 21.Google Scholar The new government of Nicaragua is “trying to implement what they call ‘the Emergency Plan for Economic Reactivation for the Benefit of the People’…”. This plan, which is seen as the first stage of a planned economy, starts from the assumption that Nicaragua is in a period of national emergency.”: See Silva, Luis, “The second battle of Nicaragua”, War on Want's Outlook, No. 6, 03–04 1980 p. 13.Google Scholar The author states that in Nicaragua the concept is “quite different from that used by many Latin American dictatorships to repress their own people, and that the full support and participation of all Nicaraguans is needed …”.

42. “Regimes which use terror to depress working-class income violate both human rights and the rules of the liberal economic game which require that the market determine the price of labour as well as other factors of production”: Farer, p. 37.Google Scholar “When the rights to life or freedom from torture are subordinated to governmentally defined “higher” human rights, and murder and torture become regarded as routine techniques for keeping the populace obedient and deferential, then a realm of ethnic and political conceptions is delineated where there is no place for the rights of man in the classical liberal tradition …”: Wood, p. 167.Google Scholar

43. Seen. 32, 31 supra.

44. United Nations, Human Rights International Instruments – Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions, etc. 1 January 1980.Google Scholar Though in force since 1976, the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR respecting procedures for complaints by individuals had received only 8 ratifications and a further 22 signatures. As of 23 December 1980, however, the ICESCR had received 66 “ratifications” and 12 signatures; the ICCPR 65 “ratifications” and 12 signatures; and the Optional Protocol had been ratified (or acceded to) by 25 states, with a further 8 signatures. (Sources: Secretary-General's Status Report (see n. 183 infra); and letter, dated 23 December 1980 from the Secretary, Human Rights Committee, Geneva).

45. See n. 32 and Kapp, p. 3.Google Scholar Some experts at a recent seminar on “Development and Human Rights” were of the view that although the Covenants legally bind States Parties, these instruments merely represent persuasive international standards for other states. The seminar was organized by the British Institute of Human Rights and Queen Mary College, University of London on 7 July 1980. A conference report is being prepared by A. McChesney and P.J. Duffy (of QMC).

46. One subject often debated in meetings concerned with international human rights is the purported dichotomy between political rights which require only proclamation and governmental self-control, and social rights which necessitate affirmative state action. See, e.g.: Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Thirty-Fourth Session – ECOSOC Official Records 1978. (ECOSOC – E/1978/34 – E/CN.4/1292) (New York: United Nations, 1978) para. 96. See also Williams, , “Human Rights and Economic Development” p. 28Google Scholar and Kapp, p. 3.Google Scholar As Kapp points out, however, civil and political rights may require positive government action, (and expenditure) for example in ensuring the right to a fair trial.

47. See especially Higgins, Rosalyn, “Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties” (1976–1977) 48Google ScholarBritish Year Book of International Law p. 280 et seq.Google Scholar

47a. At the seminar noted at n. 45 useful examples were raised for discussion purposes: (1) A university teacher in a less developed country who wishes to emigrate may deprive a student of the right to be taught (by that individual). (2) The intention of a poor country's only professional in a particular field (an economist, for instance) to leave his or her homeland will have ramifications for the rights of others (rights associated with development). (These illustrations came, respectively, from Dr. Antonio Cassese and Filip Reyntjens)

48. Obvious candidates for inclusion are rights related to food and health under ICESCR Arts. 11 and 12. Art. 55 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 provides: “To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the occupying power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.” For an example of traditional humanitarian practice see, Bello, Emmanuel, “Shared Legal Concepts Between African Customary Norms and International Conventions on Humanitarian Law” Salzburg, Institut für Völkerrecht (unpublished) p. 11.Google Scholar Humanity compels agreement with the assertion by Kapp, (p. 6)Google Scholar that no interest is so great as to justify the failure of a nation to provide food and medical supplies to its own people, to the fullest extent of its resources. This principle must apply for all of its people.

49. Harris, p. 259.Google Scholar Re retroactive Constitutional “Legitimation” see Wolf-Phillips.

50. The analysis by Kapp, (p. 5)Google Scholar of the question of priorities parallels much of this dicussion.

51. See n. 31.

52. At the 1978 session of the Commission on Human Rights, “many speakers expressed the view that the realization of economic, social and cultural rights constituted a prerequisite for the enjoyment of civil and political rights.” References were made, inter alia, to the preamble of the ICESCR and the Proclamation of Teheran: Report of the Thirty-Fourth Session (see n. 46), para. 94.

53. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Thirty-Fourth Session (see n. 46), para. 95; cf., E/CN.4/1334 p. 63 et seq.

54. See n. 44.

55. Farer, p. 8.Google Scholar

56. Williams, , ODI Review p. 16.Google Scholar

57. Williams, , ODI Review (unpublished summary) p. 2.Google Scholar The assistance of Douglas Williams in the preparation of this article is gratefully acknowledged. Mr. Williams provided helpful advice and valuable source material in the latter stages of the endeavour.

58. Williams, , ODI Review p. 2.Google Scholar

59. See Goodin, p. 35Google Scholar the “Political Business Cycle”.

60. Farer, p. 13.Google Scholar

61. Goodin, p. 36 et seq.Google Scholar

62. Hannum, p. 74Google Scholar; See, generally, ICJ, Human Rights in a One-Party State. See also Reyntjens, and Gorus, p. 125.Google Scholar

63. Hannum, p. 65.Google Scholar

64. Hannum, p. 65.Google Scholar

65. The prohibition on political association and the permeation of the sole Party could react adversely on the formation and activities of groups seen as competitive, creating pressures to conform: McChesney, (1978) p. 41Google Scholar; Carter, Marshall, “Human Rights in a One-Party State” (Book Review) 1Google ScholarUniversal Human Rights, part 3 p. 99 at p. 100.Google Scholar

66. Hannum, p. 75.Google Scholar

67. McChesney, (World Minorities) p. 135.Google Scholar

68. The idea of “participation” in development may include “decentralization of governmental authority, the recognition of trade union rights, promotion of agricultural co-operatives …”: Kapp, p. 4Google Scholar, who refers to Schumacher, E.F., Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered (Perennial Library, 1973).Google Scholar

69. Goodin, p. 36.Google Scholar

70. Nyerere, (1977) p. 10.Google Scholar

71. For a list of references, see Hannum, p. 73Google Scholar, n. 37. See also “Report on Bogota Seminar on Human Rights in the Rural Areas of the Andes Region”, ICJ Review No. 23, 12 1979 p. 64Google Scholar: The seminar concluded that failure by Andean governments to promote economic and social rights more successfully in rural areas was largely due to repression of civil and political rights and the denial to the rural population of the right to participate in the formulation and application of agricultural and development policies which concern them. See also E/CN.4/1334 pp. 118–121, Reyntjens, and Gorusp, . 159.Google Scholar

72. Williams, , ODI Review p. 33Google Scholar: Lucien Pye has shown how the ordinary people of Pakistan wanted money spent on roads and bridges when their Government was bent on showpiece prestige projects. In agriculture, the attempt to force peasants by authoritarian decrees to abandon traditional methods based on “age-old techniques refined and sharpened by countless years of experience” has repeatedly failed.

73. Kapp, p. 2Google Scholar; Williams, , ODI Review p. 33Google Scholar: “To command farmers to increase production is doomed to failure even though they have access to knowledge. Instead an approach that provides incentives and rewards is required”; McChesney, (1978) p. 21.Google Scholar

74. It is fair to say that the official rhetoric has not been consistent. In 1968, President Nyerere stated that authoritarian methods would inhibit development; “without freedom you get no development, and without development you soon lose your freedom”. He did, however, warn against taking freedom too far: “If for example, one person uses his freedom of speech and organization in a manner which will greatly reduce our prospect of economic development, or endanger our national security, what is the Government to do? Freedom of speech, freedom of movement and association, are valuable … But at the same time, we must secure urgently, freedom from hunger, and from ignorance and disease, for everyone. Can we allow the abuse of one freedom to sabotage our national search for another freedom? Freedom and Unity (1965 p. 311 et seq.).Google Scholar

75. There is much evidence that some people did not move voluntarily to village sites, but were rounded up against their will. The migration reportedly grew after Nyerere said in December 1973 that “to live in a village is an order”: McChesney, (1978) pp. 67–69.Google Scholar

