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The Impact of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the Legal Order of the Netherlands
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 May 2009
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28. The government has made it clear that both in general and in particular situations the provisions of the Convention are binding on the administrative authorities when exercising their functions. The direct influence of the Convention on the administration therefore arises mainly through the continuous interpretation of the provisions of the Convention by the public authorities when carrying out their duties. The influence of the Convention becomes apparent whenever there is a difference of opinion as to such interpretation between the administrative authorities and political bodies, such as the States-General, or between the administrative authorities and the private citizen. This may occasion discussion in the States-General or a decision by the courts.
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128a See also Boukema, , op. cit. footnote 59, pp. 173–175.Google Scholar
129 Report of the Commission on the right of information, 9 De Journalist (1958), pp. 223–229.Google Scholar
130 Handelingen II 1961–62 Bijl. 6500 – VIII no. 7, p. 39.
131 A reporter who was observing the disturbances in Amsterdam in early June 1966 in the course of his work, was arrested by the police and brought before an examining Magistrate in Amsterdam on a charge of disturbing the Queen's peace. He was released on bail, on condition that he refrained during a certain period from attending riots and disturbances in Amsterdam and its surroundings. The Federation of Dutch Journalists at once made a heavy protest to the government against this encroachment upon the free exercise of the reporter's trade, which, in its opinion, amounted to an unwarranted restriction upon freedom of information. The Federation asked the government to intervene with the police and judicial authorities in Amsterdam so as to guarantee for the future the proper exercise of the public functions of the press, radio and television under all circumstances and without hindrance by the police or the judicial authorities. De Journalist 15 06 1966.Google Scholar
The Minister of Justice has in fact made known that, in his view, the judicial authorities made a misjudgment in this case. De Journalist 30 06 1966.Google Scholar It seems that the restrictions on the freedom of movement of the reporter in question were, in fact, lifted shortly afterwards. No limitation on the freedom of journalists to gather information has since been reported from Amsterdam. In The Hague, however, the police interfered with the activities of press and film reporters during disorders and riots on 20 September 1966. The police action consisted in making the free exercise of the reporter's trade impossible manu militarii. This police action led again to heavy protest on the part of the several Unions of Journalists and daily and weekly press organs. The police authorities recognized afterwards that the police action against the reporters had indeed exceeded the limits of proper police conduct (Volkskrant 21 09 1966Google Scholar; Nieuwe Haagse Courant 21 09 1966Google Scholar; Algemeen Handelsblad 21 09 1966).Google Scholar
The burgomaster of The Hague in reply to a question put to him by a socialist member of the Municipal Council said, however, that the exercise of a (foto)-reporter's trade under circumstances in which action is being taken to restore or to maintain law and order, entails inevitably a number of risks. It is not possible to shield reporters from these risks which are inherent to their trade (Het Vrije Volk 19 10 1966).Google Scholar
132 H.R. 25 June 1965, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1966 no. 115.Google Scholar
133 The former opinion was defended by the Nederlandse Omroepstichting (Netherlands Broadcasting Foundation), in Commerciële Televisie (1963)Google Scholar, with an annex: “The Freedom of Expression”, written in collaboration with Professor A. D. Belin-fante; the latter view is supported by Veegens, , loc. cit. footnote 79, at p. 62.Google ScholarVan Panhuys, , Het Verdrag van Rome, de reclame en de commerciële televisie, 1962.Google Scholar Cf. Boukema, , op. cit., pp. 180–198.Google Scholar
134 Handelingen II 1962–63, Bijl. 6270 no. 3, pp. 3–8.
135 In Re Stichting Radio Omroep en Televisiezender Het Parool, Koninklijk Besluit (Royal Decree), 25 10 1965Google Scholar, Administratieve en Rechterlijke Beslissingen 1966, p. 10.Google Scholar
136 Cf. Prins, , “Het interview Bidault en de rechten van de mens”, Nederlands Juristenblad 1963, pp. 348–349.Google Scholar
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It should be noted that Articles 65 and 66 of the Constitution (vide supra para. 5) apply mutatis mutandis to the overseas territories of the Kingdom.
