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The Interpretation of Decisions of International Organizations
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 May 2009
Extract
In the present writer's view, certain decisions of international organizations are to be recognized as manifestations of international law in their own right; those, namely, which address themselves to the members of the relevant organization, or to some of them, and bind them as to their conduct. Being manifestations in written form, their interpretation may as much constitute a problem as does the interpretation of treaties. The main question, here, is whether the methods and rules of treaty interpretation also apply to the interpretation of these “conductdecisions” of international organizations.
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References
1. This writer, “The Recognized Manifestations of International Law, A New Theory of ‘Sources’”, German Yearbook of International Law (GYIL), 1977 p. 25Google Scholar.
2. Ibid. p. 25.
3. Ibid. pp. 65 and 69.
4. Vallejo, Manuel Diez de Velasco, Instituciones de derecho international publico, vol. II (Organizaciones Internacionales) (Madrid, 1977) pp. 51–56Google Scholar.
5. Comp. the International Court's advisory opinion of 20 July 1962 (Certain Expenses of the United Nations), ICJ Reports, 1962 p. 163: “it is the General Assembly (…) whose decision determines status”.
6. As admitted by the author himself, Ibid. pp. 54 and 55.
7. See the Certain Expenses case p. 164.
8. Kuyper, Pieter J., “The Netherlands and International Organizations”, in International Law in the Netherlands, vol. II (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979) pp. 31–32Google Scholar.
9. Art. 149 of the Convention between Germany and Poland for Establishing a Conventional Regime in Upper Silesia, concluded at Geneva on 15 May 1922, provided as follows: “En ce qui concerne l'application et l'interprétation des dispositions de la présente partie par les autorités administratives (…), les personnes appartenant à une minorité pourront (…) soumettre pour examen une pétition à l'Office des minorités de leur Etat (…). Dans le cas où les pétitionnaires ne seraient pas satisfaits de la solution donnée à l'affaire par l'autorité administrative, ils pourront faire appel au Conseil de la Société des Nations” (British and Foreign State Papers, 1923, Part II (London, 1926) pp. 412–413)Google Scholar. The Convention did not specify the effect of a Council decision, and its binding force, therefore, had to be based either on the law of the League, or on general international law.
10. “The Recognized Manifestations” p. 25.
11. See this writer's “Theory and Practice of Treaty Interpretation”, NILR, 1980 p. 145Google Scholar.
12. Series A/B, No. 40 p. 16.
13. Ibid. p. 18.
14. Ibid.
15. ICJ Reports, 1951 p. 19.
16. Ibid. p. 23.
17. Ibid. p. 24.
18. ICJ Reports, 1971 p. 45 (paia. 89).
19. Ibid. pp. 49–50 (para. 103).
20. Ibid. pp.131–133. On the Court's jurisdiction with respect to validity, see also in a positive sense the separate opinions of Judges Oneyama, ICJ Reports, 1971 p. 144, Dillard, Ibid. p. 151, and Gros, Ibid. pp. 331–332. Hesitating: De Castro, Ibid. pp. 181–182. Contra: Judge Padilla Nervo, Ibid. p. 105. On the possible consequences of an examination of the question of validity, see an older, though still useful article by Lauterpacht, E., “The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations”, in Cambridge Essays in International Law (Essays in honour of Lord McNair) (London, 1965) pp. 88–121Google Scholar.
21. On the difference between “rules” and “methods”, see “Theory and Practice” pp. 136 and 143.
22. ICJ Reports 1971 p. 46 (para. 92).
23. Ibid. p. 189.
24. ICJ Reports 1974 p. 336 (para. 50).
25. ICJ Reports 1974 pp. 335–336 (paras. 48–49).
26. Ibid. pp. 379–380.
27. ICJ Reports 1974 pp. 161–162.
28. ICJ Reports 1951 pp. 21–22.
29. ICJ Reports 1974 p. 162.
30. ICJ Reports 1951 p. 23.
31. See “Theory and Practice” p. 150, for an interpretation of the composite expression “object and purpose”.
32. ICJ Reports 1951 p. 23; and see p. 24: “the purposes which the General Assembly (…) had in mind”
33. ICJ Reports 1971 p. 189.
34. ICJ Reports 1974 p. 380.
35. Martin, Pierre-Marie, Le conflit israélo-arabe (Recherches sur l'emploi de la force en droit international public positif) (Paris, 1973) p. 254Google Scholar. Comp. Sur, L'interprétation en droit international public (Paris, 1974) p. 227Google Scholar.
36. See “Theory and Practice” p. 145.
37. As a note in the margin, the present writer would observe that, consequently, no annexation of Eastern Jerusalem could take place on the principle that victims of aggression may annex parts of “the territory of a vanquished aggressor”.
38. Martin, , op.cit., pp. 253–288Google Scholar. Developments afterwards culminated in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel concluded at Washington on 26 March 1979. Under Article I of the Treaty, Israel undertook to withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai. As laid down in Article I of Annex I (Protocol Concerning Israeli Withdrawal and Security Agreements), the withdrawal was to take place in two phases, the second one to be terminated not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty. Under Art. II of the Treaty, the status of the Gaza Strip was reserved. See International Legal Materials, vol. 18 (1979) pp. 362 et seqCrossRefGoogle Scholar.
39. See “Theory and Practice” pp. 152–154.
40. See Ibid. p. 152.
41. Comp. “Theory and Practice” p. 163.
42. See “Theory and Practice” p. 155.
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