76. Nyerere, (1977) p. 45.Google Scholar

77. Nyerere, (1977) p. 46.Google Scholar

78. Nyerere, (1977) p. 46.Google Scholar The ujamaa village scheme produced further examples of counterproductive policy implementation – some of those forced into villages were reputedly pushed to arid regions from areas of permanent water: McChesney, (1978) p. 68.Google Scholar

79. Linton, p. 20Google Scholar; Kapp, p. 1Google Scholar; Williams, , ODI Review p. 25.Google Scholar

80. Williams, , ODI Review p. 33.Google Scholar

81. Kapp, p. 10.Google Scholar

82. Kapp, p. 10.Google Scholar

83. Kapp, p. 10.Google Scholar

84. Kapp, p. 10.Google Scholar

85. Goodin, p. 33 et seq.Google Scholar

86. Tanzania and Kenya provide respective examples of direct and more indirect controls of workers' associations: McChesney, pp. 62–66 (1978).Google Scholar

87. Harris, p. 64.Google Scholar

88. See Sources.

89. Kapp, p. 10.Google Scholar

90. Hibbs, pp. 153–175Google Scholar, cited by Goodin, p. 38.Google Scholar In the short run, however, it may be instructive to see whether the prosperity of export-oriented states such as Taiwan and South Korea (and Japan) leads to wage rises which reduce competitive advantage, and the ramifications that may follow. During the 1980's riots by the urban unemployed are predicted to shake many Third World cities: New Internationalist, 01 1980 p. 25.Google Scholar

91. See “Book III”, Keynes, J.M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (first published London 1936)Google Scholar (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Harbinger Edition) pp. 89–131. In this and other more complex matters pertaining to political economy, the reference works have been more than supplemented by the counsel of Dr. Paul Auerbach, Senior Lecturer in Economics at Kingston Polytechnic, whose aid is gratefully acknowledged.

92. Goodin, p. 33.Google Scholar

93. Goodin, p. 34.Google Scholar

94. Much of this discussion follows from Goodin, pp. 40–41.Google Scholar

95. Kapp, p. 10.Google Scholar

96. Tanzania has been known to use this method, however, to discourage those whose unswerving support of the regime has wavered. Tanzania has had as recently as 1977 over 1,000 uncharged detainees: McChesney, , (1978) pp. 85–88.Google Scholar About 50 remained in custody on the mainland as of spring, 1980: Amnesty International Report 1980 (London, 10 1980) pp. 82–83.Google Scholar

97. Alfonso, p. 97Google Scholar (Dr. Miguel Alfonso of the National Association of Cuban Jurists).

98. Farer, p. 12Google Scholar; Hannum, p. 79.Google Scholar

99. Farer, p. 12.Google Scholar

100. Hannum, p. 79.Google Scholar

101. Farer, p. 12.Google Scholar

102. Adotevi, J.B., The Press in the Development of Human Rights (Butare Colloquium document) p. 5Google Scholar, cited at Hannum, p. 78Google Scholar and set out at p. 129 et seq. of Reyntjens and Gorus.

103. Hannum, p. 78.Google Scholar

104. Goodin, p. 39.Google Scholar

105. See generally, “What law and whose order? A special issue on crime and the state”. New Internationalist, 03 1979.Google Scholar

106. Goodin, p. 39.Google Scholar

107. “Even where the rise in criminal activity is real, it is unclear how much it will help for government simply to lock a large number of people up in jails. Most of the studies of deterrence show that it is more important that the threatened sanction be swift and certain than that it be an awesome penalty; and one of the most immediate results of a “crackdown on crime” is crowded court calendars and hence delay between crime and punishment that tends to reduce the deterrent effect of the criminal sanction.”: Goodin p. 39, citing authority, including Zimring, F.E. and Hawkins, G.J.. Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control (Chicago, University of Chicago Press) 1973.Google Scholar

108. Goodin, p. 39.Google Scholar

109. Goodin, p. 11.Google Scholar

110. India's steps in this direction in 1976 were abandoned in the face of protest. Legislation has been enacted in Singapore under which foreigners wishing to marry Singapore citizens will be granted a licence only on condition that they consent to be sterilized after the birth of a second child: Kapp, p. 11.Google Scholar

111. Meanwhile, suggests Goodin, (p. 39)Google Scholar, better-off people will be able to afford still more children. Farer refers to Sri Lanka as an example of a nation whose thus far successful development “may not prevent it from sinking back into extreme poverty”, because its population is growing faster than the economy (p. 9).

