Ontological Security, Critical Junctures, and Internal Legitimacy in Unrecognized States

Discourse on the relationship between states, legitimacy, and ontological security has mostly relied on the studies of Anthony Giddens (Reference Giddens1990, 92), who described the concept as “the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action.” Giddens suggested that ontological security is a basic need for all human beings regardless of class, religion, or ethnic background. It is sustained through routines and stable relationships with significant others that enable actors to uphold cognitive control of their environment, keep up with everyday activities, and possess a sense of meaningful agency. This psycho-sociological concept was adopted by some scholars in the discipline of international relations (see Kinnvall Reference Kinnvall2004; Mitzen Reference Mitzen2006; Steele Reference Steele2005, Reference Steele2008) who claimed that states also seek to maintain ontological security and act as the main ontological security providers for their citizens. Accordingly, they behave in ways that sustain a stable and distinct sense of self-conception, even if this sometimes endangers their physical security, which is often understood as the physical survival of a state’s citizens and the maintenance of its governing system or its territorial integrity.

Indeed, ontological and physical security constitute two distinct but interrelated layers of security. While conflicts may threaten the physical security of an entity/society, they may simultaneously constitute a source of its ontological security as they help deal with certain existential questions (Mitzen Reference Mitzen2006). Alternatively, an entity can be in a state of physical security while being in a state of ontological insecurity. Although physical security is very important for de facto states, considering that most of them came into existence following violent conflicts, ontological security is also essential. In most cases, physical security is already provided by a strong patron state. Yet, unless the removal of physical security concerns is accompanied by the reconstruction of identity distinctions that sustain and/or reestablish the stability and endurance of being, postconflict societies may feel ontologically insecure (Rumelili Reference Rumelili2013, 15). In the long term, failure to meet the ontological needs of its citizens and insecurity in its self-conception can undermine an unrecognized state’s internal legitimacy and jeopardize its very existence.

Since de facto states are mostly isolated, they seek both protection and de-isolation in their relations with patron states, which they rely on to make their voices heard in the international arena. Such entities have no direct economic and diplomatic relations with the outside world and often face restrictions on other means of communication, such as flight bans and exclusion from sports and cultural events. Therefore, they can operate internationally only through their patron state. This not only necessitates harmonization of their quasi-foreign policies with the patron, but also results in the latter’s excessive meddling or interference in de facto states’ internal affairs as well as its disproportionate cultural influence. Hence, maintaining distinct self and ontological security in de facto states is actually harder to accomplish. Put differently, interconnection between domestic and quasi-foreign policies eliminates the boundary between the inside and outside of unrecognized states and makes their identity less resilient when faced with external challenges, and thus it is more significant for their internal legitimacy and sustainability (Jakša Reference Jakša, Riegl and Doboš2017, 41).

In view of their legitimizing power, de facto states seek to obtain stable self-conceptions that are often constructed and secured by certain political narratives. From an ontological security perspective, narratives are sense-making apparatuses that allow notions of stable selfhood to be projected and sustained across time and space (see Kinnvall Reference Kinnvall2004; Mälksoo Reference Mälksoo2015; Steele Reference Steele2008). Self-conceptions of unrecognized states, which are established in the wake of a military operation by their patron, are often constructed through nationalist narratives. As Bieber (Reference Bieber2020a, 10) mentioned, nationalism values membership in a nation more highly than other identities and is built on the designation and exclusion of others. Accordingly, nationalist narratives usually depict territories as “our” homes and a source of association for “us” versus the “other,” while contrasting friend and enemy to nourish the idea of a siege mentalityFootnote ³ (see Goode, Stroup, and Gaufman Reference Goode, Stroup and Gaufman2020; Kadman Reference Kadman2015). In de facto states, such narratives particularly stress identity-based differences from those living in the parent state, negative experiences of coexistence, and the right to self-determination. They can be quite effective in convincing the populace of the entity to ascribe significance to certain events that can be utilized later in various contexts. Therefore, unrecognized states tend to define themselves more in relation to their parent states, which are imagined as the main “other” and are more likely to turn toward nationalism to sustain ontological security.

However, such self-conceptions are often challenged and contested by nondominant groups in de facto states that construct alternative identities to ethnic nationalism and may find support from external actors. Occasionally, such challengers can weaken the ability of an unrecognized state to provide ontological security for its citizens even if they do not lack material power. Since the provision of a shared ontological structure constitutes an important prop backing legitimacy, institutions of political authorities that do not provide the populace with a secure ontological framework cannot be regarded as truly sovereign, even if they have exclusive territorial control. For de facto states, this function is even more critical given that they are operating in contested territories that are also claimed by the internationally recognized parent state. Moreover, they face competition from other institutions such as civil society organizations and external actors in fulfilling ontological security needs of their citizens.Footnote ⁴ In other words, unrecognized states’ role as the main ontological security provider is always confronted by internal and external challengers. Ultimately, postconflict settings are characterized by overlapping claims to sovereignty and authority, profound societal divisions, rapidly shifting contextual factors, and multiple legitimacy audiences (see Billerbeck and Gippeck Reference Billerbeck and Gippert2017; Coleman Reference Coleman2017; Dagher Reference Dagher2018; Whalan Reference Whalan2017).

