1 The most concise account in English is by Wynot, E., “‘A Necessary Cruelty’”: The Rise of Official Anti-Semitism in Poland, 1936–1939,” The American Historical Review, 76, no. 4 (1971): 1035–1058. For a more comprehensive examination of the problem, see C.S. Heller, On the Edge of Destruction: Jews of Poland between the Two World Wars (New York, 1977).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Figures taken from Roczniki statystyki Rzeczypospolitej Polski, 4 (Warsaw, 12926), table 5, for the 1921 census, and Maly rocznik statystyczny 1939 (Warsaw, 1939), tables 17-20, pp. 22-26, for 1931. Data for individual minorities will be treated in the appropriate sections of this paper.Google Scholar

3 Working with all the variables, the following approximate demographic profile of Poland in 1939 emerges:Google Scholar

NOTE: While there are obvious exceptions to the ethnicity/religion pairing — e.g., Protestant Poles, German Catholics, Orthodox Poles — allowing for these variations still produces a more reliable ethno-religious picture than the raw “national identity” date offered by the official censuses.Google Scholar

4 League of Nations, Protection of Linguistic, Racial, and Religious Minorities by the League of Nations (Geneva, 1927), C.L. 110, 1927, I Annexe, pp. 42–45.Google Scholar

5 Konstytucja 17 marca 1921 rodu (Warsaw, 1921). The relevent articles are 95, 96, 104, 105, and 109–112.Google Scholar

6 Article VII of the Treaty of Riga in in Dokumenty i materialy do stosunków polsko-radzieckich, vol. 3 (Warsaw, 1964), pp. 572–609.Google Scholar

7 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 9 (Geneva, 1922), pp. 466–467.Google Scholar

8 Figures compiled from data in T. and Rzepeccy, W., Sejm i Senat 1922–1927 (Poznań, 1923).Google Scholar

9 Of the three laws, two dealt with the right of the designated nationalities to use their language in the courts and in situations involving local, provincial, or federal administrative officials in eastern Poland (Dziennik ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [hereafter DURP] 1924, no. 73, item 724, and no. 78, item 757), and a third assured the establishment of bilingual public schooling in those districts having at least a 25% minority population where at least 40 parents requested it (DURP, 1924, no. 79, item 766).Google Scholar

10 Wasilewski's views on building and maintaining a proper relationship between the minorities and the state are outlined in his Sprawy narodowościowe w teorii i w ·zyciu (Warsaw, 1929). Full details of the official minorities plan are in the files containing the minutes of Cabinet sessions deposited in the Archiwum Akt Nowych (WaRSAW(HOLDING “Protokoly Posiedzień Rady Ministrów” (session of 18 August 1926, “Konkretnie ujȩte zasady planu dzialania Rzαdu i jego organów w stosunków do mniejszosci narodowych”).Google Scholar

11 Figures compiled from data in Rzepeccy, Sejm i Senat. Google Scholar

12 Figures from Statystyka Polski, Series C, no. 4, “Statystyka wyborów do Sejmu i Senatu z dnia 16 i 23 listopada 1930 roku” (Warsaw, 1931).Google Scholar

13 Horak, S., Poland and Her National Minorities, 1919–1939 (New York, 1961), p. 100. Current Polish social historian, Marian Marek Drozdowski, also believes that there were well over 5,000,000 Ukrainians in Poland by World War II — Spoleczeństwo, państwo, politycy II Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw, 1972), pp. 69-70.Google Scholar

14 The provinces of Lwów, Lublin, and Polesie had concentrations of Ukrainians only in certain areas, but Wolyń (Volhynia), Stanislawów, and Tarnopol provinces all featured substantial numbers of Ukrainians evenly dispersed throughout each region. Given the underemphasis of official Polish statistics, the percentage of Ukrainians for 1931 in Wolyń (68.4%), Stanislawów (68.9%), and Tarnopol (45.5%) are all the more surprising.Google Scholar

