1. For an insightful treatment of the contours of the nation, see Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), pp. 8–18.Google Scholar

2. On the constructed nature of “ethnic” identity, see Frederik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), and, in a recent treatment including the Estonian case, David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).Google Scholar

3. What to call the peoples whose native tongue is Russian and who now reside in Estonia is a matter of some controversy. A few scholars follow the Estonian practice of calling them “settlers,” “colonists” or even “occupants,” terminology this author considers inappropriate given their understanding that they were simply moving within the Soviet Union. “Russian speakers” is one possibility, but it could imply monolingualism. I use “cultural Russians” here to emphasize the dominant language and cultural association of these peoples without suggesting that they are resistant to, for example, speaking the Estonian language or achieving political integration in Estonia.Google Scholar

4. The Russian poll on the country's enemies was reported by Vladimir Emelianenko, “Skol'ko stoit suverenitet?” Moskovskie novosti 31 March 1996, p. 7. In addition to charges of human rights violations from former Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his various foreign ministers, scholars ranging from the confrontational S. V. Kortunov, Imperskie ambitsii i natsional'nye interesy (Moscow: Moscow Social Science Foundation, 1998), to the usually more amiable Sergei Stankevich, “Toward a New ‘National Idea,’” in Stephen Sestanovich, ed., Rethinking Russia's National Interests (Washington,: CSIS, 1994), pp. 24–32, are strident about the treatment of ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia.Google Scholar

5. The continuing presence of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Tallinn to evaluate minority affairs is a great irritant to Estonians, for example, who believe that pressure from Russia rather than the level of ethnic tension provoked an international monitor. In May 1999 Estonian President Lennart Meri called for the mission's conversion to an education center to “to help Estonia overcome the burden of its Soviet past” (http://www.postimees.ee).Google Scholar

6. For an account of Russian threats to the Baltic states, although the author excludes the sometimes provocative participation in this dialogue on Estonia's part, see Mark A. Cichock, “Interdependence and Manipulation in the Russian-Baltic Relationship: 1993–97,” Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1999, pp. 89–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7. It was not uncommon to hear the term “little Stalins” in reference to Russians in Estonia in the post-independence period; after the Russian Duma elections in 1993, one prominent politician referred to cultural Russians in a radio interview as “little Zhirinovskiis.” Already by 1995 this kind of usage had significantly lessened, and media coverage since then has grown more likely to include positive images of cultural Russians (Teet Kallas has been a persistent force on this issue, e.g., “Vene ajakirjandus,” Postimees, 18 December 1999 (http://www.postimees.ee).Google Scholar

8. For example, Maimu Berg suggested that the Estonian press overdramatizes tension and conflicts between cultural Russians and Estonians (“Printsessid, parmud ja poliitikud ajakirjanduse embuses,” Luup, 29 September 1997 (http://www.postimees.ee.luup).Google Scholar

9. See Eesti Avatud Uhiskonna Instituut, Trii Rahvusvaheliste ja Sotsiaaluuringute Instituut, and Trü Sotsiaalteaduskond, Vene Küsimus ja Eesti Valikud (Tallinn: Trii Kirjastus, 1998); and Aksel Kirch, ed., The Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: History, Problems, and Trends (Tallinn: Estonian Academy Publishers, 1997).Google Scholar

10. Geoffrey Evans, “Ethnic Schism and the Consolidation of Post-Communist Democracies: The Case of Estonia,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 31, No.1, 1998, pp. 57–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1993). Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith included the Estonian case as instrumental nationalism (Gellner) or historically rooted community (Smith) in the Warwick Debates on Nationalism, with both approaches allowing for changeable membership. Ernest Gellner, “The Nation: Real or Imagined?” and Anthony D. Smith, “Memory and Modernity: Reflections on Ernest Gellner's Theory of Nationalism,” in Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1996, pp. 357–388.Google Scholar

12. Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” [Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?, 1882], in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, Becoming National (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 52–53.Google Scholar

13. Ibid.Google Scholar

14. Richard Rose and William Maley, Nationalities in the Baltic States: A Survey Study (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1994), p. 53.Google Scholar

15. Estonia has earned the image of “the little country that could” in terms of economic reform, and thus an invitation to join the European Union. See, for example, the glowing profiles in the Financial Times Survey, 24 February 1998, pp. I—VIII.Google Scholar

16. Remarks of President Lennart Meri at a meeting hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 15 March 1999 (http://www.ceip.org/programs/ruseuras/meri.htm).Google Scholar

17. Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the International Affairs Committee in the Russian State Duma, interview with the author in Moscow, May 1999. Lukin's successor after the 1999 Duma elections, Dimitrii Rogozin, is a Communist and relatively inexperienced in international relations.Google Scholar

