2. Art. 38(1) reads as follows: ‘The Court, whose functions is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it shall apply:

(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting states;

(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

(c) the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations;

(d) subject to the provisions of article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.’

3. See B. Lorinser, Bindende Resolutionen des Sicherheitsrates (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1996) pp. 59–62 for a discussion of the debate and references to the relevant documents; see also M. Fraas, Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen und Internationaler Gerichtshof (Frankfurt a/M, Peter Lang 1998) pp. 14–17.

4. J. Herbst, Rechtsbindung des UN-Sicherheitsrates (Frankfurt a/M, Peter Lang 1999) p. 98, illustrates that this ambiguity has led both the supporters and critics of judicial review of Security Council decisions to base their arguments on the preparatory documents. Cf., Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 62; B. Sloan, ‘The United Nations Charter as a Constitution’, 61 Pace YIL (1989) pp. 72, 74–75.

5. Herbst, op. cit. n. 4, at p. 98.

6. Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 97; C. Tomuschat, ‘Tyrannei der Minderheit?’, 19 GYIL (1976) p. 278; B. Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’, 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1998) p. 575; Sloan, op. cit. n. 4, at p. 73. Cf., Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 91.

7. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. USA), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, ICJ Rep. (1992) p. 3.

8. Advisory opinion, 35 ILM (1996) p. 813.

9. ibid., at p. 817.

10. For a more detailed discussion on why the wording of Art 10 in conjunction with Art 12 would support such a conclusion, see forthcoming article of E. de Wet, ‘Judicial Review of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly through Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice’, 10 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Internationales und Europäisches Recht (2000). See also Herbst, op. cit. n. 4, at pp. 404–405; and Fraas, op. cit. n. 3, at pp. 183–184. For a different opinion, see V. Gowlland Debbas, ‘The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in the Ught of the Lockerbie Case’, 88 AJIL (1994) p. 670.

11. See, for example, G.H. Oosthuizen, ‘Playing the Devil's Advocate: the United Nations Security Council is Unbound by Law’, 12 Leiden JIL (1999) pp. 521 et seq. The author questions whether there are any limits as to when and how the Security Council may act.

12. Cf., B. Martenczuk, ‘The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?’, 10 EJIL (1999) p. 517.

13. Cf., T.D. Gill, ‘Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council t o Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter’, 26 NYIL (1995) pp. 33 et seq.

14. M. Shahabuddeen, ‘Municipal Law Reasoning in International Law’, in Lowe, V. and Fitz-maurice, M., eds., Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice. Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge, Cambridge University 1996) p. 102; H. Mosler, 2 Encyclopedia of Public International Law (1995) p. 517.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15. See, for example, G. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘The “Federal Analogy” and UN Character Interpretation: A Crucial Issue’, 8 EJIL (1997) pp. 20–21, who regards (inter alia) the differences in the composition of international organisations and states as an insurmountable barrier for the purposes of constitutional analogy. Cf., Herbst, op. cit. n. 4, at pp. 389–391 and Fraas, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 4.

16. P. Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th rev. edn. (London, Routledge 1997) p. 48; Mosler, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 515. Cf., A. Verdross, ‘Les principes généraux du droit dans la jurisprudence Internationale’, 52 Recueil des cours (1935–II) pp. 195 et seq.; Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 5th edn. (Oxford, Clarendon 1998) p. 17;Google ScholarJennings, R. and Watts, A., Oppenheim's International Law, 9th edn. (London, Longman 1992) p. 39.Google Scholar

17. Malanczuk, op. cit. n. 16, at p. 48. For an indication of the intention of the drafters of Art. 38(l)(c) to this effect, see Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procés-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee (The Hague 1920) pp. 294 et seq. These travaux préparatoires concern the Statute of the PCLJ. Since Art. 38 was in essence overtaken in the Statute of the ICJ without any lenghty debate, the travaux preparatoires are still deemed relevant. See V.-D. Degan, ‘General Principles of Law’, 3 Finnish YIL (1992) pp. 33–41; G.J.H. van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law (The Hague, Kluwer 1983) pp. 136–139.