15 Gilberg, T., “Influence of State Policy on Ethnic Persistence and Nationality Formation,” in Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe, ed. P. Sugar (Santa Barbara, CA, 1980), p. 186.Google Scholar

16 According to official Polish figures, the total number of Ukrainian cooperatives rose from 537 in 1912 to nearly 4,000 in 1939; in 1936, nearly 550,000 Ukrainians belonged to the cooperatives, which employed over 21,000 blue and white collar workers on a regular basis. Every 10,000 Ukrainians were served by 8 coops, compared with the national average of 4 coops per 10,000 inhabitants. Maly rozcnik statystyczny 1939, table 21, p. 109. One of the most comprehensive treatments of this subject is I. Vytanovych, History of the Ukrainian Cooperative Movement (New York, 1964).Google Scholar

17 See, for example, articles in Kurjer codzienny, 30 March 1935 and 21 June 1937. Among official policies intended to harm the effectiveness of the Ukrainian cooperatives was the refusal of the Polish government to extend them the same loans and credits available to Polish organizations; the arbitrary closing of Ukrainian organizations for such transparent reasons as outdated licenses or health-code violations; and the restriction (through imposed quotas) of the export of Ukrainian cooperative products.Google Scholar

18 Figures from Maly rocznik statystyczny 1939, table 9, p. 345. The 1931 census recorded the following illiteracy rates for the eastern provinces having large Ukrainian populations: Lwów (28%), Tarnopol (32%), Stanislawów (42%), and Wolyń (52%). According to official figures, the press classifications were: general information, 60; religious, 19; political, 18; scholarly/cultural, 17; and economic, 11.Google Scholar

19 In the 1910–1911 school year, there were 2,498 Ukrainian-language elementary schools; by 1924-1925, the figure had diminished to 917, and in 1937–1938 totaled 461. There were also 3,064 bilingual elementary schools then. Altogether, 473,400 pupils enrolled in these schools in 1937–1938. There were virtually no Ukrainian high schools, and higher education was nonexistent. Maly rocznik statystyczny 1939 table 15, p. 329. For a detailed analysis of Ukrainian elementary schooling, see S. Mauersberg, Szkolnictwo powszechne dla mniejszości narodowych w Polsce w latach 1918–1939 (Warsaw, 1968), pp. 59-103.Google Scholar

20 The best descriptive analyses of Ukrainian political movements is found in the following publications: Ukrainskie i ruskie ugrupowania polityczne w Polsce w dniu I kwietnia 1927 r. (Warsaw, 1927), a quasi-official publication; M. Feliński, Ukranincy w Polsce (Warsaw, 1931); and A. Motyl, The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (Boulder, CO, 1980). For the connection between religion and politics among the Ukrainians, see the following: J. Mirtshuk, “The Ukrainian Uniate Church,” Slavonic Review, 10 (1931–1932): 377-385; J.S. Reshetar, “Ukrainian Nationalism and the Orthodox Church,” American Slavonic and East European Review, 10 (1951): 38-49; and the somewhat subjective study of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, Der Metropolit: Leben und Wirken des grossen Förderers der Kircheunion, Graf Andreas Scheptytzkyj (Munich, 1955).Google Scholar

21 Based on data in Mauersberg, Szkolnictwo, pp. 90-94.Google Scholar

22 Described best in Dumin, O., “Prawda o Ukrainskiej Organizacji Wojskowej,” Zeszyty historyczne, 30(1974): 103–137. See also Motyl, Turn to the Right, pp. 105-119.Google Scholar

23 The Ukrainian Socialist Democratic Party gave concrete proof of its “conversion” by withdrawing its 5 deputies from the Ukrainian Club in the Sejm and joining with the 2 Communist deputies to form a Communist Parliamentary Club. See A. Motyl, “The Rural Origins of the Communist and Nationalist Movements in Wolyń Województwo, 1921–1939,” Slavic Review, 37 (1978): 412-420, and J. Radziejewski, Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Ukrainy 1919–1929 (Kraków, 1976).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

