1. Max Huber, Isle of Pamas, 2 UNRIAA 8–9.

2. See Arts. 1, 2 and 6 of the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, ratified by 152 nations in 1984. Located: C. Bevans, III Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949, Multilateral (1931–1945), p. 944. This principle is indeed one of the most rapidly accepted customary rules, see Gihl, T., ‘The Legal Character and Sources of International Law‘, 1 Scandinavian Stud. L. 51 (1957), pp. 80–81Google Scholar.

3. See n.43 infra, p. 350 and Cooper, J.C., ‘Flight Space Law’, 107 Cong. Rec. A633', A634–C635 (1961)Google Scholar.

4. See McDougal, M.S. et al. , Law and Public Order in Space (New York 1965Google Scholar).

5. For different approaches see ‘The Question of Definition and/or Delimitation of Outer Space’, UN Doc. A/AC105/C2/7, Add. 1.

6. Ibid.

7. Cheng, Bin, ‘UN. in Outer Space’, 14 CLP (1961) p. 247Google Scholar. For a comprehensive recent account, see Cheng, Bin, The Legal Regime of Airspace and Outer Space-the Boundary Problem -Functionalism versus Spatialism, the Major Premises’, 5 AASL (1980) pp. 323–361Google Scholar.

8. It is a converse practice generated by the principle that a state is not responsible for the criminal or tortious acts of an individual, unless state delinquency or direct or indirect complicity is proved: Borchard, E.M., The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad or the Law of International Claims (New York 1915)Google Scholar, Section 86 ‘Obligations of the Government for Acts of Individuals’; and Weston, B. H. et al. , International Law and World Order (1980) p. 640 et seqGoogle Scholar.

9. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86 Cong. 2nd Session, p. 175 et seq.

10. Lissitzyn, O.J., ‘Some Legal Implications of the U–2 and RB–47 Incidents’, 56 AJIL (1962) pp. 35–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar and McDougal, , op.cit., n. 4, pp. 274–275Google Scholar.

11. See n.54 infra. Sec. 2, p. 203.

12. 15 UN SCOR (880–883 Mtgs), S/PV.880–883 (1960).

13. See n.ll supra.

14. Wright, Q., ‘Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident’, 54 AJIL (1960) pp. 836–838 and n.19 infra p. 65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15. The New York Times, 26 January 1961.

16. See n.54 infra, Sec 3, p. 207.

17. (1973) Digest of US. Practice in I.L. p. 302 et seq. For further details, see a US letter to the S.C. President, UN Doc S/10956 (20 June 1973); for the contents of the Libyan complaint, UN Doc S/10939 (30 May 1973) and a US Diplomatic Protest Note of 10 April 1973, Dept. of State Bui., AV17 (Libya).

18. Wright, , loc.cit., n. 14, p. 849 and n.19 infraGoogle Scholar.

19. Delupis, I., ‘Foreign Warships and Immunity for Espionage’, 78 AJIL (1984) pp. 53–75 at p. 67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20. Regs. Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Art. 29, Hague Convention IV 1907 (Annex), 36 Stat. 2277, TS No. 539.

21. Delupis, , loc.cit. n. 19, p. 62Google Scholar.

22. Oppenheim, I.L., International Law 8th edn., Lauterpacht, ed. (London 1963) p. 862Google Scholar and Delupis, , loc.cit., n. 19, p. 62Google Scholar.

23. For the operation of this concept in Maritime Law, see Jessup, P.C., The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction (New York 1927) pp. 194–208, 220–221, 254–255, 258–263, 450, 460Google Scholar.

24. Lissitzyn, O.J., ‘ The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and International Law‘, 47 AJIL (1953) p. 559CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25. Rules of Aerial Warfare, 1923, Art. 42; see also 32 AJIL (Supp.) (1938), p. 35.

26. Paris Convention for the Regulation of Air Navigation 1919, Art. 32 (11 LNTS 173).

27. Ibid., Art. 38.

28. For details, see The New York Times, 4 September and 10 October 1946; US Naval War College, Int. Law Docs. (1948–1949, 1950) pp. 206–216; Lissitzyn, loc.cit., n. 24; and n.30 infra, pp. 415–419, 501–505, 544, 725.

29. Ibid., (it highlights the need for impartial investigation).

30. 15 Dept. of State Bui. (1946) p. 415–6.

31. Ibid., pp. 417–418.

32. Ibid., p. 504.

33. Ibid., p. 505.

34. Ibid., n.26 supra, Art. 4.

35. Ibid., n.2 supra, Art. 9.

36. For Judicial, German dicta to this effect see 1 Archiv für Luft Recht (1931) pp. 72, 154, 267Google Scholar.

37. Ibid., n.2 supra, Art. 2(A).

38. Ibid., Art. 2(B).

39. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 14359 (August 1955); Gross, L., ‘The Jurisprudence of the World Court, 38th Year 1959’, 57 AJIL (1963) pp. 753–771Google Scholar; Caslisch, L.C., 54 AJIL (1960) pp. 855–868; n.40 infra and n.54 infra, Sec. 1, p. 198CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

40. Aerial Incident Case, ICJ Rep. (1959) p. 217.

41. Ibid., p. 358.

42. N.40 supra; also n.43 infra.

43. Greig, D.W., International Law, 3rd edn. (London 1970) p. 358Google Scholar

44. Gross, L., ‘Bulgaria Invokes the Connelly Amendment’, 56 AJIL (1962) p. 357 and n.4 supra, p. 127CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45. Art. 6 provides ‘No scheduled air service may be operated over or into the territory of a Contracting State, except with special permission… of that state’.

