1. 5 October 2000 has become iconic of democracy in Serbia. It is the day on which citizen protests and non-violent revolution brought an official end to Slobodan Milosevic's decade-long rule of the country. Just weeks before this protest, Milosevic had been decisively beaten at the polls, and the opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica was elected the new president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, Milosevic refused to honor the election results, and tried to force the country into a second-round election runoff. Finally, on 5 October, hundreds of thousands of citizens from all parts of Serbia marched in Belgrade. They stormed the parliament building and the headquarters of the state-controlled media, Radio and Television Serbia. Instead of firing into the crowds, Milosevic's massive police force stood quietly aside or joined the protest. Milosevic conceded defeat by the end of the day.Google Scholar

2. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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6. Wendy Bracewell, “Rape in Kosovo: Masculinity and Serbian Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2000, pp. 563–590.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7. Ibid., p. 567.Google Scholar

8. Ibid., pp. 569–570.Google Scholar

9. See Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, The Politics of Gender after Socialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). See also John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, “Introduction,” in John L Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, eds, Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999) pp. 1–43, on how people draw on notions of “civil society” in times of social, political and economic upheaval, and Kay Warren, Elizabeth Mertz and Carol Greenhouse, eds, Ethnography in Unstable Places (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), for how people mobilize familiar social categories in negotiating state transformations.Google Scholar

10. Jessica Greenberg, “‘Goodbye Serbian Kennedy”: Zoran Dindic and the New Democratic Masculinity in Serbia,” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 20, 2006, pp. 126–151.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11. It is also important to note that homosexual acts were only decriminalized in Serbia in 1994.Google Scholar

12. Participants and media continued to emphasize this association in the wake of the anti-parade violence, and the parade became iconic of a particular form of liberal democratic politics grounded in tolerance.Google Scholar

13. For an analysis of Serbia as a “periphery” and the impact this status has on popular discourse and analysis of Serbia's social and political context see Marko Zivkovic, “Jelly, Slush, and Red Mists: Poetics of Amorphous Substances in Serbian Jeremiads of the 1990s,” Anthropology and Humanism, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2001, pp. 168–182.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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15. Descriptions of the parade are based on the author's fieldnotes.Google Scholar

16. Posters on Trg Republike included the following language: “(Calling the Serbian) Orthodox to a gathering: Let's prevent the anti-Christian, homosexual, immoral and perverse orgy scheduled in Belgrade, 30 June 2001, 3:00” (author's fieldnotes; this and all other translations are the author's). See also Tamara Skrozza, “Mrznja na mrezi, batine na ulici,” Vreme, No. 548, 2001, <http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=291456> (accessed 14 January 2006).+(accessed+14+January+2006).>Google Scholar

17. See “Silom Prekinuta Gej Parada u Beogradu,” B92 , 30 June 2001, <http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2001&mm=06&dd=30&nav_category=l&nav_id=27332&fs=1> (accessed on 3 April 2006). The presence of these groups would indicate that this was a coordinated event, possibly with links to right-wing political parties and members of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The president of Obraz at the time denied involvement of the group in the event, but he strongly condemned the parade and homosexuality. See “Ko je Odgovoran za prebijanje ucesknika gej parade,” B92, 4 July 2001, <http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2001&mm=07&dd=04&nav_category=l&nav_id=27473&fs=1> (accessed 3 April 2006).+(accessed+on+3+April+2006).+The+presence+of+these+groups+would+indicate+that+this+was+a+coordinated+event,+possibly+with+links+to+right-wing+political+parties+and+members+of+the+Serbian+Orthodox+Church.+The+president+of+Obraz+at+the+time+denied+involvement+of+the+group+in+the+event,+but+he+strongly+condemned+the+parade+and+homosexuality.+See+“Ko+je+Odgovoran+za+prebijanje+ucesknika+gej+parade,”+B92,+4+July+2001,++(accessed+3+April+2006).>Google Scholar