18. It is also disputed among writers whether general principles of law refer to those observed only in national jurisdictions, or whether in addition general principles can be deducted from international law through analogy as well. For present purposes, the focus will merely be on the general principles derived from municipal law. For a discussion see Mosler, loc. cit. n. 14, at pp. 513–515 and 522–526; Van Hoof, op. cit n. 17, at pp. 143–144; J.G. Lammers, ‘General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations’, in F. Kalshoven, et al., eds., Essays on the Development of the International Legal Order in Memory of Haw F. Van Panhuys (Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff and Noordhoff 1980) pp. 56–57; O. Elias and C. lim, ‘“General Principles of Law”, “Soft” Law and the Identification of International Law’, 28 NYIL (1997) pp. 28–35.

19. For discussion of the theoretical opinions see Degan, op. cit. n. 17, at pp. 1–6; Lammers, op. cit. n. 18, at pp. 56–59; B. Vitanyi, ‘Les positions doctrinales concemant le sens de la notion de “principes généraux de droit reconnus par les nations civilisées“’, 86 Revue générate de droit international public (1982) p. 48; H.W.A. Thirlway, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Part Two’, 61 BWL (1990) p. 113.

20. See A. Verdross and B. Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht, 3rd edn. (Berlin, Duncker and Humblot 1984) p. 384. Their view would be comparable with statements of Baron Decampes of Belgium in the Procès-Verbaux, supra n. 17, at pp. 310–331. See also H.C. Gutteridge, “The Meaning of the Scope of Art. 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice’, 38 Transactions of the Grotius Society (1952) p. 127, who descibes the general principles as extremely rare.

21. B. Simma and P. Alston, “The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles’, 12 Australian YIL (1992)p. 102.

22. Ibid., at p. 102.

23. Mosler, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 517.

24. C. Bassiouni, ‘A Functional approach to “General Principles of International Law“’, 11 Michigan JIL (1989) p. 777. See also H. Schermers and N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law, Vol. I, 3rd rev. edn. (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 1994) p. 824. Cf., Van Hoof, op. cit n. 17, at pp. 138–139.

25. Mosler, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 517; K. Hailbronner, ‘Ziele und Methoden völkerrechtlich relevanter Rechtsvergleichung’, 36 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1976) p. 207. See also H. Mosler, ‘Rechtsvergleichung vor völkerrechtlichen Gerichten’, in R. Marcic, et al., eds., Festschrift für Verdross zum 80. Geburtstag (München, Fink 1971) p. 382, where he states that the concept of civilised nations is outdated. Degan, op. cit. n. 17, at p. 54, indicates that Art. 38(1)(c) may be repugnant to many modern scholars, simply because of the term ‘civilized nations'.

26. Gutteridge, loc. cit. n. 20, at p. 127. See also B. Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrates. Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaβnahme durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin, Duncker and Humblot 1996) p. 64. He is in favour of a large majority of states recognising the general principle. Bassiouni, loc. cit n. 24, at p. 812, describes the main families as the (a) Romanist-civilist-Germanic systems; (b) common law systems; (c) Marxistsocialist systems; (d) Islamic systems and (e) Asian systems. He omits the African systems from this listing. But see Hailbronner, loc. cit. n. 25, at p. 208. He points to the difficulty of obtaining information about African and Asian customary law. At the same time, however, he submits that these states have to a large extent taken over the legal systems of other countries. Therefore, he argues, the relevance of the customary systems for the determination of general principles is reduced.

27. K. Zemanek, ‘Was kann die Vergleichung staatlichen öffentlichen Rechts für das Recht der internationalen Organisation leisten?’, 24 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1964) p.464.