46. Art. 9 says that a state can establish, for reasons of military necessity or public security, Prohibited Areas, subject to the conditions set out therein.

47. See n.40 supra, p. 87 and Greig, , op.cit., n.43 pp. 24–25Google Scholar.

48. Eventually £ 195,000 was paid on 3 July 1963.

49. For a detailed account of the incident see The Times, London, 22 02 1973, p. 1; n.52 infra p. 611 et seq; and n.54Google Scholar.

50. ICAO Council Resolution, 4 June 1973, ICAO Bui., July 1973, p. 13.

51. Security Council Official Records, 28th Year, Supp. Jan.-Feb.-March 1973, p. 51.

52. Hughes, W.J., ‘Aerial Intrusions by Civil Airliners and the Use of Force’, 45 Journal of Air Law and Commerce (1980) p. 595 at p. 611Google Scholar.

53. N.40 supra.

54. For an outline of these points see Prince, J.A.P., ‘The Development Since the Second World War of the Concept of Airspace Sovereignty, with Particular Reference to the Treatment of Aerial Intrusion Under International Law’, 1980 Ph.D. Thesis, housed in the Inst. of Advanced Legal Studies, University College London, Chapter 5, Section 4, p. 213Google Scholar.

55. For a full account of this incident see Prince, , op.cit., n.54 Section 5, p. 244Google Scholar and Hughes, , loc.cit., n.52, p. 613 et seqGoogle Scholar.

56. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 29060 (June 1978); and Hughes, loc.cit., n.52, pp. 613–614Google Scholar. Later, the South Korean Foreign Minister thanked the Soviets for the release of the aircraft's captain and navigator.

57. Prince, op.cit., n.54, Sec. 5, p. 224Google Scholar.

58. The Times, London, 1 09 1983, p. 1Google Scholar.

59. The New York Times, 2 09 1983, A5Google Scholar.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid; and n.62 infra.

62. The Times, London, 3 09 1983, p. 1Google Scholar.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. The Times, London, 2 09 1983, p. 1Google Scholar.

68. For the Soviet source see The Guardian, London, 6 09 1983, p. 1 (Report by McGill, Peter)Google Scholar.

69. The New York Times, 5 09 1983, pp. 1, 6Google Scholar.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Liech, M.N., ‘Current Developments’, 78 AJIL (1984) pp. 244–245Google Scholar.

74. See n.69 supra.

75. N.68 supra, a report by D. Fairhall (see there the comparative drawings of these two aircraft by Peter Clarke).

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.It later emanated from US sources that the Soviet fighter aircraft approached the Korean plane from the rear and below; therefore, missing the opportunity to identify its silhouette. This was contrary to the procedure recommended by ICAO.

78. See n.59 supra.

79. Ibid.

80. See n.62 supra.

81. ‘International Claims’;, 78 AJIL (1984) pp. 213–216

82. Ibid, and 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1211 (12 September 1983).

83. Ibid.

84. See n.81 supra; and Dept. of State File P83, 0121–1372.

85. This statement reported in The Guardian, London, 3 09 1983, p. 4Google Scholar.

86. UN Doc. S/15966/Rev 1 (12 September 1983); and Liech, , loc.cit. n.73Google Scholar.

87. See n.93 infra.

88. See n.62 supra.

89. See n.93 infra.

90. See n.68 supra.

91. See n.93 infra.

92. See n.68 supra.

93. The New York Times, 2 September 1983, A6 (Associated Press Report).

94. Ibid.

95. Dept. of State File P83, 0136–2061; and n.81 supra.

96. Ibid (0136–2063).

97. See n.81 supra.

98. See n.95 supra (0136–2065).

99. 97 Stat. (1983) pp. 715–716; and n.81 supra.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

103. 9 Air Law (1984) p. 75 et seq. (where the text of the Resolutions can be found).

104. For the first Resolution see ibid; ICAO Doc. A24-WP49/18/19/9/83 (Appendix 1); and Liech, loc.cit., n.73, (the Resolution was adopted by 26 Council Members in favour, 3 abstaining – Algeria, China and India – and two opposing, USSR and Czechoslovakia).

105. ICAO Doc. C-WP/7695 (15 September 1983).

106. N.104 supra (Appendix 2).

107. 9 Air Law (1984) p. 77 et seq.

108. ICAO Doc. A24–WP77, p. 38; EX/9, 26/9/83 (Add. 27/9/83); and Liech, loc.cit. n.73.

109. ICAO Doc. A24–WP85; and n.107 supra.

110. N.107 supra.

111. N.107 supra.

112. 39 ICAO Bui. 6 (1984) p. 14.