140 V. supra, footnote 133.
141 This is, for instance, the case in the Federal German “Gesetz über Versammlungen und Aufzüge”, Sartorios, Verfassmgs- und Verwaltungsgesetze der Bundesrepubliek, par. 435, quoted by van der Burg, F. H., Nederlands Juristenblad 1966, p. 687.Google Scholar The Act presupposes freedom to demonstrate. A demonstration can only be forbidden or interfered with by the German public authorities if it is to be expected that it will lead to the immediate endangering of the maintenance of public order or public security.
142 E.g. Article 101 of the Amsterdam Local Police Ordinance reads:
“It is forbidden in public or on the public highway:
a) to walk in a procession
b) to take part in a procession for which no permission has been granted in terms of this Ordinance”
143 H.R. 25 June 1963, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1964 no. 239Google Scholar, in English in 11 Neth. I. L. Rev. (1964), p. 300.Google Scholar See infra p. 22.Google Scholar
144 By the defendants in a number of prosecutions for the contravention of Article 101 of the Amsterdam Local Police Ordinance. Het Parool, 22 06 1966Google Scholar; De Volks-krant, 22 06 1966Google Scholar; Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 14 06 1966.Google Scholar The Courts have, however, consistently uphold the validity of the impugned provision. See infra p. 23.Google Scholar
145 The measures adopted by the police to suppress violence and break up unauthorized demonstrations have also raised the question of the conformity of such police action with the Convention. The police practice of seizing demonstrators, not for the purpose of bringing a charge against them before a competent judicial authority, but only with a view to detaining them at a police station for the time of the demonstration or taking them a considerable distance outside the city limits and leaving them there, has been criticized as being in violation of Article 5 of the Convention. See Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant 21 07 1966Google Scholar; Smeets, , Nederlands Juristen-blad 1966, pp. 833–834Google Scholar; Van Emde Boas, , “De Politie en de Rechten van de Mens”, 29Google ScholarHet Tijdschrift voor de Politie (1967), p. 7.Google Scholar But cf. Van Bemmelen, , “Handhaving van de Openbare Orde”, Nederlands Juristenblad 1966, pp. 661–671.Google ScholarIdem“De methode Koppejan en de “Lawless'-case”, Nederlands Juristenblad 1966, pp. 701–709.Google Scholar
146 See the debates in the Municipal Council of Amsterdam, 22 June 1966, reported in Algemeen Handehblad of 23, 06 1966, p. 2.Google Scholar Proposals to change the Amsterdam Local Police Ordinance were submitted in the Municipal Council on 7 October 1966. These proposals aim at the recognition of freedom of demonstration and other means of expressing thoughts and ideas in public, without previous permission of the public authorities, i.c. the burgomaster. The police may only interfere with such manifestations, if traffic circulation is unreasonably hampered, persons or property are harmed or damaged, and if thoughts are being expressed which are contrary to any of the rights and freedoms generally recognized in a democratic society. Algemeen Handehblad, 11 10 1966.Google Scholar Cf. Belinfante, A. D., Vrijheid van Demonstratie, 1966.Google Scholar
147 F. H. van der Burg also takes this view, loc. cit. Cf. Proeve van em Niewve Grondwet, 1966, p. 54.Google Scholarvan der Meersch, Ganshof, La fonction législative en régime démocratique, 1949, pp. 29–30.Google Scholar
148 Handelingen, II 1963–1964, pp. 219–227.Google Scholar
149 V. supra footnote 105.
150 Memorandum concerning the introduction of spiritual care by the Humanist Movement in the armed forces, Handelingen, II 1962–1963Google Scholar, Bijl. 7166 no. 1. See also Handelingen, II 1963–1964, Bijl. 7400–IX no. 2, p. 5.Google Scholar
151 Handelingen, II 1963–1964, Bijl. 7400–VI no. 7, p. 13.Google Scholar
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153 V. supra, footnote 21a.
154 Donner, , Nederlands Bestuursrecht, vol. I, 1962, p. 361.Google Scholar
155 Comm. 4 October 1962, Appl. no. 1211/61, 9 Decisions (January 1963), p. 46 at 48. It should be noted that neither deportation nor detention with a view to deportation are, as such, forbidden by the Convention. The circumstances or the manner in which they are effected may, however, entail a State's responsibility under the Convention. Cf. the cases mentioned supra, footnote 73.