In addition to narratives, states obtain ontological security by routinizing relationships with significant others and eventually become attached to those relationships (Mitzen Reference Mitzen2006, 341). Accordingly, a state’s entitlement to be the main ontological security provider for its citizens obliges a quest for stable relationships within the international system. For de facto states, however, such stable relationships are rather difficult to achieve since they have limited contact with the outside world and their interactions with the patron and parent states are characterized by contradictions and ambiguities. This stems from the former’s essential economic and military assistance, which opens the door for interference in de facto states’ domestic affairs as well as the latter’s counter-recognition tactics, which often reinforce its dependence on the patron. Put differently, unrecognized states face an ontological dilemma regarding their relations with significant others. As Jakša (Reference Jakša, Riegl and Doboš2017, 38) pointed out, “what do they gain if they wrest the territory from the parent state but lose their independence to their patron, if they gain security, but lose their identity in the process.”

Indeed, ontological security can be seriously damaged by the political process of identity debates and contestations, which are frequently triggered by critical junctures (Steele Reference Steele2005, 17). Giddens (Reference Giddens1984, 61) described critical junctures as unforeseen self-identity threats that impact considerable numbers of people in a society and disrupt predominant narratives and established routines. Ejdus (Reference Ejdus2017, 884) emphasized how states become ontologically insecure during critical junctures, which allow actors to take advantage of the situation and challenge the legitimacy of governing elites. To respond, regimes are obliged to create novel narratives to reinforce social cohesion and prove that they are able to control the situation so that they no longer endanger their identity (Steele Reference Steele2005). As de facto states are constantly engaged in peace talks with their parent states, the negotiation process can generate a series of critical junctures. In particular, plans proposed during the negotiations may bring serious challenges to the sense of self, identity, and established routines by repetitively raising uncertainties in regard to the future status of de facto states and, in turn, prevent the citizens of such entities from becoming ontologically secure.

For instance, several authors have argued that the 2004 United Nations (UN) reunification plan for CyprusFootnote ⁵ triggered ontological insecurity and peace anxieties because it presumed a collective Cypriot identity and blurred the differences that constitute the distinct identities of the island’s two main communities. Indeed, Rumelili (Reference Rumelili2013) explained the consecutive failures of peace plans in Cyprus with the conflicting parties’ pursuit of ontological security by means of securitizing remaining differences. Loizides (Reference Loizides and Rumelili2015) also emphasized peace anxieties during the Annan Plan period and claimed that the referendum campaign made GCs rethink the importance of the RoC, while Dağlı (Reference Dağlı2016) emphasized how a Cypriotist narrative based on sameness made the community ontologically insecure by adding Turkishness to Cypriot identity. Even though both sides encountered identity challenges during the process, the burden was heavier for the GC community as the internationally recognized and ontologically securer side of the conflict.

Health crises like the COVID-19 pandemic constitute another type of critical juncture for all societies since they pose extraordinary challenges to our sense of self, daily routines, trust mechanisms, and freedoms that allow people to be ontologically secure. As far as de facto states are concerned, a pandemic can be particularly destructive in terms of ontological security, given that the crisis reveals their susceptibilities and dependence on external actors. It is also a reminder that they can be excluded from the global fight against health crises and neglected anew by the international community. Nonetheless, the COVID-19 pandemic has also generated opportunities for political elites in de facto states to tackle ontological security challenges through various narratives and practices. Indeed, critical junctures are moments in which implementing institutional change, transforming certain policies, or constructing new narratives becomes a greater possibility (Bieber Reference Bieber2020b). In particular, narratives that depict and propose societies as unified against the virus are effective at reinforcing the societal morale, shared bonds, and confidence mechanisms that are critical to maintain ontological security in such grim periods (Kirke Reference Kirke2020). Besides, successful handling of a health crisis can become a source of pride, especially in an unrecognized entity that faces international isolation.

Hence, practices that exhibit capability in managing the crisis or securing greater engagement with the outside world can help legitimize a de facto state while strengthening its ontological security. Moreover, if efforts of engagement elicit constructive responses from external actors, this can upgrade the status of the unrecognized entity in international settings as well as in the eyes of its own citizens. Even uncooperative or unsatisfactory responses can be utilized in elites’ legitimation strategies since they often secure the “savior and protector” identity of the patron state while reinforcing secessionist tendencies and ethnic nationalism. Indeed, de facto states are particularly prone to an upsurge in nationalist sentiments during critical junctures such as a pandemic given that they exist under permanent conditions of insecurity, fear, and siege mentality because of unrecognition, isolation, and fresh memories of turbulent past and traumas. To understand how pandemic nationalism and/or international engagement can enhance the ontological security of the TRNC, one has to explore the roots of TCs’ existing ontological insecurities and legitimacy challenges faced by their unrecognized state.

The Roots of Turkish Cypriots’ Ontological Insecurities

The Constitution of the TRNC defines TCs as an “integral and inseparable part of the Turkish nation” while identifying Turkey as the “motherland.”Footnote ⁶ As such, the community members share entrenched ontological insecurities of the larger nation that were generated by Turkey’s geopolitical and cultural in-betweenness and its imperfect modernization since the 19th century (Çapan and Zarakol Reference Çapan and Zarakol2019). Like mainlanders, TCs lacked ethnic consciousness and identified themselves as Muslim under the millet systemFootnote ⁷ until the birth of nationalism in the late Ottoman period. Accordingly, Cyprus’s two communities were institutionalized as distinct cemaats,Footnote ⁸ and religion became the central constituent of their identities (Vural and Rüstemli Reference Yücel and Rüstemli2006).