24 The figures cited by Madajczyk, C., Burzuazyjno-obszarnicza reforma rolna w Polsce (Warsaw, 1956), p. 245. See also M. Mieszczańkowski, Struktura agrarna Polski miȩdzywojennej (Warsaw, 1960), pp. 174-203.Google Scholar

25 Actual figures for specific party lists: UNDO (20), Sel-Rob (4), Sel-Rob Left (2), Ukrainian Labor Party (1), Bloc of Ukrainian Socialist and Peasant Parties (6), and Ukrainian Radical Party (8).Google Scholar

26 Specifically, the government proposed to levy a special tax on all buildings in rural municipalities, and raise property taxes on farms. Both were defeated — the Building Tax by 189-149, the Land Tax by 190-146 —.thanks to the solid opposition of the Ukrainians, who spoke out decisively against them. Details in Sprawozdania stenograficzne Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej (hereafter SSSR), 22 and 23 May 1928.Google Scholar

27 Motyl, , Turn to the Right, p. 43.Google Scholar

28 The interview was given to a reporter for the newspaper Moment, and reprinted in the daily Gazeta warszawska, 14 September 1928.Google Scholar

29 Donstov's ideology is discussed in Motyl, Turn to the Right, pp. 61-85, and developed in his own theoretical work, Pidstavy nashoi polityky (Vienna, 1921).Google Scholar

30 The available literature on the OUN is predictably subjective and mixed in viewpoint. Nonetheless, one can obtain a good sense of the organization's mission and operations from the following sample works: P. Mirchuk, Narys istorii Orhanizatsii Ukrainskykh Natstonalistiv 1920–1939 (Munich, 1968); B. Martynets, Ukrainskie pidpillia vid UVO do OUN (n.p., 1949); and A. Szczséniak and W. Szota, Droga do nikαd: Dzialaność Organizacji Ukrainskich Nacjonalistów i jej likwidacja w Polsce (Warsaw, 1973). The doctrinal basis and evolution of the OUN are summarized in Motyl, Turn to the Right, pp. 153-173.Google Scholar

31 Predictably, the “pacification” aroused burning passions on both sides of the question, whose range is reflected in contemporary accounts. Again, the following are samples of literature on the topic: P. Dunin-Borkowski, “Punkt wyjścia w sprawie ukrainskiej w Malopolsce wschodniej,” Droga, 1929, pp. 561-572; S. Los, “Galicja Wschodnia,” Droga 1931, pp. 543-561; B. Paneyko, “Galicia and the Polish-Ukrainian Problem,” Slavonic Review, 9 (1930–1931): 567-587; S. Srokowski, “The Ukrainian Problem in Poland: A Polish View,” Slavonic Review, 9 (1930–1931): 588-597; E. Revyuk, ed., Polish Atrocities in Ukraine (New York, 1931); J. Barr and R. Davies, Report on the Polish-Ukrainian Conflict in Eastern Galicia (London, 1931), a special study prepared for the House of Commons; and the anonymous Sabota·z ukrainski i akcja pacyfikacyjna (Warsaw, 1931).Google Scholar

32 Slawój-Skladkowski, Felicjan, Minister of the Interior in the Polish Cabinet at this time, notes in his memoires that Pilsudski personally ordered him to implement “collective responsibility” in a conversation held/September 1930—Strzȩpy meldunków (Warsaw, 1938), p. 223.Google Scholar

33 Symptomatic were the failures of government initiatives to UNDO and Metropolitan Sheptyky in October. During that month, UNDO leader Levitsky met with police officials in Warsaw, but could not arrive at a peaceful settlement acceptable to either side. The Archbishop visited Warsaw twice in this period, and agreed to issue a pastoral letter condemning the terrorist actions; but when it also condemned the government response, Warsaw tried to prevent its publication in the press. Czubiński, A., Centrolew (Poznan, 1963), pp. 217–218.Google Scholar