18. Though Kadri Liik (“Ilves raakis Ivanoviga hispaania keeles Eesti-Vene suhetest,” Postimees, 15 May 1999) reported cordial—even jolly—relations at a meeting between the Estonian and Russian foreign ministers, Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov said that Moscow could not allow a situation where the Duma refused to ratify the signed border agree ment (http://www.postimees.ee).Google Scholar

19. See George Kennan's comments, in Richard Ullman, “The US and the World: An Interview with George Kennan,” New York Review of Books, 12 August 1999, p. 4.Google Scholar

20. Mart Laar, War in the Woods: Estonia's Struggle for Survival, 1944–1956 (Washington: Compass Press, 1992).Google Scholar

21. Some groups take the territorial issue very seriously, however, seeking especially the union of extended families divided by the border. Peoples such as the Setus, who, although Russified, carry on certain cultural traditions in common with Estonians, are regularly featured in Estonian-language newspapers and celebrated in museum exhibitions. Demonstrations were held on a regular basis in Tallinn, the Estonian capital, demanding that Estonia reclaim nominally Russian territory inhabited by ethnically like peoples. Given Estonia's shift on the border issue, however, the focus has moved to ease of contact between Estonian family members separated by the border.Google Scholar

22. Of these three goals, only the latter has been achieved (and has received Western support). The negotiations on troop withdrawals required three years and played a considerable role in aggravating Estonian anger toward Russia. For a good discussion, see Mare Haab, “Estonia,” in Hans Mouritzern, ed., Bordering Russia: Theory and Prospects for Europe's Baltic Rim (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 116–118.Google Scholar

23. Raul Malk, Estonian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author in Tallinn, May 1994.Google Scholar

24. Vladimir A. Kolossov et al., Ethnoterritorial Conflicts and Boundaries in the Former Soviet Union (Durham, UK: IBRU Briefing Series, 1992), pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

25. Haab, “Estonia”, p. 110.Google Scholar

26. Stankevich, “Toward a New ‘National’ Idea,” p. 29.Google Scholar

27. In the later Russian-language edition of his Eesti-Vene Piir (Tallinn: Ilo, 1993), author Edgar Mattisen considers the two key positive changes for border negotiations to be the withdrawal of Russian troops and the fall of Laar's government, both in 1994 (Estoniia–Rossiia: istoriia granitsy i ee problemy, (Tallinn: Ilo, 1995).Google Scholar

28. Raul Mälk, interview with the author in London, May 1998; James Carroll, “Estonia Presses for Swift Agreement on Border,” Baltic Times, 14–20 November 1996, p. 4.Google Scholar

29. On the plethora of issues complicating border settlements for Russia, see Andrea Chandler, Institutions of Isolation: Border Controls in the Soviet Union and Its Successor States, 1917–1993 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998), pp. 101–119.Google Scholar

30. In exploring Germany's ambiguous relationship with Europe, Timothy Garton Ash notes the historical temptation for Germany to act as a “European” country and therefore tap the inherent moral good associated with this label—even if the action in question is the invasion of other European countries. Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993).Google Scholar

31. See Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 374, for an excellent account of the Baltic states' yearning for Europe—and insistence upon Europe's obligation to them.Google Scholar

32. Denise Albrighton, “War Memorial to Mark Estonia's Complex History,” Baltic Times, 3–9 June 1999, p. 4.Google Scholar

33. See, for example, Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).Google Scholar

34. See, for example, Rein Ruutsoo's consideration of the problems inherent in the “historical continuity” approach. His article excited considerable commentary (“Keeruline tee problemaatilisse rahvusriiki” appeared in Vikerkaar, No. 2, 1995—followed by an immediate rebuttal by Juhan Talve—pp. 44–60). Among the interesting responses were those of Marju Lauristin (“Veel kord Eesti Kongressist, Rahvarindest ja rahvusriigist,” pp. 174–176) and Rein Veidemann (“Ajalugu ja võim,” p. 181), both in Vikerkaar, Nos 5–6, 1995. Ruutso published a final article-length response, nuanced but unrepentant: “Vaevaline tee memuaris tikast ajaloo uurimisse,” Vikerkaar, No. 8, 1995 (http:///www.zzz.ee/vikerkaar/viker8/ruutsoo.html).Google Scholar

35. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, pp. 22–19.Google Scholar

36. Ibid., p. 27.Google Scholar

37. Smith, National Identity, treats what are called elsewhere “ethnic” and “civic” nationalism as poles between which identities shift, rather than settling for some kind of geographic ascriptions. Thus, a Western country facing secession based on arguments concerning ethnic identity is entirely plausible, making his one of the few frameworks that can account for Canada and secessionist movements in Quebec.Google Scholar

38. For a sophisticated discussion of the ways in which Huntington's argument bolsters the case for nationalism in Russia, see A. P. Tsygankov and P. A. Tsygankov, “Pliuralizm ili obosoblenie tsivilizatsii?” [Pluralism or the isolation of civilization?], Voprosi filosofii, No. 2, 1998, pp. 18–34.Google Scholar