When the British obtained the administration of the island from the Ottomans in 1878, a millet-like communal separation of the system was maintained and augmented as part of the “divide and rule” policy. As mentioned by Mylonas (Reference Mylonas2019), preservation of specific Ottoman-era policies in former Ottoman lands was largely a strategic choice of new rulers to serve new purposes, described as “manufactured legacy.” Despite the maintenance of what Tsitselikis has called the “neo-millet” system (cited in Mylonas Reference Mylonas2019, 870), TCs lost their legal privileges while experiencing hardship and humiliation during the colonial period since they found themselves a vulnerable demographic minority on the island (Yılmaz Reference Yılmaz2008). As a response to physical and ontological insecurities prompted by British colonial policies and rising Greek nationalism in Cyprus, TC elites promoted Kemalist nationalism among members of their community, in line with the republican reforms of Turkey during the 1920s and 1930s. Kemalism, which constructed a “Western, secular and self-confident Turkish identity,” was seen as a tool for modernization and resistance, and it was adopted by many TCs earlier than most Turkish mainlanders (Bryant Reference Bryant2004, 233). Certain initiatives of the colonial government also facilitated the shift from a religious to a national identity as nationalism replaced religion as the most effective tool for exacerbating divisions in Cyprus (see Xypolia Reference Xypolia2017; Fics Reference Fics2018).

The post–World War II period witnessed the peak of Turkish nationalism on the island, which was translated into “Turkification” and the preference for taksim, in opposition to GC demands for enosis during the decolonization of Cyprus.Footnote ⁹ Nevertheless, the newly established UN offered the creation of an independent republic in Cyprus as a middle ground between the conflicting preferences of the island’s two main communities. In other words, the road to Cyprus’s independence in 1960 came as an undesired compromise and was far from unambiguous. Nation building did not take root and bicommunal tension emerged from the very beginning (see Markides Reference Markides1977). Eventually the consociational power-sharing system, in which millet-like features persisted, failed to provide physical or ontological security to Cypriot communities and collapsed in the wake of a constitutional crisis in 1963. This was followed by intercommunal violence, displacement, and withdrawal of TC representation from the institutions of the republic.Footnote ¹⁰

Until the military intervention of Turkey in response to the Greek-backed coup attempt against President Makarios in 1974, TCs, who gathered in enclaves scattered all over Cyprus, were governed by a joint civilian-military organization led by nationalist front-runner Rauf Denktaş. This organization, which was subsequently named the Provisional Administration, successfully instrumentalized nationalism and acted as the main ontological security provider for most TCs during this turbulent period. In the collective memory of TCs, the enclave period stands for the major shared trauma, which provided Turkish nationalists with a great opportunity to build a separate system of administration that would eventually justify the ethnically based territorial division of the island.

The post-1974 nationalist sentiment and the concentration of TCs in the northern part of Cyprus resulted in the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot Federated State (TFSC)Footnote ¹¹ in 1975 and subsequently the TRNC in 1983 as a parliamentary democracy with semipresidential features. The euphoria of the military triumph and the unilateral declaration of independence reinforced the institutionalization of ethnic nationalism among TCs while fixing Northern Cyprus as a “home” for the community. Such policies involved a variety of measures, including alteration of the names of settlements, construction of statuses representing the griefs of TCs, and the declaration of days for commemorations as organizational routines. An additional part of the creation of a Turkish “home” in the north was promoting migration from Turkey. Nationalist leadership also benefited from the anxiety and trauma caused by intercommunal tensions and constructed ethnopolitical narratives and historiography to enhance the self-image of victimization among community members and, in turn, provide them with a sense of ontological security. Indeed, the boost in TC ontological security was an important part of the legitimation of Cyprus’s division and separate statehood in the north, alongside material benefits such as physical security, spoils of war, and provision of employment.

As mentioned earlier, however, identities shaped by ethnic nationalism are usually contested by nondominant groups in de facto states that compose alternative narratives and self-conceptions. In the TRNC, this contestation has been pursued through Cypriotism, which stresses the island’s differences from both Greece and Turkey while endorsing a collective Cypriot identity and a federal solution to the Cyprus dispute. Although it remained a marginal ideology that was popular among leftist circles until the 1990s, Cypriotism gained prominence during the 2000s, especially among the younger generations, because of a series of factors, including migration from Turkey and accompanying cultural tensions with mainlanders, fear of political subordination and loss of cultural identity, Europeanization, and the impacts of the RoC’s effective counter-recognition strategies.Footnote ¹² For instance, GCs managed to secure court judgments from the European Union (EU) that imposed restrictions on TCs’ trade and communications with the outside world. Apart from their destructive economic effects, such restrictions also intensified identity debates within the community and, in turn, damaged the ontological security and internal legitimacy of the TRNC. As Jakša (Reference Jakša, Riegl and Doboš2017, 41) noted, nonengagement enhances de facto states’ isolation, which compels them to turn inward and question their own identity. Nonengagement also weakens a de facto state’s ontological security by preventing the formation of routinized interactions with significant others.

Indeed, the TRNC’s deep-rooted ontological insecurities stem from the failure to routinize its relationship with its patron or its parent state. Although Turkey remains the only country that recognizes the statehood of the TRNC, most of the time Turkish political actors use narratives that equate Northern Cyprus with any province in Anatolia. The TRNC’s reliance on Turkey for performing some state functions, which is reinforced by nonengagement, also prevents a stable relationship between TCs and Ankara. For instance, the de facto entity largely relies on Turkish credits to finance its budget deficits, as it cannot borrow from international financial institutions and Turkey delivers a considerable amount of aid annually (Sonan and Gökçekuş Reference Sonan and Gökçekuş2020). On the other hand, although GCs recognize the political equality of the TCs in peace negotiations, most GC leaders do not distinguish them from ethnic minorities on the island, such as Armenians, Maronites, and Latins in their discourses.Footnote ¹³ GCs’ unilateral actions and measures undermining efforts for a federal solution may also raise doubts about the genuineness of the recognition of the other community’s political equality.

