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2. The EC Declaration of 27 August 1991, envisaged that two of the five members would be appointed on the unanimous decision of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, but as no such appointments were forthcoming, the three EC nominees (from France, Germany and Italy), appointed the other two (from Spain and Belgium): Maurizio Ragazzi, “Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Introductory Note,” International Legal Materials, Vol. 31, 1992, pp. 1488–1490, 1488.Google Scholar

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5. Quoted in Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandemonium, Ethnicity in International Politics (Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 83.Google Scholar

6. On the issue of whether self-determination is an example of jus cogens see Edward A. Laing, “The Norm of Self-Determination,” California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 22, 1991–1992, pp. 209–308, 248–250, 307–308.Google Scholar

7. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats & Slovenes was officially renamed as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on 3 October 1929.Google Scholar

8. Yugoslavs comes from the words jug (in Serbian & Croatian) meaning “south” and sloveni (in Serbian) or slaveni (in Croatian) meaning “Slavs,” creating the word Jugosloveni (in Serbian) or Jugoslaveni (in Croatian). Yugoslavs is used in a political sense to denote the Slavs of Yugoslavia. It is not to be confused with the term južnosloveni (in Serbian) or južnoslaveni (in Croatian) which refers to southern Slavs generally and includes Bulgarians as well as Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.Google Scholar

9. The Nis Declaration, 7 December 1914.Google Scholar

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20. On the 1989 Slovenian constitutional amendments see Robert M. Hay den, The Beginning of the End of Yugoslavia, The Slovenian Amendment Crisis of 1989 (Pittsburgh: The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies, No. 1001, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1992).Google Scholar

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28. The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia is reproduced in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents, From Its Creation To Its Dissolution (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994) (hereafter Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents), pp. 434–468.Google Scholar

29. Tudman's speech is reprinted in Izvjesca Hrvatskog Sabora, No. 15, 22 prosinca (December), 1990, Zagreb, pp. 7–18, with quotations at pp. 8, 14 & 15.Google Scholar

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32. Stipe Mesić, Kako Smo Srušili Jugoslaviju, Politicki Memoari, Globus, (hereafter, Mesic Kako Smo Srušili), pp. 44–45.Google Scholar

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35. Thus, the recognition by a significant power such as India was crucial to the ultimate success of the Bangladesh secession. Similarly the recognition by the EC of the former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, and Croatia, and eventually Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia, was critical to the success of these secessions. On the other hand the lack of widespread recognition of Katanga and Biafra was a major factor in the failure of these secession. In present times, the fact that the Turkish Republic of northern Cyprus, which seceded from Cyprus in November 1983, has only been recognised by Turkey, means that it cannot be seen as an independent state and member of the international community in general: Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, eds, Oppenheim's International Law, I, Peace, 9th Edition (Longman Group UK Ltd, 1992), p. 130. Indeed the U.N. Security Council has formally condemned and declared legally invalid the proclomation of northern Cyprus: U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983), para 2.Google Scholar

36. Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 216.Google Scholar

37. The European Report, No. 1688, 26 June 1991; Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 218.Google Scholar

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39. For an explanation of the origins of German support for the breakaway republics see, Flora Lewis, “Bavarian TV and the Balkan War,” New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 3, Summer 1994, pp. 44–47.Google Scholar

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42. Hans-Heinrich Wrede, “‘Friendly Concern'—Europe's Decision-making on the Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia,” The Oxford International Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring 1993, pp. 30–32; Hanns W. Maull, “Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis,” Survival, Vol. 37, No. 4, 1995, pp. 99–130.Google Scholar

43. For the text of the 27 August 1991 EC Declaration see Focus, pp. 128–129.Google Scholar

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46. For the text of the 17 December 1991 EC Guidelines on Recognition see Hurst Hannum, ed., Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), p. 85. The other conditions in the Guidelines were acceptance of the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights, guarantees for the rights of ethnic national groups and minorities, and compliance with international obligations in the domain of disarmament and state succession.Google Scholar

47. This was so despite the Arbitration Commission finding that Croatia had not met all the conditions for recognition set out in the Guidelines on Recognition.Google Scholar

48. For the text of Opinion No. 2 see International Legal Materials, Vol. 31, 1992, pp. 1497–1477.Google Scholar

49. For the text of Opinion No. 1 see International Legal Materials, Vol. 31, 1992, pp. 1494–1497. In its Opinion No. 8 in May 1992, the Arbitration Commission concluded that the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution was complete and that the former Yugoslavia “no longer exists.” For the text of Opinion No. 8 see International Legal Materials, Vol. 31, 1992, pp. 1521–1523.Google Scholar

