The Process of Institutionalization

Founded in 1982, the BNG acts as a political front that brings together different organizations, including —to this day— the communist party Unión do Povo Galego (UPG). BNG’s foundation also meant adopting a new political strategy within the nationalist camp, away from the rupturist path of late Francoism and the transition years. This was clearly appreciated in 1985, when the historic and charismatic leader Xosé Manuel Beiras, newly elected to the Galician parliament, formally accepted the existing legal constitutional framework and therefore the Autonomic State as a political fieldFootnote ² (Quintana Garrido Reference Quintana and Ramón2010, 96). Yet, the BNG’s political presence has not been limited to the institutional arena. The nationalists in Galicia have had an active role in civil society since its foundation, most notably within the labor movement with a powerful trade union, Confederación Intersindical Galega (CIG). This ongoing activity is also combined with the work of other satellite organizations that bridge the political party with society in multiple domains (media, education, culture and language associations, environmental movements, and other grassroots organizations), creating an effective multi-organizational field (Klandermans Reference Klandermans1997) for political mobilization.

In the early years, the party was still anchored and inspired by anticolonial and anti-imperialist struggles, and actively employed exclusionary discursive strategies characterized by Máiz and Ares (Reference Máiz and Ares2018) as a ‘niche frame’. However, in the 1990s, discursive moderation took place in both dimensions: ideological and territorial. This strategic move allowed the BNG to incorporate available votes through a renewed leftist discourse defending the welfare state, which positioned the party in direct competition with the traditional social-democratic party in Galicia, PSdeG-PSOE (Rivera Otero Reference Otero, Manuel, Otero, Rivas, Sánchez and Díez2003).

After two decades, Beiras’ leadership came to an end and was replaced by Anxo Quintana. To the variation in political strategies, we must also add an organic adaptation with characteristics of a catch-all party that consolidated an ‘organization of individual ascription’ (Barreiro Rivas Reference Barreiro Rivas2008, 97), even if the UPG maintained the organization’s control. In 2005, the BNG entered the regional government in a coalition with the PSdeG-PSOE, despite confirming already a negative electoral trend (see Figure 1). Once in government (2005-2009), Quintana encountered critical voices that questioned his leadership within the party due to the appointment of external technical figures for positions of confidence as well as for the political practices and policies adopted by the left-wing coalition (Quintana Garrido Reference Quintana and Ramón2010, 214; 238). The low coalition culture in Galicia and the government’s political ineffectiveness perceived by the citizenry, including their own voters, facilitated the return to power of the PPdeG since the coalition government’s action was not enough to entail any future electoral profitability nor significantly alter Galician dominant party system.

Figure 1. Electoral evolution of the BNG (1983-2024).

Source: Ministerio del Interior.

After the government experience, the BNG faced an important crisis. Quintana and the rest of the National Executive members resigned right after the 2009 regional election producing far-reaching changes in the nationalist organization. The Extraordinary Assembly (2009) gave a glimpse of the internal divisions during a moment of extreme fragmentation. The organic fragility ultimately led to the split in 2012 of different factions that were not fully aligned with the UPG and resulted in the birth of two new political parties: Anova Irmandade Nacionalista and Compromiso por Galicia. The internal disputes were not only about controlling the organization but also motivated by the interpretation of the political moment and the direction the party should follow in the future. The BNG advocated ideological continuity, priming center-periphery competition as new nationalist actors threatened the viability of the organization (Gómez-Reino and Marcos-Marne Reference Gómez-Reino and Marcos-Marne2022). This identitarian episode symbolized the reaffirmation of the ‘reactive’ orientation that feels comfortable in ‘resistentialist, leftist, essentialist, and ethno-cultural cognitive frames’ (Quintana Garrido Reference Quintana and Ramón2010, 113). For the first time, the BNG included the need for a republic in its political theses (BNG 2012, 13).

Meanwhile, Anova and Esquerda Unida formed an electoral coalition led by the former nationalist leader, Beiras, that sought to capitalize on the effects of the economic and political crisis through left-wing social policies and a populist narrative by appealing to latent demands such as anti-austerity and democratic regeneration. This coalition, named Alternativa Galega de Esquerdas (AGE), was able to displace the BNG to the fourth position in the 2012 regional election and challenge the long-undisputed dominant position of Galician nationalism held by the BNG.