Failure to construct stable routines with significant others and rising identity debates in the last two decades generated a sense of discontinuity while undermining the ontological security of the TRNC. This, in turn, enabled nondominant groups to compete with the nationalist leadership of the entity in their claim to be the main ontological security provider for the TC community. Since early 2000s, various opposition parties, nongovernmental organizations, and trade unions have managed to convince large segments of TCs that the only way to protect their unique identity is the reunification of Cyprus under a federal arrangement and subsequent EU membership. It was indeed this perception that advanced the attractiveness of Cypriotism, which reached at its peak level during the Annan Plan period between 2002 and 2004. This period witnessed the ultimate internal challenge to the legitimacy of the TRNC since the time it was established.

While the plan did not materialize because of GC rejection, the dynamics of the period undermined ethnonationalist legitimacy sources, ousted nationalist parties and leaders, while bringing their federalist rivals to power as they pursued a policy of engagement without seeking recognition. In fact, international actors and bodies, most notably the EU, extensively increased their level of engagement with the TC community in the wake of the referendum. Such engagement initially involved nonstate actors and technocrats to avoid an implied recognition (see Bouris and Kyris Reference Bouris and Kyris2017; Kyris Reference Kyris2015) and eventually empowered them vis-à-vis public authorities as ontological security providers. However, as most TCs turned to federalist parties and elected Mehmet Ali Talat from the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) as their leader in 2005, the EU also began engaging informally with the officials of the TRNC. This informal engagement unintentionally enhanced the ontological security of the de facto entity as well as launched a unilateral process of Europeanization. Although the TRNC remained unrecognized, its status was upgraded by various international organizations, such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Council of Europe. Meanwhile, TC leaders held prestigious meetings with key European and American statesmen and diplomats. Rising hopes regarding greater engagement with the outside world, harmonization with EU laws, and an economic boom following the referendum through foreign direct investment enabled most TCs to feel ontologically secure.

Nonetheless, the enhancement of the TRNC’s ontological security, which reinforced its internal legitimacy, proved to be short-lived. Soon, most TCs came to realize the limits of the engagement-without-recognition strategy as the RoC was quick to respond to the TRNC’s softening of relations with the outside world with effective counter-recognition policies that prevented direct trade and flights between Northern Cyprus and Europe. Meanwhile, the disappointment among TCs in regard to the end of their isolation coincided with the deterioration of relations between Turkey and the EU and a series of fruitless peace negotiations with GCs. Most TCs felt particularly disappointed with the 2015–2017 talks, which resulted in the failure of two like-minded leaders, Mustafa Akıncı and Nicos Anastasiades,Footnote ¹⁴ to achieve a common ground. Although the discovery of oil and gas riches near the coast of Cyprus was originally thought to be possible leverage to resolve the Cyprus dispute, the issue swiftly turned into a political crisis between Turkey and several EU members, especially following the unilateral decision of the GC leadership to start gas drilling process (see Kahveci Reference Kahveci2017). Consequently, the past decade has witnessed mounting debates in regard to identity, relations with Turkey, and the appropriateness of parameters in peace talks with GCs. Polarization between those who insist on federalism and those who prefer a two-state solution and closer ties with Ankara was also intensified by the contradictions between TCs’ strong Kemalist tradition and the conservative/religious identity of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Indeed, TCs split over AKP-backed policies and measures intended to encourage a revival of Islam in recent years, including the opening of new schools, the construction of new mosques, and the promotion of Islamic organizations (see Moudouros Reference Moudouros2019).

Hence, the past decade has been characterized by continuing political limbo, rising identity debates, and prevalent frustration of the TC electorate, which brought party factions and new parties, such as the center-right People’s Party (HP) and the nationalist Re-birth Party (YDP). The COVID-19 pandemic hit Northern Cyprus in this polarized political climate, in which the National Unity Party (UBP) dominated the coalition government with the HP while Akıncı was still the president. Moreover, the pandemic coincided with the presidential election of 2020, which was postponed because of coronavirus-related restrictions. As the TRNC moves toward a reinforced ontological insecurity while most TCs’ confidence in the status quo is diminishing, political actors saw the pandemic as a chance to confirm their self-image and capitalize on it as an instrument to enhance their own legitimacy.

The Response of Northern Cyprus to the COVID-19 Pandemic as an Attempt to Address Ontological Security Challenges

As reported earlier, the TRNC was already suffering from deep ontological insecurities prior to the pandemic. In particular, most TCs were feeling increasingly insecure in regard to the relationship with Turkey, as a heated row between Akıncı and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan revealed amid rising tensions between Ankara and the EU. Indeed, Akıncı had aimed to transform the relationship between Turkey and Northern Cyprus, opposed the conventional rhetoric of “motherland/babyland,” and expressed concerns about becoming a “dependency” since his election as the TRNC president in 2015 (Kayaoğlu Reference Kayaoğlu2020). During his leadership, he also openly criticized some foreign policy actions of Turkey, such as its military incursion in Syria. Such narratives were intended to demonstrate TCs’ capacity for self-agency, which, in turn, aimed at restoring their ontological security. In other words, rejection of “babyland” rhetoric/status was the federalist camp’s response to the community’s ontological insecurities stemming from asymmetric relations with Turkey as well as consecutive failures in peace negotiations with GCs. Meanwhile, the nationalist camp, most notably then Prime Minister Ersin Tatar, criticized Akıncı for jeopardizing relations with Ankara and undermining the Turkish side’s bargaining power in negotiations while relying on nationalist narratives, rhetoric on the two-state solution, and greater engagement with Turkey to tackle ontological security challenges.

