2. ‘Indigenous peoples’ under international law refers to the descendants of the original inhabitants of lands which were colonised, conquered or settled by European colonial powers. Here ‘indigenous peoples’ is used interchangeably with ‘aboriginal peoples’, which is used in the Canadian legal context to denote the same group under consideration. There is no legal definition of ‘indigenous peoples’ under international law, although the ‘working definition’ adopted by the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples identifies common characteristics, see Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations Discrimination, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21 Add. 8, paras. 362–382 pp. 50–51.

3. For example, consider Canada's support for use of the term ‘self-determination’, Statement by Canada at Working Group on the Draft Declaration, UN Commission on Human Rights 1996.

4. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 34 ILM (1995) pp. 541–555. For background see, R. Coulter, ‘The Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: What is it? What does it mean?’, 13 NQHR (1995).

5. Dodson, M., ‘Linking International Standards with Contemporary Concerns of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’, in Pritchard, S., ed., Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights (London, Zed Books 1998) p. 18.Google Scholar See also Anaya, S.J., Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1996).Google Scholar

6. Mabo v. the State of Queensland (No. 2), 175 CLR (1991–1992) p. 42.

7. M. Walters, ‘British Imperial Constitutional Law and Aboriginal Rights: A Comment on Delgamuukw v. British Columbia’, 17 Queen's LJ (1992) pp. 412–413, argues for reconciliation of aboriginal and non-aboriginal legal cultures in order to define aboriginal rights. See also R.D. Lumb, ‘Constitutional Issues Relating to the “Process of Reconciliation” with Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders’, 17 Queensland LJ (1992–1993) pp. 111–116, and A. Mason, ‘The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Land once part of the Old Dominions of the Crown’, 46(4) ICLQ (1997) pp. 812–830. R v. Van der Peet, 2 SCR (1996) pp. 507–671 at p. 539: ‘the aboriginal rights recognised and affirmed by s. 35(1) must be directed towards the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.’

8. Mabo, supra n. 6, at pp. 1–217.

9. Wik Peoples v. State of Queensland and Others, 141 ALR (1996) pp. 129–296. K. McNeil, ‘Co-existence of Indigenous Rights and Other Interests in Land in Australia and Canada’, 3 CNLR (1997) pp. 1–18.

10. In Australia the term ‘native title’ means an interest in land recognised by the common law from the time of acquisition of Crown sovereignty. Mabo, supra n. 6, at pp. 38–52, 180–192, 205–214.

11. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 3 SCR (1997) pp. 1010–1141.

12. Van der Peet, supra n. 7.

13. On ‘dynamic rights’ approach see, R v. Sparrow, 1 SCR (1990) p. 1093, L'Heureux-Dubé J. (Dissent), Van der Peet, supra n. 7, at pp. 599–600.

14. B. Slattery, ‘Understanding Aboriginal Rights’, 66 The Canadian Bar Review (1987) pp. 727–783 at pp. 732–741.

15. Slattery, ibid., at p. 733.

16. B. Slattery, ‘Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims’, 29(4) Osgoode Hall LJ (1991) pp. 681–703. See also Van der Peet, supra n. 7, at p. 547.

17. Slattery, ibid. Tully argues that there exists an ‘aboriginal and common-law system’, based on aboriginal traditions and the European common law tradition, which is the source of aboriginal rights, J. Tully, ‘Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle Ground’, in E. Paul and F. Miller, eds., Property Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1994) p. 154, fn. 5. The ‘aboriginal and common-law system’ provides a normative framework for property rights that meets both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal criteria of justice, p. 154.

18. Slattery, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 734.

19. Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria, 2 AC (1921) pp. 407, 409–410, Guerin v. The Queen, 2 SCR (1984) p. 378.

