^{page 32 note 1} SirWilliams, John Fischer, Aspects of Modern International Law, 29 (Oxford 1939).Google Scholar

^{page 34 note 1} Phillipson, Coleman, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, London, Vol. I, 29 (1911).Google Scholar

^{page 34 note 2} Ibidem, 30.

^{page 34 note 3} Digest XLIX, 15, 7, I. Grotius accepted and quoted this definition in “De lure Belli ac Pads”, I, 2 § 21.

^{page 34 note 4} Cf. Phillipson, , op. cit., 111, 113 and Vol. II, 199.Google Scholar

^{page 34 note 5} Cf. Constantinescu, L. J., Les traités internationaux en droit romain, in Annales Universitatis Saraviensis, No. 2, Saarbrücken, 132 ff. (1955).Google Scholar

^{page 34 note 6} Tractatus Represaliorum, 1354. Cf. also: Sereni, Angelo P., The Italian Conception of International Law, New York, 59 ff. (1943).Google Scholar

The quotation in original reads: “Cum quaelibet civitas Italiae… hodic dominum non recognoscat, in se habet liberum populum et habet merum imperium in ipso et tantam potestatem habet in populo quantam imperator in universo…”

^{page 34 note 7} Cf. Karol Koranyi, Studia nad Traktatami w Srednioiwieczu (Studies on the treaties in the Middle Ages), Lwow, 2–20 (1935).

^{page 35 note 1} The excerpt in original reads: “Notaries namque et generaliter predicatur ab omnibus et ubique, quod a tempore Christi citra regnum Francorum solum regem suum sub ipso Ihesu Christo… habuit, nullum temporalem superiorem cognoscens aut habens, quocumque imperatore regnante.”

Cf. Mario Delle Piane, Saggi sull'ideologia nazionale nella Francia di Filippo il Bello, in Studi Senesi, Fasc. 1–2, Siena, 65 (1954–1955).

^{page 35 note 2} Ibidem, 87. Other examples ibidem, 88 ff.

^{page 35 note 3} Cf. Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law in Early English Practice, Br. Ybk IL. 1948, 55 (1949). The Latin text reads: “In quibus nee superiorem recognoscit nec recognoscere tenetur.” Prof. Schwarzenberger writes in this connection: “Sovereignty is used in this sense in English sources at least since the thirteenth century and well describes the status of the King of England.”

^{page 35 note 4} See for further examples in Wiktor Sukiennicki, La Souveraineté des Etats en Droit International Moderne (Paris 1927) and E. N. van Kleffens, Sovereignty in International Law, 82 Hague Ree. (1953).

^{page 35 note 5} Gallus Anonymus, Cronica Poloniae, Manuscript Zamoyski of the XIVth century, edited last time by Warsaw Scientific Society, Warsaw 1949. Cf. also editions by Bandtke, Warsaw 1824, and Grodecki, Cracow 1923; the latter in Polish translation.

^{page 36 note 1} Monumentum Pro Republicae Ordinatione, Art. 5, 6, 21. Contained in Acta Tomiciana in the XVI th century, Published by Wegner, Poznan 1860, Bobrzynski in Starodawne Prawa Polskiego Pomniki, Cracow, etc.

^{page 36 note 2} Les Six Livres de la République (1576). French original edition which he translated in Latin under the title: De Republica Libri Six, “Republica” meaning State. Cf. L. L, Ch. VIII.

^{page 36 note 3} Ibidem, L. L, Ch. IX. The French original reads: “Tout aussi que les contracts et testaments des particuliers ne peuvent déroger aux ordonnances des magistrats, ny les édits des magistrats aux coutumes, ny les coutumes aux lois générales d'un prince souverain, aussi les lois des princes souverains ne peuvent altérer, ny changer les droits de Dieu et de la nature.”