At the national level, in 2015, the BNG joined other minoritarian nationalist parties under a fully Galician coalition (NÓS-Candidatura Galega) that prioritized even more the national question. However, the poor results translated into the loss of representation in the Spanish Congress for the first time since 1996. Overall, the BNG’s presence in the lower chamber has been unstable as the party receives lower support than in regional elections because of multi-level voting strategies embedded in ‘no second-order effects transitions’ (Cabeza and Scantamburlo Reference Cabeza and Scantamburlo2021) —that is, by citizens who vote for non-statewide parties in regional elections and statewide parties in national elections. This did not prevent the BNG from acquiring the status of ‘relevant party’ (Barrio et al. Reference Barrio, Rodríguez-Teruel, Baras and Barberà2010) in Spanish party politics in specific moments, contributing —alongside with other non-statewide parties— to the governability of Spain and expecting to receive in return compromises that favor the interests of the territory they represent (Delgado Sotillos Reference Irene2020).

Rising from Ashes

In 2016, under a self-proclaimed ‘re-foundation’ of the party (BNG 2016), Ana Pontón was elected as national spokesperson, a position to be held for the first time by a woman and member of the UPG. The XV National Assembly was a turning point in the organization’s recent history for three different reasons: (1) the historic appointment of a female leader could be related to the glass cliff theory, which argues that women are ‘more likely than men to be appointed to leadership positions in problematic organizational circumstances’ (Ryan, Haslam, and Kulich Reference Ryan, Haslam and Kulich2010, 57); (2) it consolidated the previous strategy of not conflating with Spanish statewide political parties (Ares Reference Ares2017); and (3) there was an organizational flexibilization that strengthened the figure of Pontón by reducing the polycephaly established in Amio (XIII National Assembly). This opened the possibility for the leader to become the presidential candidate while keeping her organizational role in the party.

Having a socially attractive leader facilitates the participation of the BNG from the new forms of politics that are inclined towards the presidentialization of politics, even at regional levels (Mata López and Ortega Ruiz Reference Mata López and Ruiz2013). Indeed, in the 2016 regional election, the candidate was key during the campaign helping to mobilize late deciders in a crucial moment where the BNG faced successful competition. In the same way the BNG lost ground to AGE in 2012, so it did in 2016 with En Marea, which incorporated AGE and Podemos, among other forces, and stressed left-wing policies rather than focusing on territorial demands (Gómez-Reino and Marcos-Marne Reference Gómez-Reino and Marcos-Marne2022).

At the national scene, the BNG regained representation in November 2019, and it was also maintained in the next election in 2023. Although the party mattered for government formation on both occasions, the stability of the government rested on Catalan and Basque nationalist parties. The two-bloc logic imposed in the Spanish party system after the corruption scandals and the events in Catalonia under Mariano Rajoy’s government catalyzed the end of the territorial consensus: Partido Popular became gradually isolated due to its strategy of criminalization of nationalist parties and PSOE was able to build cross-party alliances when moving forward the territorial debate, the acknowledgement of the multinational character of the Spanish polity, and devolution. As it had happened before, ‘PSOE found support from non-statewide parties who wanted to avoid the alignment with PP’ (Barrio et al. Reference Barrio, Rodríguez-Teruel, Baras and Barberà2010).

In the meantime, in Galicia, after the 2020 regional election, the nationalists took advantage of their left-wing competitors’ weaknesses, and they exercised the symbolic representation of the opposition with Pontón as the main alternative to the PPdeG. The debacle, and subsequent disappearance, of En Marea proofs that the realignment process of the 2012–2020 electoral cycle in the nationalist camp was ‘incomplete’ (Gómez-Reino and Marcos-Marne Reference Gómez-Reino and Marcos-Marne2022), with vote transfers up to 48% from En Marea to the BNG (CIS study 3294). If the electoral strength in 2020 was already remarkable (23.79%, 19 seats), the 2024 regional election represented a historical milestone for the nationalist party, breaking the organization’s electoral ceiling and achieving the best results ever (31.57%, 25 seats) —which position the BNG among the most voted regionalist parties in Europe.

Setting the Terrain: The Dual National Identity

Nested national identities challenge the classical interpretation of nationalist about the existence of a homogeneous community built upon ascriptive criteria (language, race, culture, history, traditions…) that facilitate the differentiation with other nations. Even though differential ethnic and social preconditions continue to be remarkable in Galicia, characterized by a relative ethno-cultural homogeneity, today it is not possible to affirm the national identity from an approach that ignores the complexity, the conflict, and the internal plurality of the nation.