112. Rising age at marriage has been put forth as “a significant factor in explaining decreases in crude birth rates in nations as diverse as the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and the Phillipines” and as “the dominant factor” in the latter three countries: Mauldin, W.P., Patterns of Fertility Decline in Development Countries, 1950–1975, cited at p. 35 of Goodin.Google Scholar

113. “India, Korea and Tunisia have experimented with the payment of incentive bonuses to those who agree to sterilization; Indonesia has terminated or reduced family allowances where the number of children exceed prescribed limits; the Phillipines have placed limits on the number of children in respect of which income tax deductions may be claimed; and the city government of Seoul, Korea, has announced that married men undergoing vasectomies will receive priority in buying or renting new municipally built apartments”: Kapp, p. 12.Google Scholar China has also recently announced measures more stringent than previously employed to curtail population growth, including financial and educational incentives for ‘one child’ families: New Internationalist, 10 1980 p. 3.Google Scholar

114. Kapp, p. 12Google Scholar, referring to the UN Declaration on Social Progress and Development, G.A. Res. 2542 (XXIV), Art. 22(b).

115. Kapp, p. 10.Google Scholar

116. As in Tanzania: McChesney, (1978) no. 244.Google Scholar

117. Kapp, p. 8.Google Scholar

118. In the developed world, legislation of similar spirit has been challenged. Instances of this in Europe are noted in Harris, p. 33.Google Scholar Cases include a Swedish law authorizing the government to call upon citizens to help fight fires; an Austrian law stipulating that lawyers must perform certain legal aid work; and the Norwegian law concerning compulsory service in disadvantaged regions of the country. A dentist concerned with the latter instance (Provisional Act 21, June 1956 No. 11) challenged his duty as a dentist to work (while fully paid) in a remote area; the Iversen Case was found by the European Commission of Human Rights to be manifestly ill-founded and inadmissible: (1963) 6 Yearbook of the European Commission of Human Rights 278.Google Scholar The Act in question was prolonged, but terminated in 1973: Helgesen, J.H., “The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Norway” (1975) 8 Revue des droits de l'homme p. 251.Google Scholar

119. See “Streets paved with gold: the lure of the city”, New Internationalist, 06 1978 pp. 4–26.Google Scholar

120. Kapp, p. 9.Google Scholar

121. Kapp, p. 10.Google Scholar

122. Other examples of involuntary movement of peoples were found in Tanzania's villagization programme (see McChesney, (1978) p. 67Google Scholar et seq.) and in the unsuccessful schemes adopted by both Kenya and Tanzania to combat urban unemployment, which included deportation back to tribal areas.

123. Kapp, p. 10.Google Scholar Among more positive incentives to foster villages, Tanzania endeavoured to provide improvements in the local availability of farm equipment, schools, water and health facilities: McChesney, (1978) pp. 70–72Google Scholar; McChesney, (World Minorities) p. 137.Google Scholar

124. Kapp, p. 7.Google Scholar

125. Such practices have been experimented with from time to time by the USSR and Sri Lanka: Kapp, p. 8.Google Scholar

126. (USSR): Kapp, p. 8.Google Scholar

127. (Sri Lanka): Kapp, p. 8.Google Scholar

128. Proposed by Bhagwati, Joseph in “The Brain Drain”, in ILO Background Papers for the Tripartite World Conference on Employment, Income Distribution and Social Progress and the International Division of Labour. ILO, 1976 pp. 139, 155Google Scholar (Cited in Kapp, p. 8).Google Scholar

129. Senegal requires a 10 year commitment in certain fields of higher education but will waive it upon being reimbursed for educational costs. Sri Lanka has experimented with a commitment of 15 years, which can be waived for reimbursement of educational costs plus payment of a penalty: Kapp, p. 8.Google Scholar

130. See “Ready, able … and out of work – The employment crisis in the Third World”, New Internationalist, 04 1980 pp. 7–28.Google Scholar

131. See “Summary of Discussion Committee I – Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, in ICJ Human Rights and Development p. 82.Google Scholar The obligation to work features in official government philosophy in both Kenya and Tanzania, and played a part in laws concerning the detention or harassment of urban unemployed: McChesney, (1978) pp. 8, 370–372.Google Scholar