Then COVID-19 crisis hit Northern Cyprus on March, 10, 2020 and emerged as a new critical juncture endangering the ontological security and internal legitimacy of the unrecognized entity and its leadership. Prior to the detection of the first case, both the government and opposition leaders were quite relaxed in their approach to the coronavirus outbreak. In response to the closure of several checkpoints between the north and the south of the island by RoC authorities, Prime Minister Tatar stated that the issue was being overemphasized while condemning the unilateral decision of GCs (Kıbrıs Postası, “Tatar: “Koronavirüs Abartılıyor,” March 2, 2020). TC opposition parties also evaluated the decision as political rather than cautious and backed demonstrations organized by civil society organizations in the buffer zone of Nicosia (Hatay Reference Hatay2020). Soon, the very first case of COVID-19 was announced in the north by Health Minister Ali Pilli: a German tourist staying in a Famagusta hotel. Hundreds of tourists and hotel staff were quarantined immediately for 14 days to prevent the spread of the novel virus. On March, 12, 2020, the government closed all schools, including universities, which have a high proportion of international students, and prohibited mass gatherings. Meanwhile, foreigners were barred from entering the TRNC with certain exceptions. Since tourism and higher education are the drivers of the TC economy, such preventive measures posed a significant economic challenge for the de facto state. In fact, most TCs were still feeling the destructive effects of the ongoing Turkish currency and debt crisis that had begun in 2018. This critical juncture, however, concurrently provided the governing right-wing parties, especially the UBP, as the dominant party of two coalitions during the pandemic, with a valid excuse for economic challenges and the prospect to secure their nationalist identity alongside the “protector” role of “motherland Turkey.”

The absence of quick European solidarity with the hardest-hit countries, such as Italy and Spain, justified already existing nationalistic and isolationist tendencies among TCs. Nationalist columnists criticized the EU for excluding TCs, who are considered to be European citizens, in their struggle against the pandemic and mockingly called on the bloc to impose a “coronavirus embargo” on the TRNC (Şafaklı Reference Şafaklı2020). Columns also associated the pandemic and successive restrictions with TCs’ “struggle for survival” during the enclave period of 1960s while displaying confidence quotes to boost the society’s self-esteem, such as “we can succeed again” (Hatay Reference Hatay2020, 4). Meanwhile, many TCs used social media to call on the government to implement more severe measures against the virus, including a lockdown. In fact, the small size of Northern Cyprus, which brings more straightforward and reciprocal modes of communication between citizens and authorities, put the government under intense pressure to take timely decisions and employ effective measures. Open access to politicians and the members of the Higher Committee for Infectious Diseases contributed to the political responsiveness of the TRNC authorities concerning demands for a lockdown.Footnote ¹⁵

Obviously, the fact that the pandemic hit the unrecognized state in the midst of the presidential elections also obliged all candidates, including incumbent Akıncı, Prime Minister Tatar (UBP), Foreign Minister Kudret Özersay (HP), and the leader of the main opposition, Tufan Erhürman (CTP), to be more responsive, which, in turn, shaped pandemic decisions while adjusting the leadership competition to the success of crisis management. For instance, President Akıncı, who mostly functions as the community’s peace negotiator with little say and responsibility in domestic politics, called for an immediate state of emergency, which was rejected by the prime minister. Instead, the government imposed new restrictions, such as suspending flights from the worst-affected countries and closing public offices except essential services, while highlighting that it had no intention of suspending democracy.

In an apparent contradiction, TC presidential elections were soon delayed for six months because of the health crisis. Although the postponement of the elections extended Akıncı’s leadership until the fall of 2020, it also provided all candidates, especially the governing UBP’s leader Tatar, an opportunity to capitalize on the crisis, since public debates focused on the ongoing pandemic, thereby preventing wider discussion about other crucial issues. As stated earlier, effective management of a health crisis can become a source of self-esteem, particularly in de facto states, which often suffer from long-lasting ontological insecurities. In this regard, authorities in Northern Cyprus implemented a series of practices displaying competence in crisis management.

As a first step, the government started repatriating its citizens from countries that were hardest hit by the pandemic, especially students studying in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom’s early “herd immunity” strategy and slow response to the outbreak, which caused a high death toll among minorities, intensified pressure on the government to bring thousands of TCs to the island and provide them with free quarantine facilities. Even if the repatriation caused controversy in the public and even brought a mini-crisis between the president, prime minister, and foreign minister, the program was relatively successful. A particularly noteworthy case during the repatriation that demonstrates the contentious nature of presidential elections arose when some students complained of unhygienic conditions in quarantine centers. Anxiety among their families brought three candidates to the premises—Akıncı, Erhürman, and Özersay—each looking to exploit the issue to gain the upper hand against their rivals and boost their own popularity.

While TC nationals were safely brought “home,” foreign students and workers who were stuck on the island were provided with limited aid by the authorities and faced a rising tide of xenophobia and racism. Indeed, Tatar came under fire following his controversial statements concerning foreign laborers while discussing his government’s new coronavirus economic aid package on television. Regarding the welfare of foreign workers during lockdowns, Tatar stated that “the responsibility lay with those who had brought them here not the government. They were a problem before the COVID-19 and the crisis provided an opportunity to ‘clean them out’ … It is not racism, but we have to protect our own citizens” (Ruwoko Reference Ruwoko2020). Such narratives revolving around protection, the right to return “home,” and ethnic solidarity actually helped rebuild borders between TRNC citizens and others, thereby contributing to the reconstruction of a more exclusive TC identity shaped what Bieber (Reference Bieber2020a, 15) called “exclusionary nationalism.”