In multinational societies, it is common to see a compound nationality. Galicia is no exception (see Figure 2). This particularity, stable over time, reduces the possibility of explaining the booming results of the BNG based on nationalist sentiment, as the identity expression of Galicians has remained almost unaltered in the last decades. In addition, the position held by most of Galician society offers a sketch of how the people deal with the national question. The majoritarian position (‘equally Spanish as Galician’) represents the absence of national conflict, as this response balances both national identities, integrating them in a non-conflictual state.

Figure 2. National identity of Galicians by year. Source: CIS.

In this section we will explore the national self-identification of Galicians as well as considering the present politicization of national identity and its relevance. In Galicia, exclusive national identities (only Spanish, only Galician) are uncommon and the expression of a mononational Galician identity is extremely lower than in other societies such as Catalonia or the Basque Country (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Exclusive national identity (2005–2024). Source: CIS.

The dominant dual identity is not altered even if we take into account the generational cohortsFootnote ⁴, which still reveal certain patterns that respond to the esprit de l’époque. For instance, in older generations —Silent generation (1914–1928), Francoist generation (1929–1943), Baby boomers (1944–1958), and Generation X (1959–1973)—, born under Franco’s dictatorial regime, we notice a higher proportion of people who feel ‘only Spanish’ in comparison to feeling ‘only Galician’. In the same way that older generations are influenced by the socio-historical context of the era in which they were born, the same occurs with the younger generational cohorts: Generation Y (1974–1988) and Generation Z (1989–2003) consider themselves ‘only Galician’ to a greater extent than the rest of the generations analyzed (see Appendix A). They were socialized under a democratic system in which Galicia was already a consolidated political-administrative entity endowed with considerable political autonomy, and whose material realization could be observed in almost all elements of the everyday life: from going to school or the doctor to watching television. This, somehow, enhances identity differentiation and contributes to the hypothesis developed by Losada (Reference Losada1999, 57): the autonomic process constitutes a favorable opportunity structure for the consolidation of the ‘social preconditions for nationalism in Galicia’.

It is evident that the existence of the necessary conditions for a differentiated ethnicity does not mechanically translate into nationalist politics. Moreover, in the case of Galicia, even support for a nationalist party does not imply the politicization of identity, since, at present, the ethnonational conflict is restricted to intra-elite disputes. Proof of this can be seen in the gap between representatives and citizens in terms of identity (see Herrera and Miley Reference Herrera, Miley, Coller, Jaime-Castillo and Mota2018, 211), as nationalist political elites, contrary to the majority, tend to adopt exclusive national identities.

This is also true for the BNG, whose ethos may prioritize the national question, but its voters do not. According to the 2024 pre-election data (CIS study 3437), among those with intention to vote for the BNG, only 3.9% declared ‘autonomy, identity and Galician sentiment’ to be the main problem in the region. And following this argument, we observe how the variable ‘only Galician’, although significant, has a lower explanatory weight in the electoral behavior of BNG voters compared to other nationalist parties in Spain (Corujo, Fernández-Esquer, and Rama Reference Corujo, Fernández-Esquer and Rama2019).

The Political Idiom of the BNG

To better understand the chain of signification of the BNG discourse, our analysis should start with an examination of the nationalist distinction drawn between the signifiers ‘Galicia’ and ‘Galiza’. While both toponyms are recognized and correct, Galician nationalism chooses to employ ‘Galiza’. They consider this option, as there is evidence of its use in the Middle Ages, to be the most accurate due to its historical origin, conferring greater legitimacy to the nationalist project. Although it is true that this semantic debate can be raised between the historians and the philologists, researchers on nationalism must not fall into the trap set by nationalists (Hobsbawm Reference Hobsbawm1992, 12). That is why our focus should be on what is truly relevant: the political consequences produced by this differentiation.

The signifier ‘Galicia’ is reduced to its name; it has an imprecise political meaning that opens the possibility for a successful rearticulation of the term through frame alignment processes by a very diverse set of ideological actors. ‘Galiza’, on the other hand, is a univocal and strongly charged concept that refers to a nation, and its nomination evokes a wide range of meanings associated with Galician nationalist frames, such as the official Galician flag featuring a red star, known as the Estreleira. Its conceptual content implies rejecting the integration within the Spanish constitutional design (State of Autonomies) and the subordination to the Spanish State.

In this way, the problems enumerated by the BNG stress Galiza as a differentiated nation subjected to a process of impoverishment and marginalization. This narrative, typically used by nationalist movements, results in the articulation of the nation as an ethnic-national community with economic-social interests inherent to the group (Máiz Reference Máiz2018, 156). Not surprisingly, the interaction between cultural and economic factors is a central element in explaining the levels of support for regionalist parties (Álvarez Pereira, Portos, and Vourdas Reference Pereira, Brais and Vourdas2018).