132. Human Rights and Development (see n. 131 supra) p. 82.Google Scholar

133. Ibid. p. 82.

134. Williams, , ODI Review p. 24.Google Scholar

135. The Tanzanians have been praised for school curricula which equip children for the realities of rural existence, emphasising fanning and technical skills (including practical agricultural work) and ujamaa socialist principles: McChesney, (1978) p. 34 et seq.Google Scholar

136. Williams, , ODI Review p. 24.Google Scholar

137. See n. 135 and McChesney, (1978) p. 34 et seq.Google Scholar

138. The Commission on Human Rights states that the unjust international economic system inhibits the provision of an adequate standard of living: See at n. 1 supra p. 6.

139. See, generally, “Growing inequality – Peasants, Landlords and Businessmen. The Struggle for Control of Third World Farming”, New Internationalist, 11 1979.Google Scholar

140. Williams, at ODI Review p. 33Google Scholar, cites Farmer, B.H. (editor) Green Revolution? Technology and Change in Rice Growing Areas of Tamil Nad and Sri Lanka (MacMillan, 1977).Google Scholar

141. Kapp, p. 7.Google Scholar See, e.g., Ganji (in Sources) and Myrdal, Gunnar, The Challenge of World Poverty, A World Anti-Poverty Programme in Outline (Panthean, 1970).Google Scholar

142. The question of the justness or reasonableness of compensation for expropriation or nationalization has caused heated debate: See, generally, Lillich, Robert (ed.) Economic Coercion and the New International Economic Order (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 1976).Google Scholar The 1962 UN Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources stipulates that owners of expropriated property “shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law”: G.A.Res. 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962. The 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States provides that in the case of expropriation of foreign property, “appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account the relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent” (emphasis added): G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Ch. II, Art. 2(c), adopted 12 December 1974.

143. The right to own property is not protected by the European Social Charter (1961) or the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), but is found in the first Optional Protocol (in force 1954) to the latter, at Art. 1.

144. Kapp, p. 7.Google Scholar

145. The central government has in several interethnic conflicts in Africa been accused of depriving an antagonistic element of food in attempts to acquire submission through starvation – Nigeria (Ibos); Ethiopia (Somalis and Eritreans). Aboriginal people have suffered similar odious practices in the Americas and elsewhere.

146. Other United Nations conventions include the 1953 Convention on the Political Rights of Women and the 1967 Declaration on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. Among ILO agreements are the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 and the Equal Renumeration Convention, 1951 (Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work and Equal Value). See also E/CN.4/1334 p. 125 re International Women's Year. The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 1979.

147. Source material may be found in: Women and World Development: An Annotated Bibliography (Praeger, 1976)Google Scholar and Rihani, May, Development as if Women Mattered: An Annotated Bibliography with a Third World Focus (Overseas Development Council, 1978).Google Scholar

148. See “The Hundred Hour Week”, New Internationalist, 01 1980 p. 26.Google Scholar

149. Ibid. p. 26.

150. Ibid p. 26. It is not impossible, of course, that the mechanical weeder was generally untried in the country in question and being imported merely as an experiment. If so, prudence may have demanded setting aside some of the funds expended on tractors. No enlightenment can be offered here as to the true factual circumstances.

151. Réunion, Jamaica, Martinique and the USA. In the latter 2, the rate was almost equal for men and women: Grant, p. 48, Table A-1.Google Scholar