20. Slattery, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 736.

21. Royal Proclamation, 7 October 1763, (1985) R.S.C. Appendix II, No. 1 reads in part:

‘… Nations or Tribes of Indians … should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are reserved to them … as their Hunting Grounds … We do … strictly enjoin and require, that no private Person do presume to make any purchase from the said Indians of any Lands reserved to the said Indians …; but that, if at any Time any of the said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our Name, at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians …’

22. Asch, M. and Zlotkin, N., ‘Affirming Aboriginal Title: A New Basis for Comprehensive Claims Negotiations,’ in Asch, M., ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for Difference (Vancouver, UBC Press 1997) pp. 209–211.Google ScholarColder v. Attorney General of British Columbia, 1 SCR (1973) p. 313

23. Sparrow, supra n. 13, at pp. 1091–1093.

24. Asch and Zlotkin, op. cit. n. 22, at pp. 208–229.

25. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 and 31 Vict., ch. 3, s. 91(24).

26. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Pt. I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 (UK).

27. Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, Pt. II of the Constitution Act, 1982, ibid.

28. Sparrow, supra n. 13, at p. 1091.

29. Sparrow, supra n. 13, at pp. 1091–1093. Slattery, loc. cit. 14, at p. 782: ‘“existing” … suggests that the rights in question are affirmed in a contemporary form rather than in their primeval simplicity and vigour.’

30. Van der Peel, supra n. 7, at p. 507.

31. Guerin, supra n. 19, at p. 335 and Sparrow, supra n. 13, at p. 1075. Guerin found fiduciary obligations to result in part from the concept of ‘Native, Aboriginal or Indian title’, p. 348. R v. Agawa, 28 OAC (1988) pp. 215–216, found fiduciary obligation to derive from ‘history, treaties and legislation’. Dupuis, R. and McNeil, K., Canada's Fiduciary Obligation to Aboriginal Peoples in the Context of Accession to Sovereignty by Quebec, Vol. 2: Domestic Dimensions (Ottawa, Canada Communication Group Publishing 1995).Google Scholar

32. ‘It is this fact, and this fact above all others, which separates aboriginal peoples from all other minority groups in Canadian society and which mandates their special legal, and constitutional, status.’ Van der Peel, supra n. 7, at pp. 538–539.

33. Slattery argues that indigenous American peoples had exclusive title to their territories at the time of European contact, participating actively in the formation of Canada and the United States. This fundamental fact suggests that under the constitutional structure of Canada ‘Aboriginal nations continue to hold a residue of the sovereignty they once possessed’, Slattery, loc. cit. n. 16, at p. 701.

34. Art. 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, in Hudson, M.O., ed., International Legislation: A Collection of the Texts of Multipartite International Instruments of General Interest (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International peace 1950) p. 620, provides: ‘The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other States.’Google Scholar See Brownlie for relevance of this legal criteria of statehood and the need for additional criteria for a ‘working legal definition of statehood’, Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 5th edn. (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1998) pp. 70–77.Google Scholar

35. Self–determination is used in this sense to include the traditional meaning under international law of permitting a people ‘a range of options from absorption within another nation, at one end of the range, to full sovereign independence, at the other’, Nettheim, G., ‘“Peoples” and “Populations” – Indigenous Peoples and the Rights of Peoples’, in Crawford, J., ed., The Rights of Peoples (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1988) p. 118.Google Scholar For explanation of internal and external self-determination, see Cassese, A., The Self–Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1995).Google Scholar

36. Terra nullius is defined here as uninhabited territory over which there is no sovereign, Shaw, M.N., International Law, 4th edn. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1997) p. 355.Google Scholar See Williams, R.A.,(Jr) The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1990), for analysis of European colonial perspectives of lands inhabited by indigenous peoples, and how law was used as a legitimating tool in the process of colonisation.Google ScholarMabo, supra n. 6, at pp. 32–42.

37. Island of Palmas case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 RIAA (1928) p. 829. See also Anaya, S.J., ‘The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims’, in Kymlicka, W., ed., The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1995) p. 322.Google Scholar

38. Island of Palmas case, supra n. 37, at p. 829, Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), PCIJ Reports Series A/B, No. 53 (1933), Cayuga Indians (Great Britain v. United States), 6 RIAA (1926) p. 173.

39. Island of Palmas case, ibid.

40. Western Sahara, ICJ Advisory Opinion, 3 January 1975, p. 12.

41. See Brennan J., Mabo, supra n. 6, at p. 42.

42. See Anaya, op. cit. n. 37, at p. 322.

43. This is the argument that because aboriginal peoples were dispossessed of lands they legally occupied they are entitled to compensation, Kymlicka, W., Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1995) pp. 219–220, fn. 5, see also pp. 116–120 on compensatory justice in the context of honouring historical agreements.Google Scholar

44. Kymlicka, ibid., at p. 220, fn. 5. On persecuted minorities, see V. Van Dyke, Human Rights, Ethnicity, and Discrimination (Westport, CT, Greenwood 1985), N. Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law (Dordrecht, Nijhoff 1991).