156 Donner, , op. cit. at p. 373.Google Scholar
157 Comm. 13 July 1966, Appl. no. 1983/63 20 Decisions (October 1966), p. 68 at pp. 76–77. On this application see also supra para. 8 and infra p.27. Cf. Scheuner, op. cit. footnote 13, p. 23a:Google Scholar
“Doch braucht sich das eingelegte Rechtsmittel nicht notwendig auf die Menschenrechtskonvention zu berufen. Es kann ihren Bestimmungen inhaltlich entsprechende Vorschriften des nationalen Rechts zum Gegenstand haben”,
with reference to Comm. 16 Dec. 1961, Appl. no. 712/60, Retimag S.A. v. Fed. Rep. of Germany, 8 Decisions (06 1962), p. 29 at p. 41.Google Scholar
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163 Cf. to the same effect, with regard to freedom of education (Article 208 of the Dutch Constitution and Article 2 of the First Protocol), H.R. 10 December 1957, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1958 no. 176. Recently, with regard to the freedom of expression again, H.R. 24 January 1967, Nieuwe Rotterdams Courant, 24 01 1967Google Scholar, and Attorney-General s'Jacob, Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 26 04 1967Google Scholar, in his conclusion relations to the case mentioned infra footnote 185c.
164 Gerechtshof, , The Hague, 31 01 1963Google Scholar, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1964 no. 54Google Scholar, in English in 11 Neth, I. L. Rev. (1964), p. 300.Google Scholar
165 Limitation of Hours of Driving Act (Rijtijdenwet), Staatsblad 1936 no. 802, provides that drivers may only drive a certain number of hours a day. If they exceed this period, this constitutes a misdemeanor on the part of their employer, unless he can excuse himself on one of a limited number of grounds laid down in the Act.
166 Kantongerecht Dordrecht, 28 april 1965, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1966, no. 254.Google Scholar
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172 It is doubtful whether this statement is correct as a general statement. Sometimes the daily observance of rules prescribed by a religion forms an essential part of the manifestation of a religious belief. Cf. Complaints Board of the Brussels National Employment Office, 13 March 1962, 5 Yearbook (1962), p. 364Google Scholar, where it was held that an Orthodox Jew was entitled to refrain from working on Saturdays, by virtue of the freedom of worship enshrined in Article 9 of the Convention and Article 14 of the Belgian Constitution. He would consequently not lose any rights he might have under Belgian unemployment legislation.
173 H.R. 13 April 1960, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1960 no. 436Google Scholar annotated by B.V.A. R(öling), in English in 8 Neth. I. L. Rev. (1961) p. 286, 10Google ScholarArs Aequi (1960–1961), p. 70Google Scholar annotated by Prins and 11 Ibidem (1961–62), p. 85 annotated by Hazewinkel-Suringa. Gerechtshof (Court of Appeal) Leeuwarden 13 April 1961, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1964 no. 401Google Scholar, in English in 12 Neth. I. L. Rev. (1965), p. 180.Google ScholarIdem 1 November 1962, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1964 no. 402Google Scholar, annotated by B.V.A. R(öling), in English in 12 Neth. I. L. Rev. (1965) p. 181.Google Scholar H.R. 13 March 1963, Administratief Rechterlijke Beslissingen 1963, p. 610.Google Scholar
174 H.R. 13 March 1963, Administratief Rechterlijke Beslissingen 1963, p. 610Google Scholar Cf. Comm. 14 December 1965, Appl. no. 2065/63, X v. the Netherlands, 18 Decisions (05 1966), p. 40 at p. 42.Google Scholar
175 Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 2 November 1961, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1962, no. 441Google Scholar, in English in 11 Neth. I. L. Rev. (1964) p. 299.Google Scholar
176 President Rechtbank Rotterdam, 15 June 1961, Nederlandse Jurisprudence 1962 no. 470Google Scholar, in English in 9 Neth. I. L. Rev. (1962) p. 321.Google Scholar
177 Cf. Comm. 28 March 1963, Appl. no. 834/60, X v. Austria, 6 Yearbook (1963), p. 140 and cases cited there.Google Scholar
