A Brief Historical Background of the Debate about the Armenian Genocide

Between the 15^th and the 20^th centuries, Armenians were part of the Ottoman Empire’s millet system, which categorized non-Muslim communities into two groups: polytheists and the “People of the Book,” adherents of Abrahamic religions. Armenians, Jews, and Orthodox Greeks held a designated protected (dhimmi) status in this system, affording them religious, educational, and juridical autonomy (Barkey Reference Barkey2008). However, they were treated as secondary citizens and were ineligible for official positions. This system waned with the decline of the Ottoman Empire. During the period of the empire’s collapse, intercommunal violence escalated between Turks and Armenians. One of the most notorious outcomes was the Ottoman government’s deportations from 1915 to 1917, orchestrated by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The events are commonly referred to as the Armenian genocide by scholars, by many in the international community, and have been legally recognized as such by various national governments and international bodies, including rulings by the European Court of Human Rights. Determining the exact number of Armenians who perished during the genocide remains difficult and widely debated, with estimates ranging from as high as 1.5 million to as low as 200,000. However, most scholars agree that at least 800,000 lives were lost (Dixon Reference Dixon2010b). Levene (Reference Levene1998) estimates that between 600,000 and over a million Armenians were killed out of a total population of two million, aligning with the CUP’s goal to establish a modern, ethnically Turkified nation-state in Anatolia. Indeed, most Armenian properties were seized and redistributed by state agents, leading to the destruction of the Armenian community that had resided in Anatolia for centuries (Dixon Reference Dixon2010b). Üngör (Reference Üngör2011) argues that between 1913 and 1950, nationalist population policies in Turkey’s Eastern region were designed to achieve ethnic homogeneity, through methods such as genocide, deportation, spatial planning, and forced assimilation.

The Republic of Turkey, established in 1923, officially abolished the millet system and promised equal modern citizenship for its non-Muslim minorities. The principle of equality was not fully realized in modern Turkey, and the definition of the Turkish nation excluded the non-Muslim minorities. Indeed, Turkish nationalism developed a cautious perspective towards non-Muslim minorities, attributing the collapse of the Empire to an inability and impossibility to integrate these communities into the nation. This view is particularly evident in the work of Ziya Gokalp, one of the founding fathers of Turkish nationalism (Nefes Reference Nefes2013, Reference Nefes2018). Accordingly, the Turkish nationalist ideology tends to approach the non-Muslim minorities as non-local communities from the Ottoman past or “native foreigners” (Tansuğ Reference Tansuğ2021). This was manifested in the 1931 edition of the Citizenship Education textbook, an integral component of the official educational curriculum formulated by the Turkish Ministry of Education, which labeled non-Muslims as bad people (Ekmekçioğlu Reference Ekmekcioglu2014). In parallel, the Turkish state closely monitored and censored Armenian publications during the early Republican period, and this apprehensive stance towards Armenians was further fueled by the Armenian territorial claims against Turkey presented at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 (Suciyan Reference Suciyan2016). Moreover, Armenians were among the victims of exclusionary state policies and xenophobia against non-Muslims, such as the Wealth Tax of 1942 and the September 6–7 Pogrom in 1955. Since the 1960s, international pressure to recognize the Armenian genocide, along with terrorist attacks by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), which primarily targeted Turkish diplomats in the 1970s and 1980s, has further damaged the perception of Armenians in Turkey (Gunter Reference Gunter2007). Further, the Nagorno-Karabakh military conflict since 1994 positioned Turkey against Armenia (Dixon 2010), which added to the negative and exclusionary attitudes toward Armenians in the country.

A shift in how Armenians are perceived in Turkey could be attributed to the aftermath of the tragic assassination of Hrant Dink, a Turkish-Armenian journalist and human rights activist, on January 19, 2007 (Okten Reference Okten2022). This event garnered widespread condemnation both in Turkey and on the international stage, with many regarding it as an assault on freedom of expression and minority rights (Türkmen-Dervişoğlu Reference Türkmen-Dervişoğlu2013). Following the assassination, sympathy towards Armenians grew among the general population in Turkey. In parallel, in 2009, a year-long diplomatic normalization process between Turkey and Armenia ensued (Türkmen-Dervişoğlu Reference Türkmen-Dervişoğlu2013). However, this did not have a lasting impact on Turkish-Armenian relations or the official Turkish stance on the genocide debate. In January 2017, Mr Garo Paylan, an Armenian-Turkish politician and a member of the Turkish Parliament (MP), referred to the Ottoman-era killings of Armenians as genocide in a speech, sparking outrage among members of parliament who accused him of insulting Turkish identity. Consequently, he faced a temporary suspension from parliament lasting three days (Hurriyet Daily News 2017). This event not only exemplifies the exclusionary treatment of Armenians but also demonstrates the direct connection between the denialist perspective and Turkish nationalist ideology. The exclusionary stance of modern Turkish nationalism toward non-Muslim minorities since the beginning of the republican period, combined with national reactions to ASALA terror attacks and diplomatic pressure on Turkey to recognize the genocide, has solidified the official view that acknowledging the genocide is an affront to Turkish identity.