113. Ott, J., ‘ICAO Report dismisses Soviet Charges’, AW and ST, (19 12 1983) pp. 33–34Google Scholar.

114. Chicago Convention (n.2 supra), Art. 55(E).

115. Ibid, Art. 54 (J, K).

116. For the Report on this investigation see n.113, supra.

117. For further exploration of a possibility of a navigational error by the Korean cockpit crew, see: AW and ST, (12 December 1983) p. 5.

118. Reported in The Sunday Times, London, 22 07 1984, pp. 1–2Google Scholar (Article by Anthony Sampson).

119. See n.113 supra.

120. 39 ICAO Bul. 6 (1984) p. 10 et seq.

121. Ibid.For the unmodified original texts of the Austro-French and the US Draft Amendments, see n.107 supra.

122. 39 ICAO Bui. 6(1984) p. 10 et seq. Chilean ratification of the Protocol on 23 November 1984 was the first, which was followed by Mexico on 26 November 1984.

123. .See n.107 supra.

124. See n.107 supra.

125. See n.120 supra.

126. This provision has been incorporated in the amendment, Art. 3bis, to assure those nations which wanted to be protected from the ulterior uses of civil aviation; indeed, it regurgitates the exact words already incorporated in the Chicago Convention by Art. 4.

127. See n.120 supra.

128. 39 ICAO Bui. 6 (1984) pp. 14–28.

129. Ibid.

130. The Chinese were responsible for the shooting down of a Cathay Pacific airliner flying from Bangkok to Hong Kong on 23 July 1954. Saying that it was an accident and that the plane was mistaken for a hostile aircraft, the Peoples Republic of China agreed to entertain the UK claim for compensation for the injured and deceased; The Times, London, 24 07 1954, pp. 6, 8Google Scholar; Hughes, , loc.cit., n. 52, pp. 601–602Google Scholar.

131. 39 ICAO Bul. 6 (1984) pp. 14–28.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

134. Chicago Convention (n.2 supra), Art. 38.

135. See n.131 supra.

136. Ibid. See also n.142 infra,

137. N.131 supra.

138. Ibid.The extract is from the UN Secretary General's speech in the ILA Meeting in 1982 in Montreal.

139. N.131 supra, p. 10 et seq.

140. Ibid, p. 23

141. As mentioned above, the Soviet Union refused to recognise the investigative capacity of ICAO in respect of 1983 KAL incident. The US has objected to the economic competency of ICAO in air transport (which is limited anyway) which this author regards as untenable, see: Majid, A.A., ‘Impact of Current U.S. Policy on International Civil Aviation’, German Journal of Air and Space Law (1983) pp. 295–325, particularly p. 313 et seq.Google Scholar; and Majid, A.A., ‘Recent U.S. Aviation Policy – Need for Multilateralism Emphasised’, City of Lon. L.R. (1984) pp. 51–71Google Scholar, particularly p. 61 et seq.

142. See n.40 supra, p. 127; and Corfu Channel case, ICJ Rep. (1949) pp. 4, 22.

143. Hughes, , loc.cit., n.52, pp. 605–606Google Scholar.

144. Mexico v US (1928) 4 UNRIAA 119. See also Cheng, Bin, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (London 1953) p. 60Google Scholar.

145. See n.30 supra. The UK cited the Yugoslav approach with approval in its Memorial to the ICJ in the Aerial Incident Case, see n.40 supra, p. 363. The Legal Study Group of IFALPA (Int. Fed. of Air Line Pilots Assns.), regarded the wording of the amendment to the Chicago Convention, Art. 3bis, as self-contradictory and expressed the view that the above Yugoslav action should be considered the correct procedure in all such cases, see Air Law (1984) pp. 131–132.

146. The Times, London, 30 04 1952, p. 6Google Scholar and Hughes, , loc.cit., n.52, pp. 600–601Google Scholar.

147. See, e.g., Hughes, , loc.cit., n.52, p. 619Google Scholar. Prof. Oliver J. Lissitzyn, giving his opinion on the 1983 KAL incident, attached rather excessive importance to the fact of a warning being given; however, he said that if a warning was delivered and disobeyed, the Soviet Union still had to show that the aircraft had embarked upon a ‘hostile mission’ such as aerial espionage or the dropping of agents; The New York Times, 2 09 1983, A4 (by Margolick, DavidGoogle Scholar).

148. In the 25th ICAO Assembly, the UK Delegate subscribed to this definition of self defence. For further details see: Moore, J., ‘Caroline’, 2 History and Digest of International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party (1906) p. 412Google Scholar. On proportionality of response, see ‘I'm Alone', 3 UNRIAA 1609 (1929); and Air Services Agreement 1946, Arbitral Award of 9 December 1978, 54 ILR (1979) p. 304. For the broader scope of the Customary I.L. concept of Self Defence, see Delupis, , loc.cit., n.19, pp. 72–73Google Scholar.

149. Korovin, , ‘Aerial Espionage and International Law’, International Affairs (1960) pp. 49–50Google Scholar.