1. See this writer's contribution to the Festschrift for Van der Ven (Deventer: Kluwer 1972) under the title “Notices pour servir à une théorie de la force obligatoire du droit international”, pp. 345–355, at p. 348.Google Scholar Attention is drawn to the fact that the views expressed there at pp. 348–350 and relating to the subject of the present study will be somewhat modified here.

2. See Tammelo, Umar, “Zum Aufbau einer Theorie der Gerechtigkeit”, 20 Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (1970), p. 154.Google Scholar

3. Ibid., “Diese Formulierungen der naturrechtlichen Kriterien der Gerechtigkeit gelten alle unter der Voraussetzung der Vernünftigkeit”.

4. Ibid., p. 155: “Objektivität als Wohlbegründetheit durch Inbetrachtziehen aller erheblichen Umstände, und zwar nich nur aller einschlägigen faktischen Umstände, sondern auch aller an einem gegebenen Ort und zu einer gegebenen Zeit ausser Zweifel stehenden anwendbaren Prinzipien; Folgerichtigkeit als Beachtung der Prinzipien der Logik in argumentativen Situationen: Klarheit und Deutlichkeit im Ausdruck der Gedanken; Unvoreingenommenheit als Sichtrennen von der person-determinierten Sachlage und als voile geistige Freiheit”.

5. See his contribution to the Van der Ven- Festschrift quoted before, p. 348 (“conceptioncadre du droit, c.-à-d. une conception où toutes les formes historiques du phénomène juridique ont leur place”).

6. Comp. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's Special Report to the Institut de Droit International entitled “The Future of Public International Law and of the International Legal System in the Circumstances of Today”, in Livre du Centenaire de l'Institut de Droit International 1873–1973 (Basel, 1973), p. 310Google Scholar: “law in society is never (or cannot continue to be) merely, or purely, regulatory in its character and objects. To be viable – that is to say, in the long run, acceptable – it must not only regulate, but regulate on the basis of certain minimum standards and principles of justice (…)”.

7. Elias, Norbert, Über den Prozess der Zivilisation, Vol. II, 2nd ed. (Berne: Francke Verlag, 1969), p. 395.Google Scholar

8. Ibid., pp. 377, 378, and 388.

9. Ibid., pp. 378 and 444.

10. Ibid., p. 444.

11. Ibid., pp. 444–445.

12. Seep. 44 supra.

13. Seep. 44 supra.

14. See p. 44 supra.

15. Elias, , op.cit., p. 380Google Scholar and passim, quotes longer foresight as a phenomenon of rationalization.

16. And see the International Court's judgment of 18 December 1951 in the Fisheries Case, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 133Google Scholar: “(…) certain basic considerations inherent in the nature of the territorial sea bring to light certain criteria which, though not entirely precise, can provide courts with an adequate basis for their decisions (…)” (italics supplied).

17. Comp. Lawson, F.H., The Rational Strength of English Law (London, 1951), p. 11Google Scholar: “By rational I do not mean rationalist”; and p. 12Google Scholar: “I shall regard law as rational in so far as it serves in a sane and intelligent way to further a policy which is either acknowledged or can be easily detected from internal or external evidence”. The author, it is suggested, in fact deals with “efficiency” (see pp. 50–51 infra).

18. See p. 44 supra.

19. See p. 44 supra.

20. On the principle ex iniuria, cf. SirFitzmaurice, Gerald, “The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law”Google Scholar, in 92 Hague Recueil (1957, Vol. II), pp. 117–128.Google Scholar With regard to structural consistency, see the International Court's observations in the Fisheries Case quoted above, at pp. 136–137 (“this system was consistently applied by Norwegian authorities”) and 138 (“too much importance need not be attached to the few uncertainties or contradictions, real or apparent, which the United Kingdom Government claims to have discovered in Norwegian practice”).