According to Gocek (Reference Gocek2015), the denial of violence against Armenians can be categorized into four phases: Imperial denial (1789–1907), Young Turk denial (1908–1918), early republican denial (1919–1973), and late republican denial (1974–Present). It was not until the 1970s that Turkey shifted from maintaining an official silence regarding the genocide. This transformation was spurred by two key international challenges: (a) The international recognition of the Armenian genocide in countries like Uruguay, which began in 1965; and (b) the terror attacks carried out by ASALA during the 1970s and 1980s (Dixon Reference Dixon2010a). Following the 1980 coup d’état in Turkey, the military junta that assumed control played a significant role in shaping the government’s official stance of denial from 1980 to 1983. Turkish military and bureaucratic elites devised and executed new strategies to systematically address challenges related to the Armenian genocide. These encompassed centralizing control over the official narrative, publishing defenses of this narrative, gathering supporting evidence, incorporating it into the education system, and seeking international support (Dixon Reference Dixon2010a). In the early 2000s, the Armenian genocide started to be discussed more openly, as the acknowledgment of the genocide became an informal criterion for Turkey’s EU accession between 1999 and 2005, indirectly pressuring Turkey (Açar and Rüma Reference Açar and Rüma2007). Turkey responded by making concessions, such as proposing a joint history commission (TBMM 2005).

The Turkish state’s position on the Armenian genocide is not merely a refusal to acknowledge historical crimes, it is deeply rooted in concerns over territorial integrity, potential legal consequences, and the preservation of a national identity perceived to be under constant threat (Dixon Reference Dixon2018). The Turkish state has upheld a consistent narrative that recasts the events of 1915 as necessary wartime measures against a rebellious population. This narrative is legally reinforced through laws that criminalize any questioning of the official stance, effectively silencing domestic dissent and preventing public discourse that challenges the state’s account. Dixon (Reference Dixon2018) notes that Turkish officials have historically been driven by fears of potential material demands, such as compensation or territorial claims, which are seen as highly probable and extensive. This is deeply intertwined with the foundational narrative of the Turkish Republic, which emerged from the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire amid perceived foreign threats and internal uprisings — often referred to as the Sevres Syndrome. This syndrome portrays Turkey as a nation besieged by both internal and external enemies intent on dismembering the country, much like the Ottoman Empire’s collapse (Nefes Reference Nefes2015, Reference Nefes2023, Reference Nefes2024). It fosters a belief that acknowledging the genocide would not only undermine the state’s legitimacy but also threaten its very identity, making the denial of the genocide a critical element in maintaining national unity and sovereignty.

Since the early 1990s, civil society has played a significant role in shaping perceptions in Turkey by promoting alternative narratives that challenge the official state history. This movement has involved a wide range of individuals — journalists, writers, academics, filmmakers, and descendants of victims — who have produced cultural works presenting counter-narratives that contest the official version (Salomoni Reference Salomoni2024). Moreover, some Turkish intellectuals issued an apology in late 2008 for the mass killings of Armenians in 1915, an action that provoked widespread discontent (Bakiner Reference Bakiner2013). The emergence of commemorations of the Armenian genocide in Istanbul, beginning around 2005, also reflects the efforts of civil society. These events, organized by groups such as the Say “Stop” to Racism and Nationalism (Irkçılığa ve Milliyetçiliğe Dur De!) initiative and the Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği, IHD) directly challenged the official narrative (Salomoni Reference Salomoni2024). The involvement of cultural actors, such as the Hrant Dink Foundation — which organizes conferences, exhibitions, and other cultural events to foster dialogue between Turks and Armenians — further underscores the influence of civil society as a driving force in pressuring the state and shaping public opinion on matters of historical significance (Bakiner Reference Bakiner2016).

