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Domestic Implementation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 May 2009
Extract
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for a modicum of international supervision of its States parties through the scrutiny of their periodic reports by the Human Rights Committee. This measure, which may be described as one of ‘international implementation’, operates in concert with the ‘domestic implementation’ requirement included in Article 2 of the Covenant. The ‘international implementation’ aspect entails some abridgement of the sovereignty of States parties and thus represents a noteworthy development in international politics. The companion aspect of ‘domestic implementation’ is, however, it is submitted, of far greater and more enduring significance for the promotion and protection of human rights. For, the availability and the exercise of the rights of the Covenant depend, as a matter of practical fact, upon their incorporation into the domestic system and the constraints — legal and social — that that system may place upon their exercise. The Covenant's rights are intended to be legal rights implemented by States parties and exercised by individuals within domestic legal systems. In addition:
‘Not only are the domestic remedies likely to be speedier and perhaps less expensive; in many cases they may be more effective, because a national court of appeal or Supreme Court can usually reverse the decision of a lower court, whereas the decision of an international organ does not have that effect, even though it will engage the international responsibility of the State concerned.’
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References
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