^{page 36 note 4} Ibidem, in French original: “… le prince est tenu aux contracts par luy faits, soit avec son sujet, soit avec l'estranger”. Prof. A. Nussbaum ascertains Bodin's influence on international law: “In fact, the ruler's sovereignty became a cornerstone of the latter”. See: A Concise History of the Law of Nations, New York 57 (1950).

^{page 37 note 1} Hugonis Grotii, De Iure Belli ac Pads Libri Tres, first edition 1625. Cf. L. I., Ch. 3,§§ 21, 22. About sovereignty(Suprema Potestas): L. I., Ch. 111, § 7.

^{page 37 note 2} In many other respects, Grotius was ahead of his time particularly in respect to the position of the individual under international law. Cf. Jules Basdevant's study about the doctrine of Grotius in Les Fondateurs du Droit International, Paris, 227 ff. (1904), and Maurice Bourquin, Grotius et Les Tendances Actuelles du Droit International, in Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée, Paris, 88 ff. (1926).

^{page 37 note 3} Samuel Pufendorf, De Iure Naturae et Gentium, Cf. L. II, C. 111; Christian Wolff, Institutiones Iuris Naturae et Gentium.

^{page 37 note 4} J. J. Burlamaqui, Principes du Droit de la Nature et des Gens et de Droit Public Général 1747, Cf. edition Paris 1821, T. I. 595, 638, 867.

^{page 37 note 5} Emeric de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle Appliquée à la Conduite et aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains, Londres Vol. I, 18 (1758). In fact, the book was published in Switzerland.

^{page 38 note 1} Ibidem, Vol. I, 19.

^{page 38 note 2} Ibidem, II, 106.

^{page 38 note 3} Some scholars criticize Vattel severely because of his doctrine of the fundamental rights of States which, according to these critics, contributed to slowing down the progress of international law. Cf. the resumé of these “indictments” in Van Vollenhoven, Les Trois Phases du Droit des Gens, La Haye (1919).

^{page 38 note 4} See here Prof. Jessup in Proceedings of the ASIJ, 5 (1955). George Washington borrowed a copy of Vattel's book from the New York Society Library on October 5, 1789.

^{page 38 note 5} Cf. M. St. Korowicz, La Souveraineté des Etats et l'Avenir du Droit International, Paris, Pedone, 15–27 (1945).

^{page 39 note 1} Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugense; Instrumentum Pacis Monasteriense. According to the general belief expressed in legal literature, these treaties lay the foundations of modern international law, with the principle of the sovereignty of States as its basis.

^{page 39 note 2} Robert Redslob, Histoire des Grands Principes du Droit des Gens, 230 (Paris 1923).

^{page 39 note 3} Quoted in French by Redslob, , op.cit., 223.Google Scholar

^{page 39 note 4} Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, First edition 1642, C. V., § III, and C. VI, §§ 1–12. Inside the State, the sovereign power is for Hobbes “great as possibly men can be imagined to make it”. Cf. Leviathan, Ch. XX (1651).

^{page 40 note 1} It is, therefore, possible to take exception to the following statement of Prot Scelle: “In what concerns the medium and small States one hardly imagines the interest which could push them to defend the dogma of sovereignty. Strong nations can find in this dogma the justification of their arbitrary acts; but the weak? Pure mysticism!” Cf. Georges Scelle, Précis de Droit des Gens, Première Partie, Paris, 82 (1932).

^{page 40 note 2} Writings in this subject for the last three decades of the XlXth century, and the first half of our century are extremely numerous. See for the most important in the bibliography, contained in Prof. Louis B. Sohn, Cases and Other Materials on World Law, Brooklyn (1950), 266–268.

^{page 40 note 3} Elements of International Law, Carnegie, Oxford (1936), §§ 19,20. Literal reprod. of the 1866 Dana edition. The term “external public law” is apparendy taken from G. W. Hegel, the German philosopher of Law (Das aüssere Staatsrecht). See below. Wheaton appreciated also greatly his other German contemporary, professor Heffter in Berlin. On the other hand John Marshall, Justice of the Supreme Court of the USA, considerably influenced many writers in international law at that time. He stated about the sovereignty, already in 1825:.