Perceptions of the Armenian Genocide through Cohen’s Typology: Intersecting denialism and nationalism

Stanley Cohen’s (Reference Cohen2001) book, States of Denial, provides a useful elaboration of the ways in which people and states deny past atrocities. His analysis is a broader exploration of state-sponsored violence and its aftermath. The work delves into the psychological and sociological mechanisms that enable collective denial, highlighting how societies often employ various strategies to suppress or distort historical truths. In that regard, a key component in Cohen’s examination of denialism is nationalism. The book initiates with an epigraph from George Orwell, implying that nationalists tend to selectively perceive information, overlooking atrocities committed by their own group: “…The nationalist not only does not disapprove of atrocities committed by his own side, but he has a remarkable capacity for not even hearing about them” (Cohen Reference Cohen2001, 5). In parallel, Cohen (Reference Cohen2001, 98) asserts that this perspective on nationalism highlights the resemblance between personal and ideological denial: “The rhetoric of nationalism functions as a ‘moral vocabulary of self-exoneration,’ as if derived from a handbook of motivational accounts.” Simply put, nationalists may manipulate facts and historical records, as nationalistic loyalties or animosities can make certain facts intolerable. Indeed, this is evident in the staunch defense of the denialist perspective on the Armenian genocide by Turkish nationalists (Açar and Rüma 2007; Nefes, Gürpınar, and Kaymak Reference Nefes, Gürpınar and Kaymak2023).

Cohen (Reference Cohen2001) describes three basic forms of denial: (1) literal, (2) interpretive, and (3) implicatory. To start with, literal denial refers to a blatant rejection of past suffering, as something never happened. Second, interpretive denial is a form of perception in which individuals acknowledge that human suffering occurred but reinterpret or rationalize it in a way that lessens its significance. It involves accepting the facts on some level but distorting their meaning to avoid the moral or ethical implications. Third, implicatory denial refers to the form where people acknowledge that a wrongdoing or atrocity occurred but refuse to accept their own complicity, responsibility, or moral connection. It is recognizing the facts while disavowing personal or collective involvement, and in so doing avoiding the psychological and moral demands of the suffering. Its manifestations could include idioms of detachment such as “It has got nothing to do with me…”; “What can an ordinary person do?”; “What is the big fuss about?” (Cohen Reference Cohen2001, 8). Cohen’s (Reference Cohen2001) typology offers a comprehensive perspective on denial, covering cognitive aspects (the refusal to acknowledge the facts), emotional components (not feeling disturbed), moral dimensions (the inability to recognize wrongness or responsibility), and behavioral facets (not taking any action in response to knowing about the suffering).

Cohen’s forms of denial could afford a comprehensive perspective on how people in Turkey perceive the international recognition of the Armenian genocide. To start with, people could engage in literal denial by arguing that nothing happened that could be classified as genocide. In addition, they could use interpretive denial and believe that while the mass deportation of Armenians caused a lot of undesired suffering, it could not be classified as genocide. They might minimize the scale of the tragedy by framing it as collateral damage not an intentional killing of Armenians. By doing so, they can dispute the genocide definition and restrain the significance of the event. Further, as an example of implicatory denial, people might acknowledge that atrocities occurred during the period, but could deny that the modern Turkish state or its predecessors bear any responsibility. They might describe the suffering during the period as a result of wartime chaos perpetrated by a few individuals, and not reflective of the Turkish government or society. This form of denial allows them to justify what happened and absolve the nation from any moral or legal culpability.

The academic literature concerning the perception of genocide in Turkey presents examples of denialism that could be categorized in Cohen’s classifications. Nefes, Gürpınar, and Kaymak (Reference Nefes, Gürpınar and Kaymak2023) investigate the responses in Turkish parliamentary politics to the international acknowledgment of the genocide, asserting that ideological distinctions among political parties, the historical context, and the backgrounds of parliamentarians influence how political parties engage in denial. The study reveals that political parties predominantly employ literal denial of the Armenian genocide, and their response tones become increasingly harsh as one moves from the center-left to right-wing Turkish nationalism. Açar and Rüma (2007) discuss how intellectuals’ ideological orientations influence their approaches to the international recognition of the genocide. Their presentation of the ideas of the Turkish nationalist intellectuals coincides with literal denialism, while liberal, Islamist, and left-wing intellectuals do not clearly deny or accept the genocide, but take a neutral and interpretive stance that is open to discussing the past atrocities. In his analysis of two films, 120 (2008) and The Ottoman Lieutenant (2017), which both perpetuate institutional denialism, Seckinelgin (Reference Seckinelgin2023) contends that Cohen’s (2011) typology, distinguishing between literal and interpretive denial, can aid in understanding the distinctions in the denialism portrayed in these movies. He asserts that the former film, 120, exemplifies literal denial by simply presenting the events as an act of self-defense by the Turkish population. He views The Ottoman Lieutenant as an example of interpretive denial, as it acknowledges victimization among both Turks and Armenians but portrays the Armenian suffering as an unintended consequence.

