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The Justification of Choice of Law: A Liberal-Political Theory as a Critical and Explanatory Model, and the Field of International Consumer Transactions as an Example*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2009

Jannet A. Pontier
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Extract

Although it is often said that nowadays the central issue of conflicts law or private international law is to be found in the areas of jurisdiction or the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, rather than in the field of choice of law, in my opinion choice of law is still at its core. Choice of law, including the rationale of this area of conflicts law, is still to be considered as a separate and important subject that cannot be compared with the other areas in this field of law, because ultimately it depends on the contents of the judgments of our courts whether or not justice will be achieved between the parties. However, whether justice is achieved in a multistate case depends not only on the quality of the substantive law that has been applied, but also on the quality of the choice-of-law decision in such a case. I submit that these choice-of-law decisions are fundamental to the authority of states enforcing the law in multistate cases.

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Articles
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Netherlands International Law Review , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , December 1998 , pp. 388 - 410
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1998

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References

1. This also explains why, in most choice-of-law categories, there is no perfect symmetry between jurisdictional and choice-of-law criteria (Gleichlauf), even if both are structured to designate the legal system with the closest connection: the policy considerations (or rationale) underlying each area can be quite different. Cf., Clarkson, C.M.V. and Hill, J., Jaffey on the Conflict of Laws (London, Butter-worths 1997) p. 6.Google Scholar

2. Compare, e.g., Clarkson and Hill, op. cit. n. 1, pp. 506 et seq., with section 3 of this article; see also Nygh, J.P.E., ‘The Reasonable Expectations of the Parties as a Guide to the Choice of Law in Contract and Tort’, Recueil des cours (1995) pp. 272–400.Google Scholar

3. The theory can also be seen as a universalistic one, and creates a basis for legitimacy that is not only formal. Cf., Mehren, A.T. von, ‘The Significance of the State for Choice of Law’, in Bernstein, H., et al., eds., Festschrift für Konrad Zweigert zum 70. Geburtstag (Tübingen, Mohr 1981) pp. 292 and 294.Google Scholar

4. Among others: Brilmayer, L., ‘Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law’, 98 Yale LJ (1989) pp. 1277–1319;CrossRefGoogle Scholaridem, ‘Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Theory’, 39 University of Florida L Rev. (1987) pp. 293–314;Google ScholarDane, P., ‘Vested Rights, “Vestedness”, and Choice of Law’, 96 Yale LJ (1987) pp. 1191–1275;CrossRefGoogle ScholarEly, J.H., ‘Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting its Own’, 23 William and Mary L Rev. (1981) pp. 173–216;Google ScholarLaycock, D., ‘Equality and the Citizens of Sister States’, 15 Florida State Univ. L Rev. (1987) pp. 431–448;Google ScholarSinger, J.W., ‘Real Conflicts’, 69 Boston University L Rev. (1989) pp. 3–129;Google ScholarBaxter, W.F., ‘Choice of Law and the Federal System’, 16 Stanford L Rev. (1963) pp. 1–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Nygh, loc. cit. n. 2, and Vischer, F., ‘General Course on Private International Law’, Recueil des cours (1992) pp. 9–255.Google Scholar

5. Cf., Brilmayer (1987), loc. cit. n. 4, p. 294.

6. Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1986) pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

7. See Raz, op. cit. n. 6, p. 165.

8. See, in particular, Rawls, J., Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press 1993) p. 291;Google Scholaridem, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1972) pp. 60, 250 and 302.Google Scholar The ‘difference’ principle will not be discussed here any further because, in my opinion, it cannot be of much importance to choice of law. But see Pontier, J.A., Conflictenrecht: grondslagen, methoden, beginselen en belangen. Een politiek liberaal perspectief [Choice of Law: Foundations, Methods, Principles and Interests. A Liberal-Political Perspective] (Nijmegen, Ars Aequi Libri Nijmegen 1997) pp. 325 et seq.Google Scholar

9. Rawls (1993), op. cit. n. 8, p. 291; idem (1972), op. cit. n. 8, p. 235.

10. Rawls (1972), op. cit. n. 8, p. 236. See also Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press 1977) pp. 81 et seq.Google Scholar

11. See Baxter, loc. cit. n. 4, p. 1.

12. Raz, op. cit. n. 6, p. 110.

13. Rawls (1993), op cit. no. 8, p. xxv.

14. Cf., Raz, op. cit. n. 6, pp. 401–402. See also Feinberg, J., Harm to Others. The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Vol. I (New York, Oxford University Press 1984) pp. 10 et seq.Google Scholar