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19. See Ivan Čolović, Politics of Identity in Serbia (New York: New York University Press, 2002), pp. 295–304; Eric Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999); Mladen Lazic, “The Emergence of a Democratic Order in Serbia,” in Mladen Lazic, ed., Protest in Belgrade (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), pp. 1–30; Slobodan Cvejic, “General Character of the Protest and Prospects for Democratization in Serbia,” in Mladen Lazic, ed., Protest in Belgrade (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), pp. 60–77.Google Scholar

20. On the construction of alternative voices and public protest in Serbia see Orli Fridman, “Alternative Voices: Serbia's Anti-war Activists, 1991–2004,” dissertation, George Mason University, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2006. For an analysis of representations of women, as well as women activists, in the media in Serbia in the 1990s see Jasmina Lukić, “Media Representations of Men and Women in Times of War and Crisis: The Case of Serbia,” in Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, eds, Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics and Everyday Life after Socialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 393–423. For testimonial and analytic accounts of Women in Black's attempts to redefine Serbia's public sphere, as well as the marginalization of these protests, see Women in Black, ed., Women for Peace (Belgrade, 1998, 2005).Google Scholar

21. Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere;” Peggy Watson, “The Rise of Masculinism in Eastern Europe,” New Left Review, Vol. 198, March/April 1993, pp. 71–82; Anne Philips, Engendering Democracy (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991); Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); Zillah Eisenstein, Feminism and Sexual Equality: Crisis in Liberal America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984).Google Scholar

22. On tolerance, multiculturalism and the politics of recognition see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Amy Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25–73. For a critique of the contradictions in multicultural, liberal citizenship and the politics of recognition see Hale, “Neoliberal Multiculturalism;” Patchen Markell, Bound by Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Elizabeth Povinelli, The Cunning of Recognition (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002); Stanley Fish, “Boutique Multiculturalism,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1997, pp. 378–395; Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).Google Scholar

23. Brown, States of Injury , 1995.Google Scholar

24. Bracewell, “Rape in Kosovo.”Google Scholar

25. For an overview of the stakes of these debates see Lenard J. Cohen, The Socialist Pyramid: Elites and Power in Yugoslavia (New York: Mosaic Press, 1989).Google Scholar

26. Milovan Djilas, The New Class (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983 [1957]).Google Scholar

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28. Konrád and Szelényi, Intellectuals, p. 203.Google Scholar

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32. The idea that some aspects of transition are happening too fast or that Serbia was not ready for some changes is a recognizable discourse among some politicians. Vojislav Kostunica has promoted this view, particularly with regard to issues of economic restructuring. The trope of Serbia not being “ready” for tolerance was also mobilized by some prominent figures in response to the parade. Then chief of Belgrade police, Bosko Buha, who came under fire for the inadequate numbers and readiness of police at the parade, said, “it's obvious that in this environment we still aren't mature enough for this kind of expression of some people's, let's say, abnormality, or as others might call it, personal desire or sexual orientation.” “Silom Prekinuta,” B92 . Zoran Djindjic, then prime minister, also mobilized such ideas about social readiness, noting, “I think that it is too early for a country which has for so long been in isolation and under a patriarchal, repressive cultural to endure this test of tolerance.” “Djindjić o Sprečavanju Gej Parade,” B92, 1 July 2001, <http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2001&mm=07&dd=01&nav_category=1&nav_id=27367&fs=1> (accessed on 3 April 2006).+(accessed+on+3+April+2006).>Google Scholar

33. This interview was conducted in English.Google Scholar

34. Author's interview.Google Scholar

35. Author's interview.Google Scholar

36. Author's interview.Google Scholar

37. Author's interview.Google Scholar

38. Author's interview.Google Scholar

39. Konrád and Szelényi, Intellectuals, p. 170.Google Scholar

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41. Cohen, The Socialist Pyramid . On the anti-bureaucratic foundation of self-management see also Susan Woodward, Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia 1945–1990 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 117–118.Google Scholar

42. Ralph Pervan, Tito and the Students: The University and the University Student in Self Managing Yugoslavia (Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1978), p. 10.Google Scholar