45. J.J. Corntassel and T.H. Primeau, ‘Indigenous “Sovereignty” and International Law: Revised Strategies for Pursuing “Self-Determination’”, 17(2) HRQ (1995) pp. 360–361.

46. See Anaya, op. cit. n. 37, at p. 324.

47. Anaya, op. cit. n. 37, at p. 323, see also Brownlie, op. cit n. 34, at ch. V.

48. Comtassel and Primeau, loc. cit. n. 45, at pp. 358–359. However, some argue that the ‘prior sovereignty’ of North American Indians was recognised by the colonial powers entering treaty relations with them, P. Macklem, ‘Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples’, 45 Stanford L Rev. (1993) pp. 1333–1335.

49. Anaya, op. cit n. 37, at pp. 323–324.

50. See R. Falk, ‘The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples)’, in Crawford, op. cit. n. 35, at pp. 7–37, Anaya, op. cit. n. 5.

51. Elliott, D.W., ‘Aboriginal Title’, in Morse, B.W., ed., Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: Indian, Metis and Inuit Rights in Canada (Ottawa, Carleton University Press 1985) pp. 56–84.Google Scholar See also K. McNeil, ‘The Meaning of Aboriginal Title’, in Asch, op. cit. n. 22, at pp. 135–154.

52. St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen, 14 A.C. 46 (1888) p. 54.

53. Calder, supra n. 22.

54. Calder, supra n. 22, at p. 328.

55. Guerin, supra n. 19, esp. per Dickson J., at p. 376.

56. R v. Côté, 3 SCR (1996) pp. 139–198 at p. 169.

57. ibid. at p. 169.

58. Côté, supra n. 56, at p. 173. Slattery, loc. cit. n. 14, at pp. 737–738.

59. Côté, supra n. 56, at p. 173.

60. Côté, supra n. 56, at p. 174.

61. Murphy, W.T. and Roberts, S., Understanding Property Law (London, Fontana Press 1994) pp. 40–41.Google Scholar See, however, C.L. Anderson and E. Swimmer, ‘Some Empirical Evidence on Property Rights of First Peoples’, 33 Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation (1997) pp. 1–22, who argue that empirical evidence of different land tenure systems, individual and collective, among indigenous peoples suggests that these differences maximise net values of land, rather than indicating innate preferences for different property systems.

62. Guerin, supra n. 19, at p. 382. Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, 2 SCR (1988) p. 678: ‘The inescapable conclusion from the Court's analysis of Indian title up to this point is that the Indian interest in land is truly sui generis. It is more than the right to enjoyment and occupancy although, as Dickson J. pointed out in Guerin, it is difficult to describe what more in traditional property law terminology.’ Sparrow, supra n. 13, at p. 1112, added, ‘Courts must be careful … to avoid the application of traditional common law concepts of property.’

63. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at p. 1081 and p. 1091.

64. St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen, supra n. 52.

65. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at p. 1082. See also McNeil in Asch, op. cit. n. 22, at pp. 135–154.

66. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at pp. 1082–1083.

67. Adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 27 June 1989. Entered into force 5 September 1991. As at 31 December 1999 ratified by 13 states, <http://ilolex.ilo.ch: 1567/scripts/ratifce.pl?C169>. Canada is not a party to the Convention.

68. Supra n. 4.

69. Text as approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, on 26 February 1997, <http://www.oas.org/EN/PROG/indigene.htm>.

70. ‘The Definition and Proof of Aboriginal Title’ – Analysis prepared by Brian Slattery in The Supreme Court of Canada Decision in Delgamuukw (Materials prepared for conference held in Vancouver, British Columbia, 12–13 February 1998) p. 3.5.

71. ibid., at p. 3.6.

72. See R v. Adams, 3 SCR (1996) pp. 116–117.

73. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at pp. 1094–1095. See also Slattery, supra n. 70.