This insight was also reflected in some of the government’s economic measures amid the first lockdown that began in late March 2020, such as the employment assistance fund, which provided laborers with aid packages and grants of ₺1,500. The measure originally covered only TRNC and Turkish nationals, whereas thousands of employees from other countries were excluded. Such developments triggered a wider debate on identity, citizenship, racism, and statehood in the de facto entity. Various trade unions, nongovernmental organizations, opposition parties, and some mayors harshly criticized the government’s approach during lockdowns. While CTP MP Fikri Toros described the measures as inhumane, unfair, and unacceptable, Nicosia mayor Mehmet Harmancı from the federalist Communal Democracy Party (TDP) and YDP leader Erhan Arıklı accused the government of racism and exploitation (Kıbrıs Postası, “Üçüncü ülke vatandaşları görmezden gelindi, hükümet tepki topladı,” March 26, 2020). Nevertheless, the government was quick to respond by changing its policy following growing criticism from employers and the public. It also implemented other economic measures, such as the suspension of cost-of-living adjustments and rent payments, a fund of ₺750 million to back producers, postponement of credit card charges for living expenses, and reductions in electricity bills. In fact, such measures to support the private sector came at a cost to public sector employees, who faced a temporary pay reduction (approximately 25 percent). Public institutions such as municipalities and foreign representative offices also experienced wage structuring and a decline in financial aid. Meanwhile, Ankara provided Northern Cyprus with ₺73 million aid as well as masks, disinfectants, test kits, and medical equipment used in the struggle against the coronavirus. Considering the substantial decline in revenues due to pandemic-related restrictions, Finance Minister Olgun Amcaoğlu stated that the TRNC would need ₺3.3 billion in aid while praising the “motherland’s” generosity and support for TCs, who could not have tackled the COVID-19 pandemic without Turkey’s help (Kıbrıs Genç TV, “KKTC’nin mali geleceği için hali umutluyum,” May 19, 2020).

While the government relied on nationalist narratives and Turkish support to boost societal morale, the president sought assistance, aid, and engagement from international institutions. Akıncı instrumentalized the pandemic to increase the level of international engagement in an effort to enhance TCs’ ontological security in the global arena. Indeed, engagement is strongly attached to the ontological security of a de facto state in times of health crisis by means of humanitarian aid from international actors, which the entity uses as a hallmark of statehood. In a letter to Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), Akıncı requested the inclusion of pandemic-related developments/data in Northern Cyprus in the official statistics of the WHO, while appealing to the global community to have direct communication with the TC side (Arslan Reference Arslan2020). Although such calls remained largely unanswered by most countries and institutions for fear of implied recognition, the EU transferred €5 million of the €30 million that had already been assigned to the TC community for the struggle against the coronavirus. Through the UN Development Programme and the Bicommunal Health Committee, the bloc also provided essential medical equipment to the north and declared a number of economic measures, including the provision of grants to small and medium-sized businesses operating in the region.

Moreover, Akıncı negotiated with Anastasiades, who agreed to send medical supplies used in treating COVID-19 cases to the north as a goodwill gesture. However, this brought the TC president and prime minister into another discursive battle concerning the authority, legitimacy, and statehood of the TRNC. Tatar blamed the TC leader of transferring the medicines to the north without the approval of the Ministry of Health and said, “This is against the constitution. We are a state, not a tribe,” while Akıncı responded mockingly by stating, “We learned from this announcement that we have committed a major smuggling crime” (Hürriyet, “KKTC’de ‘Corona Virüs’ siyasete sıçradı! Yardım krizi tansiyonu yükseltti,” November 5, 2021).

By early May, TCs were celebrating the end of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic as the last patient was discharged from hospital. Tatar announced that the “TRNC successfully managed the COVID-19 pandemic,” while Özersay highlighted the low number of cases (108) and death toll (4) in a letter to the WHO. He added that “he will be sharing with WHO information as regards the measures implemented by his government, which led Northern Cyprus to this success story in the hope that it will set a positive model for other countries” (Bayar Reference Bayar2020). Representing an unrecognized state as a role model in a global crisis and a virus-free territory in the Mediterranean aimed at not only enhancing TCs’ ontological security but also attracting tourists as a remedy for economic challenges amid the pandemic.

Although Northern Cyprus’s relatively successful handling of the first wave was a matter of pride and a source of social solidarity and unity for the TC community, developments in the second half of 2020 aggravated political polarization in the de facto entity ahead of the rescheduled presidential elections. Taking advantage of post-pandemic pridefulness, UBP candidate Tatar announced that the resort town of Varosha (Maraş), which had been fenced off since the 1974 division of Cyprus, would be partially opened with the support of Ankara. The opening was also welcomed by the Islamic Trust of Cyprus (Evkaf), which claimed ownership of a large segment of the “ghost town” and increased and expanded its activities, appearance, and voice in recent years. The foundation’s increasing visibility, especially during the pandemic, can be associated with Ankara’s political agenda of raising the influence of religion in the public life of TC society.