28. Ibid., at p. 465; Cf., H. Steinberger, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence and Judicial Protection of the Individual against the Executive: A Method for Ascertaining International Law?’, in H. Mosler, ed., Judicial Protection against the Executive, Vol. III (Cologne, Carl Heymanns 1971) p. 275; I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, ‘Die Rolle der Rechtsvergleichung im Völkerrecht’, in F.A. von der Heydte, Völkerrecht und rechtliches Weltbild: Festschrift für Alfred Verdross (Vienna, Springer 1960) p. 269.

29. Mosler (1971), op. cit. n. 25, at p. 404; M. Bothe, ‘Die Bedeutung der Rechtsvergleichung in der Praxis internationaler Gerichte’, 36 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1976) p. 298.

30. Bothe, loc. cit. n. 29, at p. 287; Mosler, loc. cit n. 14, at pp. 517–518. Zemanek, loc. cit. n. 27, at p. 463; Cf., Hailbronner, loc. cit n. 25, at p. 210. For a more cautious approach see M. Bothe and G. Ress, “The Comparative Method and Public International Law’, in W.E. Butler, ed., International Law in a Comparative Perspective (Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff and Noordhoff 1980) p. 53. Using the European Union as a starting point, they submit that the different legal systems of the Member States have much in common with respect to, inter alia, fundamental rights as far as the mere principles are concerned. There nonetheless remain considerable differences with respect to details which would make it impossible to dispense with a more detailed examination of lawful restriction on these fundamental rights. If this proves to be true for the Member States of the European Union, it would be surely true for any other group of states.

31. Bothe and Ress, op. cit. n. 30, at p. 53. See also G. Ress ‘Die Bedeutung der Rechtsvergleichung für das Recht internationaler Organisational’, in 36 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1976) p. 278.

32. Shahabuddeen, op. cit. n. 14, at p. 102; Mosler, loc., cit. n. 14, at p. 517.

33. Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 553.

34. Ibid., at pp. 553–554; C. Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States without or against their Will’, 241 Recueil des cours (1993–IV) p. 235; T.M. Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, 86 AJIL (1992) pp. 46 et seq.

35. Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at pp. 553–554. The new constitution in post-apartheid South Africa, for example, demonstrates a profound belief in a constitution as an instrument of organising government and which secures freedom for individuals and communities. President Thabo Mbeki (quoted in Fassbender) emphasised the African character of this constitution and described it as a creation of African hands and African minds.

36. Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 536.

37. Ibid., at p. 534.

38. Ibid., at p. 538.

39. Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 85; Sloan, op. cit. n. 4, at p. 81. See the Certain Expenses of the United Nations, advisory opinion, ICJ Rep. (1962) p. 157.

40. Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 85; Verdross and Simma, op. cit. n. 20, at pp. 77–78. See also S. Rosenne, Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945–1986 (Cambridge, Cambridge University 1989) p. 194. He pointed out that even those who do not accept the implications of the Charter as a constitution usually do not submit that it is for all purposes to be measured by the yardstick of the normal law of treaties only.

41. Tomuschat, loc. cit. n. 34, at p. 219.

42. Ibid., at p. 236; Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 573.

43. D. Thürcr, ‘Internationales “Rule of Law” – innerstaatliche Demokratie’, Schweizerische Zeitschrifi für Internationales and Europäisches Recht (1995) p. 457; Sloan, op. cit n. 4, at pp. 62, 116. See also Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 87, who states that the Charter, like a national constitution, expresses a political compromise that reflects a basic consensus between the different groups of power. Cf., P.-M. Dupuy, “The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited’, 1 Max Planck YIL (1997) p. 3.

44. Art. 1 para. 1 and Art. 2 para. 4.

45. Art. 1 para. 1 and Art. 2 para. 3 and para. 33.

46. Art. 1 para. 2.

47. Art. 1 para. 3.

48. Art. 1 para. 3. This reference to human rights is complemented by Arts. 55 and 56 of the Charter which affirms the universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

49. Art 2 para. 1; Cf., Dupuy, op. cit. n. 43, at p. 6.

50. A/RES/2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970; see also Dupuy, op. cit. n. 43, at p. 31; Fassbender, loc. cit n. 6, at p. 573.

