1. Borut Brumen, “The State Wants It So, and the Folk Cannot Do Anything against the State Anyway,” Narodna umjetnost, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1996, pp. 150–151.Google Scholar

2. In this paper, the pejorative term ‘balkan’ is not capitalized to distinguish it from the geographic meaning of the word.Google Scholar

3. Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).Google Scholar

4. Boris Banovac, Društvena pripadnost, identitet, teritorij (Rijeka: Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Rijeci, 1998); Petar Janko, O Istri i istrijanstvu je riječ (Pula, Croatia: CASH, 1997); and Fulvio Suran, “Istrijanstvo kao slabiji (odnosno jači) identitet,” Društvena istraživanja, Vol. 2, Nos 6–7, 1993, pp. 769–782. For example, Banovac suggested that the national and regional identities in Istria were compatible and not contrary to one another, because Istrian identity was seen by the native population as being linked to the region, while national identities were more ethnically oriented (pp. 237–238). Thus two ethnic identities were not competing against one another in this instance.Google Scholar

5. See Milica Bakić-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of the Former Yugoslavia,” Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No. 4, 1995, pp. 917–931. For a short critique of Bakić-Hayden, see Todorova, op. cit., pp. 10–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6. Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford: University of California Press, 1994), p. 5.Google Scholar

7. Ibid., p. 1.Google Scholar

8. Ibid., p. 13.Google Scholar

9. Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).Google Scholar

10. Bakić-Hayden, op. cit ., p. 918.Google Scholar

11. Ibid., pp. 918–199.Google Scholar

12. Ibid., p. 922.Google Scholar

13. Ibid., pp. 923, 926–927.Google Scholar

14. For an interesting discussion of the rural/urban split in Bosnian society, see Wolfgang Höpken, “Yugoslavia's Communists and the Bosnian Muslims,” in Andreas Kappeler, Gerhard Simon, Georg Brunner, and Edward Allworth, eds, Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 236–237, where he suggests that mixed marriages and the social values that developed in urban environments in Bosnia allowed for significant numbers of “Yugoslavs” while rural regions were much more ethnically segregated. Also see John Allcock's work on the rural/urban division in Yugoslavia, “Rural–Urban Differences and the Break-up of Yugoslavia,” Balkanologie, Vol. 6, Nos 1–2, 2002, pp. 101–125.Google Scholar

15. Bakić-Hayden, op. cit ., p. 930. This is an excellent point. Such ideas about the nature of political ideology illustrated the entire HDZ–IDS struggle, where many Istrians saw the centralism and conservatism of the ruling party as backward and “balkan.”Google Scholar

16. Ibid., p. 930.Google Scholar

17. Todorova, op. cit ., pp. 10–11.Google Scholar

18. Ibid., p. 8.Google Scholar

19. Ibid., pp. 11–20, 57–58.Google Scholar

20. Ibid., pp. 32–34.Google Scholar

21. Ibid., pp. 140–160.Google Scholar

22. This question of Croatia belonging, at least in part, to a Mediterranean world is taken up in an issue of the Croatian ethnographic journal, Narodna umjetnost. This particular issue is dedicated to the exploration of the boundaries of “the Mediterranean world,” and two articles in particular deal with this question. Dunja Rihtman-Auguštin suggests that Croats and Croatia belongs in each of the Danube, Mediterranean, and Balkan worlds in her article, “A Croatian Controversy: Mediterranean, Danube, Balkans,” Narodna umjetnost, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1998, pp. 103–120. Bojan Baskar takes up the issue of how the exodus community from Istria in Trieste portrays the Croats as interlopers and not Mediterranean (or European for that matter) in his article, “Made in Trieste: Geopolitical Fears of an Istrianist Discourse on the Mediterranean,” Narodna umjetnost, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1998, pp. 121–34.Google Scholar

23. This is not uncommon in Croatian scholarship that attempts to link the Croatian nation to Europe via Italy. For example, Valentina Gulin Zrnić links Croatia to the Italian Renaissance via the Slavic artists and intellectuals in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Dubrovnik in “The Mediterranean from a Mediterranean Angle: Renaissance Dubrovnik,” Narodna umjetnost, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1998, pp. 135–156.Google Scholar

24. Todorova suggests that the majority of descriptions of the balkan man (“balkanac,” “balkanci” [plural]) label him “uncivilized, primitive, crude, cruel, and, without exception, disheveled” (Todorova, op. cit., p. 14).Google Scholar

25. Clandestine support for Croatian separatists continued to come from the HDZ as late as spring 2001.Google Scholar

26. Glenda Sluga, The Problem of Trieste and the Italo–Yugoslav Border: Difference, Identity and Sovereignty in Twentieth-Century Europe (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001); and Pamela Ballinger, History in Exile: Memory and identity at the Borders of the Balkans (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). For a more political examination of Trieste and the Istrian question in the early Cold War, see Bogdan Novak, Trieste, 1941–54: The Ethnic, Political, and Ideological Struggle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).Google Scholar