The BNG presents Galiza as a country rich in possibilities, due to its cultural, natural, and human resources, but whose potential cannot be fulfilled under a centralist system. The state of dependence on Madrid, symbol of Spanish centralism, would be the main reason why the true interests of Galiza are not followed to determine the political decisions. Indeed, the capital of Spain is seen as ‘the other’ and acts (1) as a division that orders the political field by making the rest of issues subordinate to it and (2) as an empty signifier capable of condensing most of the grievances suffered by the oppressed nation.

Galiza, as a national particularity —defined by Galician language—, would be subjected to historical injustices by the Spanish state resulting in an impoverished, second-class nation that the BNG represents through a synecdoche device: the party speaks for the entire nation.

In the Name of Democracy

As could not be otherwise, the BNG holding power and the BNG leader of the opposition share many interpretative frames that shape their narrative through a nationalist discursive structure. We will try to point out some of these similarities and, above all, the differences in their framing and performative strategies.

The diagnosis of the BNG led by Quintana rests, as it is under Ponton’s leadership, on the otherness of Madrid and several similar problems such as the economic underdevelopment of Galiza or the historical financial mistreatment by the Spanish state. Nonetheless, when ruling, the BNG highlighted two elements as particularly worrying regarding ‘democracy’.

At the internal level, lower quality of democracy limited the nation’s potential. This situation would be the result of a strong culture of clientelistic relationships built in a multilevel perspective, and promoted by the head of the regional executive, Fraga (Lagares Reference Lagares1999). This long-established network of patrons, brokers, and clients erodes the universal relationship of politics and public policies by priming private interests through clientelistic linkages (Pantín and Máiz Reference Pantín and Máiz2019). The BNG saw these practices as the main producers of political, media, and business power structures that weakened social mobility in Galiza.

At the external level, the lack of recognition of Spain as a plurinational state created a democratic anomaly: ‘Galiza’ as a mere ‘appendix of Spain’. The origin of this situation goes back to the Spanish Constitution, establishing the exclusion of peripheral nationalism through the State of Autonomies, a limited uniformizing system priming majoritarian nationalism.

This interpretation led to a dichotomy in which Galician nationalism represents the values associated with democracy (popular sovereignty, recognition of plurality, etc.), and the Spanish system only would work against it. This struggle over the floating signifier ‘democracy’ (majoritarian democracy versus constitutional democracy) plays a central role in the process of construction of the people made by the nationalist movements (Ruiz Casado Reference Casado and Alberto2022).

The PPdeG, in its usual role of antagonist to the BNG, is characterized not simply as an actor imprisoned by a centralist mindset, but also as anti-democratic and responsible for the very low level of democracy. We are facing a confrontational discourse with political actors and less with other social groups, as it will be explained in the prognostic. The relationship with the PSdeG-PSOE is ambivalent and complicated, insofar as it is a necessary ally (coalition partner). However, the BNG needs to differentiate itself from the other left-wing party and try to attract part of its electorate. Depending on the interests of the nationalists, the socialists can be part of the ‘state-wide forces’ responsible for ‘Galiza’s underdevelopment’, with PPdeG and PSdeG-PSOE being different sides of the same coin, or allies who recognize ‘Galiza’s national status’ and with whom agreements can be reached at the institutions.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that among the antagonistic actors we should include the hegemonic media outlets, presented as ‘big media groups’, who are pointed for interfering with government action because of their strong criticism. As we mentioned before, the BNG considered them part of the clientelist structure and, therefore, part of the problems the country suffered from.

Identity and Welfare

The proposals are the core of the BNG’s discourse with Quintana (see Table 1), as the party became fully institutionalized. Their most important proposition, due to its symbolic and material significance, was to reform the Statute of AutonomyFootnote ⁶, that is to say, the basic norm that regulates Galicia’s relationship with the State. For the BNG, this was a matter of (1) claiming organizational and financial resources to protect and defend Galiza’s interests and, continuing with the typical behavior of minority nationalists in multinational states, (2) seeking to change ‘the common state from one that is an expression of a single political community into one that acknowledges and accepts its national diversity’ (Basta Reference Basta2021, 9).

Table 1. Codes in Quintana’s speeches by frequency

The realization of the first demand was closely related to a new regional financing model. In fact, the last two of the seven points of the proposed Statute plan presented by the coalition government were about the creation of a Galician treasury with the capacity to manage the taxes collected in Galiza and a new financing arrangement with the State, committing 8% of the national investment for the territories for a period of 10 years.