39. Anderson, Imagined Communities.Google Scholar

40. On the role of friendship in breaking down cultural barriers, see Kadri Allikmäe, “Eesti ja vene lapsed müttasid üheskoos mooda metsa,” Postimees, 17 September 1999 (http://www.postimees.ee); and Malle Pajula, “Vene lapsed lihvivad eesti peredes keelt,” Eesti Päevaleht, 21 April 1999 (http://www.epl.ee).Google Scholar

41. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1993), p. 8.Google Scholar

42. Alfred C. Stepan, “When Democracy and the Nation-State are Competing Logics: Reflections on Estonia,” Archives Europeennes de Sociologie, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1994, pp. 127–141.Google Scholar

43. Arista Maria Cirtautus, “Nationalism in East European Latecomers to Democracy,” in Stephen E. Hanson and Willfried Spohn, eds, Can Europe Work? Germany and the Reconstruction of Postcommunist Societies (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), pp. 24–46. See also Priit Järve's treatment of Estonia's strengths and weaknesses as a new, “catch-up” democracy: “Transition to Democracy,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1995, pp. 19–27.Google Scholar

44. Rein Taagepera, “Ethnic Relations in Estonia, 1991,” Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1992, p. 126.Google Scholar

45. Klara Hallik, “Eestima Venelased: kas Eestimaa või Venemaa vähemus” in Vene Küsimus ja Eesti Valikud, pp. 203–232.Google Scholar

46. Marika Kirch, Aksel Kirch, Ilvi Riim and Tarmo Tuisk, “Integration Processes in Estonia 1993–1996,” in Aksel Kirch, ed., The Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society, p. 53. In an effort to mobilize support, inclusive citizenship measures were promised at the Congress of Estonia, which did not materialize once independence was achieved.Google Scholar

47. Ibid.Google Scholar

48. Ole Nørgaard et al., The Baltic States After Independence (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996), p. 169.Google Scholar

49. Jaan Kaplinskii, interview with author in Tallinn, March 1994.Google Scholar

50. Peeter Vihalemm, interview with author in Tartu, March 1989.Google Scholar

51. Mark Levin, interview with author in Tallinn, October 1993.Google Scholar

52. This figure is from a 1996 estimate by the Estonian Statistical Office. One way to gauge the political temperament of those discussing the Russian population is whether they use these easily available post-migration numbers or the more attention-getting but now out-of-date 1989 census data.Google Scholar

53. Thus, the much-debated citizenship exams require some knowledge of Estonian language and history. Another possibility—short of granting citizenship on less demanding terms of residence, for example—would be to require classes rather than an examination, an approach favored by Jaan Einasto and Rein Taagepera. Jaanus Piirsalu, “Teadlased soovitavad anda vene noortele keskkooli lõpetamisel kodakondsuse,” Eeasti Päevaleht, 14 June 1999 (http://www.epl.ee).Google Scholar

54. These quotations are from the Human Rights Watch/Helsinki October 1993 Report, Vol. 5, No. 20, Integrating Estonia's Non-citizen Minority. A more recent treatment was able to point to greater effort from governmental institutions since 1994, but included the cultural backdrop of insufficient tolerance among Estonians and Latvians which affects many of these projects: Forced Migration Projects, Estonia and Latvia: Citizenship, Language and Conflict Prevention (New York: Open Society Institute, 1997).Google Scholar

55. On the sad condition of the northeastern cities of Narva and Sillamae, for example, see Denise Albrighton, “Estonia's Little Russia,” Baltic Times, 17–30 June, 1999, p. 16, and Kertu Ruus, “Sillamäe igatseb eestluse järele,” Eesti Päevaleht, 25 June 1999 (http://www.epl.ee).Google Scholar

56. Marina Ochakovskaia, the only cultural Russian on then prime minister Laar's staff, interview with the author in Tallinn, February 1994. Ochakovskaia was responsible for the one early Russian-language publication targeted to the concerns of cultural Russians, My zhivem v Estonii (Tallinn Gosudarstvennaia kantseliarniia Pravitel'stvo ER, 1994). In her struggle to get the booklet funded she faced tremendous ministerial-level opposition on the grounds that Estonian educational projects should take precedence over “the so-called needs of such people.”Google Scholar

57. I attended two introductory-level courses in the Estonian language during my 1993–1994 residency in Tallinn. The first, with a cost equal to one-fifth of the monthly wage of many participants, was poorly taught and attended by exhausted dock workers trying to learn at least five of the 14 commonly used cases of Estonian grammar, for fear of losing their jobs. The other course was excellent, twice as expensive, and attended by better-educated Russian speakers.Google Scholar