51. Dupuy, op. cit. n. 43, at p. 31.

52. Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969; see also J.A. Frowein, ‘Jus Cogens’, III Encyclopedia of Public International Law (1995) p. 66; Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 589.

53. Dupuy, op. cit. n. 43, at p. 7; Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 589.

54. Cf., Frowein, loc. cit. n. 52, at p. 67, who states that it is generally recognised that the prohibition of the use of force has the character ofjus cogens.

55. Dupuy, op. cit. n. 43, at p. 7. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Merits, ICJ Rep. (1986) pp. 95, 102.

56. Dupuy, op. cit. n. 43, at p. 8.

57. Tomuschat, loc. cit. n. 34, at pp. 217–218.

58. Ibid. The rules on government in the United Kingdom constitute the prime example of a constitution whose relevant components cannot be found in a single document.

59. Supra n. 55, at p. 100; Dupuy, op. cit. n. 43, at pp. 8–9.

60. Dupuy, op. cit. n. 43, at pp. 9–10. He submits that the ICJ proceeded in a similar way in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), judgement, ICJ Rep. (1980) p. 3. The emphatic way in which it stressed the importance of the obligation of states to respect the diplomatic and consular immunities attached to the representatives of foreign countries, suggest peremptory character. Although the respect for diplomatic immunities is not mentioned in the Charter, it can also be linked with the principle of equality of sovereign states. Cf., V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Security Council Enforcement Actions and Issues of State Responsibility’, 43 ICLQ (1994) p. 69.

61. Dupuy, op. cit. n. 43, at pp. 10–11, 31.

62. Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 553.

63. Cf., Thürer, loc. cit. n. 43, at pp. 457–458. Within this new perspective of the international constitutional community new fields of activity arise whilst traditional state communities and state sovereignty loose (some of their) significance. This fact seems to be overlooked by Arangio-Ruiz, loc. cit., n. 15, at p. 8, when stating that state sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction are reserved by Art. 2(7) of the Charter. As a result, he is not willing to accept the constitutional nature of the Charter.

64. T.M. Franck, ‘The Political and the Judicial Empires: Must there be a Conflict over Conflict-Resolution?’, in N. Al-Naumi and R. Meese, eds., International Legal Issues Arising under the Nations Decade of International Law (The Hague, Nijhoff 1995) p. 627; Dupuy, op. cit. n. 43, p. 28; Sloan, op. cit. n. 4, at p. 117.

65. Dupuy, op. cit. n. 43, at p. 3; Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 581.

66. The only countries that are not members of the United Nations are Switzerland, Taiwan, State of the Vatican City, Kiribati, Tavula, Tonga and Nauru. See Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 567.

67. Fassbender, loc., cit. n. 6, at p. 542.

68. See also J.A. Frowein, ‘Obligations Erga Omnes’, III Encyclopedia ofInternational Law p. 757.

69. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain), second phase, ICJ Rep. (1970) p. 32 at p. 32. Frowein, loc. cit. n. 68, at p. 757; Tomuschat, loc. cit. n. 34, at p. 195.

70. Barcelona Traction case, supra n. 69, at p. 32; J.A. Frowein, ‘Collective Enforcement of International Obligations’, 47 Zeitschrift für Ausländisces öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1987) p. 71.

71. Frowein, loc. cit. n. 68, at p. 757.

72. See Lockerbie case, supra n. 7, at p. 3. See also Gowlland-Debbas, loc. cit. n. 60, at p. 88. She states that this hierarchy between treaties and predominance of Charter obligations reflects the constitutional character of the Charter.

73. Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969; See G.S. Watson, ‘Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court’, 34 Harv. ILJ (1993) p. 37, who submits that it is generally agreed that states cannot enter into treaties to commit genocide, perpetuate slavery, engage in illegal aggression, or to perpetuate Apartheid.

74. Dupuy, op. cit. n. 43, at p. 14; Cf., Watson, loc. cit n. 73, at p. 37.

75. Franck, op. cit. n. 64, at p. 662.

76. Cf., Lorinser, op. cit n. 3, at p. 53; Cf., Fraas, op. cit n. 3, at p. 78.

77. Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at pp. 548,554,574; Tomuschat, loc. cit n. 34, at p. 216.

78. Lorinser, , op. cit. n. 3, at p. 84.Google Scholar

79. Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 574; Thürer, loc. cit. n. 43, at pp. 457,463.

80. Lorinser, op. cit n. 3, at p. 97.

81. Ibid.; Doehring, K., ‘Unlawful Resolutions of the Security Council and their Legal Consequences’, 1 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (1997) p. 96.Google Scholar

82. Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at pp. 97.

83. Ibid., at pp. 97–98; by Herdegen, M.J., 27 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law (1994) p. 151; see also Martenczuk, op. cit. n. 26, at p. 65.Google Scholar

84. Lorinser, op. cit n. 3, at p. 86; Arangio-Ruiz, loc. cit. n. 15, at pp. 10–11.

85. Doehring, op. cit n. 81, at p. 97; see also Tomuschat, op. cit n. 6, at p. 278; Tomuschat, loc. cit. n. 34, at p. 238.

86. Doehring, op. cit. n. 81, at p. 97; Cf., Verdross and Simma, op. cit. n. 20, at p. 78.

87. Herdegen, op. cit. n. 83, at pp. 150–151. The European Union exercises competencies that have been transferred to it by the Member States. Its main political organ is the Council of Ministers, which makes decisions usually on the basis of majority rule. The Community Treaties explicitly recognise the European Court of Justice as the guardian of Union legality vis-à-vis the other organs and the Member States. This court possesses a clear cut constitutional authority to interpret the Community Treaties and to annul measures adopted by other European Union organs. (See, e.g., Ar t 220 (former Art. 164) of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EC Treaty)). Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 558. Cf., K. Lenaerts, ‘Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community’, 28 CML Rev. (1991) pp. 11 etseq.Google Scholar

88. Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 558.

89. S. Wright Sheive, ‘Central and Eastern European Constitutional Courts and the Anti-major-itarian Objection to Judicial Review’, 26 Law and Policy in International Business (1995) p. 1221; Shahabuddeen, op. cit. n. 14, at p. 95.

90. SeeDoehring, op. cit. n. 81, at p. 98.

91. The issue of whether the General Assembly can engage in law-making activities will not be explored here. For a discussion on the normative effect of (unanimous) resolutions of the General Assembly, see Tomuschat, op. cit. n. 6, at pp. 279–282.

92. Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 574.

93. That this is also the case with the separation of powers within the European Union, is indicated by Lenaerts, loc. cit. n. 87, at p. 13.

94. 501 US 252 (1991).

95. Cf., Bowhser v. Synar, 478 US 714 (1986).

96. Cf., Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983).

97. Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at pp. 91,93.

98. See the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff case, supra n. 60, at p. 21; Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at pp. 91–92. Cf., Arts. 24 and 92 of the Charter, which refers to the powers of the Security Council and the ICJ, respectively.

99. Cf., Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 576; also conceded by Lorinser, op. cit n. 3, at p. 98.

100. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v. United States of America, Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application, ICJ Rep. (1984) p. 432 at p. 433.

101. As is attempted by Herbst, op. cit. n. 4, at pp. 389–390; and Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 98.