152. Kapp, p. 12.Google Scholar

153. Kapp, p. 12.Google Scholar

154. Kapp, p. 12.Google Scholar

155. See “Revolution! Equality?” Links No. 11, 1980 p. 12Google Scholar concerning present Nicaragua.

156. Many existing or proposed schemes for non-governmental monitoring of compliance with human rights standards concentrate on a specific area of human rights, such as aspects of civil and political rights: Amnesty International and International Commission of Jurists: see Rodley. Freedom House's Comparative Survey of Freedom: see Dominguez, p. 31.Google Scholar Others focus on a concept of basic human needs such as food, health care, housing and education (Argentina's Bartiloche Institute) or an expanded list of “basic needs” (The “basic needs strategy” inspired by the ILO; see Alston, , Working Paper p. 2Google Scholar). Proposals have been made for new international monitoring organizations: Rodley, p. 147Google Scholar et seq. Attempts have been made to design a comprehensive matrix involving a broad range of needs and rights variables. Dominguez; Friedman, Julian R., “Human Rights Teaching and Research Instruments”, (1979) Universal Human Rights, No. 3 p. 77.Google Scholar The difficulty of reliance on indicia referable to only a limited category of rights is demonstrated by 2 anomalies. On the Freedom House scale related only to civil liberties, South Africa (which has electoral competition) ranks higher than Cuba (See Falk, pp. 10–11Google Scholar). On the PQLI of social indicators, Thailand appears almost 3 times as meritorious as Tanzania, which is not governed by a military dictatorship.

157. The total of the annual flow of goods and services in an economy evaluated at market prices. To arrive at real GNP the former is adjusted to discount the effects of inflation.

158. Hannum, p. 71Google Scholar cites on this point – Meier, G.M., Leading Issues in Economic Development (1970) p. 7Google Scholar; and Myrdal, G., Asian Drama (Pantheon, 1968) p. 1868.Google Scholar

159. Hannum, p. 71.Google Scholar

160. Three of their works are listed in Sources.

161. Adelman, and Morris, (1973) p. 181.Google Scholar

162. See generally, Grant. The PQLI has been criticized for policy and statistical reasons. Hannum, p. 72.Google Scholar The Overseas Development Council which utilizes the PQLI, also measures the rate of annual progress in reducing absolute poverty through Disparity Reduction Rates. The DRR is the percentage of annual reduction of the disparity existing between (a) current national performance in categories of PQLI and (b) previous levels attained, or those likely to be attained before the end of this century, by the most advanced countries: Farer, p. 26.Google Scholar

163. Grant, p. 7Google Scholar, quoted by Farer, p. 25.Google Scholar Support is provided by Ganji, cited at McChesney, (1978) nn. 129, 131 and 132Google Scholar: “The literacy rate … may be viewed as a factor … of access to social services and participation in national political life. The rate of illiteracy is correspondingly indicative of the degree of (a) social backwardness, (b) underdevelopment of human resources, (c) maldistribution of opportunities for participation in social and political development, and (d) social mobility. “The life expectancy data indicates (a) the country's overall economic and social progress, (b) the distribution of mental and health care, (c) the general standard of living, and (d) the importance a country has already given to social welfare”. “The rate of infant mortality can be interpreted to show (a) the situation with respect to income distribution, (b) the availability of prenatal medical care, midwives and mother and child centres, and (c) the food and nutrition of the low income groups”.

164. Farer, p. 26.Google Scholar

165. Sewell, J.W., The United States and World Development – Agenda 1977 (Praeger, New York, 1977) p. 50.Google Scholar

166. Grant, p. 34Google Scholar, cited by Farer, p. 28.Google Scholar

167. Farer, p. 28.Google Scholar

167a. Even a cursory cross-reference of the Amnesty International Report 1980 (London, 10 1980)Google Scholar and of “Table I – Basic Indicators”, World Development Report, 1980 reveals the proposition's weakness.

168. Farer, pp. 30, 86.Google Scholar

169. Farer, p. 30.Google Scholar

170. Neither country had signed either the ICCPR or the ICESCR as of January 1980: Human Rights International Instruments – Signatures, Ratification, Accessions, etc. 1 January 1980. United Nations (ST/HR/4/Rev.2).

171. Farer, p. 9.Google Scholar

172. Farer, p. 9.Google Scholar

173. Farer, p. 9.Google Scholar

174. Iran had actually signed the ICCPR and ICESCR under the Shah's regime: United Nation Multilateral Treaties in respect of which the Secretary-General performs depositary functions – List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions, etc. as at 3 December 1978.

175. Grant, p. 8Google Scholar; Farer, p. 26.Google Scholar

176. Mexico has not signed the Covenants. Neither Taiwan (as the Republic of China) nor China has signed either Covenant: See citations at nn. 170, 174.