34 On 10 September, the government estimated that property losses amounted to 6,743,000 zloty, including 62 houses, 67 barns, 112 mills, and 78 assorted other buildings. See Gazeta warszawska, 10 September 1930.Google Scholar

35 For example, New York Times, 19 October 1930; Manchester Guardian, 14 October 1930; N. Farson, “Pacification of the Ukraine,” The Nation, 7 January 1931, p. 14. The British legislators’ petition was printed in Manchester Guardian, 19 December 1930.Google Scholar

36 In addition, 9 pro-government Ukrainian deputies were elected on the BBWR slate (2 from East Galicia, 7 from Volhynia).Google Scholar

37 The parliamentary motion was printed in Robotnik, 28 December 1930.Google Scholar

38 On the League petition and its fate, see the unpublished by Tarnopolsky, W., “The Polish-Ukrainian Conflict in Easter Galicia in 1930 and its Repercussions in the League of Nations” (Columbia University, 1955).Google Scholar

39 The Ukrainians demanded full and fair compensation for all damage suffered, the reopening of 3 high schools that had been closed, and government financial aid for the many cooperatives that suffered during the fighting. The Poles insisted that, before any concrete agreement on specific points was possible, the Ukrainians had to withdraw their petition from the League, and swear an oath of loyalty to the Polish state—New York Times, 14 March 1931. The Ukrainians refused these pre-conditions, and in May issued a communique stating that, “The Ukrainians could not accept a condition to declare loyalty to the State publicly because this would imply that the Ukrainians were disloyal in the past and broke the laws of the country.” New York Times, 16 May 1931.Google Scholar

40 For an inside view of conditions facing a Ukrainian in Bereza Kartuzka, see Makar, V., Bereza Kartuzka: Spomyny, 1934/35 (Toronto, 1956). Horak estimates that about 2,000 Ukrainians were sent to this camp and the one at Biala Podlaska prior to 1939. See Horak, Poland, p. 158.Google Scholar

41 DURP 1933, no. 35, pp. 693–723. The law was enacted on 24 March 1933.Google Scholar

42 For a sound analysis of this trend, see the article by Vytytsky, S. and Baran, S., “Western Ukraine under Poland,” in Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia (Toronto, 1963), pp. 838–846.Google Scholar

43 For a graphic example of this changed perspective, see the pastoral letter issued in March, 1931 by the Uniate Bishop of Stanislawów, Bishop Khomyshyn, and printed in Czas, 24 March 1931.Google Scholar

44 The government announced the publication, on a regular basis, of a “Polish-Ukrainian Bulletin” in December, 1933; the following month, Premier Janusz Jȩdrzejewicz told the Sejm Budget Committee of his sympathies for the Ukrainian people, emphasized that the “difficult situation” in East Galicia resulted from “regrettable actions committed by both sides,” and pledged his efforts toward a workable detente. See Gazeta polska, 19 January 1934.Google Scholar

45 For a complete picture of Polish internal political life after Pilsudski, see Wynot, E., Polish Politics in Transition: The Camp of National Unity and the Struggle for Power, 1935–1939 (Athens, GA, 1974). For the Ukrianians specifically in the 1935–937 period, see Vytvytsky and Baran, “Western Ukraine under Poland,” pp. 843–848.Google Scholar

46 Of the remaining Ukrainian legislators, the Ukrainian Catholic National Party claimed one each for the Sejm and Senate, while the “Parliamentary Regional Group of Volhynia” returned 5 deputies and 1 senator.Google Scholar

47 For details on the internal divisions within the Ukrainian community, see Vytvytsky, and Baran, , “Western Ukraine under Poland,” pp. 843–848, and the contemporary view by N. Andrusiak, “The Ukrainian Movement in Galicia,” Slavonic Review, 14(1936): 163-175, 372-379.Google Scholar

48 The section dealing with Polish-Ukrainian relations in the 1936–1939 period is based on the article by Wynot, E., “The Ukrainians and the Polish Regime, 1937–1939,” The Ukrainian Historian, 7, no. 4 (1970): 44–60.Google Scholar