102. Cf., n. 131 and n. 134 infra.

103. Supra n.7.

104. This would also apply to the ICJ's assertion in the Certain Expenses opinion, supra n. 39, at p. 168, to the effect that the United Nations system does not have a procedure for determining the validity of its organs, as it exits in some domestic jurisdictions. This is merely a reaffirmation that there is no fully fledged appeal system in the United Nations. It does not reflect on the propriety of comparative analysis between domestic systems and the United Nations system for the purposes of judicial review per se.

105. Thürer, loc. cit. n. 43, at pp. 457, 463; Sloan, op. cit. n. 4, at p. 63; Dupuy, op. cit. n. 43, at p. 30.

106. Cf., Fassbender, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 572.

107. See the website http://www.sigov.si/us/eus-map.html which is operated by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia and was last updated on 14 April 1999. The website also offers links to a variety of constitutional courts and other bodies exercising constitutional review at http://www.sigov.si/ us/ courtnet.html. Another webiste in this regard is provided by the Commission of Venice at http://www.coe.fr/venice/links-e.htm.

108. G. Brunner, ‘Die neue Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Osteuropa’, 53 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentlkhes Recht umi Völkerrecht (1993) p. 819; Young Hu, ‘Sechs Jahre Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Republik Korea’, 45 Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts (1997) p. 535; Wright Sheive, loc. cit. n. 89, at p. 1201.

109. R.F. Utter and D.C. Lundsgaard, ‘Judicial Review in the New Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Some Thoughts from a Comparative Perspective’, 3 OSCE Bulletin (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) (1995) p. 13.

110. Countries (and regions) with this system include Albania, Andorra, Angola, Argentina (province of Tucuman), Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bashkiria (Russia) Belarus, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Germany, Georgia, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Kazahstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Moldavia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Russia, Romania, Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tadjikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. See http://www.sigov.si/cgi-bin/htimage/images/svet2.map?25,506. Cf., Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 82.

111. Countries with this procedure are Belgium, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Costa Rica, Eritrea, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Niger, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Senegal, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Uruguay, Yemen, Zaire. See http://www.sigov.si/cgi-bin/htimage/images/ svet2.map?190,508.

112. Countries adhering to this procedure include Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Canada, Cameroon, Comoros, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kiribati, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Singapore, St. Christopher/Nevis, Surinam, Sweden, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United States of America, Zambia, Zimbabwe. See http://www.sigov.si/cgi-bin/htimage /images/svet2.map? 180,536. See also Utter and Lundsgaard, loc. cit. n. 109, at p. 15; Cf., Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 81.

113. Countries that adhere to this model and that have a specialised Constitutional Court include Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Gautemala, Portugal. Other countries which adhere to the model, but which do not have a specialised Constitutional Court are Brazil, Switzerland, Taiwan, El Salvador, Greece, Indonesia, Iran, Venezuela. See http://www.sigov.si/cgi-bin/htimage/images/svet2.map?182,571 and http://www.sigov.si/cgi-bin/htimage/images/svet2.map?21,535. Cf., Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 82.

114. Countries applying this procedure include France, Algeria, Ivory Coast, Morocco and Mozambique. See http://www.sigov.si/cgi-bin/htimage/images/svet2.map?369,503.

115. These countries include Australia, Afghanistan, Brunei, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Finland (based on long term practice, Guinea Bissau, Kuwait, Mauritius, North Korea, Sao Tome and Principe, Tunisia, Turkmenistan and Vietnam. See http://www.sigov.si/cgi~bin/htimage/images/svet2.map7516,533. See also Utter and Lundsgaard, loc. cit. n. 109, at p. 15.

116. Libya, Liberia, Guinea, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands do not recognize national judicial review.

117. Such as Burma, Lagos, Oman, Saudi-Arabia and Somalia.

118. Cf., Utter and Lundsgaard, loc. cit. n. 109, at p. 15.

119. Marckx v. Belgium, ECHR, Series A 31 (1979); see also D.J. Harris, et al, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (London, Butterworths 1995) p. 26.

