1. On 17 September 1979 the Federal Government in an answer to the UN Secretary-General (UN Doc. A/AC.121/30/Add. 1; reproduced in: 41 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1981) p. 633 et seq.) restricted any commitment in peace-keeping operations to indirect contributions: ‘[…] the Federal Government regards its support for the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations as a major component of its own policy of safeguarding peace. In this context it attaches special importance to the peace-keeping operations … Owing to the nature of such operations, the actual measures and their scope cannot be determined from the outset but only on an ad hoc basis; they depend on the actual crisis to be coped with, as the planning for UNTAG in particular has shown. Consequently, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany cannot make a general commitment as regards its contributions for future individual peace-keeping operations. In the light of past experience, however, support from the Federal Republic of Germany will continue to consist not only of a financial contribution but especially of logistical and humanitarian an assistance.’

2. In Res. 713 of 25 September 1991 the Security Council, according to Chapter VII, established an embargo on all arms destined for Yugoslavia. Again pursuant to Chapter VII, the Security Council, by Res. 757 of 30 May 1992, established a trade embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

3. Bulletin No. 68 (23 June 1992) p. 649 et seq. In that declaration the foreign and defence ministers of the WEU declared their principal preparedness to assist measures taken by the CSCE and by the UN Security Council in order to prevent international conflicts or to manage international crises. They further agreed that their armed forces could be used for humanitarian and peace-keeping tasks as well as for military enforcement actions. With regard to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia the WEU ministers established an ad hoc group that was to examine the possible contribution of the WEU to the implementation of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

4. According to this decision the NATO foreign ministers:

‘1. agreed on a NATO maritime operation, drawing on STANAVFORMED and other assets as appropriate, to monitor compliance with UN-Security Council resolutions 713 and 757 in coordination and cooperation with the operation decided by the WEU. The participation of the member states will be subject to the provisions of their national constitutions;

2. agreed that practical details and modalities to implement the decisions by Ministers should be worked out by NATO Military Authorities, in coordination with those of the WEU, for decision by the appropriate fora.’

5. Bulletin No. 79 (17 July 1992) p. 760.

6. In NATO parlance ‘Operational Control’ has to be distinguished from ‘Full Command’ and from ‘Operational Command’. It means that a commander is entitled to command assigned forces in order to accomplish a special mission that is regularly limited in time and space. He may also deploy the units concerned and take ‘Tactical Control’ over them. It does not imply an entitlement to order the separate use of those units. In general, it neither comprises logistical nor executive functions of military discipline.

7. ‘Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland wird sich mit eigenen Beiträgen an der Durchführung der Beschlüsse von WEU und NATO vom 10. Juli 1992 auf der Grundlage der VN-Resolutionen Nr. 713 und 757 zu ûberwachungsmaβnahmen im Mittelmeer beteiligen. Die Bundesmarine wird hierfür drei Seeraumüberwachungsflugzeuge sowie die derzeit am Ständigen Einsatzverband Mittelmeer der NATO teilnehmende Schiffseinheit, Zerstörer Bayern, die am 30./31. Juli 1992 durch die Fregatte Niedersachsen abgelöst werden soll, bereitstellen.’

8. According to UN SC Res. 787 of 16 November 1992, Member States were authorized to militarily enforce the embargo. The Federal Government, however, did not approve of the participation of German armed forces in enforcement action and, on 19 November 1992, took the following decision: ‘Das deutsche Schiff bleibt auch künftig im Rahmen seines bisherigen Auftrags im NATO-Verband in der Adria präsent. Eine Teilnahme an Zwangsmaβnahmen (Stop and Search) kommt nicht in Betracht.’

9. The prohibition of overflight over Bosnia-Hercegovina is contained in UN SC Res. 781 of 9 October 1992. UNPROFOR forces were asked to monitor compliance with that resolution. By UN SC Res. 816 of 31 March 1993 regional arrangements or agencies were authorized to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the prohibition.

10. The Federal Government, except the ministers of the Free Democratic Party, decided: ‘Sie ist einverstanden, daβ NATO-AWACS-Verbände nunmehr in ûbereinstimmung mit Sicherheitsratsresolution Nr. 816 vom 31. März 1993 auch unter deutscher Beteiligung daran mitwirkt, dieses Flugverbot durchzusetzen.’

