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Neville Chamberlain and the Baltic States: A Retrospective Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Aimi Kibena-Zechanowitsch
Aimi Kibena-Zechanowitsch*
Affiliation:
Ecole Polyvalente de Buckingham, Ottawa, Ontario
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Extract

In the spring of 1939, negotiations commenced between the British and the Soviet Governments with the proffered goal of an agreement on the containment of Germany; it was essential that the negotiating powers agree on the identity of the border states to be guaranteed. The guaranteed states would then form a potential cordon sanitaire against Hitler's future expansionary policies.

Type
Articles
Information
Nationalities Papers , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , Spring 1980 , pp. 67 - 74
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 Association for the Study of Nationalities of Eastern Europe 

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References

Notes

1. Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report, Fifth Series, (London, 1939), vol. 343, col. 2415. Hence will be referred to as P.D.Google Scholar

2. Woodward, E.L. and Butler, Rohan eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, Third Series, (London, 1952), 5:205–206. Hence will be referred to as D.B.F.P.Google Scholar

3. Ibid., pp. 214-15 and 349-50.Google Scholar

4. Ibid., p. 215.Google Scholar

5. Ibid., p. 350.Google Scholar

6. Ibid., pp. 558-59.Google Scholar

7. Ibid., pp. 564-65.Google Scholar

8. For example:Google Scholar

On May 31, Molotov's speech before the Supreme Council of the USSR. D.B.F.P., 5:743-46.Google Scholar

On June 2, Molotov in a new proposal again demanded the inclusion of the Baltic States as guaranteed nations. Ibid., 5:753-54. On June 12, Ivan Maisky called on Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, and reiterated the Soviet demand to include the Baltic States. Ibid., 6:50-51.Google Scholar

On June 13, an article in “Pravda” insisted that Estonia and Latvia were included. Ibid., 6:54–56.Google Scholar

On June 29, again an article in “Pravda” reiterated the above. Ibid., 6:217–219.Google Scholar

9. Ibid., 5:737 Google Scholar

10. Though not stated, it was clearly understood that the “potential aggressor” in question was Germany.Google Scholar

11. D.B.F.P., 5:560; 6:48-49; 158-59; 325-27; 382-83.Google Scholar

12. Ibid., 5:572; 669; 696-98.Google Scholar

13. P.D., vol. 349, col. 1783.Google Scholar

14. Halifax agreed on principle on June 22, the official agreement was given on June 27. D.B.F.P., 6:92–93; 144-45; 173-74.Google Scholar

15. On September 27, 1938, Chamberlain referred to the Czech crisis as “a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing”, and this was quoted on the next day in the Times (London) Sept. 28, 1938.Google Scholar

16. D.B.F.P., 6:173-74.Google Scholar

17. By “indirect aggression” was meant a situation similar to the fall of Czechoslovakia, whereby no military aggression had taken place, yet a country had fallen to Nazi expansion. The main problem concerning “indirect aggression” was that of definition: a loose definition of the term could give licence to any of the signatory powers to invade a guaranteed nation on the pretext that it was acting in its own defense.Google Scholar

18. Feiling, Keith, The Life of Neville Chamberlain, (London, 1946), p. 403.Google Scholar

19. Middlemas, Keith, Diplomacy of Illusion: the British Government and Germany 1937-39, (London, 1972), p. 445.Google Scholar

20. D.B.F.P., 4:492.Google Scholar

21. P.D., vol. 345, col. 435 till the end of the volume.Google Scholar

22. D.B.F.P., 5:260.Google Scholar

23. Ibid., p. 331.Google Scholar

24. The speech was delivered on April 28, 1939. D.B.F.P., 5:359; 370-72; 369; 372-73; 373-75.Google Scholar

25. Molotov succeeded Litvinov on May 4, 1939. D.B.F.P., 5:410; 412; 451; 453-54; 542-46.Google Scholar

26. Ibid., pp. 449-50.Google Scholar

27. P.D., vol. 346, cols. 1484-85; 1697-99; 2219-22; vol. 349, cols. 2212-13.Google Scholar

28. William Strang was the Head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office.Google Scholar

Admiral Drax was appointed Chief of the British Military Mission to Moscow. However, the latter possessed no written authority to negotiate.Google Scholar

29. P.D., vol. 345, cols. 887-88.Google Scholar

30. P.D., vol. 346, cols. 1112-13; 1846.Google Scholar

31. For example:Google Scholar

from Sir Reginald Hoare, British Ambassador in Bucharest, from Sir Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, from Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin. D.B.F.P., 5:81; 236; 399; 422-24; 665.Google Scholar

32. Ibid., 4:474-75.Google Scholar

33. Ibid., 5:600–603; 674-75; 716-17; 728-29.Google Scholar

34. D.B.F.P., 7:40–41; 53-54; 61; 69-70; 73; 84-89; 91-92; 101; 105-108; 112-13; 115-17; 119; 130; 133-36; 149-50; 168-70.Google Scholar

35. Though not pertinent to the argument pursued in this paper, it might be pointed out that from Chamberlain's point of view certain Soviet involvement was necessary. Were Chamberlain to fail in his efforts to achieve cooperation with Hitler, an alliance with the Soviet was preferable to allowing the Soviet Union to stand aloof and make gains from a war between the Western democracies and Nazi Germany.Google Scholar

36. One of Chamberlain's most serious errors was to ignore the rumours of impending Russo-German rapprochement. Equally, Chamberlain ignored one of the Soviet Government's main motives for negotiations: to use the Western offers to exact the best possible terms from Germany.Google Scholar

One of his fallacious beliefs was that Hitler, through personal contacts with the British statesmen, would come to an amicable understanding on European problems and German aims.Google Scholar