27. For an example of this scholarship, see Nevio Šetić, Istra izmedu tradicionalnog i modernog (Pazin, Croatia: Naša sloga, 1995).Google Scholar

28. Strčić expressed this belief numerous times in a conversation with me in 1999. He opined that regional identity could never be as important as national belonging, implying that national identity was somehow more organic and natural. Šetić has made such points abundantly clear in his book, Istra izmedu tradicionalnog i modernog , in which the foreword, written by renowned Istrian historian Miroslav Bertoša, set the tone by suggesting that the contemporary struggle for politicized regional identity was primarily “political trash” on the part of the regionalists (p. 10). The entire work describes “the integration process of the modern Croatian nation in Istria,” which is the subtitle of the book itself. Furthermore, Šetić, a politically active member of the HDZ in Istria, has also made such claims in public forums (Davor Šišović, “Istarski iseljenici u Australiji žele suradivati s rodnim krajem,” Glas Istre, 11 April 1995, p. 10).Google Scholar

29. The preporod was a period of national awakening among the Croats and Slovenes of the peninsula in the latter half of the nineteenth century.Google Scholar

30. Šetić, op. cit ., pp. 15–17.Google Scholar

31. Stanko Žuljić, “Regionalizam i nardonosno izjašnjavanje u Istri 1991 godine,” Susreti na dragom kamenu, Vol. 19, 1994, p. 278.Google Scholar

32. Ibid., pp. 280–281. However, like many others, Žuljić was a slave to his rhetoric. He ignored the fact that numerous Croatian intellectuals on the peninsula in the past had continued to be Yogoslavists until the Italian occupation following World War I. He also chose to overlook the fact that the HDZ imposed its system of political corruption on the peninsula, hurting not only the regionalists and Italians, but also the Croatian citizenry. Oddly enough, he did justify to a certain degree the existence of regional feeling. According to Žuljić, regionalism was only acceptable if it strengthened the state (national) identity (p. 280).Google Scholar

33. Ibid., pp. 287–288.Google Scholar

34. Loredana Bogliun-Debeljuh, “The Istrian Euroregion. Socio-cultural Situation and Problems,” in Stefano Bianchini and Paul Shoup, eds, The Yugoslav War, Europe and the Balkans: How to Achieve Security? (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1995), p. 93.Google Scholar

35. Ibid., pp. 99–101.Google Scholar

36. Ibid., p. 102. Such claims were obviously meant to juxtapose the monoculturality of the Croatian nationalists with the open, liberal, democratic multiculturality of the regionalists. Multiculturality was perceived by most regionalists as “Western,” and so they hoped to court the West into aiding the IDS in its struggle against the HDZ.Google Scholar

37. I will illustrate this feeling of paranoia in Istria with an example, which I experienced shortly after my arrival in September 1998. Upon asking a woman if I could use her telephone to connect to the internet, she flatly refused. She explained that she believed the police were tapping her phone, and that their suspicions would be aroused if a foreigner connected to the internet. Though the vast majority of the population did not display such a heightened level of paranoia, this was illustrative of the insecurities of the population in a territory considered by many Croats as separatist and sometimes as an internal enemy. The instability of the economic situation on the peninsula combined with the crises in nearby Yugoslavia also contributed to the general unease.Google Scholar

38. Banovac's research showed that of his sample 53.3% used Čakavian everyday (p. 167) and that those identifying themselves regionally used it 58.95% of the time when communicating on the peninsula (p. 171). Croats either used Croatian (39.04%) or Čakavian (32.3%) when speaking. Banovac also reported that almost half of his Croatian respondents reported a good or excellent comprehension of Italian (49.86%) and 38.31% reported a passive knowledge of that language. Over three-quarters (76.84%) of the regionally identified claimed good to excellent knowledge of Italian (p. 177). I find that 86% reporting some fluency in Italian a bit too high compared with my sample. I am assuming that “basic Italian comprehension” is how this question was interpreted.Google Scholar

39. The population figures for Istria come from the official Croatian census taken in 1991. However, these figures are almost ten years out of date and do not represent the refugee population settled in Istria and those of the native population who emigrated from the peninsula during the 1990s.Google Scholar

40. Janusz Bugajski, Political Parties of Eastern Europe: A Guide to Politics in the Postcommunist Era (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 600–623.Google Scholar