The national question in the Statute was a hot issue and eventually caused the failure of the reform. The nationalist document presented in the negotiation with the PSdG-PSOE defined ‘Galiza’ as a nation stating the following: ‘AFFIRMING our existence as a nation, made explicit in a deeply rooted and unique historical, linguistic, cultural, socio-economic and political fact, AWARE that it was during the Middle Ages when those traits were defined until they emerged in the Galician Nation. (…) In Galiza, specific traits preserved allow us to identify, since the late Middle Ages, the current Galician Nation facing centralist attempts by Castile in the 14^th and 15^th centuries’ (BNG 2005a). In this definition, it remains clear that the BNG understands the Galician nation as a different ethnicity rooted in diverse elements and interests historically opposed to those of Castile/Spain.

In addition to national recognition, the seven points of the agreement also included setting bilateral relations with the State and the establishment of Galician as the official language and Spanish as the co-official one. Linguistic policies, especially those linked to education, were a central element in the BNG agenda within the bipartite government. Based on the premise that Galician deserves positive discrimination, a decree on the ‘use and promotion of Galician in the educational system’ was approved in 2007. This meant, for example, establishing a minimum of 50% of teaching in Galician at all non-university education levels. They also established a new network of public nursery schools entirely in Galician, which were named Galescolas Footnote ⁷ (a combination of ‘Galego’ —Galician— and ‘Escolas’ —schools—).

These nationalizing endeavorsFootnote ⁸ led to a backlash from pro-Spanish sectors. Led by the association Galicia Bilingüe (Bilingual Galicia), currently integrated in another association called Hablamos español (We speak Spanish), altogether with the support of the PPdeG, they complemented each other to produce intra- and extra-parliamentary mobilization ‘against linguistic imposition’ (Bianculli, Jordana, and Ferrín Pereira Reference Bianculli, Jordana and Pereira2021, 102). The contention resulted in frames of ‘totalitarianism’ (them) and ‘free choice’ (us) as the basis to attack BNG’s project (Losada Reference Losada2022, 8).

In addition to this attempt carried out by political entrepreneurs to emotionally mobilize ethnic conflict at the macro level, there is also a micro level component linked to how Galicians understand their own identity. Nationalization policies were not effective because the politicization of identities is regarded as an artificial or self-interested production of a problem where previously there was none. It represents a dealignment with an everyday ethnicity normality in which conflicts related to national or identity issues are not perceived to be of significant concern. In fact, the failure also became evident in the national attachment of Galicians, as the number of people who identified ‘equally Spanish as Galician’ increased (see Figure 2), while those who considered Galicia a nation decreased (Máiz and Ares Reference Máiz and Ares2018, 193) after the experience of nationalists in government.

The consequence of this conflict at macro level, absent at micro level, is that the nationalist party, once in government, pushed to achieve national recognition and increase the presence of Galician identity, while the opposition took advantage of the fact that the policies —identified as conflicting with the prevailing dual national sentiment— were not received enthusiastically by the majority of the population. In doing so, the PPdeG chose the path of identity polarization as an electoral strategy, forcing the contradiction between nationalization and dual identity.

After the reform of the Statute was blocked by the PPdeG, the BNG focused on consolidating what they called the ‘Galician welfare state’. In a clear adaptation of social democratic ideology to the Galician context, the signifier grouped policies of equality, daycare, education, healthcare, etc. whose consolidation required increasing competencies.

In government, besides prioritizing more on providing solutions, the BNG pragmaticism relied on understanding Galician people as an interclass bloc where everyone could benefit from a nationalist social-democratic administration centered exclusively in the needs of Galiza and its people. Quintana himself used rhetoric that incorporated expressions commonly used in the business world.

In short, the discursive strategy of Quintana’s BNG consisted of defending nationalism as the articulation of social democratic welfare that can be achieved through greater self-government and the defense of Galician identity, especially through culture and language. The disagreement of the UPG with this social democratic turn became more and more evident.

Nationalist Exaggeration

When the BNG holds power, the repertoire of stimuli for action is aligned with its institutional position. Demonstrations decreased, and militant mobilization was limited to party events and nationalist tributes. Quintana stood out for using more references to historical Galicianism as the basis for the symbolic packaging of his narrative. In the nationalist process of ‘choosing our ancestors’ (Yack Reference Yack2012, 88), Quintana focuses on Galician language writers and poets, emphasizing the long history of Galician as an aesthetic and affective bond of the community. In his speeches, he commonly recited verses that evoked the unity of the Galicians or their status as an oppressed nation. However, the conception of culture as a marker of ethnonational identity goes beyond discourse. The BNG attempted to make it the basis of a network of corporations and associations with language as the core element. Also, the employment of a poetic register was complemented by exaggerated rhetoric regarding the Galician community or the possibilities of national development rooted in the language.