21. I.C.J. Reports, 1951, pp. 15et seq.Google Scholar

22. Elias, , op.cit., pp. 392–395 and 452.Google Scholar

23. See p. 46 supra on intuition.

24. Frosini, , “Rilievi metodologici sulla posizione del giudice nel diritto internazionale”, 36 Rivista di diritto internazionale (1956), p. 509Google Scholar: the philosophy of history was replaced by historical methodology, i.e., the science of characteristic developments in history and of the logic of historical judgment.

25. See p. 46 supra.

26. See p. 46 supra.

27. In its judgment in the Fisheries Case (see footnote 16, supra), the International Court, linking up the Natur der Sache and natural order, offers a number of “basic considerations” on “the close dependence of the territorial sea upon the land domain” and “the more or less close relationship existing between certain sea areas and the land formations which divide or surround them” (p. 133) in which this view of world structure is implicit.

28. Comp. p. 46 supra.

29. Elias, , op.cit., p. 387.Google Scholar

30. See p. 43 supra.

31. See p. 45 supra, and comp. Fitzmaurice, in Livre du Centenaire, pp. 239–240.Google Scholar

32. See, for instance, Brierly, J.L., The Outlook for International Law (Oxford, 1944), pp. 39–43Google Scholar, and Wengler, W., “Prolegemena zu einer Lehre von den Interessen im Völkerrecht”, 50 Friedens-Warte (1950–1951), pp. 120et seq.Google Scholar

33. See p. 47 supra.

34. See Permanent Court of International Justice, judgment of 30 August 1924 (The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions), Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A, Nr. 2, p. 34: “The Court, whose jurisdiction is international, is not bound to attach to matters of form the same degree of importance which they might possess in municipal law”. And see for a most recent statement on the subject the judgment handed down on 20 December 1974 by the International Court of Justice (Nuclear Tests Case), I.C.J. Reports, 1974, pp. 267–268.Google Scholar

35. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale (Milan: Giuffrè, 1943), p. 286.Google Scholar

36. See p. 49 supra.

37. See p. 47 supra.

38. On stare decisis, see Drion, J., Stare decisis. Het gezag van precedenten (The Hague, 1950)Google Scholar, and Schneider, J.W., “Stare decisis van het Internationaal Gerechtshof”, in Rechtsvinding (Deventer: Kluwer, 1970), pp. 209–230.Google Scholar On the security of the law, see Langemeijer, G.E., Inleiding tot de studie van de Wijsbegeerte des Rechts (Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink, 1956), p. 240Google Scholar (quoting Radbruch), and Tammes, A.J.P., De gerechtigheid in de Internationale verhoudingen en de weerstand die zij daar ondervindtGoogle Scholar, report to the “Vereniging voor Wijsbegeerte des Rechts” (1954), p. 41Google Scholar (considering the security of the law to be “an autonomous value”).

39. See Strupp, K., “Der Streitfall zwischen Schweden and Norwegen”Google Scholar, in 2 Das Werk vom Haag, Zweiter Band (l.II) (Munich and Leipzig, 1914), p. 93Google Scholar; and comp. François, J.P.A., “La Cour permanente d'arbitrage, son origine, sa Jurisprudence, son avenor”, 87 Hague Recueil (1955–1), pp. 498–500Google Scholar, and Lauterpacht, H., “Regiesgenerates du droit de la paix”, 62 Hague Recueil (1937–IV), p. 333.Google Scholar

40. Leisner, , Effizienz als Rechtsprinzip (Tübingen: Mohr, 1971)Google Scholar, denies the existence in the German Federal Republic of a legal principle of efficiency obliging the State to efficient government. On efficiency as a guiding principle in the case law of the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raadjundei the presidency of Dr. J. Donner, see G.E. Langemeijer, then Attorney-General, in the Dutch daily Trouw of 3 February 1971.

41. On intuition, cf. p. 46 supra.

42. See p. 47 supra. The “principle of effectiveness” is also recognized as a principle of interpretation (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In this guise, the principle may be applied not in connection with the adaptation of the order to a change in circumstances, but with a view to either its definition or its efficiency.

43. See p. 44 supra.

44. See p. 51–52 supra.

45. See p. 44 supra.

46. See p. 49 supra.