177. Grant, pp. 8, 58.Google Scholar

178. Cuba has signed neither Covenant as at 1 January 1980. (See citations at nn. 170, 174). An extensive methodical comparison of Mexico and Cuba has been prepared by Jorge Dominguez (“Assessing Human Rights Conditions” – See Sources). Other material in this section comes from Grant, pp. 8, 48 and 58Google Scholar et seq. and Farer, p. 27.Google Scholar

179. Dominguez, p. 84.Google Scholar

180. Dominguez, p. 85.Google Scholar

181. Deaths per 1000 births in the 1920's were 207 in Mexico. This figure was halved by the late 1940's and by 1973 reduced to 51.4.

182. Dominguez, p. 51Google Scholar; World Development Report – 1980 (Washington DC, The World Bank, 08 1980).Google Scholar

183. Both Kenya and Tanzania are signatories to the ICCPR and ICESCR. See nn. 150, 154 for references. In June 1979, the UN representative of each country was contacted by the Chairman of the Human Rights Committee for failure to submit their initial state reports (due in 1977) under Art. 40 of the ICCPR: UN Human Rights Committee Report of the 7th Session, 20 August 1979. (CCPR/C/SR. 174/Add.l) para. 14. These were both submitted later in August 1979, but have not yet been dealt with: See Addenda, 47Google Scholar (CCPR/C/1/Add. 47) and 48 (CCPR/C/1/Add. 48) to Report of the Secretary-General to the 35th session of the General Assembly, Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights New York: UN Document A/35/195 80-20518 (29 August 1980).

184. Guardian, 1 05 1979.Google ScholarMcChesney, (1978)Google Scholar; The Moi regime has been attempting to redress these imbalances somewhat: McChesney (Journal of African Law) passim.

185. 1967 was the year in which, pursuant to the Arusha Declaration, banks, insurance companies, rental properties, and many large industries, including export firms were nationalized: McChesney, (1978) p. 7.Google Scholar Gross Domestic Product (GDP) differs from GNP in that it does not include receipts of interest, profits and dividends by national residents from productive activity carried out overseas; nor does it exclude profits of foreign-owned enterprises operating within the country. The balance of these two accounts is known as net property income from abroad and must be added to GDP to obtain GNP: Prest, A.P. and Coppock, D. J., editors, The UK Economy – A Manual of Applied Economics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1972).Google Scholar

186. McChesney, (1978) pp. 18–25.Google Scholar

187. Grant, pp. 8, 58Google Scholar; McChesney, (1978).Google ScholarWorld Development Reports, 1980.Google Scholar

188. Grant, p. 58 et seq.Google Scholar

189. Kenya has not, of course, ignored the problem of rural health services: See “Success Story”, New Internationalist, 01 1979 p. 14.Google Scholar

190. McChesney, (1978) pp. 37–40Google Scholar and generally, McChesney (World Minorities). Unless there ensues a large outflow of medical personnel, Tanzania has taken steps nearer this goal, by the cessation of private medical practice as of 30 June 1980: Guardian, 22 03 1980.Google Scholar

191. See article by Falk listed in Sources.

192. Capitalism has lead to such improvement, but generally over a large time frame: Adelman, (1975).Google Scholar

193. Falk, p. 5.Google Scholar

194. Falk, p. 12.Google Scholar

195. Falk, p. 5.Google Scholar

196. Neither Brazil nor South Korea had signed the Covenants as of 1 January 1980. See reference at nn. 170, 174.

197. Grant, p. 58 et seq.Google Scholar

198. Adelman, (1975) p. 307.Google Scholar

199. Adelman, (1975) p. 308Google Scholar; Farer, p. 36.Google Scholar

200. Along with Israel and Japan, who Adelman says have similarly joined growth with augmented incomes for the poor: Adelman, (1975) p. 307.Google Scholar

201. Adelman, (1975) pp. 307–308Google Scholar; Faier, p. 30.Google Scholar

202. Lijphart, pp. 226–228Google Scholar, quoted in Carter and Marenin, p. 45.Google Scholar Some observers have presented military regimes, which control a high proportion of Third World states, as being efficient guarantors of economic growth. Other analysts have suggested that the evidence shows that military governments have little or no effect different from that of civilian regimes (either positive or negative effect) on social change or economic performance: Hannum, p. 48Google Scholar; Jackman; McKinlay and Cohen.