120. Vermeire v. Belgium, ECHR, Series A 214-C (1991); Harris, et al, op. cit. n. 119, at p. 30.

121. Cf., for example, Art 226 (former Art 169) and Art 227 (former Art 170) of the EC Treaty.

122. Art. 228 (former Art. 171) of the EC Treaty; see H. von der Groeben, et al, eds., Kommentar zum EU-/EG-Vertrag, Vol. 4,5th edn. (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1997) pp. 4/531–4/532.

123. I.e., the norms of the European Convention on Human Rights or of EC law.

124. Harris, et al, op. cit n. 119, at p. 26; Van der Groeben, et al, op. cit n. 122, at pp. 4/531 et seq. This is, in principle, also the effect of the preliminary rulings procedure provided by Art. 234 (former Art 177) of the EC Treaty. On receiving requests from national courts concerning the interpretation of EC law, the European Court of Justice is limited to interpreting EC law and may not give an opinion on the compatability of the national law with EC law. On the other hand, however, the European Court of Justice will formulate its opinion in such a way that the national court would be in a position to draw the necessary consequences for the national law with respect to the case at hand – for example, that it should not be applied. Cf., Craig, P. and de Búrca, G., EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford, Oxford University 1998) pp. 407 et seq.Google Scholar

125. Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 83.

126. Franck, op. cit. n. 64, at p. 630; J.E. Alvarez, ‘Theoretical Perspectives on Judicial Review by the World Court’, 89 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International taw (1995) p. 87.

127. Cf., Franck, op. cit n. 64, at p. 625.

128. Cf., Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at pp. 79, 84.

129. Wright Sheive, loc. cit n. 89, at p. 1222.

130. Franck, op. cit. n. 64, at pp. 630–631.

131. Wright Sheive, loc. cit n. 89, at p. 1221.

132. Franck, op. cit. n. 64, at pp. 630–631; Wright Sheive, loc. cit n. 89, at p. 1221.

133. Watson, loc. cit n. 73, at pp. 28, 31. The criticism that judges are neither representative nor accountable to the electorate is less pronounced in the United Nations than in some national systems. ICJ judges are indeed elected by the Security Council and General Assembly. The ICJ is also a much more representative body than the Security Council. Not only are all the major regions of the world represented, but no state is guaranteed a seat on the ICJ or holds any veto in the decision making process. Cf., Art. 13 of the Charter.

134. Watson, loc., cit n. 73, at p. 28; see also Lorinser, op. cit n. 3, at p. 80, who fears excessive political judgements by courts. Cf., Wright Sheive, loc. cit n. 89, at p. 1216. With respect to abstract review, she refers to the criticism that it allows courts to alter legislative outcomes and foreclose political initiatives that might otherwise be open to popularly elected legislatures and government.

135. The United States, for example, attempted to deal with this controversy by means of the introduction of the political question doctrine. In certain circumstances the courts refrain from giving a decision, on the basis of the political nature of the decision. For a recent article on this issue, see M. David, ‘Passport to Justice: Internationalizing the Political Question Doctrine for Application n i the World Court’, 40 Harv. ILJ (1999) pp. 81 et seq.

136. Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 80; Wright Sheive, loc. cit. n. 89, at p. 1218. Cf., H. Klug, ‘Introducing the Devil: An Institutional Analysis of the Power of Constitutional Review’, 13 South African Journal on Human Rights (1997) p. 191.

137. Cf., Utter and Lundsgaard, loc. cit. n. 109, at p. 22.

138. Cf., R. Higgens, ‘Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process’, 17ICLQ (1968) p. 63. Note also that the ICJ has consistently refused to adopt the view that the political context within which a legal dispute is taking place should prevent it from deciding on the legal issues at hand. Cf., n. 102 supra.

139. Higgens, loc. cit n. 138, at p. 63.

140. Franck, op. cit. n. 64, at p. 630. He refers in particular to the courts in the United States, Canada, Germany and Australia. Wright Sheive, loc. cit. n. 89, at p. 1218, refers to a notion of ‘social accountability' on the part of the courts in this context.