The style of his leadership, seen by many sectors as too extravagant, had three well-differentiated aspects: the first, characterized by elements closely linked to traditional politics, including the daily use of a suit in all his public interventions, which generated rejection from part of the nationalist militancy that favors more relaxed and alternative styles like Beiras; the second, adopting a masculine style of communication (Grebelsky-Lichtman and Bdolach Reference Grebelsky-Lichtman and Bdolach2017), with a deep, serious, and strong voice tone, often shouting; and the third, his determination to present himself as a natural person (see Figure 4) and close to the most vulnerable sectors of society, especially the elderly. One of his favorite places to appear in public were the parties and meals dedicated to the elderly, where it was common for him to be very expressive and effusive (see Figure 5). In fact, the BNG intended to exploit this representation of its candidate as a man of the people during election campaigns. In 2009, the BNG released a reggaeton videoFootnote ⁹ about Quintana, the first time ever a political party in Spain used such resource and style in electoral marketing.

Figure 4. Quintana dancing during the BNG rally.

Source: Lavandeira Jr.

Figure 5. Quintana in the company of elderly people.

Source: Lavandeira Jr.

Lastly, as a counterpart to reformism, the level of institutionalization reached, and the contradictions derived from it, Quintana tried to legitimize himself by inscribing the new project within a much broader process aimed at self-determination. For this reason, it was common for him to use references to this goal, particularly in speeches intended for internal consumption —discourses whose main audience are the party members—.

New Old Problems

The BNG, leading the opposition, faces a renewed hegemonic PPdeG which, with the exception of the bipartite period, has governed since 1990. The conservatives are accused of using the regional government to push for privatization and a centralist agenda, functioning as a transmission chain for interests external to those of the country. Here begins a game of differences, aimed at creating a rhetorical strategy based on antagonistic frames (us/them), whereby a subordinate Galiza is ‘small’ while a free Galiza is ‘big’, or the BNG is ‘the party of Yes’ while the PPdeG is ‘the party of No’.

The problem of centralism is exacerbated in a context of economic and social crisis. This is presented as a ‘great swindle’ in which a minority is multiplying the economic profits while the many see their living conditions worsened. The division of the social field (see Table 2) between the Galician people and the economic elite implies a strategy of nomination where the minority takes multiple general forms (‘multimillionaires’, ‘multinationals’, ‘economic lobbies’…) as well as more specific labels (‘Repsol’, ‘Naturgy’, ‘Endesa’…).

Table 2. Codes in Pontón’s speeches by frequency

This could be easily understood as an adaptation of the strategy that guided the Spanish left in the previous political cycle (Cancela and Rey-Araújo Reference Cancela and Rey-Araújo2022). However, we do not appreciate any trait to characterize the BNG as a populist party because (1) the elite/minority is not blamed to be the main responsible of economic underdevelopment, but a direct consequence of Galiza’s dependence, and (2) the Galician people, as a collective subject, is the national community. As we shall see, the solution lies in more national sovereignty, instead of popular. This is clearly reflected in the nominal act of claiming the existence of the Galician nation, in which the degree of differential consciousness is high.

The impoverishment and the crisis, heightened by centralism, are illustrated in what is known as the latest challenge of nationalism (Conversi Reference Conversi2020): the relationship between nationalism and climate change, and in particular with energy issues. Galician nationalists have evolved their positions from a ‘sustainable Galiza’ (BNG 2005b), focused on the preservation of the territory, to a ‘green Galiza’ (BNG 2021a), which includes the fight against climate change. This continuity is far from being exclusive to the BNG. In fact, it constitutes the basis of a ‘green nationalism’ that Conversi and Hau (Reference Conversi and Hau2021) identify as the successful result of frame bridging between self-determination and environmentalism. And it is precisely this strategy that allows the reclaiming of nationalism as a force historically concerned with environmental issuesFootnote ¹⁰. It is not so much that there has been an ideological evolution, but rather an adaptation of previous ideas and proposals to fit the current cultural struggle of how to define ‘green’. All sorts of parties, even those on the far right (Forchtner Reference Forchtner2019), fight for providing a particular meaning to the concept ‘green’ to make it favorable to their interests. The BNG also participates in this contest and now describes its policies as ‘ecological’ and ‘pro-climate action’ when in the past they were labeled as ‘sustainable’ or ‘environmentally friendly’.