11. UNOSOM II was established pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993. The command of the forces deployed in Somalia no longer remained with the US. UNOSOM II was placed under the command of the Turkish General Cevik Bir.

12. Federal Constitutional Court (‘Bundesverfassungsgericht’), judgment of 8 April 1993, 2 BvE5/93,2BvQ 11/93, BVerfGE88,173; reproduced in: 46 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1993) p. 1317 et seq.Google Scholar

13. Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 12 July 1994, 2 BvE 3/92, 2 BvE 5/93, 2 BvE 7/93, 2 BvE 8/93. This judgment will be published in English in the forthcoming issue of the International Law Reports.

14. See for instance Khan, D.-E. and Zöckler, M., ‘Germans to the Front? or Le malade imaginaire’, 3 Eur. J. Int. L. (1992) p. 163 at p. 166 et seq.;CrossRefGoogle ScholarDeiseroth, D., ‘Die Beteiligung Deutschlands am kollektiven Sicherheitssystem der Vereinten Nationen aus verfassungsrechtlichter Sicht’, 47 Neue Justiz (1993) p. 145, at p. 148 et seq.;Google ScholarGornig, G., ‘Die Verfassungs mäβigkeit der Entsendung von Bundeswehrsoldaten zu “Blauhelm”-Einsätzen’, Juristenzeitung (1993) p. 123.Google Scholar

15. For instance, Thalmair, R., ‘Die Bundeswehr im Ausland – eine offene Verfassungsrechtfrage?’ 26 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (1993) p. 201, at p. 202 et seq., with further references.Google Scholar

16. T. Stein, ‘Die verfassungsrechtliche Zulässigkeit einer Beteiligung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland an Friedenstruppen der Vereinten Nationen’, in Frowein, J. Abr. and Stein, T., Rechtliche Aspekte einer Beteiligung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland an Friedenstruppen der Vereinten Nationen. Materialien des Kolloquiums vom 17./18.8.1989 (1990) p. 17, at p. 24;Google Scholar Thalmair, loc. cit. n. 15, at p. 202; in this direction A. Randelzhofer, ‘Commentary on Article 24 para. 2, para. 67’, in Maunz, Th. and Dürig, G., Grundgesetz, Loose-leaf.Google Scholar

17. The former version of Art. 143 read as follows: ‘The conditions under which it will be admissible to have recourse to the Armed Forces in case of a state of internal emergency, may be regulated only by a law which fulfils the requirements of Article 79’.

18. See, for instance, Thalmair loc. cit. n. 15, at p. 203; Stein loc. cit. n. 16, at p. 23 et seq.; Khan and Zöckler, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 168.

19. Ipsen, K., ‘Der Einsatzder Bundeswehr zur Verteidigung im Spannungs-und Verteidigungsfall sowie im internen bewaffneten Konflikt’, in Schwarz, K. D., ed., Sicherheitspolitik, 3rd edn. (1978) p. 615, at p. 625:Google ScholarIpsen, K., ‘Article 87a’, in Kommentar zum Bonner Grundgesetz (loose-leaf, 1992) para. 32;Google ScholarKirchhof, P., ‘Bundeswehr’, in Isensee, J. and Kirchhof, P., eds., Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Vol. III:Das Handeln des Staates (1988) p. 977, at p. 994;Google Scholar Stein, loc. cit. n. 16, at p. 24 et seq.; Stein, T., ‘Landesverteidigung und Streitkräfte im 40. Jahr des Grundgesetzes’, in Hailbronner, K., Ress, G. and Stein, T., eds., Staat und Völkerrechtsordnung, Festschrift für Karl Doehring (1989) p. 935, at p. 938 et seq.;Google ScholarDürig, G., ‘Article 87a’, in Maunz, and Dürig, , eds., op. cit. n. 16, paras. 33, 36.Google Scholar

20. Khan and Zöckler, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 168, with further references.

21. For instance, Tomuschat, Ch., ‘Deutscher Beitrag zu den UN-Friedenstruppen’ Aussenpolitik (1985) p. 272, at p. 279;Google ScholarStern, K., Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Vol. II (1980) at p. 1477;Google ScholarBothe, M., ‘Das Verfahren wegen des Adria-Einsatzes der Bundeswehr vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht (1992)’, Kritische Vierteljahreszeitschrift (1993) p. 53, at p. 63;Google Scholar see also P. Kirchhof, in Frowein and Stein, op. cit. n. 16, at pp. 43 and 86.