203. Carter, and Marenin, p. 45.Google Scholar

204. Farer, p. 34.Google Scholar

205. Grant, p. 58 et seq.Google Scholar

206. Farer, p. 33Google Scholar; Kapp, p. 18, n. 10.Google Scholar

207. Farer, p. 33.Google Scholar

208. Falk, p. 12.Google Scholar

209. Falk, p. 33.Google Scholar

210. “One observer … reports thirty thousand deaths in connection with the initiation costs of the Ethiopian socialist regime as of mid-1977, whereas maintenance costs for its predecessor included two hundred thousand victims of the 1972 famine, many of whom might have survived if the ruling elite at the time had acknowledged and competently responded to the problem”. “Revolution in Ethiopia”, Monthly Review 29, No. 3, (07/08 1977) pp. 46–60Google Scholar cited by Falk, p. 26.Google Scholar

211. Is the average Third World woman, for example, better off in a country ruled by a secular capitalist system, a radical nationalist Islamic regime, or an authoritarian socialist government which gives priority to rapid increase in agricultural output at all costs?

212. Falk, p. 13.Google Scholar

213. Falk, p. 5.Google Scholar

214. Trubek, p. 198.Google Scholar

215. Success does require political commitment, precise targetting sufficient managerial skills and bureaucratic efficiency: Farer, p. 31Google Scholar; Williams, ODI Review, generally.

216. Farer, p. 32.Google Scholar Along with other traits cited which it does not significantly share, Tanzania is also less authoritarian than say Cuba or China.

217. Farer, p. 32Google Scholar; Adelman, (1975) p. 308.Google Scholar

218. Farer, p. 32.Google Scholar

219. Williams, , ODI Review (unpublished summary) p. 3.Google Scholar

220. Several studies reveal some correspondence at lower levels of development between political repression and rapid economic growth: Adelman, and Morris, (1967)Google Scholar examine (for 1957–1962) 74 less developed countries with respect to annual GNP, strength of democratic institutions, and political competitiveness. Strouse, J.C. and Claude, P.R. in “Empirical Comparative Rights Research: Some Preliminary Tests of Development Hypotheses”Google Scholar in Claude, , Comparative Human Rights (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976)Google Scholar compare (for 1960–1970) 105 less developed countries with respect to economic growth and indicators of political and civil rights compiled in the Freedom House Survey of Human Rights. Kapp, , at p. 4Google Scholar, in commenting on these, states that “the correlation disclosed by these studies is relatively mild (The Adelman-Morris study, (1967) found that political factors (competitiveness of the political system, strength of democratic institutions, etc.) accounted for only 5–7 per cent of the differences in the rate of economic growth at the lowest levels of development), and other factors, in particular the absence of national integration and the domination of economic activity in rural areas by traditional social and religious attitudes and customs are revealed to have a far greater impact on the rate of growth. More importantly, these studies focus almost entirely on … [GNP].”

221. Farer, p. 32Google Scholar; Grant, pp. 8, 58Google Scholar et seq. The PQLI figures for these countries for the early 1970's were as follows: Taiwan (87); Cuba (84); Sri Lanka (82); Costa Rica (85); Trinidad and Tobago (85).

222. Williams, , ODI Review (unpublished summary) pp. 2 and 3.Google Scholar

223. Ibid.

224. Ibid.

225. Ibid.

226. See, e.g., Williams, (ICJ 1978) p. 26Google Scholar and Faier, p. 36 et seq.Google Scholar

227. Farer, p. 40.Google Scholar

228. The Brandt Commission proposes that the IMF adopt a more flexible attitude to the balance of payments adjustment problems of the less developed countries, and “should not be so ready to insist on severe deflationary measures as standard policy but should pay due regard to the short and long term economic and social objectives of the ldc's”. ODI Briefing Paper No. 2 1980 (March) (concerning North-South – A Programme for Survival (Pan Books, 1980) p. 3).Google Scholar

229. For a list of somewhat comparable proposals see Kapp, p. 6.Google Scholar

230. One problem presented by the current list of non-derogable rights is that it does not accord with the actual value ranking found in all parts of the world. There is a political disadvantage in stressing a narrow set of rights instead of a broader one that would facilitate international coalition: “Why should not freedom from induced malnutrition or from induced epidemics – caused by the state's failure to act or its delayed response in a critical situation – rank equally with freedom of conscience?” Dominguez, p. 44.Google Scholar