“The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of the sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.” (The Exchange v. McFaddon et al.) Justice Marshall touched upon the problem of the divisibility (partibility) of the sovereignty, much discussed since Grotius, Justice Story, one of Marshall's great successors, defined sovereignty in its largest sense as “the supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power, the Ius Summi Imperii: the absolute right to govern”. (Cherokee Nation v. Kansas RR. Com.). Cf. also Charles Pergler, Judicial Interpretation of International Law in the United States, New York (1928).

^{page 41 note 1} The Collected Papers of John Westlake on Public International Law, ed. by Oppenheim, L., 87 (1914).Google Scholar

^{page 41 note 2} The Principles of International Law, 7th ed. London, 48, 50, 49 (1923).Google Scholar

^{page 41 note 3} Le Droit International Codifié, French ed. Paris, 52, 81 (1870).

^{page 42 note 1} David Dudley Field, Projet d'un Code International, French ed. Paris-Gand, p. 8, Art. 12 (1881).

^{page 42 note 2} Le Droit International Codifié et sa Sanction Juridique, French ed. Paris, 105 (1890).

^{page 42 note 3} Franz v. Liszt, Le Droit International, French ed. (Trad. G. Gidel) Paris, 54, 77 (1928).

^{page 42 note 4} Droit des Gens Moderne de l'Europe, French ed. Paris, 30 (1874).

^{page 42 note 5} Traité de Droit International Public Européen et Américain, Paris, 160 (1885).

^{page 42 note 6} Antoine Pillet, Recherches sur les Droits Fondamentaux des Etats, Rev. Gen. de Dr. Int. Publ., Paris (1898, 1899).

^{page 42 note 7} Léon Duguit, Etudes de Droit Public, t. I. L'Etat, le Droit Objectif et la Loi Positive, Paris, 394 (1901).

^{page 43 note 1} Paul Fauchille, Traité de Droit International Public, T. I. Première Partie, Paris, 224 (1922).

^{page 43 note 2} Ibidem, 225, 454.

^{page 43 note 3} Ibidem, 429–431.

^{page 43 note 4} Op. cit. 104.

^{page 43 note 5} Louis Le Fur, Précis de Droit International Public, Paris, 63 (1933). Also 41 Hague Rec. 550 (1932).

^{page 43 note 6} Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft, 108 (1926).

^{page 43 note 7} H. van Zanten, Le Problème de la Souveraineté des Etats et le Droit International, Rev. de Dr. Int. et de Leg. Comparée, 527, 528 (1930).

^{page 44 note 1} Règles Générales du Droit de la Paix, 54 Hague Ree. 359 (1935).

^{page 44 note 2} Les Problèmes Fondamentaux du Droit des Gens en Amérique, 47 Hague Rec. 33 (1934).

^{page 44 note 3} Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante y Sirven, Droit International Public, Paris, 217, 220 (1934).

^{page 44 note 4} Lectures on International Law, London, 62, 63 (1933).

^{page 45 note 1} Recent Developments in International Law, 643 ff., Calcutta (1925).

^{page 45 note 2} International Law, London, 31, 32 (1927).

^{page 45 note 3} Règles Générales du Droit de la Paix, 58 Hague Rec., 578, 580–584 (1936).

^{page 45 note 4} Washington, 1916, § II. Cf. also: Alejandro Alvarez, International Law and Related Subjects from the point of view of the American Continent, Washington, Carnegie (1922).

^{page 45 note 5} The Future of International Law, Oxford. Carnegie, § 1, pp. 18, 19 (1921).

^{page 46 note 1} La Codification du Droit International. Exposé de motifs et projet de déclaration sur les données fondamentales et les grands principes du droit international de l'avenir, 44 (1931).