22. For example Tomuschat, loc. cit. n. 21.

23. Khan and Zöckler, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 169 with further references.

24. see Giegerich, Th., ‘The German Contribution to the Protection of Shipping in the Persian Gulf: Staying Out for Political or Constitutional Reasons?’, 49 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1989) no. 1, p. 25;Google Scholar for further references see Khan and Zöckler, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 172, fn. 66.

25. Khan and Zöckler, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 172; Deiseroth, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 148; T. Stein, in Frowein and Stein, op. cit. n. 16, at pp. 19–20; Gornig, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 125, with further references.

26. See for instance Deiseroth, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 148; Gornig, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 125 et seq.

27. The relevant argument for the latter solution is that there is no case in which the German armed forces do not exercise sovereign tasks: Gornig, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 125 and in fn. 39.

28. Art. 26 Basic Law reads as follows:

‘(I) Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional. They shall be made a criminal offence.

(II) Weapons designed for warfare may not be manufactured, transported or marketed except with the permission of the Federal Government. Details shall be regulated by a federal statute.’

29. See, for instance, Deiseroth, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 148. Khan and Zöckler distinguish between a ‘territorial defence conception’, an ‘international law defence conception’, and an intermediate, ‘more widely accepted’ conception covering both territorial defence and compliance with NATO obligations: Khan and Zöckler, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 170 et seq. with further references.

30. This is recognised, e.g., by Klein, E., ‘Rechtsprobleme einer deutschen Beteiligung an der Aufstellung von Streitkräften der Vereinten Nationen’, 34 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Rechtund Völkerrecht (1974) p. 429;Google Scholar T. Stein, in Frowein and Stein, op. cit. n. 16, at p. 22; Gornig, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 126, and Khan and Zöckler, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 171.

31. See only Deiseroth, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 148; T. Stein, in Frowein and Stein, op. cit. n. 16, at p. 22; Gornig, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 126.

32. See supra n. 24 and accompanying text.

33. See infra n. 41 and accompanying text.

34. Mössner, J. M., ‘Bundeswehr in blauen Helmen, verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte des Einsatzes von Bundeswehrsoldaten im Rahmen von UN-Peace-Keeping-Forces’, in Münch, I. v., ed., Staatsrecht – Völkerrecht – Europarecht, Festschrift für H. J. Schlochauer (1981) p. 97, at p. 111.Google Scholar

35. T. Stein, in Frowein and Stein, op. cit. n. 16, at p. 22; Riedel, N. K., Der Einsatz deutscher Streitkräfte im Ausland – verfassungs- und völkerrechtliche Schranken (1989) at p. 216.Google Scholar

36. See, for instance, Hernekamp, K. -A., ‘Article 87a’, in Münch, I. v., ed., Grundgesetzkommentar, 2nd edn. (1983) para. 13.;Google Scholar K. Ipsen, in Schwarz, ed., op. cit. n. 19, at p. 625 et seq.; Scholz, R., ‘Deutsche Soldaten im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Grundgesetz’, in Koch, E., ed., Die Blauhelme – Einsatz für den Frieden (1991) p. 205, at p. 208;Google Scholar Ch. Tomuschat, ‘Art. 24’, in: Kommentar zum Bonner Grundgesetz, op. cit. n. 19, para. 188.

37. Art. 24 para. 3 Basic Law reads:

‘For the settlement of disputes between states, the Federation shall accede to agreements concerning international arbitration of a general, comprehensive and obligatory nature.’

38. See Wieland, J., ‘Verfassungsrechtliche Grundlagen und Grenzen für einen Einsatz der Bundeswehr’, 44 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (1991) p. 1174, at p. 1180;Google Scholar R. Wolfrum, ‘Comment’, in Frowein and Stein, op. cit. n. 16, at pp. 70–71; K. Doehring, ‘Comment’, ibid., at p. 60; Tomuschat, loc. cit. n. 36, para. 174.