Although this pre-election political maneuver sparked widespread controversy both in Cyprus and in the wider world, and even led to the collapse of the coalition government with the HP,Footnote ¹⁶ it can also be interpreted as an attempt to demonstrate the Turkish side’s capacity for unilateral action vis-à-vis GCs. Indeed, the move posed an ontological threat to GC identity, considering the significance of Varsoha in the community’s self-narratives and the expectations for its return following a peace deal or even as part of a confidence-building measure given the absence of civilian settlement in the area. Noting that the opening of Varsoha broke the mold, Tatar stated that “the TRNC must be strengthened and this can only be done with the support of Turkey” (BBC News Türkçe, “Maraş’ın kısmen açılması, Kuzey Kıbrıs’ta seçimi nasıl etkiler?” October 9, 2020). Undoubtedly, this vastly controversial and highly publicized move aimed to revitalize nationalist sentiments among TCs and enhance their ontological security in a period of extreme uncertainty to ensure a high enough turnout among right-leaning voters. As Browning and Joenniemi (Reference Browning, Joenniemi and Rumelili2015) suggested in their study on Finnish-Russian conflict over Karelia, threats to territorial status quo can constitute a source of ontological security/insecurity for postconflict societies. While election campaigns and the tight race between Akıncı and Tatar revealed the high degree of polarization, the victory of Tatar with a slight majority demonstrated anew that nationalism still provided a powerful source of identity for many TCs, and thereby a safe instrument for augmenting internal legitimacy of the TRNC amid the pandemic. In his victory speech, Tatar personally showed gratitude to Erdoğan for his support and highlighted a “new future” envisioning a two-state solution for the Cyprus dispute.

Meanwhile, TCs began feeling the effects of the second wave of the pandemic with new cases reported as restrictions eased. The return of the coronavirus to Northern Cyprus was attributed to imported cases after relaxing border control measures and “pandemic fatigue”Footnote ¹⁷ (Evren and Evren Reference Evren and Evren2021). As the number of new cases remained steady without decline, the main opposition CTP leader Erhürman accused the government of short-sightedness and mismanagement (Kıbrıs Postası, “Tufan Erhürman: Şu an yaşadıklarımızın nedeni ikinci dalga değil, öngörüsüzlüktür,” October 14, 2020). The government rapidly responded by inaugurating an emergency hospital in Northern Nicosia that was built in 45 days with Turkey’s funding and support on the occasion of the TRNC’s thirty-seventh establishment anniversary. Erdoğan personally attended the opening ceremony and stated, “This hospital is the most important sign of solidarity between Turkey and the TRNC,” while Tatar said that “the hospital is ready, the health system has become stronger, the TRNC continues to become stronger in front of the eyes of the world” (Aydın Reference Aydın2020).

In addition to the hospital opening, Erdoğan and Tatar also attended a controversial picnic on the beachfront of Varosha. Both Erdoğan and nationalist TC officials attempted to create a sense of normalcy in celebrating the foundation day of the de facto entity to boost solidarity and ethnic identity, whereas GCs and some left-wing TCs described the visit as an act of provocation. Such narratives about rising power in global arena and unilateral steps regarding the Cyprus dispute indeed aim to provide a sense of confidence and ontological security for both the TRNC as well as its citizens, whose isolation was reinforced by the pandemic.

In January 2021, TC authorities began inoculating the north’s population against COVID-19 with 20,000 doses of the Chinese Sinovac vaccine that had been sent by Turkey. The first vaccine was administered to Tatar at the new emergency hospital, followed by Prime Minister Ersan Saner and Health Minister Pilli. Speaking to journalists, Tatar said, “While Turkey started to vaccine its own people, it did not forget us, and sent 20,000 vaccines,” and Pilli thanked Erdoğan and Turkey’s health minister, Fahrettin Koca: “As always, Turkey is with us in the fight against COVID-19 as well” (Bayar Reference Bayar2021). Both politicians joined several world leaders who publicized their images while getting jabs to reassure and convince citizens to follow suit. This was particularly challenging for the TC leadership given that the Sinovac vaccine had not been approved by the WHO or the European Medicines Agency at that time. Meanwhile, the EU declared that TCs would be included in the EU-wide vaccination plan. Tatar immediately attempted to capitalize on this statement and use it prove the TRNC’s statehood by seeking direct engagement with the EU. In a meeting with UN representative Elizabeth Spehar, he stated that “the EU is our interlocutor, not the GCs and therefore any vaccine should be given directly to the TCs, and not through the RoC government” (Kıbrıs Postası, “Ersin Tatar: AB’den gelecek aşı konusunda muhatabımız Rum Yönetimi değil, AB’dir,” January 13, 2021). Shortly thereafter, the EU sent 1,000 doses of the vaccine developed by Pfizer-BioNTech through the Bicommunal Health Technical Committee. As many TCs were initially upset by the relatively low number of doses, especially from Europe, multiple actors in Northern Cyprus, including mayors, opposition parties, and trade unions, soon instrumentalized the vaccine diplomacy to bring a greater number of doses and boost their popularity. As mentioned earlier, ruling elites in unrecognized states compete with domestic and external actors who seek to delegitimize such entities while augmenting their own legitimacy.

Furthermore, the vaccination program became a political power struggle and rivalry within the major party of the coalition government. In February, Prime Minister Saner sacked Pilli as health minister and replaced him with the former tourism minister, Ünal Üstel. Pilli’s dismissal came as a shock to many, as Saner had described him as “one of the best health ministers in the world” (Yenidüzen, “Dünyadaki en başarılı Sağlık Bakanları’ndan dedi, görevden aldı,” February 20, 2021) just weeks before his decision, and enhanced anti-government sentiment among many, including some supporters of the UBP. Indeed, a group on social media in support of Pilli attracted thousands of members within hours of being established. The general secretary of the TC Teachers’ Union, Şener Elcil, evaluated Pilli’s dismissal as “an indicator that the northern part of the island is being ruled by interest groups with links to Ankara” (CDF Press Review, “TCC Press Review,” February 24, 2021). He also blamed Tatar for thwarting the delivery of COVID-19 vaccines and other medical equipment sent by the EU, as well as forbidding representatives of Pfizer to cross to the north to give briefings on its vaccines. Meanwhile, the opposition CTP mayor of Geçitkale, Hasan Öztaş, claimed that they had ran out of vaccines and the system collapsed due to the shortage (Öztansu Reference Öztansu2021). Throughout the spring of 2021, more vaccines of various types, including those produced by Sinovac, Pfizer-BioNTech, AstraZeneca, and Johnson & Johnson, arrived in Northern Cyprus from both Turkey and the EU.