In this new ecological conception, energy resources extraction associated with centralism is presented as extractivism. Galician nationalists, in a somewhat contradictory way, exemplify this problem condemning the ‘predatory wind power boom’ derived from the PPdeG policies, which promote —under the guise of the need for renewable energies— massive wind farms all over the country. They see the wind farms with high environmental impact and little direct benefits for Galicians. The benefits, they claim, fall on the electric companies that operate them. The nationalists have adopted the slogan ‘wind farms yes, but not like this’Footnote ¹¹, which is shared in some sectors of the Galician environmental movement.

The energy is used as a frame of empirical objectivity with the purpose of presenting the interpretative scheme explained in an objective, concrete, and measurable form: Galiza suffers from energy resources extraction from Madrid (cause) without any kind of compensation (injustice), tolerated by the PPdeG (responsible) and executed through private Spanish electric corporations (perpetrator). The latter political-economic association would form an anti-national power bloc opposed to Galician national interests, which are presented as the general interest.

It is evident that Pontón’s BNG constructs a public discourse centered around social and economic topics, emphasizing the defense of Galicia’s interests and relegating identity issues to a secondary position. The only recurrent mention of this type of issues occurs when nationalists state that the spiking loss of Galician speakers is a response to an explicitly anti-Galician project directed by the PPdeG, which uses public schools as ideological de-Galicianizing artifacts.

Imaginaries of Sovereignty

The alternatives proposed by the BNG to solve the national problems are grouped under a ‘sovereigntist project’. This, in line with the nationalist premise, is the result of a basic notion: the need for greater self-government capacity. The BNG focuses on acting as a corrective factor to a historical anomaly, that is, ‘as a form of remedial political action’ (Brubaker Reference Brubaker1996, 79).

The sovereigntist conception of the prognostic frame has internal and external consequences for the party. Internally, the vacuity of the term is useful because it allows the different national sensibilities —ranging from militants in favor of independence to those who only want increasing competencies within the current Autonomic State— to feel comfortable under a label that simply refers to ‘govern ourselves’. Externally, it serves to represent the linkage between nationalist and left-wing frames. A process that connects sovereign aspirations with market regulation and the control of natural resources and strategic sectors through state intervention: Galician public banking, Galician public energy company… In this way, greater government capacity is understood as greater administrative powers, but also as the construction of a state structure that reinforces the nation’s capabilities.

The project combines public control measures with others aimed at reversing the lack of investments in Galiza by defending existing industries, calling for further industrialization, and extending the rail system within the region. These solutions seek to correct a historical deficit. Once again, the primacy of foreign interests rather than Galician ones would be the reason why there is a railway line to Madrid, but not between Galician major cities.

In addition, they demand compensatory measures adapted to the particularity of Galiza, which would distinguish it from other national realities. In this sense, the most notorious one is cheaper energy because ‘Galiza is a producer country’, a measure included in the ‘The Future of Galiza is Green’ strategy (BNG 2021a) that also incorporates the defense of Galiza´s biodiversity, public control of renewable energy to avoid threatening the landscape and rural population centers, energy saving, and also the ‘Galician Urban Agenda 2030’. To sum up, they demand structural changes in the productive and territorial model to alleviate the multifaceted crisis (inequality, climate change, exploitation…).

The party presents itself as the only actor in the Galician political system with enough historical legitimacy, ‘the Galician Party of the 21^st century’, and enough freedom to defend Galician national interests. In other words, the logic of centralism and, ultimately, the relationship with Spain determines which political parties are free from external influences. This understanding also affects the rest of the left-wing parties, as their leadership would be affected by the influence of Madrid’s political directions. Thus, what Galiza needs is a leading political force and a president with ‘free hands to act’.

This is well reflected in the advancement of economic patriotism, even at the expense of unfolding contradictions within the party’s antagonism towards economic elites. While Pontón criticizes ‘foreign’ (Spanish) multinationals, she praises ‘national’ (Galician) companies for the development of the nation’s industrial capabilities (BNG 2022; 2023). The differentiation among the economic actors (national versus non-national) establishes the possibility of blending national and economic interests.

One Party, Two Souls

The BNG, as previously stated, is committed to a repertoire of mobilization with the objective of leading the regional government. The electoral and parliamentary work is mixed along with (1) short-term and multi-party mobilizations in defense of public services and the territory, and (2) more traditional ones linked to national exaltation and the celebration of anniversaries or tributes to historical figures of Galician nationalism. Notoriously, Galician-language writers Alfonso Castelao and Rosalía de Castro stand out: the former, for his ability to link the left and nationalism; the latter, for her prominent literature work that can be easily assimilated into feminist rhetoric.

