1. Russian ethnicity is as a rule here used to describe those with russkiy listed in their “point five” in official documents; the so-called “passport nationality.” For a detailed discussion of the issue of nationality in the Soviet Union and Russia, see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Inheriting the Soviet Policy Toolbox. Russia's Dilemma Over Ascriptive Nationality,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 6, 1999, pp. 1069–1087.Google Scholar

2. Roman Szporluk, “Statehood and Nation Building in Post-Soviet Space,” in R. Szporluk, ed., Nation, Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 9.Google Scholar

3. Nationalism I will define here as a doctrine emphasizing the importance of the individual's belonging to a ethnic group, and of the promotion of the interests of this group—which is perceived by the “nationalist” to form a “nation.” Such promotion may above all imply efforts to make the borders of a state coincide with those of a ethnic group, but may also take other expressions. The character of the nationalism may vary depending on, inter alia, its perception of other ethnic groups, and its territorial aspirations. When I refer to a “nation,” I will do so in the understanding of the individual perception that I am dealing with at the moment, while not necessarily endorsing this assessment. This interpretation is not meant as the last word on the degree of “constructedness” of nations, or in this case, the “Russian nation;” rather, it is as deep into this discussion I consider it necessary to go in this specific context.Google Scholar

4. In reality, the city did not become directly subordinated to the RSFSR, but rather to the Union itself; the proper term for its status was gorod soyuznogo podchineniya.Google Scholar

5. The Fleet counted 21 submarines, 35 principal surface combatants and some 240 other surface ships; as well as other forces, including naval aviation (some 244 combat aircraft and 85 combat helicopters), naval infantry and coastal defense forces. Figures from The Military Balance 1993–1994 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 103.Google Scholar

6. Among the classic works in this field, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (London: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957 [1985]), p. 79; and Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times. On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 2.Google Scholar

7. The cut-off date has been defined by two events: Leonid Kuchma replaced Leonid Kravchuk as president of Ukraine, elected on a platform promising closer ties with Russia (July 1994); and Russian federal forces invaded Chechnya (December 1994), concentrating Moscow's attention on the North Caucasus, and making it important for the Yeltsin regime not to appear as an instigator of separatism in general.Google Scholar

8. For a more detailed chronology up to this event, see Ustina Markus, “Black Sea Fleet Dispute Apparently Over,” Transition, Vol. 1, No. 13, 1995, pp 30–34. The current state of Crimea and the BSF in Russian-Ukrainian relations was defined in May 1997. On 28 May, the prime ministers of the two countries signed three agreements related to the BSF issue: on the division of the fleet, on Russia's rights to bases in Crimea, and on debt settlement. The parties agreed that Russia's fleet would remain based in Sevastopol, leasing facilities there for 20 years. Then, on 31 May, Presidents Yeltsin and Kuchma signed a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, declaring respect for the respective countries' territorial integrity. Both countries' federal assemblies have since ratified these agreements. For a brief outline of the agreements, see Vladimir Baranovsky, “Russia: Conflicts and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes,” in SIPRI Yearbook 1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp 118–120. A thorough analysis is provided in James Sherr, “Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement? The Black Sea Fleet Accords,” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3, 1997, pp. 33–50.Google Scholar

9. This author's survey on the media coverage from this period indicate that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev only to a very modest degree participated in the debates over Crimea and the BSF. As for Grachev, this contrasts strongly with his activities in relation to the Baltic states.Google Scholar

10. Vera Tolz, “Conflicting ‘Homelands Myths’ and Nation-State Building in Postcommunist Russia,” Slavic Review, Vol. 57, No. 2, 1998, p. 283. Starovoitova and Tishkov both had left the Yeltsin team by the end of 1992.Google Scholar

11. Mark Galeotti, The Age of Anxiety. Security and Politics in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia (New York: Longman, 1995), p. 153.Google Scholar

12. “Galina Starovoytova: Mistakes Are Costly,” Krasnaya zvezda, 22 January 1992, FBIS-SOV-92–016.Google Scholar

13. Roman Solchanyk: “Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation over the Crimea,” RFE/RL Research Report, 10 February 1992, IR920096.RIR, p. 26.Google Scholar

14. See, e.g., “Krym v fevrale 1954 goda,” Moskovskie novosti, 2 February 1992. This article also features the brief decree from the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the transfer.Google Scholar

15. “Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiyskoy Federatsii. O pravovoy otsenke resheniy vysshikh organov gosudarstvennoy vlasti RSFSR po izmenniyu statusa Kryma, prinyatykh v 1954 gody.” Reprinted in Chernomorskoy Flot, gorod Sevastopol i nekotorye problemy rossiysko-ukrainskikh otnosheniy. Khronika, dokumenty, analiz, mneniya (1991–1997 gg.) (Moscow: Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1997), p. 25.Google Scholar

16. Roman Solchanyk, “The Crimean Imbroglio: Kiev and Moscow,” RFE/RL Research Report, 9 October 1992, p. 6.Google Scholar

17. Roman Solchanyk: “Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation over the Crimea,” RFE/RL Research Report, 10 February 1992, p. 26.Google Scholar

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19. Nasha Rossiya—Vestnik FNS, No. 21 (45), 1992.Google Scholar