39. Bothe, loc. cit. n. 21, at p. 66;Arndt, C., ‘Bundeswehreinsatz für die UNO’, 107 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1992) p. 618, at pp. 619–620;Google ScholarHoffmann, O., Bundeswehr und UN-Friedenssicherung (1991) p. 229 et seq.Google Scholar

40. Khan and Zöckler, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 173 with further references.

41. The drafting history does not give any clue. Although during the discussions in the ‘Hauptausschuss’ of the ‘Parlamentarischer Rat’, Dr. Carlo Schmid held that the term ‘collective security is something very precise’ (‘… eine Institution aus dem grossen Gebiet des Kriegsverhütungsrechts, das in den modernen Lehrbüchern als besonderer Abschnitt des Systems despositiven Völkerrechtsbehandeltzu werdenpflegt.’ [ParlamentarischerRat, Verhandlungendes Hauptausschusses 1948/49, 6th session on November 19, 1948, stenographic protocols, at pp. 70–71]), he did not state exactly what he meant.

42. This becomes obvious when glimpsing at the drafting history of Art. 24 para. 2 Basic Law. The Chairman of the ‘Grundsatzausschuss’ of the ‘Parlamentarische Rat’, Dr. von Mangoldt (CDU), explicitly stated that the United Nations Organization constitutes a system of mutual collective security: Stenographic Protocol of the 20th session of the ‘Grundsatzausschuss des Parlamentarischen Rates’, at p. 40.

43. Kersting, K., ‘Kollektive Sicherheit durch Peace-Keeping Operations. Insbesondere: Zur Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an UN-Aktionen’, 25 Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht (1983) p. 64, at p. 71;Google Scholar Randelzhofer, loc. cit. n. 16, para. 56; Tomuschat, loc. cit. n. 36, para. 190; Frowein, J. Abr, ‘Der völkerrechtliche Status von UN-Friedenstruppen und seine Bedeutung für das deutsche Recht’, in Frowein and Stein, op. cit. n. 16, p. 1, at pp. 11–12Google Scholar. The opposite opinion is provided above all by Riedel, op. cit. n. 35, at p. 195 et seq.; Riedel, N. K., ‘Bundeswehr mit “blauen Helmen”? Völker- und verfassungsrechtliche Probleme einer Beteiligung an UN-Friedenstruppen’, 42 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1989) p. 639, at p. 641.Google Scholar

44. Khan and Zöckler, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 174.

45. Ibid., at pp. 174–175.

46. See, for instance, Wieland, loc. cit. n. 38, at p. 1181.

47. See, for instance, Tomuschat, loc. cit. n. 36, para. 124, with further references.

48. BVerfGE 68, p. 1, at pp. 95–96.

49. Cf., Wieland, loc. cit. n. 38, at p. 1177 with further references; Bothe, loc. cit. n. 21, atp. 70; Stern, K., Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Vol. 1, 2nd edn. (1984) p. 546;Google ScholarFrank, H. G., ‘Article 24 paragraph 2’, in Alternativkommentar zum Grundgesetz, 2nd edn. (1989) para. 7.Google Scholar

50. BVerfGE68, p. 1, at pp. 99.

51. Dissenting opinion of Judge Mahrenholz, BVerfGE 68, 1, at 111. The judgment Mahrenholz refers to is BVerfGE 58, 1, at 35.

52. See, for instance, Bothe, loc. cit. n. 21, at p. 75; Wieland, loc. cit. n. 38, at p. 1178.

53. See supra n. 24 et seq. and accompanying text.

54. See, for this division of German constitutional scholars, Khan and Zöckler, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 175.