15. Rawls (1993), op. cit. n. 8, p. xviii.

16. Rawls (1972), op. cit. n. 8, p. 114. See also Raz, op. cit. n. 6, pp. 401 et seq.

17. Raz, op. cit. n. 6, pp. 412 et seq.

18. Rawls (1993), op. cit. n. 8, p. xx.

19. Rawls (1993), op. cit. n. 8, pp. xx–xxi.

20. See Pontier, op. cit. n. 8, ch. 4, pp. 233–272.

21. Cf., Rawls (1993), op. cit. n. 8, pp. xvi et seq.

22. Another argument against the projection of the viewpoints of political liberalism upon the international setting is the fact that in international society not every local community can be considered as liberal. Cf., Rawls, J., ‘The Law of Peoples’, in Shute, S. and Hurley, S., eds., On Human Rights, The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York, NY, BasicBooks 1993). See also Pontier, op. cit. n. 8, para. 4.2.Google Scholar

23. Rawls himself projected his theory upon the international context. In particular, he developed the ‘law of peoples’ out of liberal ideas of justice similar to, albeit more general than, the idea he called ‘justice as fairness’, described in A Theory of Justice. See Rawls, op cit. n. 22, pp. 42–82.

24. For example, the private laws of such orders should honor basic human rights, and the application of such private laws should not undermine the basic principles of liberal-political societies or their public policies. See also Rawls, op cit. n. 22, pp. 60 et seq.

25. See Nygh, loc. cit. n. 2, p. 308.

26. Cf., Pontier, op. cit. n. 8, para. 5.3.5.

27. See hereafter, section 3.2.

28. Cf., Art. 3(4) in connection with Arts. 8, 9, 10 of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980.

29. J. Burger, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 US 1 at 12 (1972), as cited by Nygh, loc. cit. n. 2, p. 297, fn. 95.

30. See Pontier, op. cit. n. 8, p. 35, para. 4.3.1 en and 5.2.2; Nygh, loc. cit. n. 2, p. 310.

31. Cf., H.U. Jessurun d'Oliveira, ‘Openbare orde en rechtsvergelijking’ [Public Policy and Comparative Law], in H.U. Jessurun d'Oliveira, et al., eds., ‘t Exempel dwinght. Opstellen aangeboden door vrienden en vereerders aan Prof. mr. I. Kisch [Essays in Honour of Prof. Mr. 1. Kisch] (Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink 1975) p. 244.

32. See Pontier, op. cit. n. 8, p. 267, fn. 84, referring to Rawls (1972), op. cit. n. 8, para. 19, pp. 115–116 and para. 39, p. 250.

33. Cf., Brilmayer, L., Conflict of Laws, Foundations and Future Directions (Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1991) pp. 128 et seq.Google Scholar

34. As the purely domestic cases provide the paradigm for most of our thinking about law and legal rules. Cf., Von Mehren, op. cit. n. 3, p. 287.

35. See also Nygh, loc. cit. n. 2, p. 291.

36. See hereafter, section 3.2.

37. One example of a norm of reason and fairness the court should observe is the Rule of Validition. In my opinion, this rule of validition should be considered as a principle of fairness, rather than an extension of the principle of liberty, or the protection of legitimate expectations. See Nygh, loc. cit. n. 2, p. 340.

38. Cf, Art. 3(3) of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980.

39. Cf., Pontier, op cit. n. 8, pp. 311 et seq. and pp. 378 et seq.

40. Liberal-political theory emphasizes vertical legitimacy, which means that the focus is on the relationship between the state and the individual, and on the relationships between individuals. See also Brilmayer (1989), loc. cit. n. 4, pp. 1296–1297.

41. See also Pontier, op. cit. n. 8, para. 3.2.3.2.

42. Ibid., p. 84.

43. Currie, B., Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press 1963) p. 417.Google Scholar

44. See Brilmayer, op. cit. n. 33, pp. 128 et seq.

45. Under this condition, the law of the country in which the consumer has his habitual residence only applies:

‘– if in that country the conclusion of the contract was preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him or by advertising, and he had taken in that country all the steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of the contract, or

– if the other party or his agent received the consumer's order in that country, or

– if the contract is for the sale of goods and the consumer travelled from that country to another country and there gave his order, provided that the consumer's journey was arranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing the consumer to buy …’

46. Cf., Pontier, op. cit. n. 8, pp. 275 et seq; see also Mostermans, P.M.M., ‘Party Autonomy: Why and When?’, in Boer, Th.M. de, et. al., eds., Forty Years On: The Evolution of Postwar Private International Law in Europe; Symposium in Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Centre of Foreign Law and Private International Law, University of Amsterdam, on 27 October 1989 (Deventer, Kluwer 1990) pp. 123–141.Google Scholar

47. See n. 45.

48. Cf., Ponder, op. cit. n. 8, para. 5.2.4.2.

49. Rawls (1972), op. cit. n. 8, pp. 209, 248, and 249.

50. Cf., section 3.

51. Cf., section 3.

52. It should be noted that a greater freedom in international cases is not only supported by a liberal-political choice-of-law theory but also by the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations itself, as indicated by the rationale of Art. 3(3).

53. Cf., n. 45.

54. Cf., n. 45.

55. Other grounds relate to the advantages of uniformity and security in domestic cases; see Pontier, op. cit. n. 8, paras. 4.3.1 and 5.2.4.2.

56. Cf., section 3.