178 Rechtbank Utrecht, 26 October 1965, no. 2098/1965 (unpublished).
179 H.R. 18 March 1961, Nederlandse Jurispruden tie 1961 no. 273Google Scholar annotated by B. V. A. R(öling), in English in 9 Neth. I.L.Rev. (1962), p. 315.Google Scholar 10 Ars Aequi (1960–1961), p. 279Google Scholar annotated by Prins, . Sociaal Economised Wetgemng 1960, p. 41 annotated by Samkalden.Google Scholar
180 Gerechtshof (Court of Appeal) Leeuwarden, 13 April 1961, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1964 no. 401Google Scholar, in English in 12 Neth. I.L. Rev. (1965) p. 180.Google Scholar College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven (Board of Appeal for Trade and Industry) 31 August 1962, Sociaal Economische Wetgeving 1963, p. 238.Google Scholar
181 H.R. 19 January 1962, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1962 no. 107Google Scholar annotated by B. V. A. R(öling), in English in 9 Neth. I. L. Rev. (1962) p. 319.Google Scholar 11 Ars Aequi (1961–1962), p. 135 annotated by Prins.Google Scholar
182 Gerechtshof Arnhem, 8 March 1961, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1961 no. 424Google Scholar, in English in 9 Neth. I. L. Rev. (1962) p. 318.Google Scholar
183 This judgment has given rise to a great deal of comment. The following jurists agree with it: Prins, loc. cit. Stellinga, Tijdschrift voor Overheidsadministratie 1962, pp. 62–64.Google ScholarVan Troostwijk, , Weekblad voor de Nederlandse Bond van Gemeenteambtenaren 1962, pp. 59–61Google Scholar and Boas, Van Emde, Nederlands Juristenblad 1962, pp. 297–307.Google Scholar Against it are: Duynstee, , Nederlands Juristenblad 1964, p. 121Google Scholar, who is of opinion that the restrictive provisions of Article 9 (2) have by this decision of the Supreme Court become non-self-executing. Therefore, the question of whether the provision, taken as a whole, is self-executing loses all pertinence, as only complaints on the grounds of the non-application of the provision are to be expected. Röling criticizes the judgment in “Het nationale processieverbod en de regionale godsdienstvrijheid”. 16 Bestuurswetenschappen (1962), pp. 217–227.Google Scholar The Supreme Court, he says, has reduced its power to exercise control to such an extent that it will henceforth be of very little importance. According to Röling, the Convention expressly provides for a wider and more effective activity on the part of the judiciary when interpreting and applying the many detailed restrictive provisions. In the same sense, see Van Wijmen, 27 Maandschrift Economie (1962), p. 141Google Scholar and Erades, 9 Neth. I. L. Rev. (1962), p. 321.Google Scholar
184 H.R. 25 June 1963, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1964 no. 239Google Scholar annotated by B. V. A. R(öling), in English in n Neth. I. L. Rev. (1965) p. 300.Google Scholar
185 Cf. Röling, , loc. cit. footnote 184.Google Scholar Van der Hoeven, 13 Ars Aequi (1962–1963), p. 171.Google Scholar
185a E.g. a number of cases arose in connection with unauthorised demonstrations in Amsterdam and The Hague. See supra, pp. 6–7 and footnote 144. Inter alia: Kantongerecht) Magistrate) Amsterdam 22 06 1966, no. 92363.66Google Scholar (unpublished). Rechtbank (District Court) Amsterdam 11 May 1966, no. 3099–141–I–66–D (unpublished). Kantongerecht The Hague 21 July 1966, Het Vrije Volk, 22 07 1966Google Scholar, Idem, 4 August 1966, Het Vrije Volk 5 08 1966.Google ScholarIdem 1 September 1966, Haagsche Courant 1 09 1966.Google Scholar
185b Gerechtshof (Court of Appeal), 5 June 1966 (unpublished).