74. Slattery, ibid.

75. The ‘integral to distinctive culture’ test requires an aboriginal group to prove that a particular practice, custom or tradition is integral to the culture. Van der Peet, supra n. 7, at pp. 507–671.

76. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at p. 1083.

77. ibid., at pp. 1086–1087.

78. Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada, 4 SCR (1995) p. 344.

79. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at p. 1088.

80. ibid., at p. 1089.

81. Final Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1996, Vol. 2, Part 2, s. 4 (3.2) ‘Significance of Lands and Resources to Aboriginal Peoples’) <http://www.inac.gc.ca/rcap>. See also Anaya, op. cit. n. S, at pp. 104–105.

82. Supra n. 4. For significance of the inter–generational aspect to cultural identity and survival, see E-I. Daes, Preliminary Working Paper, ‘Indigenous People and their Relationship to Land’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/17 p. 4, Anaya, op. cit. n. 5, at pp. 104–107.

83. Birnie, P.W. and Boyle, A.E., International Law and the Environment (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1992) pp. 211–212.Google Scholar See also Brown-Weiss, E., In Fairness to Future Generations (Dobbs Ferry, NY, Transnational Publishers 1989).Google Scholar

84. Sands, P., Principles of International Environmental Law: Frameworks, Standards and Implementation, Vol. I (Manchester, Manchester University Press 1995) p. 13.Google Scholar

85. Nuttall defines this as, ‘a body of knowledge built up by a group of peoples through generations of living in close contact with nature. It includes a system of classification, a set of empirical observations about the environment, and system of self-government that governs resource use’, M. Nuttall, Protecting the Arctic: Indigenous Peoples and Cultural Survival (Amsterdam, Harwood Academic 1998) p. 72. See, in general, Burger, J., The Gaia Atlas of First Peoples: A Future for the Indigenous World (New York, Doubleday 1990) pp. 32–33, W.A. Shutkin, ‘International Human Rights Law and the Earth: the Protection of Indigenous Peoples and the Environment’, 31(3) Va. JIL (1991) pp. 479–511.Google Scholar

86. R. Kapashesit and M. Klippenstein, ‘Aboriginal Group Rights and Environmental Protection’, 36 McGill LJ (1991) pp. 925–961, J. Woodliffe, ‘Biodiversity of Indigenous Peoples’, in M. Bowman and C. Redgwell, eds., International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1996) pp. 255–269.

87. F. Yamin and D. Posey, ‘Indigenous Peoples, Biotechnology and Intellectual Property Rights’, 2(2) Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (1993) pp. 141–148. G. Wenzel, ‘Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Inuit: Reflections on TEK Research and Ethics’, 52(2) Arctic (June 1999) pp. 113–124. D.A. Posey, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Just Compensation for Indigenous Knowledge’, in M. Bothe, T. Kurzidem and C. Schmidt, eds., Amazonia and Siberia: Legal Aspects of the Protection of the Environment and Development in the Last Open Spaces (London, Graham and Trotman 1993) p. 284.

88. 31 ILM (1992) pp. 822–841.

89. Agreed by consensus at the UN Conference on Environment and Development, 3–14 June 1992, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in Burhenne, W.E., ed., International Environmental Soft Law: Collection of Relevant Instruments (Dordrecht, Nijhoff 1993) pp. 992:4783–992:4785.Google Scholar The Agenda is an 800–page document which sets out priority actions for environmentally sustainable development, which among other actions include, achieving sustainable growth, as through integrating environment and development in decision–making, and fostering an equitable world, as by combating poverty and protecting human health, 31 ILM (1992) pp. 814–815.

90. C. Tennant, ‘Indigenous Peoples, International Institutions, and the International Legal literature from 1945–1993’, 16 HRQ (1994) pp. 1–57.

91. K. McNeil, ‘Defining Aboriginal Title in the 90’s: Has the Supreme Court Finally Got It Right?’ (Twelfth Annual Roberts Lecture, 25 March 1998, York University, Toronto, Ontario) p. 13.

92. See Shutkin, loc. cit. n. 85, at pp. 479–511, for discussion of interface between human rights and environmental issues.