41. Since the sample is too small for further political analysis, I refer the reader to the articles by Mirjana Kasapović: “1995 Parliamentary Elections in Croatia,” Electoral studies, Vol. 15, 1996, pp. 269–274; and “Izbori za Županksi dom Sabora,” Politička misao, Vol. 34, No. 2, 1997, pp. 95–103. Also see Zoran Malenica, “Dinamika višestranačja u Hrvatskoj,” Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, Vol. 34, 1997, pp. 267–279; and Nenad Zakošek, “Struktura i dinamika hrvatskoga stranačkog sustava,” Revija za sociologiju, Vol. 25, Nos 1–2, 1994, pp. 23–39, on issues of political philosophy and the general characteristics of each of the parties active during the 1990s in Croatia. Furthermore, Bugajski's 2002 work on the political parties of Eastern Europe is a good English-language reference resource in determining platforms of parties and their success in the Croatian political arena.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

42. Banovac, op. cit ., p. 195.Google Scholar

43. Ibid., pp. 192–195.Google Scholar

44. Banovac got a similar neutral response to the regional party with 33.52% (p. 192).Google Scholar

45. A common descriptive term applied to Jakovčić was “arrogant.”Google Scholar

46. Bugajski, op. cit ., p. 621, and Gojko Marinković, “Istria Defies Zagreb,” 4 July 1995, <http://www.aimpress.com> (accessed 19 September 2004); as well as many other sources.+(accessed+19+September+2004);+as+well+as+many+other+sources.>Google Scholar

47. One of the HSP supporters explained, “The Italians are fascists and want Istria. That is that.”Google Scholar

48. Banovac, op. cit ., p. 146.Google Scholar

49. Thus this category is a highly subjective one, and therefore subject to different interpretations.Google Scholar

50. Banovac, op. cit ., p. 138.Google Scholar

51. The multilinguality of the Istrian people is a forgone conclusion with 93% of my sample responding that they were bilingual (or trilingual) to some extent. Banovac showed similar but lower figures.Google Scholar

52. However, according to both my research and Ballinger's, this acceptance may not be extended to those individuals from Bosnia-Hercegovina or Croats of a more “nationalist” persuasion.Google Scholar

53. Oddly enough, the issue of food had some importance in an article appearing in Glas Istre , the regional newspaper, in 1992. The article reported that a meeting was held for Italian journalists to promote Istria as safe for tourism during the war. In it, Istrian similarities to Italian culture were emphasized. One Italian journalist was reported to have said something that would please many Istrians: “Istria is peaceful, close to Italy.” Another Italian suggested that the food offered in Istria was good, “like Italian food,” and was not dominated by čevapćići and ražnjići, two meat dishes often viewed as “Slavic” or “balkan,” as it had been in previous years. Such language suggested that Istria was closer to the West than the Balkans, as indicated by the food itself. Such Western perceptions were and are very important to Istrians. “Hrvatska je cvjetnjak Evrope,” Glas Istre, 5 July 1992, p. 7.Google Scholar

54. Such widespread knowledge of the regional dialect indicates a strong sense of regional identity among a significant proportion of Istrians. By this time, the regional party had touted regionality as a “Western” trait.Google Scholar

55. Siniša Tatalović, “Military and Political Aspects of the Croato-Serbian Conflict,” Politička misao, Vol. 33, No. 5, 1996, p. 187.Google Scholar

56. This fits nicely into Fredrik Barth's theory that groups often define themselves by what they are not, concentrating on the borders between collective entities instead of on internal identity characteristics (see Fredrik Barth, “Introduction,” in Frederik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), pp. 9–38).Google Scholar

57. This businessman's choice of words is ironic for two reasons. First, he was roaring drunk when he made this statement, and, second, his choice of animal, the she-goat, is the traditional symbol of Istria. Before and after the interview, when he was sober, the informant agreed that his statements could be included as long as his name was not used.Google Scholar

58. Again, see Allcock's article for a discussion of this division.Google Scholar

59. It also seemed that the respondents, though acknowledging the presence of Muslims in Istria during and just after the war years, focused almost exclusively on the Hercegovinan and Bosnian Croats. The Muslims were ridiculed at times as well, but the Croatian refugees, though sharing the same nationality as the respondents, were somehow more distant in mentality. Also, as a side note, four respondents said they themselves were more similar to the Muslims from Sarajevo than to the Croats from Mostar. Sarajevo, before the war, was a symbol of multiculturalism and toleration, thus possibly explaining the professed affinities these respondents had with former residents of that Bosnian city.Google Scholar

60. See <http://www.arkzin.com/actual/maple.html> for the full text of this article.+for+the+full+text+of+this+article.>Google Scholar

61. Pamela Ballinger argues much the same thing in relation to the exclusivist attitude of Istrians toward Albanians and others from the Balkan peninsula in her article, “‘Authentic Hybrids’ in the Balkan Borderlands,” Current Anthropology, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2004, pp. 31–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

62. I recently submitted an article to the Journal of the Association for History and Computing , which, using Geographic Information Systems, examines this particular voting pattern in the regional and local elections in Istria during the 1993 and 1997 elections. The article shows the increasing popularity of the HDZ in the interior and the loss of votes for the IDS.Google Scholar

63. This I have argued both in my dissertation and in a book manuscript currently under review.Google Scholar