Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
The Albanians are divided between three religions: the Catholics, the Orthodox, and the Muslims. The religious groups participated in the national development of the Albanians around 1900 each in its own way and in proportion to its own strength. As the majority group, the Muslims (70–80%) played the most important role. Most of the Muslims wanted to remain within the Ottoman Empire as long as their traditional rights were maintained, in spite of a strong desire for local self-government, but, as the Ottoman Empire declined, radical Albanian leaders stressing cultural and linguistic unity rather than religious unity were to gain the upper hand. The Albanian language, culture, and feeling of common blood played the most important roles in Albanian nationalism. The Albanian language in particular gave Albanians the feeling of belonging to the same nation.
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