20. Estimate made by Associated Press, quoted in Dagens N&aexcl;ringsliv, 3 December 1992.Google Scholar

21. Manifest Fronta Natsionalnogo Spaseniya (1992).Google Scholar

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23. Under Kruglov, the FNS has been described as displaying “little caution in dealing with sensitive ethnic and geopolitical issues and [Kruglov's] statements have been highly incendiary,” Jane I. Dawson, “Ethnicity, Ideology and Geopolitics in Crimea,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1997, p. 433.Google Scholar

24. For an analysis of the military's vote, see James Sherr, “Russia's Elections—the Military Implications,” Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1994, pp. 67–68.Google Scholar

25. RFE/RL Daily Brief, 12 August 1992.Google Scholar

26. RFE/RL Daily Brief, 12 July 1993.Google Scholar

27. Ibid.Google Scholar

28. For a convincing analysis of phases in the regime's foreign policy, see Neil Malcolm and Alex Pravda, “Introduction,” in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). For a parallel analysis of policy phases related to the diaspora issue, see Neil J. Melvin, “The Russians: Diaspora and the End of Empire,” in Charles King, and Neil J. Melvin, eds, Nations Abroad. Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).Google Scholar

29. A detailed discussion of the different definitions of Russianness that were employed is provided in Neil Melvin, Forging the New Russian Nation. Russian Foreign Policy and the Russian-Speaking Communities of the Former USSR (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Russian and CIS Programme Discussion Paper 50, 1994), pp. 17–22. These terms are also discussed in S. G. Simonsen, “Raising ‘the Russian Question’: Ethnicity and Statehood—Russkie and Rossiya,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1996, pp. 91–110.Google Scholar

30. As for other groups, the number of Crimean Tatars was 38, 000; of Belarusians 50, 000. Figures from Natsionalnyy sostav naseleniya SSSR (Moscow: Goskomstat SSSR, Finansy i statistika, 1991), p. 82. Within a few years, the return of Tatars brought the number much higher; by 1992, it was estimated at 210, 000. Ian Bremmer, “Ethnic Issues in Crimea,” RFE/RL Research Report. Vol. 2, No. 18, 1993, p. 25.Google Scholar

31. The treaty involving Tajikistan has not been ratified by Russia. For an in-depth discussion of the issue of dual citizenship, see Igor Zevelev, “Russia and the Russian Diasporas,” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1996, pp. 266–272.Google Scholar

32. “My vsegda otkryty dlya vsekh,” Oppozitsiya, No.4, 1994.Google Scholar

33. For a discussion of this work, see John B. Dunlop, “Russia: Confronting a Loss of Empire,” in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds, Nation and Politics in the Soviet Successor States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 58–60.Google Scholar

34. The best study of Russian military policy in the “near abroad” and the Russian military in general is Pavel Baev, The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles (London: Sage/PRIO, 1996).Google Scholar

35. See “Ofitserskoe sobranie nastaivaet na edinstsve vooruzhennykh sil,” Izvestiya, 18 January 1992; and “Manevry vokrug ochen vooruzhennykh sil,” Izvestiya, 20 January 1992.Google Scholar

36. Krasnaya Zvezda, as reported by Russian Press Digest, 14 February 1992Google Scholar

37. Nikolay Stolyarov, “Integratsiya tak zhe tsenna, kak i nezavisimost,” Izvestiya, 16 January 1992. Stolyarov was an aide to the Commander in Chief of the CIS forces, and chairman of the personnel committee.Google Scholar

38. “Soviet Officers Start Political Movement; Aim Is to Preserve Military Unity, Benefits,” Washington Post, 17 January 1992.Google Scholar

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40. The doctrine was published in a special issue of Voennaya Mysl in May 1992.Google Scholar

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42. Dick, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1994. Dick speculated that differences between the 1992 draft and this doctrine could be explained by the fact that the General Staff had a heavy influence on the earlier one, whereas the latter was mainly the work of the MO.Google Scholar

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45. Vice-Admiral Kazimir Stalbo, “Prestuplenie veka; obekt i podelniki,” Rossiyskaya gazeta, 24 June 1993. Another example of Rossiyskaya gazeta publishing articles at odds with government policy over Crimea is the Academy of Sciences member Georgiy Shakhazarov's flaming article “Mne stydno za Prezidenta” (“I Am Ashamed of the President”), published on 29 June 1993, as a response to Yeltsin's criticism of the Supreme Soviet.Google Scholar

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52. “Ethnic Turmoil Tears Apart Armed Forces,” The Independent, 12 January 1992. At this point, Admiral Kasatonov stated that Ukrainians accounted for 19% of the officers and 30% of the seamen and petty officers of the BSF. “Troops Begin to Take the Oath on Ukrainian Territory,” Izvestiya, 7 January 1992, FBIS-SOV-92–004.Google Scholar

53. Two other positions that may also be identified above all with the policies of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the winner of the Duma election four months earlier, also scored particularly well in the military. The first was the elimination of the current ethno-territorial divisions of the state for one of a territorial-administrative system. Here, the officers were among the top categories, scoring 26%, compared with the average 14%. The position that Russia should be “cleansed” of aliens (inorodtsy) was supported more by officers than by any other group: 23% versus the 16% average. I. Klyamkin, V. Lapkin and V. Pantin, Politicheskiy kurs B. Eltsina: predvaritelnye itogi (Moscow: Fond “Obshchestvennoe mnenie,” 1994), p. 70–71.Google Scholar

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