93. Sparrow, supra n. 13. Infra s. 4.1 (Infringement of aboriginal title).

94. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at p. 1091.

95. McNeil, supra n. 91, at p. 12.

96. Views on communication No. 511/1992, llmari Länsman et al v. Finland, adopted on 26 October 1994, para. 9.2. See also Views on communication No. 197/1985, Kitok v. Sweden, adopted on 27 July 1988, para. 9.2.

97. Länsman, supra n. 96, at para. 9.3.

98. See McNeil, supra n. 91. Kymlicka argues that minority rights are compatible with values of Western liberalism relating to the autonomy of the individual, and freedom of choice, since membership in a ‘societal culture’ enables meaningful individual choice and supports self-identity. As a matter of justice the state necessarily is involved in supporting ‘societal cultures’ to rectify and prevent these minorities facing disadvantages, Kymlicka, op. cit. n. 43, at ch. S.

99. Kymlicka describes ‘external protections’ as intended ‘to protect the group from the impact of external decisions (eg. the economic or political decisions of the larger society)… [and involving] … inter-group relations–that is, the ethnic or national group may seek to protect its distinct existence and identity by limiting the impact of the decisions of the larger society’, ibid., at pp. 35–36. See Slattery, loc. cit. n. 14, at pp. 743–755, for evolution of concepts of inalienability and fiduciary duty.

100. McNeil, supra n. 91, at p. 16.

101. See W. F. Flanagan, ‘Piercing the Veil of Real Property: Delgamuukw v British Columbia’, 24 Queen's LJ (1998) p. 279, who argues that the sui generis concept of aboriginal title is questionable i f it is a device to restrict the scope of aboriginal title, rather than a culturally sensitive approach that recognises that ‘alien’ common law principles of property law should not apply to aboriginal title.

102. For analysis of levels of identity construction, see J.J. Corntassel and T.H. Primeau, The Paradox of Indigenous Identity: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach’, 4 Global Governance (1998) pp. 139–156.

103. See R.H. Bartlett, ‘The Content of Aboriginal Title and Equality Before the Law’, 61 Sask. L Rev. (1998) p. 377, who argues that the Court in Delgamuukw limited the recognition of aboriginal title that equality would otherwise dictate in favour of a principle of pragmatic reconciliation.

104. Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1 FC (1980) pp. 557–558.

105. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at p. 1097.

106. Van der Peet, supra n. 7, at pp. 554–555.

107. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at p. 1098.

108. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at p. 1101.

109. Slattery, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 758.

110. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at pp. 1099–1100. Van der Peet, supra n. 7, at p. 551, recognised that ‘true reconciliation will, equally, place weight on [the aboriginal perspective and the common law perspective].’

111. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at p. 1100.

112. Van der Peet, supra n. 7, at pp. 558–559. See also Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at pp. 1065–1069.

113. ibid., at pp. 1102–1103.

114. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at pp. 1104–1106.

115. See Baker Lake test for proving aboriginal title, supra n. 104.

116. D.W. Elliott, ‘Delgamuukw: Back to Court?’, 26(1) Manitoba LJ (1998) p. 111 and pp. 103–109 on oral aboriginal evidence.

117. Sparrow, supra n. 13, at p. 1113.

118. ibid.Côté, supra n. 56, at pp. 139–198.

119. Côté, supra n. 56, at p. 185.

120. Sparrow, supra n. 13, at pp. 1113–1114.

121. R.v. Gladstone, 2 SCR (1996) pp.762–780.

122. ‘The special trust relationship and the responsibility of the government vis-à-vis aboriginals must be the first consideration in determining whether the legislation or action in question can be justified’, Sparrow, supra n. 13, at p. 1114.

123. Sparrow, supra n. 13, at p. 1119.

124. ibid.

125. Sparrow, supra n. 13, at p. 1113, pp. 1114–1116.

126. Gladstone, supra n. 121, at p. 767.

127. Sparrow, supra n. 13, at p. 1113.

128. ibid.

129. Gladstone, supra n. 121, at pp. 774–775.

130. Van der Peet, supra n. 7, at p. 667, see also McNeil, supra n. 91, at pp. 19–21 on the infringement justification undermining constitutional protection.