The scholarship also highlights the role of existential threats in shaping Turkey’s prevailing denial. Adar (Reference Adar2018) connects the ongoing Armenian genocide debate in Turkey to anxiety experienced by both Armenians and Turks in the country. She argues that the genocide recognition generates anxiety among Armenians due to their historical displacement in the nation and among Turks who perceive it as a potential threat of displacement. Aybak (2018) posits that Turkey’s “Armenian problem” is deeply rooted in its profound geopolitical unease concerning the acknowledgment of the Armenian genocide. While the academic literature presents ample evidence as such, regarding how Turkish state officials, politicians, films, and intellectuals perceive the genocide and their underlying motivations, there is a scarcity of analyses addressing people’s perspectives in Turkey. This study employs Cohen’s typology to better understand and distinguish nuances in people’s perceptions. In fact, Üngör’s (Reference Üngör2014) oral history interviews with elderly Turks and Kurds in Eastern Turkey demonstrate that people’s views often diverge from the official perspective. By using Cohen’s theory in a novel context, this article also contributes to the sociological theory of how societies remember past atrocities by assessing the current applicability of the perspective.

Findings

This section examines online user responses found in Eksisozluk, a popular online platform, regarding the topic of the Armenian genocide. By conducting an open-ended analysis, this study identifies three types of responses: rejection, neutrality, and acceptance. The term “rejection” refers to those entries that deny the occurrence of the Armenian genocide, while “acceptance” represents the opposite perspective that acknowledges its existence; neutral comments neither take a definitive stance nor dismiss the debate entirely. Out of the 2127 entries analyzed, 774 (36%) were categorized as acceptance, 1103 (52%) as rejection, and 250 (12%) as neutral. As Table 1 below presents, online users tend to justify their stances in a variety of ways. This article delves into a comprehensive investigation of these reactions to the genocide, shedding light on the diverse range of attitudes and the underlying rationales behind them. It should also be noted that while considerable effort was invested in creating categories that are mutually exclusive (Krippendorff Reference Krippendorff2013), it is essential to regard this taxonomy as ideal-typical, as these categories represent abstract concepts meant to highlight variations in people’s attitudes.

Table 1. Perception of the Armenian Genocide in Eksisozluk

Rejection

As shown in Table 1 above, the denialism encompasses four distinct attitudes: (1) inclination, (2) passing the blame, (3) confidence, and (4) conditionality. This section offers insights into the denial attitudes, highlighting the nuanced ways in which individuals engage with this historical event. First, online users incline towards denial of the genocide, arguing its improbability (1a), calling for verification (1b), or acknowledging it as a tragedy but not a genocide (1c). The second category of denial shifts responsibility away from the Turkish role, blaming other groups such as the Kurds and Germans (2a), or drawing comparisons to past instances of victimhood of Turkish minorities (2b). The third category confidently rejects the classification of genocide. Some simply dismiss the argument without elaboration (3a), while others label it as a political conspiracy against Turkey (3b), or contend that the events fail to meet the legal definition of genocide (3c). Fourth, some users respond insensitively to the Armenian genocide debate, branding Armenians as traitors deserving state violence (4a), or expressing that the genocide was deserved although did not happen (4b). For illustrative examples of each denial, please refer to Table 2 below.

Table 2. Types of denialism

Neutral comments

As demonstrated in Table 1 above, neutral comments were expressed in four tones: undecided, discontented, distanced, and weary. To begin with, certain online users remained undecided regarding the opposing perspectives on the genocide and, as a result, refrained from taking a stance (category 5). Others refrained from clearly aligning with any side due to their dissatisfaction with the quality of the genocide debate (category 6). Additionally, some users asserted that the debate was pointless, as there was no merit in discussing past violence (category 7). Finally, a portion of online users felt disconnected from the debate due to its overtly partisan nature in contemporary politics (category 8). Examples of each of these attitudes in Eksisozluk are provided in Table 3 below.

Table 3. Types of neutrality

Acceptance

Online users recognized the Armenian genocide in three ways: (1) through inclination, (2) by shifting blame, and (3) with confidence. First, various users were inclined to acknowledge the genocide by drawing inferences from three distinct aspects. Some contended that the consistent mistreatment of ethnic and religious minorities in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey supported the possibility that it happened (9a), while others deduced that the genocide’s existence was likely due to the widespread recognition it had received worldwide (9b). Additionally, some argued that the existence of widespread human suffering made it impossible to deny the genocide (9c). The second category of acceptance sought to diminish Turkey’s responsibility. In doing so, they emphasized the roles of specific groups, such as Young Turks (10a). They also tended to assert that the insistence on recognizing the genocide was politically futile (10b) and argued that the genocide was an unintended consequence of misguided policies (10c). Similar categories emerged among online users who unreservedly acknowledged the genocide. Most of them regarded it as an undeniable historical fact (11a) and strongly criticized arguments used to deny it (11b), as well as the Turkish state’s ideological stance of denial (11c). Others asserted that Turkey should apologize for the historical crime (11d). Table 4 below presents examples of each category.

Table 4. Types of acceptance