However, the vaccination program continued to be the subject of various controversies and debates. Early in May, the TC Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of Industry, Building Contractors Association, and Hoteliers Association organized a demonstration on the grounds that the inoculations sent by the EU for the entire island were not fairly distributed according to the population.Footnote ¹⁸ CTP leader Erhürman also took ownership of the issue and stated “Neither the EU’s attitude is acceptable, nor is those who fail to receive the amount TCs deserve” (Kıbrıs Postası, “Tufan Erhürman: “Ne AB’nin tutumu kabul edilebilirdir ne de Kıbrıs Türk halkının hakkı olan miktarı almayı beceremeyenlerin,” May 9, 2021). Meanwhile, some opposition columnists criticized Turkey for sending only doses of the Sinovac vaccine, although it began administering Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine, amid concerns over its efficacy against the new Delta variant (Mutluyakalı Reference Mutluyakalı2021). Üstel defended the use of the Sinovac vaccine in response to such criticisms and stated that “the world has closed its door on us. Our motherland gave us what we asked for. It’s AstraZeneca, not Sinovac, that should be infused with hesitation. Why the EU and south are sending us the AstraZeneca vaccine despite its risks?” (Gıynık Gazetesi, “Üstel: “Tereddüt edilmesi gereken aşı Sinovac değil, AstraZeneca’dır,” June 18, 2021). Such public statements made by the health minister in defense of vaccines sent by Turkey evoke the rhetoric about the “motherland/babyland” relationship while strengthening the savior and protector identity of the former.

While the COVID-19 pandemic was exacerbating nationalist feelings, TC leadership also attempted to strengthen the TRNC’s ontological security by initiating new openings in regard to Varosha. On the 47th anniversary of the Turkish intervention, Tatar announced that a 3.5-square-kilometer section of the “ghost town” would revert from military to civilian control enabling GCs to reclaim their properties via the Immoveable Property Commission(IPC).Footnote ¹⁹ Although Tatar justified the decision as a step to “fulfill human rights and eliminate grievances,” he also stated that “the opening is part of the two-state plan and the new policy” (Cyprus Today, “Tatar Claims Maraş Reopening Has GC Leader on the Back Foot,” August 7, 2021). Erdoğan also attended the events marking the anniversary while underlining Turkey’s backing for a two-state solution. As part of the celebrations, the first Friday prayers were held in Varosha’s Bilal Ağa Mosque with the virtual attendance of the Turkish president, showcasing his ideological blend of nationalism and Islamism. During his visit, Erdoğan also inaugurated various infrastructure projects while announcing the construction plans for a new presidential palace, a national park, and new premises for the TC parliament. Although this came as a disappointment to many who were expecting more concrete steps toward the TRNC’s recognition,Footnote ²⁰ Erdoğan justified the project as an expression of statehood (Cupolo Reference Cupolo2021). Such plans and the vision of language essentially aimed at manifesting a state-specific form of agency and the notion of ontological security emerging during the pandemic.

By mid-August, more than 350.000 doses of various COVID-19 vaccines were administered in the northern part of Cyprus. Furthermore, third doses began being administered in an attempt to boost antibody levels among those already vaccinated. Nonetheless, the vaccination program is still sparking debates and controversies as the COVID-19 pass certificates (named AdaPass) issued by the TRNC are not widely accepted, with many students studying in the United Kingdom having to quarantine upon arrival. Once again, different actors (state and nonstate) have been engaged in intense competition to provide a solution for affected individuals which may contribute to undermining the internal legitimacy of the unrecognized entity. On one hand, the TRNC government refused to provide the RoC authorities with the personal information of TCs who wish to travel as proof of separate statehood. On the other hand, “this country is our platform,” an umbrella organization that brings together left-leaning political parties and trade unions, blamed the government and the presidency for alienating TCs while negotiating with the GC leadership and claiming the solution of the problem. The organization’s joint statement declared that “the partitionist camp who are responsible for the loss of TCs’ EU process in 2000s is continuing to politicize health issues and the vaccination process while victimizing the society” (Haber Kıbrıs, “Bu Memleket Bizim Platformu: Aşı girişimimiz olumlu sonuçlandı,” August 16, 2021). Meanwhile, CTP MP Fikri Toros stated, “I am condemning the representatives of this separatist mentality who satisfy their so-called nationalist egos by disregarding international law and practices which further isolates TCs from the outside world” (Kıbrıs Postası, “Fikri Toros: Kıbrıslı Türkleri dünyadan koparmakta ve yalnızlaştırmakta olan ayrılıkçı zihniyeti kınıyorum,” August 2, 2021). Eventually, the RoC announced that TCs would be able to obtain an EU Digital COVID Certificate after submitting the required documents, including a flight ticket. Such debates are indeed reminders of overlapping claims to sovereignty and authority, the existence of multiple legitimacy audiences, and particular challenges to the ontological security in de facto states. All in all, various actors in Northern Cyprus capitalized on the pandemic to secure their identity and consolidate power through different legitimation strategies. None, however, could escape the impacts of unrecognition, which remains the ultimate threat to TCs’ ontological security.