141. See also Alvarez, loc. cit. n. 126, at p. 88.

142. Alvarez, loc. cit. n. 126, at p. 88.

143. Franck, op. cit. n. 64, at p. 631.

144. Dupuy, op. cit. n. 43, at p. 30.

145. Cf., Dupuy, op. cit. n. 43, at p. 30; But see Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 100, who argues that the mere failure of this mechanism is no justification for introducing judicial review. This is also implied by Gill, op. cit. n. 13, at p. 121, who submits that the lack of legitimacy is not a judicial issue that can be remedied by judicial review. Cf., Tomuschat, loc. cit. n. 34, at p. 249

146. Lorinser, op. cit n. 3, at p. 80.

147. Lorinser, op. cit n. 3, at p. 83. See generally R. Bernhardt, ‘Normkontrolle’, in H. Mosler, Verfassungsrichtsbarkeit in der Gegenwart (Berlin, Springer 1962) pp. 727 et seq. Also see http://www.sigov.si/us/map/powers/powers.html for an overview of the different types of reviewing powers.

148. See also Wright Sheive, loc. cit. n. 89, at p. 1209.

149. Wright Sheive, loc. cit n. 89, at p. 1209; Utter and Lundsgaard, loc. cit n. 109, at p 21.

150. Lorinser, op. cit n. 3, at pp. 82–83; see also Herdegen, loc. cit. n. 83, at p. 151; Utter and Lundsgaard, loc. cit. n. 109, at pp. 19–20.

151. Cf., Gill, supra n. 13, at p. 117, who argues that courts traditionally steer clear of reviewing issues relating to national security. On the other hand, one should keep in mind that the national security argument is very often abused by governments. For that very reason it would be advisable t o subject it to judicial review.

152. Cf., R. Bemhardt, ‘Eigenheiten und Ziele der Rechtsvergleichung im offentlichen Recht’, 24 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1964) p. 447. For an opinion that a link between formal state recognition and actual intra-state implementation is important, see Bothe and Ress, op. cit. n. 30, at p. 51.

153. Cf., Rosenne, op. cit. n. 40, at p. 226.

154. Watson, loc. cit. n. 73, at p. 13. For the normative impact of so called non-binding advisory opinions or decisions, see De Wet, loc. cit. n. 10.

155. Ivarez, loc. cit. n. 126, at p. 89.

156. Cf., Shahabuddeen, op. cit. n. 14, at p. 95. It would be incorrect to view the ICJ as if it were a court exercising judicial power on exactly the same basis as that on which a municipal court does. But that consideration, relating to differences in the basis of the power, is not a convincing reason for suggesting that no analogy exists as to the nature of the power itself.

157. As is feared by Lorinser, op. cit. n. 3, at p. 86.

158. Franck, op. cit. n. 64, at p. 625. The Court will understand that its power of review is essentially a weapon of deterrence, the effectiveness of which is best demonstrated by the absence of occasions for its future. A similar point is made by P. Malanczuk, ‘Reconsidering the Relationship between the ICJ and the Security Council’, in W.P. Heere, International Law and The Hague's 750th Anniversary (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser 1999) p. 99.

159. Legal Consequence for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Rep. (1971) p. 45.

160. Ibid., at p. 45.

161. See De Wet, loc.cit. n. 10.

162. See ibid., for arguments that disputes the correctness of this position.

163. See decision of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tadic, FT-94–1-AR72, 2 October 1995, p. 7. The Appeals Chamber determined that the competence to determine the legality of its own creation belongs to the essence of its jurisdiction, i.e., its judicial function to state what the law is. Cf., the decision of the ICTR, in Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Decision on Jurisdiction, Case No. ICTR–96–15–T, 18 June 1997, pp. 6 et seq. Cf., Herbst, op. cit. n.4, at pp. 283–284, 290–291.