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Old Germanic Law analogies in International Law, or the State as Homo Liber
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 May 2009
Extract
In his collected lectures, the late legal historian in the University of Groningen, Professor P.W.A. Immink, draws an interesting parallel between Old Germanic law on the one hand, and present-day international law on the other hand. His argument runs as follows.
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References
1. De wording van Staat en souvereiniteit in de Middeleeuwen (The Genesis of State and Sovereignty in the Middle Ages), 2nd ed. (Groningen, 1969).Google Scholar
2. Op. cit, pp. 13–14Google Scholar, Professor Immink sees an Old Germanic period (roughly until A.D. 500), a Frankish (Merovingian and Caiolingian) period (A.D. 500–1000), and, in the Northern Netherlands, a period dominated by bishops, dukes, counts, etc. who shook off the king or emperor, becoming sovereigns themselves (the landsheerlijke periode, starting around A.D. 1000 and lasting until A.D. 1581, the year King Philip II of Spain, then landsheer, was abjured).
3. Op. cit., pp. 21–26.Google Scholar
4. Ibid. p. 40.
5. Ibid. p. 38.
6. Ibid. pp. 18–19: just like the Roman Emperor had auctoritas over the Old Germanic tribes with whom he concluded a treaty and the latter had but potestas, there now are permanent members of the Security Council with a right of veto which the other members lack. But see the refutation of this view at p. 60 infra.
7. Ibid. pp. 27–28.
8. Professor H.J. Scheltema in his In Memoriam for Professor Immink. See De wording van Staat en souvereiniteit in de Middeleeuwen, p. XIV.Google Scholar
9. ProfessorImmink, , op. cit., p. 27.Google Scholar
10. Ibid. p. 95.
11. Ibid. pp. 29–30. To avoid an overdose of subjectiveness, objective criteria were developed for malicious intent, for example, stealth instead of openness.
12. Being a Penonenverbandsstaat (Germ.), that is, a “State” based on the personal (feudal) bond between superiors and vassals. Comp. Immink, , op.cit., pp. 45 and 73.Google Scholar
13. Brunner, Otto, Land und Herrschaft – Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte Südostdeutschlands im Mittelalter, 2nd. ed. (Brünn-Munich-Vienna, 1942), p. 121.Google Scholar
14. Ibid. pp. 19, 83 and 107.
15. Ibid. pp. 5–6.
16. Ibid. p. 13.
17. Ibid. pp. 5 and 121.
18. Ibid. pp. 10–11.
19. Ibid. p. 20.
20. Ibid. p. 31.
21. Ibid. pp. 12–13. Janssen, , Die Anfänge des modernen Völkerrechts und der neuzeitlichen DiplomatieGoogle Scholar, Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, XXXVIII. Band (1964) p. 476Google Scholar, rightly points out the total contrast between Brunner's view and the traditional one interpreting feuds as illegal imitations of State wars, as “bloody sport” (Nuszbaum). Brunner's view he calls well documented.
22. Brunner, , op. cit., pp. 148–153Google Scholar; and see p. 162: “So lebt denn das einheitliche Rechtsbewusstsein der Frühzeit während des ganzen Mittelalters fort”.
23. Ibid. pp. 156 and 161.
24. Ibid. p. 156.
25. Ibid. p. 13. Comp. the present-day concept of “une Europe civile”.
26. Brunner, , op. cit., p. 31.Google Scholar
27. Ibid. p. 122 (this writer's translation).
28. Ibid. pp. 2 and 13, footnote 3.
29. Immink, , op. cit., pp. XIV–XVI and 17–19.Google Scholar
30. In all probability, the “Frankish” kings to whom reference is going to be made infra were not “Germanic” kings, stricto sensu, but the question has to be passed over, here. On the origin of the Franks, see Grand, , Recherches sur l'origine des Francs (Paris, 1965).Google Scholar
31. See footnote 12 supra.
32. Seep. 51 supra.
33. Immink, , op. cit., pp. 45–46 and 49–50.Google Scholar
34. Ibid. pp. 56 and 58–59.
35. Ibid. p. 74.
36. Ibid. pp. 76–78.
37. Ibid. pp. 79 and 87.
38. Ibid. pp. 84 and 86.
39. Ibid. p. 89.
40. Brunner, , op. cit., pp. 37–39 and 70–71.Google Scholar
41. See footnote 2 supra.
42. Brunner, , op. cit., p. 39.Google Scholar One of the techniques of restriction was ever more to diminish the number of those entitled to feud. See Janssen, , loc. cit., p. 477.Google Scholar
43. Brunner, , op. cit., p. 38.Google Scholar
44. Ibid. p. 107: “Die Fehde ist (….) Kampf urns Recht”.
45. Ibid. p. 54.
46. Ibid. pp. 153–154.
47. Immink, , op. cit., pp. 91–105.Google Scholar
48. An implied reference to the idea of allodium in connextion with the State is to be found in SirWhevell, Henry Sumner Maine's. Lectures on International Law (London, 1888) pp. 56–57Google Scholar: “Evidentally the fundamental conception was that the territory belonged to the Tribe, and that the Sovereign was Sovereign of the Tribe. The fact is that the feudalisation of Europe had to be completed before it was possible that Sovereignty could be associated with a definite portion of soil”.
49. In abstracto, for no account is taken of the destructive effects of too much violence.
50. See p. 58 supra.
51. In the Middle Ages as well as in Jean Bodin's view of the absolutist ruler, even the so-called princeps legibus solutus was subject to the ius divinum et naturae. See Brunner, , op. cit., p. 437Google Scholar (and pp. 435–442 on the principle princeps legibus solutus generally, five different meanings of which are discussed).
52. See p. 52 supra.
53. See the present writer's study “Principles of Rational Organization as Applied in the Process of Law” in Essays on International Law and Relations in honour of Tammes, A.J.P., 24 N.I.L.R. (1977) pp. 43 et seq.Google Scholar
54. In the same vein, see SirFitzmaurice, Gerald, The Future of Public International Law and of the International Legal System in the Circumstances of Today, Institut de Droit International, Livre du Centenaire 1873–1973 (Basle, 1973), pp. 257–258.Google Scholar The author excludes “as chimerical a world in which all national divisions had been abolished, and which functioned as would a single unitary State”. But see Janssen, , loc. cit., p. 478Google Scholar: a unitary State only with obligatory jurisdiction and powers to enforce will be in a position to match the individual State's achievement in the abolition of feuds, and to ban war.