^{page 46 note 2} Le Progrès du Droit des Gens, Paris, 359 (1934).

^{page 46 note 3} Les Règles Générales du Droit International de la Paix, 47 Hague Rec. (1934): also cf. his Eléments de Droit International Public, 40.

^{page 46 note 4} Traité de Droit Public International, Paris, 227 (1905).

^{page 46 note 5} Ibidem, 22.

^{page 47 note 1} Le Droit International Public Positif, Oxford, 172 if. (1920).

^{page 47 note 2} 32 Hague Rec. 55 (1930).

^{page 47 note 3} Le Droit des Gens et les Rapports des Grandes Puissances avec les autres Etats avant le Pacte de la S. d. N., Paris 75 ff. (1921).

^{page 47 note 4} Op. cit. 32 Hague Rec. 55. Thus, Dupuis rejects the old teachings of Francesco Vitoria and his followers, according to which States are bound to open their countries to international trade and communications. In 1532 the great Spaniard claimed that there is no justification for the exclusion of commerce, and that refusal to recognize the right of trade, refusal to enter into relations with a foreign country or the use of violence to sanction this negation and this refusal, authorize the recourse to arms, the construction of fortresses and res-sorting to war. “Every independent State has, on the one hand, the obligation to entertain relations, and, on the other hand, to permit its citizens to entertain freely these relations with members of other nations.” Cf. Carnegie Classics of International Law: Francisci de Vitoria: De Indis et de Iure Belli Relectiones, Washington 1917. These lectures were first published in Lyon, France, in 1557. Cf. Sections II and III. Cf. also: J. T. Delos, La Société Internationale et les Principes du Droit Public, Paris, 215 ff. (1929). Vitoria speaks about the right of society and communication, as about a right stemming from Natural Law. “Primus titulus potest vocari naturalis societatis et communicationis… Hispani habent ius peregrinandi in illas provincias.” De Indis, Sec. 111, 386, 1 and 2. The ideas of consolidating international community during the Renaissance period were stronger than three or even four centuries later. Dupuis expresses opinions based upon international customary, and conventional law, and international jurisprudence after the first World War.

^{page 48 note 1} The International Law of the Future. Postulates, Principles and Proposals, Washington, Carnegie (1944).

^{page 48 note 2} Mandates under the League of Nations, 283.

^{page 48 note 3} A Study of War, Chicago, Vol. II, Ch. XXIV: Sovereignty and War, 896, 898, 906, 907, 922.

^{page 49 note 1} L'Organisation Politique Mondiale et le Déclin de la Souveraineté, in Revue Gén. de Dr. Int. Publ., Paris, T. L., 28 ff. (1946).

^{page 49 note 2} Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, Boston, Vol. I., 22 (1945).

^{page 49 note 3} Duff Development Comp. v. Government of Kelantan and Another (1924), House of Lords: “It is obvious that for sovereignty, there must be a certain amount of independence, but it is not in the least necessary that for sovereignty there should be complete independence. It is quite consistent with sovereignty, that the sovereign may in certain respects be dependent upon other Power; the control, for instance, of foreign affairs, may be completely in the hands of a protecting Power, and there may be agreements or treaties which limit the powers of the sovereign even in internal affairs without entailing a loss of the position of a sovereign Power.” Cf. Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. I, 51. Apparently, Viscount Finlay had in mind the status of colonial “sovereigns”, and he certainly would not like to apply the same interpretation to the status of a European Power, including his own great country.

^{page 49 note 4} Department of State Press Releases, March 25, 1939, 220.

^{page 50 note 1} Henry Roiin, Les Principes de Droit International Public, 77 Hague Rec., 326 (1950).

^{page 50 note 2} Austro-German Customs Union, PCIJ, A/B 41, 57–58 (1931).

^{page 51 note 1} Austro-German Customs Union, PCIJ, A/B 77 (1931).