185c After this paper had been written, the Rotterdam Magistrate (Kantonrechter) in an interesting judgment of 1 November 1966, decided that the section of the Rotterdam Local Police Ordinance prohibiting driving, walking or standing on the public highway with advertisements or propaganda, without the permission of the burgomaster, was ultra vires, because it conflicted with the freedom of the press guaranteed by the Dutch Constitution and the freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. He consequently acquitted some young persons who were prosecuted for having stood in the streets with anti-American placards referring to the Vietnam war. The Magistrate took the view,
“that Article 18 of the Local Police Ordinance is so broadly worded that the exercise of the freedom guaranteed by Article 7 of the Constitution to impart ideas and opinions in the press, is made impossible;
“that the Municipal Council is empowered by Article 168 of the Local Government Act to make regulations for public order, morality and health and other matters of interest to the Municipality
“that the Municipal Council, in my opinion, in drawing up the above-mentioned Article has overstepped the limits of its competence and, in particular, it is inconceivable that the maintenance of public order and other interests of the municipality play any role in relation to the acts against which Article 18, paragraph 1 sub litt. (a) of the Local Police Ordinance is directed…
“that the above-mentioned Article 18, according to which not even the most innocent advertisement or propaganda is permissible, is consequently ultra vires, being in violation of Article 7 of the Constitution;
“that, furthermore, the contents of the said Article are not in conformity with Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention of Rome), and none of the circumstances described in paragraph 2 of that Article, which would allow for an exception to be made to the first paragraph, is present.”
Judgment reported in de Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 1 and 2 11 1966.Google Scholar
186 H.R. 18 February 1966, Rechtspraak van de Week 1966 no. 8, p. 117.Google Scholar
187 See supra footnote 139.
188 Surinaams Juristenblad 1964, p. 30.Google Scholar
189 H.R. 13 September 1963, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1963 no. 509Google Scholar, in English in 11 Neth. I. L. Rev. (1964), p. 303.Google Scholar
190 Wallace in fact took two lines of action in the Dutch courts: Firstly, he petitioned the District Court in Rotterdam, alleging that his detention was illegal and, that, under Article 5, para. 4, of the Convention, he was entitled to have the lawfulness of his detention decided by a court. This petition was dismissed. See supra para. 8 Secondly, in regard to his deportation, he instituted the above-mentioned proceedings in the District Court of The Hague, the The Hague Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.
191 Comm. 13 Dec. 1965, Appl. no. 1983/63, X v. the Netherlands, 18 Decisions (05 1966), p. 19 at p. 36Google Scholar: “the right not to be extradited or deported is not as such included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention”… “the Applicant also alleges that the authorities subjected him to an inhuman or degrading treatment by taking him against his will to the U.S.A. … it is true that the Commission has held in a number of previous cases (see, for instance Applications nos. 1465/62, X v. Fed. Rep. of Germany, 5Google ScholarYearbook (1962), p. 256 and 1802/62Google Scholar, X v. Fed. Rep. of Germany, 6Google ScholarYearbook (1963), p. 462)Google Scholar that the deportation or extradition of a foreigner to a particular country might in exceptional circumstances give rise to the question whether there had been inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention;…, however, the Commission has no hesitation in stating that there are no such exceptional circumstances in the present case”.
192 Ibidem at p. 39.
193 H.R. 9 December 1965, Rechtspraak van de Week 1966 no. 1.Google Scholar
194 H.R. 20 July 1965, Nederlands Juristenblad 1966 no. 115.Google Scholar See also supra para.11 at p. 355 and p. 2.
195 This judgment is in conformity with the case-law of the European Commission of Human Rights in so far as it implies that the prohibition of discrimination does not imply that one is not allowed to apply a differential treatment on reasonable grounds. See Comm. 17 Dec. 1955, Appl. no. 104/55 X v. Fed. Rep. of Germany, 1Google ScholarYearbook (1955–1957), p. 229Google Scholar and Comm. 28 Sept. 1956, Appl. no. 157/56, X v. Fed. Rep. of Germany, Ibidem, p. 235.
196 See supra p. 00.
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198 See supra paras. 14–16, 26 and 30. Cf. Handelingen II 1964–1965, Aanhangsel (Appendix), p. 385. Ibidem, p. 407.
199 See supra p. 6.
200 Cf. the Statement of Dr. Y. Scholten, the Minister of Justice, quoted supra, para. 22, footnote 103.
201 Samkalden, , 18Google ScholarInternationale Spectator (1964), pp. 672–673.Google Scholar
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