The action frame is common, historically coherent, and generally shared by all party members and sympathizers; nonetheless, internally, we find two different styles: the one represented by Ana Pontón in Galiza and the one represented by Néstor Rego in Madrid.

In the case of the national-populists we can speak of ‘bad manners’ (Moffit Reference Moffit2016) as one of the keys to understanding their leadership. In the case of Pontón, it is actually the opposite. The nationalist leader assumes part of the performative repertoire of technocracy and bases her behavior on ‘good manners’, which characterize her political persona, from the tone voice she uses —calmed and respectful— to the way she acts in parliament, where she is often interrupted by members of the PPdeG who behave in a more confrontational form.

In the 2020 regional election, according to a representative survey carried out by the CIS (study 3294), almost 35% of the BNG voters stated that the main reason to cast a vote for the nationalists was, indeed, because of the candidate. Pontón’s leadership matters for explaining the vote choice, as she is the main element of identification of current Galician nationalism. She does so by adopting an institutional and moderate style, in contrast to the common portrait made by the leading groups who link the party with radicalism and independence (Núñez Seixas Reference Núñez Seixas1997).

Respecting the norms and the conventions and showing herself to be more educated than the elites is complemented by a performativity focused on the representation through images of the national people she addresses. This, from a socio-cultural perspective (Ostiguy and Roberts Reference Ostiguy and Roberts2016), is constructed through a popular (not populist) identification (Casullo Reference Casullo2020, 31), based on the interpretation of ‘the low’ as that of people with humble origins. Thus, it is common for Pontón to employ scenarios characterized by their everydayness (see Figure 6) in which people and even food respond to the same logic: common people with common appearances, and problems and banal food present in any Galician home. She also uses a very correct, simple, and direct rhetoric that correlates with the leadership traits she wants to promote, such as closeness with the people (see Figure 7). We do not find the ‘flaunting of the low’ (Ostiguy Reference Ostiguy2020) but empathy as a form of collective representation, an attitude very much present in new female leaderships defined by positive styles and emotional reflexivity (Holmes Reference Holmes, Thompson and Hoggett2012).

Figure 6. Pontón with her family in her hometown at the beginning of the 2020 electoral campaign.

Source: BNG.

Figure 7. Pontón meeting with students to hear about the housing problems. Source: BNG.

At the same time, Pontón has erased words like ‘self-determination’ or ‘independence’ from her vocabulary. In her speeches, it is very difficult to find references to the national issue; this is reduced to more abstract signifiers such as the need for ‘sovereignty’ or ‘self-government’, and they always are means for the true objective: social justice. Aware of the historical difficulties of Galician nationalism to penetrate sectors with mixed national identities, Pontón appeals to broad forms of Galician identification. Indeed, one of her favorites phrases is: ‘there are many ways to be Galician, and they are all necessary to open a new era’.

However, Pontón’s style, electorally successful, is not replicated in Madrid by Rego. The only BNG representative in the Congress, instead, practices a tough style in which the strategy is aimed at symbolically representing the oppressive relationship between Galiza and Madrid. This representation is made evident through a maneuver of moralization (Hatzisavvidou Reference Hatzisavvidou, Kock and Villadsen2022) that rests on the exploitation to which ‘Galiza’ would be subjected. This frame turns ‘Madrid’ into the embodiment of evil within a binary moral logic and ‘Galiza’ into a community in which a feeling of belonging is produced through the collective experience of victimization (Noor et al. Reference Noor, Vollhardr, Mari and Nadler2017). This is the origin of the stylistic duality that exists in the BNG: Pontón works to represent the national people in Galiza and Rego the defense of Galician interests in Spain (‘Madrid’).

This interpretation has led the deputy to use transgression as a performative strategy (Aiolfi Reference Aiolfi2022) through a belligerent rhetoric that includes uncommon expressions in parliamentary sessions, usually directed against Vox, the monarchy, businessmen, or the Spanish state; and also, his way of acting in Congress includes breaching formal procedures (e. g. when he decided speaking Galician until he was ejected in November 2020 and June 2022). This strategy adjusts Rego’s style to a more traditional one within the framework of Galician sovereignty, where references to self-determination and the Galician Republic are common. This more bellicose style, being emotionally dense and identity-defining, is also reflected in roll-call voting, where the BNG refused several times to vote in favor of approving the left-wing coalition’s annual budget, unlike their nationalist allies Esquerra Republicana or EH Bildu.