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53. This is not to deny that there has been support for the EC Guidelines on Recognition: see Morton H. Halperin & David J. Scheffer with Patricia L. Small, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1992). The views of this book's authors have been criticised in a review by Hurst Hannum, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, 1993, pp. 467–471.Google Scholar

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57. Carl Jacobsen, “On the Search for a New World Order: ‘The Inviolability of Borders': Prescription for Peace or War?” European Security, Vol. 1, 1992, p. 55. Lord Owen made a similar point when he wrote that “a blanket ban on any boundary changes, particularly internal boundaries, is as hard to sustain as a belief that boundaries can be in a permanent state of flux”: Owen, Balkan Odyssey, p. 34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

58. U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar at the time urged Germany to reconsider its decision to recognise Croatia and Slovenia, correctly pointing out that recognition would provoke “the most terrible war in Bosnia-Hercegovina”: Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, The Third Balkan War, 2nd Edition (Penguin Books, 1993), p. 163.Google Scholar

59. Marc Weller, “The International Response to The Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” The American Journal of International Law, 1992, p. 606; Hannum, “Self-Determination, Yugoslavia, and Europe,” p. 69; Kamal S. Shehadics “Self-determination and the Breakup of States”, Adelphi Paper No. 283, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993 (hereafter Shehadi, Ethnic Self-determination), p. 29. Thus, in the case of the Kurds of Turkey, the Turkish government has consistently rejected demands for a federation of Turkish and Kurdish republics on the ground that such a constitutional structure would be but a first step towards secession: Jeri Laber, “The Hidden War in Turkey,” The New York Review of Books, 23 June 1994.Google Scholar

60. The proposal as outlined by Milan Djukic, leader of the Serbian Peoples Party, is largely modelled on the constitutional structure for the Aaland Islands of Finland where the Swedish population has a considerable degree of autonomy pursuant to the Act on the Autonomy of Aaland, 1991. Djukic publicly outlined his views in an interview “Srpskih Je Skola u Zagrebu Bilu i Prije, Pa Nema Razloga Da Ih Opet Ne Bude!” Globus, 8 travnja (April), 1994. The concept of a federal structure within Croatia was also suggested by some opposition leaders in Croatia, such as Drazen Budisa, the then leader of the Croatian Social-Liberal Party.Google Scholar

61. See for example, “Hrvatska Je Drzava Konastantna Vrijednost, Interview: Veselin Pejnovic,” Danas, Nova Serija, Broj 87, Zagreb, 6 rujna (September), 1994; “Refederaliziranu Hrvatsku Ne Mogu Ni Zamisliti! Interview: Damir Zoric,” Danas, Nova Serija, Broj 89, Zagreb, 20 rujna (September), 1994; Tihomir Dujmovic, “Sto Nam To Govore,” Nedeljna Dalmacija, Broj 1222, Split, 30 rujna (September), 1994.Google Scholar

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63. Afrikaner groups in South Africa have claimed that the Arbitration Commission Opinions support claims for an Afrikaner State separate from South Africa, based on the Boer Republics of Orange Free State and Transvaal: John Dugard, “Secession: Is the Case of Yugoslavia a Precedent for Africa?” African Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 5, 1993, pp. 163–175. Similarly the Yugoslav secessions are claimed to support the recognition of Northern Cyprus from Cyprus: Zaim M. Nectagil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, 2nd Edition (Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 231–233.Google Scholar

64. Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee, A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples,” European Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, 1992, pp. 178–181 (hereafter Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee”), p. 181.Google Scholar

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66. In the case of Macedonia, its leadership in the months after the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence sought to preserve Yugoslavia on the basis of a loose confederation of sovereign states, and opposed secession from Yugoslavia by Slovenia and Croatia: See memorandum to the EC entitled “The International Position of the Republic of Macedonia and its Status in the Yugoslav Community,” in Focus, pp. 153–156. In Bosnia-Hercegovina the Republican Assembly passed a resolution on the republics sovereignty but sought the continuation of a Yugoslav community provided such a community included both Croatia and Serbia. The vote on this resolution was boycotted by the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP proposed (unsuccessfully) that the Assembly adopt a resolution that in the event that Croatia gained international recognition the three peoples of Bosnia-Hercegovina, namely the Moslems, Serbs and Croats, be granted the right to self-determination and that, pursuant to such a right, parts of the republic either join the remains of the Yugoslav State or form their own states: see “Documents of Parties in Bosnia-Hercegovina” in Focus, pp. 181–186.Google Scholar

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