Opposition to Soviet rule has deep roots and traditions in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Modern dissentism, however, is a response to Soviet rule different from what we call opposition in the West. In the Baltic republics it must be dated from 1968, the watershed year in the rise of human rights movement in the Soviet Union. In Estonia and Latvia, dissident activity was galvanized to life primarily by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia which provoked vocal criticism. In Lithuania, reaction to Czechoslovakia's occupation coincided with the growing concern that an increasingly severe implementation of prohibitive anti-religious legislation will choke off the existence of the Catholic church. Concern for religious rights served as the primary catalyst for the reborn dissent movement in Lithuania.

The study of ethnic nationalism in the Caucasus is problematic. This situation arises not so much from the extreme ethnic and cultural diversity of this region, but more from the same methodological obstacles and problems encountered when studying ethnic nationalism anywhere in the USSR. Before discussing ethnic nationalism in the Caucasus, then, a brief treatment of some of these problems is presented. It is hoped that this format will make this paper more valuable to those interested in the nationality situation in the Soviet Union in general.

With the destruction of the Third Reich and subsequent establishment of two separate and sovereign German states, different perspectives on society and class have resulted in differences in German-Jewish affairs. The Jewish communities in the Federal Republic of Germany, while predicated on the principles of religious corporations, became oriented toward the World Zionist Organization and the State of Israel. Indeed, Jewish life in West Germany soon represented expatriate Israeli existence, and the religious, cultural and political organizations of West-German Jews have become largely extensions of Zionist and Israeli purposes.

Before engaging in empirical treatment inherent in the title, I will outline the model on which my analysis is based. I begin with the observation that natural languages are codes which groups of people have conveniently adopted for the purposes of communicating and of information storing. The costs, both explicit and implicit, associated with a given code can be divided into two categories.

At the end of 1928 Matvyi Iavorskyi, head of historical studies in the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism and hitherto considered a sort of court historian of Ukrainian communism, was attacked for allegedly committing “nationalistic deviations” in interpreting Ukrainian history. Iavorskyi was in no sense a “dissident” like Oleksander Shumskyi or Mykola Khvylovyi; he never, so far as is known, questioned the official Party line. Rather, he was a close associate of Mykola Skrypnyk, the political strongman of the Soviet Ukrainian regime, and the hue and cry raised against “Iavorskyism” in historial scholarship was actually an indirect attack upon Skrypnyk. It had the distinction of being the first such attack; it would not be the last.

Many writers, among them Alexis de Toqueville, George Orwell, Aldous Huxley, Jose Ortega y Gasset and, more recently, Jacques Ellul, have predicted that as a result of technological and political development, the mass societies in which we now live will be fully transformed into distopian regimes by the end of this century. They foresaw the emergence of vast, regimented systems in which people would live lonely, dehumanized lives under the tutelage of all-providing and all-pervading hierarchies made up of functionaries and intellectuals, pitifully subservient to the ruling elite.

The protection of Imperial Russian territorial integrity was, when the peace conference convened in Paris, one of the firmest and least ambivalent elements of Woodrow Wilson's Russian policy.1 The Russia to which he applied this policy was in fact an empire, including nationality groups incorporated, often forceably, during the 17th and 18th centuries. Many of these ethnic nationalities — and especially those with which Wilson and his fellow peacemakers were familiar — were concentrated along the borders of European Russia. Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine were perhaps the best known of the ethnic nationalities, each with defined geographic areas, which had formed part of imperial Russia. Such nationality centers, many of which had long established administrative borders which changed little as a result of the peace conference, are the Russian borderlands to which this paper refers.

Karol Cardinal Wojtyla's encounters with Marxism-Leninism, the official ideology of the Polish state run by the Communist party, have taken place on two levels: theoretical-philosophical and political-practical. As a person living in the country ruled by the Marxist-Leninists, the Cardinal had to be concerned with the reality of his own situation as well as the power structure of the Party-state. As a priest he had to deal with the concept of alienation that is at the center of Marxist anthropology, realizing that the fundamental precondition for abolition of alienation is not abundance of material goods, but an internal improvement of people. As a philosopher Wojtyla had to cope with Marxist concepts of man, nature, society, economics and culture. A neo-Thomist scholar, the present pope believes in human liberty and rejects deterministic philosophies such as Marxism.

The Yugoslav critique of Stalinism and the concomitant elaboration of the Titoist model of self-managing socialism continue to bewilder observers East and West, as well as the Yugoslavs themselves. Thus, until recently, Chinese communist criticism that Yugoslavia had sold out to the West and become its Trojan Horse in the communist world was neatly balanced by those Western critiques which see in Titoism a communist Trojan Horse to penetrate Western defenses. Some wonder whether Yugoslavia is really a self-managing democracy or a single-party dictatorship. Others ask themselves whether Yugoslavia's decentralized economy is capitalist or socialist. Many fear for Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and national independence, particularly since Tito's death on May 4, 1980.