49 For two viewpoints of this relationship, see Ilnytzkyj, R., Deutschland und die Ukraine, 1934–1945, vol. 1 (Munich, 1955), and R. Torzecki, Kwestia ukrainska w polityce III Rzeszy 1933–1945 (Warsaw, 1972).Google Scholar

50 The UNDO leadership announced its support for the special “Internal Loan for anti-Aircraft Defense,” a bond drive to upgrade that component of the Polish defense system, and on April 27, Mudry asserted publicly that the primary objective of his party was to “preserve the Ukrainian national presence in Poland,” to which end its followers would fulfill all their obligations to the state. See Robotnik, 27 April 1939.Google Scholar

51 Horak, , Poland, p. 90.Google Scholar

52 Among all the inhabitants of Polesie, Nowogródek, and Wilno provinces, only 8.5% were employed in industry in 1931; many Belorussian peasants conducted their primitive trade on the barter basis, avoiding involvement in a modern money economy entirely.Google Scholar

53 For a contemporary socio-economic and political profile of the Belorussians by a sympathetic Pole, see Leon Wasilewski's Litwa i Bialorus: Zarys historyczno-polityczny stosunków narodo-wościowych (Warsaw, 1925). A more predictable analysis of the radical nature of Belorussian politics is offered by 2 Belorussians writing in the Soviet Union; see V. and J. Poluian, Revoliutsonnoe i natsio-nalno-osvoboditelnoe dvizhenie z Zapadnoi Bielarusi v 1920–1939 gg. (Minsk, 1960). The entire panorama of Belorussian political movements in the 1920's is in the semi-official publication, Bialoruskie ugrupowanie polityczne w Polsce w dniu I kwietnia 1927 rodu (Warsaw, 1927).Google Scholar

54 Wasilewski, , Litwa i Bialorus, pp. 194–196.Google Scholar

55 Vakar, N., Belorussia: The Making of a Nation (Cambridge, MA, 1956), pp. 117–118. This is the most authoritative study of Belorussia in the English language. For a contemporary account of the vacillations in Polish policy, see. A. Luckiewicz, Okupacja polska na Bialorusi (Wilno, 1920).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

56 Unless cited otherwise, figures for Belorussian schools are from Mauersberg, Szkolnictwo, pp. 104–114, and the article by a Polish official, W. Swiȩtochowski, “Obecny stan szkolnictwa bialoruskiego na ziemiach wschodnich,” Sprawy Narodowościowe, 1, no. 1 (1927:15-16).Google Scholar

57 The Social Democrats claimed 7 of the 11 deputies, with the Socialist Revolutionary Party (2) and the Christian Democratic Movement (1) accounting for the others who ran on a partisan list.Google Scholar

58 Vakar, , Belorussia, p. 122.Google Scholar

59 SSSR, 23 January 1923, col. 39.Google Scholar

60 The transcripts of speeches given by Belorussian legislators in the Sejm and Senate (SSSR) feature continual complaints against these administrative abuses, especially throughout 1923 and in early 1924.Google Scholar

61 For a representative look at the KPZB, see the following: S. Bergman et al., “Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Bialorusi,” Nowe Drogi, 13 no. 5 (1959): 86-93; A. Matsko an dB. Tsamutin, eds., Revolyutsonnii put’ Kompartii zapodnoi Bielarusii 1921–1939 gg. (Minsk, 1966); and S. Wyslouch, Rola komunistycznej partii zachodniej Bialorusi w ruchu narodowym Bialorusinów w Polsce (Wilno, 1933). See also B. Dymek, Niezalezna Partia Chlopska 1924–1927 (Warsaw, 1972).Google Scholar