43. For a thorough account of this process see Jasna Dragovic-Soso, “Saviours of the Nation”: Serbia's Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002). Dragovic-Soso documents the way in which Serbia's intellectual opposition in the 1980s redefined itself around the question of Kosovo. In particular, it focused on the perceived failure of the Yugoslav leadership to address Kosovar Albanian demands for greater independence and the proliferation of accounts of human rights violations and forced emigration of Kosovo's Serbs. The early opposition combined nationalist elements with calls for greater democratic freedom under the banner of human rights and free speech. These nationalist intellectuals initially occupied the position of dissidents, defining themselves in opposition to communist apparatchiks who refused, as they saw it, to deal with the Kosovo question. As he came to power, Milosevic was able to capitalize on and effectively coopt this movement. The initial critique of the Yugoslav leadership for failing to deal with Kosovo and the early calls for increased democratic rights gave way to a nationalist agenda that was in collusion with, rather than opposition to, the Milosevic-controlled Serbian state apparatus. Despite being in power, Milosevic retained the earlier language of political opposition. Once the nationalist opposition and Serbian state power were collapsed, the opposition position was no longer against the socialist state, but against the “enemies” of Serbia, nationally defined. It is in this context that he made the move from the working class masses, betrayed by the communist bureaucrats, to the Serbian people, betrayed by the anti-Serbian (and pro-Albanian) agents of Yugoslavia. See also Olivera Milosavljevic, “Yugoslavia as a Mistake,” in Nebojsa Popov, ed., The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), pp. 50–80, esp. pp. 67–72; Dubravka Stojanovic, “The Traumatic Circle of the Serbian Opposition,” in Nebojsa Popov, ed., The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), pp. 449–478; Mirjana Prošić-Dvornić, “Serbia: The Inside Story,” in Joel M. Halpern and David A. Kideckel, eds, Neighbors at War: Anthropological Perspectives on Yugoslav Ethnicity, Culture and History (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), pp. 316–335.Google Scholar

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47. Ibid., pp. 579–580.Google Scholar

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49. There was certainly a generational dynamic to the resentment of civic leaders and intellectuals who saw themselves as presenting hard truths about Serbia's responsibility in the wars. Younger men and women felt that the moral high ground these elites took cast blame even on those too young to have had any role in decision-making during and before the wars.Google Scholar

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51. Zala Volčić, “The Notion of ‘the West” in the Serbian National Imaginary,” European Journal of Cultural Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2005, pp. 155–175. This sense of persecution by the West was seemingly confirmed for many by the 1999 NATO bombing, exacerbating a widespread sense of Western betrayal. For more on tropes of “Westernness” in the construction of Serbian and Balkan identity and politics see Robert Hayden and Milica Bakic-Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkans”: Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics,” Slavic Review, Vol. 51, 1992, pp. 1–15; Marko Živković, “Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny in the 1980s and 1990s,” dissertation, University of Chicago, Department of Anthropology, 2001.Google Scholar

52. There was some basis to this perceived feminization of the NGO sector, since many of the leading anti-war and pro-democracy NGOs were led by women. A large number of local NGOs in the former Yugoslavia began as efforts to support refugees, particularly women and children, and to assist women who had experienced violent sexual assault during the wars of the 1990s. Thus the earliest and strongeor NGOs were often founded by women activists who were explicitly concerned with gender issues. In addition, when international donors began to pour into the region in the 1990s and as international humanitarian efforts gave way to civil society, reconstruction and democratization efforts, organizations like US AID and the World Bank began to prioritize gender sensitivity as one of their criteria for project funding. Gender projects began to pop up to meet this growing donor demand. In the case of Serbia, the NGO sector received far less international money because of sanctions throughout the 1990s. However, women activists from Serbia formed linkages with their counterparts and friends in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, providing a more organic basis for support and networking. As a result, many of the oldest and still most active Serbian NGOs have their roots in the anti-war and women's movements.Google Scholar

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