55. Ibid., at p. 175.

56. Ibid., at p. 176.

57. This was clearly stated in the Pershing Decision: BVerfGE 68, 1, at 85/86.

58. BVerfGE 1, 351, at 369; 1, 372, at 394.

59. BVerfGE 68, 1, at 85.

60. Bothe, loc. cit. n. 21, at p. 68 et seq.

61. Even if we had an Art. 42 case, additional agreements in accordance with Art. 43 UN Charter would be necessary.

62. E.g., UN SC Res. 678 of November 29, 1990.

63. This is, inter alia, Bothe's train of thought: Bothe, loc. cit. n. 21, at p. 68 et seq.

64. Ibid., at p. 71.

65. Ress, G., ‘Verfassungsrechtliche Auswirkungen der Fortentwicklung völkerrechtlicher Verträge’, in Fürst, W., Herzog, R. and Umbach, D. C., eds., Festschrift für Wolfgang Zeidler (1987) p. 1175, at p. 1179 et seq.Google Scholar

66. See the references supra at n. 14 et seq. and accompanying text. A short comparative overview is also given by Damrosch, L. Fisler, ‘Constitutional Control of Military Actions: A Comparative Dimension’, 85 AJIL (1991) p. 92 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

67. For the constitutional debate on the scope of Art. 24 para. 2 Basic Law, see the references supra at n. 41 et seq. and accompanying text.

68. Cf., Delbrück, J., ‘Collective Security’, in Bernhardt, R., ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Instalment 3 (1982) pp. 104, 106.Google Scholar

69. Cf., Tomuschat, loc. cit. n. 36, para. 132 f.; Randelzhofer, loc. cit. n. 16, para, ll et seq.; R. Wolfrum, in Isensee and Kirchhof, eds., op. cit. n. 19, Vol. VII, section 176, paras. 1 et seq. and 17.

70. The Court cites its decision BVerfGE 68, 1, 84 f. See supra n. 48 et seq. and accompanying text.

71. For the bill of ratification see Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette) 1973 II, 431; 1974 II, 770; 1980 II, 1252.

72. Cf., Frowein, J. Abr., ‘Article 43’, in Simma, B., ed., Charta der Vereinten Nationen. Kommentar (1991) para. 18.Google Scholar

73. Cf., M. Bothe, ‘Article 38’, in ibid., para. 61 et seq.

74. For the bill of ratification see Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette) 1955 II, 289.

75. For references see supra n. 24 et seq.

76. See supra n. 24 et seq. and accompanying text.

77. For the constitutional debate on the scope of Art. 59 para. 2 Basic Law see the references in supra n. 57 et seq. and accompanying text. See also Ch. Gloria, in Ipsen, K., Völkerrecht, 3rd edn. (1990) section 74, para. 34 et seq.;Google ScholarGeiger, R., Grundgesetz und Völkerrecht, 2nd edn. (1994) pp. 134 et seq., 172 et seq.Google Scholar

78. BVerfGE 68, 1, at 88. See also W. G. Grewe, in Isensee and Kirchhof, eds. op. cit. n. 19, Vol. III, section 77 no. 59.

79. BVerfGE 68, 1, at 88 f.

80. BVerfGE 1, 372, at 382; 68, 1, at 85.

81. Cf., inter alia, Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 4th edn. (1990) p. 604 et seq.;Google Scholar W. Heintschel v. Heinegg, in Ipsen, op. cit. n. 77, section 9, para. 1; Geiger, op. cit. n. 77, at p. 80 et seq.

82. BVerfGE 1, 372, at 381.

83. Cf., section 15 para. 3 of the Court's Rules of Procedure.

84. Cf., J. A. Frowein, ‘Article 42’, in Simma, ed., op. cit. n. 72, para. 16, especially fn. 23.

85. Cf., Dinstein, Y., War Agression and Self-Defence (1988) p. 7 et seq.Google Scholar

86. Cf., Bothe, M., ‘Friedenstruppen’, in Wolfrum, R., ed., Handbuch der Vereinten Nationen, 2nd edn. (1991) para. 17.Google Scholar

87. Cf., Greenwood, Ch., ‘Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait: Some Legal Issues’, 33 Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht (1991) p. 45 et seq.;Google ScholarHeinegg, W. Heintschel v., ‘Kriegsentschädigung, Reparation oder Schadenersatz?, 90 Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft (1991) p. 113 et seq.Google Scholar

88. Cf., Schachter, O., ‘United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict’, 85 AJIL (1991) p. 452 et seq.;CrossRefGoogle Scholar E. V. Rostow, ‘Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense?’, ibid., p. 506 et seq.

89. For the differences between defence alliances and systems of collective security see Delbrück, loc. cit. n. 68.