131. Van der Peet, supra n. 7, at p. 661.

132. Van der Peet, supra n. 7, at p. 664.

133. Gladstone, supra n. 121, at p. 775.

134. ibid.

135. Justice McLachlin regarded reconciliation justifications as ‘indeterminate and ultimately more political than legal’. She suggested adopting a restrictive approach: ‘the Crown may prohibit exploitation of the resource that is incompatible with its continued and responsible use’, Van der Peet, supra n. 7, at p. 659.

136. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at p. 1111.

137. ibid.

138. Communication No. 167/1984, Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, views adopted by the Human Rights Committee on 26 March 1990, para. 33.

139. Länsman, supra n. 96, at paras. 9.4–9.8.

140. ‘The Delgamuukw Decision’ – Analysis prepared by Louise Mandell, in The Supreme Court of Canada Decision in Delgamuukw (Materials prepared for conference held in Vancouver, British Columbia, 12–13 February 1998) p. 10.15. See also R.L. Barsh and J.Y. Henderson, ‘The Supreme Court's Van der Peet Trilogy: Naive Imperialism and Ropes of Sand’, 42 McGill LJ (1997) pp. 993–1009.

141. ‘Delgamuukw. the Problem of Legitimacy’ – Analysis prepared by John L. Howard, in The Supreme Court of Canada Decision in Delgamuukw (Materials prepared for conference held in Vancouver, British Columbia, 12–13 February 1998) p. 12.11.

142. In their reasoning, Justices La Forest and L'Heureux-Dubé agreed that the above objectives would satisfy the first part of the justification analysis, Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at pp. 1132–1133.

143. McNeil, supra n. 91, at p. 20.

144. Tully, op. cit. n. 17, at pp. 158–162.

145. See Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, supra n. 138, at para. 16.5.

146. McNeil, supra n. 91, at p. 21.

147. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at p. 1113.

148. ibid.

149. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at p. 1113.

150. Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 23(50) (Art. 27), para. 7.

151. Länsman, supra n. 96, at para. 9.6.

152. See keynote address by Professor Dr. Martin Scheinin, member of the Human Rights Committee, at ‘Public Forum’ sponsored by the Coalition for a Public Inquiry into Ipperwash (Toronto, Canada, 18 March 2000).

153. Anti-Slavery International Newsletter, June 1994, No. 25.

154. The Raglan Agreement, 28 February 1995.

155. ibid., Preamble, Art. 7.2.3, ss. 5 and 6.

156. ibid.

157. Guerin, supra n. 19, at p. 385, Sparrow, supra n. 13, at p. 1119, Gladstone, supra n. 121, at p. 768.

158. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at p. 1114.

159. McNeil compares this to the protection of private property under the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, and s. 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution which empowers parliament to acquire property from states or persons on just terms, supra n. 91, at p. 23, fn. 80.

160. Delgamuukw, supra n. 11, at para. 169.

161. Infra, Shahin Shane Ebrahimi v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

162. ibid.

163. ibid., at para. 203.

164. There are four states with objections to parts of Art. 27 and one state that objects to the whole of Art. 27.

165. See Hannum, H., Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press 1996) pp. 91–94.Google Scholar

166. Coulter, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 135.

167. Factory at Chorzow (Claim for Indemnity) case (Germany v. Poland), Merits, PCIJ Series A, No. 17 (1928), in Dixon, M. and McCorquodale, R., Cases and Materials on International Law, 3rd edn. (London, Blackstone Press limited 2000) pp. 473–474.Google Scholar

168. Anglo–Iranian Oil case (United Kingdom v. Iran), United Kingdom Memorial to the Court, ICJ Rep. (1952) para. 30, Dixon and McCorquodale, op. cit. n. 167, at p. 474.

169. ibid.

170. ibid.

171. Shahin Shane Ebrahimi v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1994), United States-Iran Claims Tribunal, 89 AJIL p. 385, Dixon and McCorquodale, op. cit. n. 167, at pp. 478–480.

172. ibid., at p. 478.

173. ibid.

174. Amoco International Finance v. Iran, United States-Iran Claims Tribunal, 15 Iran-USCTR (1987) p. 189, Dixon and McCorquodale, op. cit n. 167, at p. 481.

175. ibid., at pp. 481–482.

176. ibid.