62 There is surprisingly little scholarly work on the Hromada. For two works of divergent perspective but convergent conclusions, see A. Bergman, “Bialoruska Wlościańosko-Robotnicza Hromada (1925–1927),” Z Pola Walki, 5, no. 3, (1962): 73-99, and former Pilsudskiite Bohdan Podoski's article by the same title in Niepodleglość (London), 6 (1958): 205-207.Google Scholar

63 The most dramatic episode in this terrorist campaign occurred in the night of August 3-4, 1924, when an armed force of 100 led by a Soviet officer attacked the district capital of Stolpce, in Nowogródek province. After gaining control of the entire town, they burned and pillaged shops and homes alike, and completely destroyed the police and railroad stations plus other government offices. This, along with other attacks, is proudly described by Tomasz Dαbal, a leading Polish Communist, in his “Ruch partyzancki w Polsce,” Nowy Przeglαd (January 1925; rep.ed., Warsaw, 1959), pp. 291-302.Google Scholar

64 This section based on J. Korus-Kabacińska, “Polozenie ludnosci bialoruskiej w Rzeczypospolitej Polski w latach 1924–1926,” Zeszyty historyczne Uniwersytetu warszawskiego, 2 (1961): 166-221.Google Scholar

65 Paczkowski, A., Prasa polska w latach 1918–1939 (Warsaw, 1980), pp. 166–221.Google Scholar

66 See Papierzyńska-Turek, M., “Kościól prawoslawny w Polsce w latach 1918–1927: Sytuacja prawna i konflikty wewnȩtrzne,” Dzieje Najnowsze, 8, no. 3 (1976): 15–31.Google Scholar

67 Excerpts from this memorandum are printed in Vakar, Belorussia, p. 125.Google Scholar

68 In addition to the works cited earlier on the pro-Communist dimensions of Belorussian nationalism, see specifically the contemporary article on the Hromada persecution by William Zuckerman, “Nation on Trial: Poland's Attempt to Suppress White Russian Autonomy,” The Nation, 26 September 1928, pp. 304-306. For the reaction of the Belorussian Christian Democrats, see. Stankevich, A., Belaruski chryścjanski ruch (Wilno, 1939), pp. 186–200.Google Scholar

69 The intensity of the mutual fear and hatred during this confrontation can be gauged by reading two contemporary accounts: The Polish version by S. Elski, Sprawa bialoruska (Warsaw, 1931), and the Soviet by D. Bergen, Zachodniaja Belarus’ pod kryvavym bizunom polskich okupantau (Minsk, 1931).Google Scholar

70 Since it was an illegal organization by this time, it is difficult to obtain reliable data on the KPZB and other Communist movements. However, two contemporary Polish analysts offered “informed guesses” on the subject of KPZB membership in this period. J. A. Regula, Historia Komunistycznej Partii Polski, 2d ed., rev. (Warsaw, 1934), believes that membership rose from approximately 6,000 in 1931 to 12,000 in 1934 (pp. 51 passim). A. Strapiński, Wywrotowe partie polityczne (Warsaw, 1933), raises the 1934 total to about 20,000 by including those people enrolled in party youth organizations (pp. 38-39).Google Scholar

71 Vakar, , Belorussia, p. 130.Google Scholar

72 Stankevich, , Belaruski chryścjanski ruch, pp. 209–226, 243-258.Google Scholar

73 Figures from Maly rocznik statystyczny 1939, pp. 319, 325.Google Scholar

74 Vakar, , Belorussia, p. 132.Google Scholar

75 Typical is the following statement from a wartime publication released by the Polish Government-in-Exile to support its claims to the eastern lands: “The White Ruthenians … had achieved a certain ethnical awakening only a few decades before the restoration of the Polish state … but did not possess the conditions required for starting a national life … A few White Ruthenian secondary schools, founded in the first years after the war, had to be shut down for lack of pupils. Self-dependent White Ruthenian associations — social, economic, and even cultural — only barely survived, while the White Ruthenian peasants willingly joined Polish organizations. The White Ruthenian press was unable to acquire enough readers, and appeared mostly in the form of weeklies which vanished after an ephemeral existence.” See Eastern Poland (London, 1941), p. 26.Google Scholar