^{page 51 note 2} Charles Fenwick, International Law, New York, 29, 42 (1948).

^{page 51 note 3} Ibidem, 249, 250.

^{page 51 note 4} Pitman B. Potter, An Introduction to the Study of International Organization, New York, 188, 192 (1948).

^{page 51 note 5} Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the International Law Commission. Memorandum submitted by the Secretary General, Part. II, 19, § 27, “Subjects of International Law” (1948).

^{page 52 note 1} U. N. Report of the International Law Commission, covering its first session, April 12–June 9, 1949. Fourth Session, Suppl. 10/a/925, N.Y. (1949).

^{page 52 note 2} Corfou Channel Case, Judgement of April 9, 1949. ICJ Reports, Individual Opinion by Alejandro Alvarez, cf. p. 43.

^{page 52 note 3} Jean L'Huillier, Eléments de Droit International Public, Paris, 40 (1950). Robert Redslob, Traité de Droit des Gens, Paris, 73, 74 (1950).

^{page 52 note 4} Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law, as applied by International Courts and Tribunals, London-New York, 53 (1950).

^{page 52 note 5} Manley O. Hudson, Separate Opinion, PCIJ, Lighthouses in Crete and Samos, A/B 71, p. 127 (1937).

^{page 53 note 1} Op. cit. 58.

^{page 53 note 2} A Manuel of International Law, London, 29 (1952).

^{page 53 note 3} Emile Giraud, Le Rejet de l'Idée de Souveraineté, in La Technique et les Principes du Droit Public, Etudes en l'Honneur de Georges Scelle, Paris, Vol. I, 253 (1950).

^{page 53 note 4} Charles de Visscher, Théories et Réalités en Droit International Public, Paris, 128. 133 (1953).

^{page 54 note 1} Marcel Sibert, Traité de Droit International Public, Paris, Vol. I, 248–250 (1951).

^{page 54 note 2} Philip G. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, New York, 2, 41 (1952).

^{page 54 note 3} Studies in International Law, Calcutta, 49 (1952).

^{page 54 note 4} Paul Guggenheim, Les Principes de Droit International Public, 80 Hague Rec. 83, 84 (1952).

^{page 54 note 5} Traité de Droit International Public, Genève, t. I, 174, 171, 173 (1953).

^{page 54 note 6} Le Fondement du Caractère Obligatoire du Droit International Public, 80 Hague Rec., 621–625, Essai d'une Théorie Réaliste (1952).

^{page 55 note 1} International Law, London, Vol. I, 6, 12, 114–116 (1953).

^{page 55 note 2} An Introduction to International Law, London, 86 (1954).

^{page 55 note 3} Karl Loewenstein, Sovereignty and International Cooperation, 48 AJIL, 222, 227, 243 (1954).

^{page 55 note 4} Brierly, J. L., The Law of Nations, Oxford, 46, 121, 122 (1955).Google Scholar

^{page 56 note 1} The Scope of International Law, Br. Ybk of IL, 1954, 12 (1956).Google Scholar

^{page 56 note 2} La Souveraineté des Etats, Helsinki, 39 (1955).

^{page 56 note 3} Alfred Verdross, Völkerrecht, Wien, 8, 9 (1955).

^{page 56 note 4} This exception reads: “… disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of the Government of the Union of South Africa as determined by the Government of the Union of South Africa.” The United States declaration of August 14, 1946, exception (b) reads: “… disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of America.” Cf. ICJ, Yearbook 1954–1955, 200.

^{page 56 note 5} The Thirty-Fourth Year of the World Court, 50, AJIL, 15 (1956) Cf. also M. O. Hudson, International Tribunals, Washington, 201–203 (1944), and The Permanent Court of International Justice, New York, 396–399 (1943).

^{page 56 note 6} The American Society of International Law 1906–1956, 50 AJIL, 312 (1956).