58. Sergei Isakov, then a professor at Tartu University, now also a member of the Estonian parliament, interview with the author in Tartu, May 1994. The bulk of Estonian-language tuition is still financed from abroad. (On efforts to place Russian-speaking children on extended stays with Estonian families, see Albrighton, “Estonia's Little Russia.”)Google Scholar

59. Thomas Sowell, Migrations and Cultures: A World View (New York: Basic Books, 1996), p. 58.Google Scholar

60. Ibid., p. 56.Google Scholar

61. Valerii Budiakin, Russian embassy in Estonia, interview with the author in Tallinn, February 1994.Google Scholar

62. N. S. (who requested anonymity), interview with the author in Tallinn, March 1994.Google Scholar

63. Mati Heidmets, “Eesti Valikud,” in Vene küsimus ja Eesti valikud, pp. 239–254.Google Scholar

64. This betrayal of Western trust went over badly, and contributed to a 1994 demarche by international representatives against the Laar administration's failure to clarify the significance of registration and to set clear and manageable procedures for it. Kirsti Pallysahoo, Finnish embassy in Estonia, interview with the author in Tallinn, April 1994.Google Scholar

65. Peeter Vihalemm, interview with the author in Tartu, March 1989. On the usually unpleasant process of migrating to Russia, see Hilary Pilkington, Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia (London: Routledge, 1998), especially pp. 116–183.Google Scholar

66. See, for example, the pamphlet by Apollon Kuz'min, Kto v Pribaltike ‘korennoi’? (Moscow: PAO, 1993).Google Scholar

67. For a discussion on Estonian and Latvian distrust of urban life and reaffirmation of the rural character of Baltic identity, see David Kirby, The Baltic World 1772–1993: Europe's Periphery in an Age of Change (London and New York: Longman, 1995), pp. 418–422.Google Scholar

68. For a comprehensive discussion, see Ann Sheehy, “The Estonian Law on Aliens,” RFE/RL Research Report, 24 September 1993. One cultural Russian in Tallinn remarked to me at the time, “First I was a settler, then a colonist, then an occupant, now an alien. What's next?”Google Scholar

69. Ain Haas, “Non-violence in Ethnic Relations,” Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1996, pp. 47–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

70. Michael Geistlinger and Aksel Kirch, Estonia: A New Framework for the Estonian Majority and the Russian Minority (Vienna: Braumüller, 1995), p. 75. Subsequent study by Peeter Vihalemm confirmed a profound reorientation from east to west in terms of economic and cultural influence, and through Estonia's “Nordic gate” (“Changing Baltic Space: Estonia and Its Neighbors,” Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1999, pp. 250–269).Google Scholar

71. Marina Ochakovskaia, interview with the author in Tallinn, February 1994.Google Scholar

72. The Estonian State Web Center is available in Estonian, Russian, and English, for example (http://www.riik.ee).Google Scholar

73. As early as 1996, then Director of the Russian Federal Border Service Andrei Nikolaev emphasized the functionality of the border arrangement, given agreements between the two countries' border guards, despite the lack of formal recognition (“Granitsy ‘na zamke’ i granitsy ‘prozrachnye,’” Literaturnaia gazeta, 4 September 1996, p. 10).Google Scholar

74. The complaints from the Russian and Estonian sides of the border are similar; see Igor Mikhailov, “Vytesnenie,” Novyi mir, No. 2, 1998, p. 147; and “Eesti-Vene kontrolljoone ületasmisest Petserimaal,” Setomaa, October 1999 (http://www.estpak.ee/~setomaa).Google Scholar

75. In contrast to the 72% of Estonians who believed that Russians who live in Estonia are treated fairly, only 29% of Russian speakers agreed with this statement (Rose and Maley, Nationalities in the Baltic States, pp. 44–45).Google Scholar

76. Interviews by the author in 1993–1994 revealed a wide divide on the issue of settling the border with Russia at that time. Cultural Russians gave it a high priority, while most Estonians saw it as a less urgent issue than, for example, economic reform.Google Scholar

77. Guardian Weekly, 14 December 1997, p. 3.Google Scholar

78. S. Kortunov, “Russia's Way: National Identity and Foreign Policy,” International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 4, 1998, pp. 154–155.Google Scholar

79. Reflecting both this attitude toward Estonia and sensitivity to border issues, a Duma deputy from the Pskov region requested funding for a military orchestra on the grounds that it was necessary “in order to maintain Russian military spirit at the border.” Deputatskii zapros [deputy inquiry] No. 45254, Deputy V. S. Nikitin, May 1999, read by the author in the Duma Parliamentary Library, Moscow.Google Scholar

80. As reported by Agence France-Presse, 16 July 1999.Google Scholar

81. Jaan Kaplinsky, The Wandering Border (London: HarperCollins, 1992), p. 9.Google Scholar