76 Vakar, , Belorussia, p. 136.Google Scholar

77 Unless cited otherwise, all information on the German minority in this section is from Wynot, E., “The Polish Germans, 1919–1939: National Minority in a Multinational State,” The Polish Review, 17, no. 1 (1972): 23–64.Google Scholar

78 “In the western provinces of Poland the change of position from that of ruler to subject was significant. This interchange of roles had not only political consequences but also cultural and economic effects. This unsettled state of political affairs was of little concern to German colonists of that part of Poland formerly ruled by Czarist Russia. Purely local issues assumed greater importance.” — Horak, Poland, p. 126.Google Scholar

79 Horak, , Poland, p. 96.Google Scholar

80 In additon to Wynot, “The Polish Germans,” on German political life and organizations in the 1920's, see P. Kazet, “Niemieckie ugrupowania polityczne w Polsce,” Sprawy Narodowościowe, 1, no. 2 (1927): 110–121.Google Scholar

81 See Stoliński, Z., “Niemcy w Sejmie i w Senacie 1919–1927,” Sprawy Narodowościowe, 2, no. 1 (1928): 21–32.Google Scholar

82 Horak, , Poland, pp. 137–138. He gives the following specific figures up through 1927, citing an official report of the Polish Control Board: 89 large estates (200 or more hectares) totaling 95,386 hectares; 3,644 small holdings worth 56,662 hectares; 1,652 municipal and other public holdings; and 272 industrial or commercial enterprises.Google Scholar

83 This practice was described in detail (and with outrage) in the leading Polish German newspaper Deutsche Rundschau, 1 March 1930.Google Scholar

84 According to a German author, in 1926, German farms accounted for 92% (10,800) of the total 11,750 hectares parcelled out; in 1927, although its relative proportion had declined to 69% (9,863 hectares), the ratio was still very high. H. Kohnert, “Agrarreform-statistik aus Polen,” Nation und Staat, 21 (1939): 617-622.Google Scholar

85 For Grażyński's own assessment of the situation and his mission to change it, see his policy statement in Polska Zachodnia, 12 September 1926, and his Neuf anneés de travail polonais en Haute Silésie (Paris, 1932).Google Scholar

86 There were 87 public German elementary schools in Upper Silesia in 1926–1927; two years later, the number had dropped to 76, and in the final full year before the war (1938–1939), the total reached 51. See E. Wynot, “The Case of German Schools in Polish Upper Silesia, 1922–1939,” The Polish Review, 19, no. 2 (1974): 47-69. A lengthy description of Grażyński's general activity is in H. Rechowicz, Sejm Ślαski 1922–1939 (Katowice, 1965), pp. 105-195.Google Scholar

87 For example, Ulitz of the Volksbund told a public rally in Katowice in May, 1933 that his organization considered the term “Nazi,” as applied by Polish authorities to the party in perjorative way, to be a compliment. Rechowicz, Sejm Ślαski, p. 244.Google Scholar

88 Text in Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, V (Washington, 1953), Doc. 18, pp. 24–25.Google Scholar

89 A prime example of this tendency was offered in evidence produced in the trial and conviction of 86 Germans in Katowice for having created an underground organization, the National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Bewegung, to detach Upper Silesia from Poland through an armed uprising and guerilla warfare — Robotnik, June 21, 1936.Google Scholar

90 The best discussion of this topic is by W. Kozaczuk, Bitwa o tajemnice (Warsaw, 1967).Google Scholar

91 In 1937, 75.7% of all land parcelled out in Pomorze and Wielkopolska was owned by Germans. Kohnert, “Agrarreform-statistik aus Polen,” loc. cit. Google Scholar

92 See Kneifel, E., Geschichte der Evangelisch-Augsburgischen Kirche in Polen 1935–1939 (Hamburg, 1957).Google Scholar

93 Rothschild, J., East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle, 1974), p. 45.Google Scholar