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Asser Institute Lectures on International Law: Legal Implications of the use of Direct Broadcasting and Remote Sensing Satellites and their Effect on International Relations*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 May 2009
Extract
When on 3 October 1957 the Russian astronaut Gagarin was launched into outer space and when twelve years later on 20 July 1969 the American astronauts Armstrong and Aldrin landed on the Moon, the enthusiasm of the world population for these two events was enormous.
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References
1. See, e.g. the Resolution adopted by the International Law Association at its 53rd Conference held in Buenos Aires 1968: The Association considers that the term “outer space” as used in the Space Treaty of 1967, should be interpreted so as to include all space at and above the lowest perigee achieved by the 27 January 1967, when the Treaty was opened for signature, by any satellite put into orbit, without prejudice to the question whether it may or may not later be determined to include any part of space below such perigee.
2. See “Implementing the contractual obligation of Art. 1 para 1 of the Outer Space Treaty 1967”, Il Diritto Aereo XIII n. 50, p. 154.
3. See further the present writer's article, “An Evaluation of the Leading Principles of the Treaty on Outer Space of 27th January 1967”, Netherlands International Law Review, 1968, p. 24 et seq.Google Scholar
4. See the present writer's contribution to the Centenary Volume of the International Law Association, “The Present State of International Law”, p. 214.Google Scholar
5. See the article of Herbert Scoville Jr., “Is Espionage Necessary for our Security?”, published in Foreign Affairs, April 1976: “Satellite photography —unlike aircraft reconnaissance, which it has largely supplanted— can, in a relatively short period of time, provide visual evidence of military deployments throughout a country or even a continent. Without photographic intelligence, productive strategic arms limitation talks would be impossible: it is essential both in determining the desirability of an agreement and in verifying that no violations occur”.
6. See “Le Traité de 1967 sur l'Espace”, Journal du Droit International, 1968, p. 532 et seq.Google Scholar
7. cf. Tanaka, Kotaro, “Observations on Peace, Law, and Human Rights” published in Transnational Law in a Changing Society, Essays in Honour of Philip C. Jessup, 1972, p. 242 et seq.Google Scholar
8. See “International Concern with Human Rights”, Moses Moskowitz, Leiden 1974, p. 160.Google Scholar
9. As regards the legal nature of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, see: “The Helsinki Declaration: “Brobdingnac or Lilliput”? Russell, Harold S.; American Journal of International Law, April 1976, p. 242 et seq.Google Scholar
10. See “The Law of Outer Space”, Leiden 1972, p. 138.Google Scholar
11. See UN Doc. A/A.1/PV.2049, p. 23 et seq.
12. See UN Doc.A/AC.105/PV146, p. 54; see also the statement by the delegate of Iran, Mr. Moghtaderi, about Iran's cooperation with NASA, UN Doc.A/AC.105/PV147, p. 66.
13. See UN Doc.A/AC.105/156.
14. See UN Doc.A/C.1/1047. Chile, Mexico and Venezuela co-sponsored this draft.
15. See UN Doc.A/AC.105/PV.133, Annex IV.
16. See UN Doc.A/AC.105/C.2/L103.
17. See UN Doc.A/AC.105/C.2/SR.226–245.
18. See UN Doc.A/AC.105/V.2/L.103.
19. See UN Doc.A/AC.105/PV.150 p. 16.
20. See UN Doc.A/AC.105/PV.152 p. 22.
21. See UN Doc.A/AC.105/PV.153 p. 57.
22. See “Liber Amicorum presented to Salvador de Madariaga on his 80th Birthday”, Bruges 1966 p. 77.Google Scholar
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